Tribunal decisions

The decision

Case No: JR-2024-LON-002968
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
(IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER)
Field House,
Breams Buildings
London, EC4A 1WR

29 August 2025
Before:

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE OWENS

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Between:

THE KING
on the application of
AA (First Applicant)
AN (A child) (Second Applicant)
HN (A child) (Third Applicant)
MN (A child) (Fourth Applicant)
(By their litigation friend Mrs Bushra Nawaz)
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Applicants
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ENTRY CLEARANCE OFFICER
Respondent
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Mr Mansoor Fazli
(instructed by Law Lane Solicitors), for the applicants

Ms Natasha Barnes
(Counsel for the Government Legal Department) for the respondent

Hearing date: 5 May 2025

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J U D G M E N T

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Judge Owens:

1. The applicants seek to challenge the respondent’s Administrative Review decision dated 10 July 2024, which maintained a decision dated 29 November 2023, in respect of the second, third and fourth applicants, and a decision dated 14 December 2023 in respect of the first applicant, refusing their applications for entry clearance to enter the UK with their parents as dependants of a skilled worker under Immigration Rules Appendix Skilled Worker (Health and Care Migrant).

2. The issue before me was whether the decisions under challenge were unlawful, irrational and procedurally improper and whether they constituted a breach of Article 8 ECHR. The importance of the issue to the applicants is that the immigration rules Appendix Skilled Worker have been amended since the original applications were made and the applicants can no longer apply to enter the UK as the dependants of a health and care worker.

Background

3. The applicants are nationals of Pakistan and claim to be the children of Mr Ali Kalhoro and Mrs Bushra Nawaz. They claim to have been born on 11 February 2007, 7 July 2013, 16 August 2015 and 10 October 2018 respectively.

4. On 2 October 2023, Mr Kalhoro applied for entry clearance under Appendix Skilled Worker (Health and Care Migrant). On 3 October 2023, applications were made for Mrs Nawaz, (Mr Kalhoro’s partner) and their four dependent children, the applicants. During October 2023 the respondent made further enquiries regarding the dependent children’s applications (which will be set out in further detail below). On 16 October 2023 the applicants’ parents were both granted entry clearance to enter the UK under Immigration Rules Appendix Skilled Worker.

5. On 29 November 2023 the respondent refused the second, third and fourth applicants’ application for entry clearance on the basis that there was insufficient evidence to satisfy the Entry Clearance Officer that they were the children of Mr Kalhoro in accordance with SW 30.1 of the Immigration Rules.

6. On 14 December 2024 the respondent refused the first applicant’s application for entry clearance on the basis that he had provided insufficient evidence to demonstrate that he was the child of Mr Kalhoro. He therefore did not satisfy SW 30.1 of the Rules. His application was also refused under Part 9.9.1.(b) grounds for refusal on the basis that he had failed without reasonable excuse to respond to a reasonable requirement to provide information.

7. In summary, the children’s births had all been registered late (in 2021) in some cases many years after their births and the birth certificates had been used to obtain their passports which were issued in 2023 shortly prior to the applications. The respondent decided that in these circumstances there was insufficient evidence to find that the children were the children of the skilled worker as claimed.

8. On the same date (14 December 2023) all four applicants lodged applications for Administrative Review. Further evidence, including DNA evidence in respect of the first applicant was submitted to the respondent in January 2024 and June 2024.

9. On 10 July 2024 the respondent issued Administrative Review decisions in respect of all four applicants maintaining the entry clearance refusal decisions.

The Application for Judicial Review
10. A Pre-Action Protocol letter was issued on 9 September 2024, challenging the original refusal decisions and the Administrative Review decisions dated 10 July 2024. On 23 September 2024 the respondent issued her response and on 5 November 2024, the four applicants filed their application for judicial review, including a statement of facts and grounds. On 16 December 2024 Upper Tribunal Judge Ruddick granted permission on all grounds. On 24 January 2025, the respondent filed detailed grounds of defence and on 28 April 2025 the four applicants filed their skeleton arguments.
Preliminary Matters
Anonymity order
11. At the outset of the hearing, I invited submissions on the need for an anonymity order. This had been raised as an issue by the respondent. Mr Fazli submitted that it was not in the children’s best interests for their names to be publicised given that the relationship between the children and their parents is not accepted by the Secretary of State. Ms Barnes indicated that the respondent’s position was neutral. I decided that it was appropriate to make an anonymity order in line with the Upper Tribunal’s Practice Direction on Anonymity Order because the applicants were all children at the date of the applications and the relationship between them and their parents is in dispute.
Litigation Friend
12. I then asked Mr Fazli to address me on the need for a litigation friend. The applicants were, at the date of their applications all asserted to be children under the age of 18. I indicated that at the current time the first applicant was now over 18 and therefore clearly did not need a litigation friend to conduct the litigation, however the remaining children were aged 11, 9 and 6 and in accordance with the principles in The Queen (on the application of JS and others) v The Lord Chancellor Interested Party (litigation friend – child) [2019] UKUT 00064 (IAC) and Masterman-Lister v Brutton & Co. (Nos. 1 and 2) [2003] 1 WLR likely to lack the capability to instruct a representative or understand the proceedings even with the assistance of legal advisors.
13. Mr Fazli took instructions from his instructing solicitors who contacted the applicants’ family in Pakistan. After a short while, Mr Fazli indicated that the applicant’s mother had consented to act as a litigation friend for the applicants and had provided written consent. I therefore appoint the applicants’ mother as litigation friend for the second, third and fourth applicant. I am satisfied that even if the proceedings were commenced without a litigation friend that I may retrospectively validate the proceedings.
Grounds
14. The applicants’ initial statement of facts and grounds of review were rather loosely drafted. There was also a lack of accuracy in respect of which documents had been provided with the initial applications, and which documents were submitted later. There were various assertions that documents were before the original decision maker when they were manifestly submitted later. The applicants are reminded that they have a duty to the court to assist, and this includes both a duty to present an accurate factual summary and a duty of candour.
15. Further, and also confusingly, the skeleton argument was drafted in a different way to the original grounds as pleaded and raised additional grounds, including that there had been a material error of fact because the applicants did respond to the request for information, an assertion that the respondent ought to have exercised her discretion once the DNA evidence was provided at Administrative Review stage and an assertion that there was a breach of the Secretary of State’s Tameside duty to have undertaken further enquiries in respect of the children.
16. At the outset of the hearing, Mr Fazli conceded that these three grounds were not raised in the original grounds of judicial review and that no application had been made to amend the grounds. He indicated on this basis that he would no longer pursue these specific arguments as set out in the skeleton argument.
17. I disregard these further grounds because they are manifestly distinct from the original grounds not just a mere expansion of existing grounds and permission has not been granted in respect of them.
18. I set out the grounds below as I understand them to be.
Ground 1 - unlawfulness
a) The respondent failed to take into account the documents submitted prior to the Entry Clearance Decisions;
b) The respondent deviated from its guidance because further documents were submitted within a timeframe of 10 days;
c) The respondent failed to take into account DNA certificates provided by the applicants which the applicants submit confirm the relationship between them and their sponsor father in the Administrative Review decision;
d) The applicants had provided sufficient evidence to establish on the balance of probabilities that they were the children of their sponsor father, and it was therefore unlawful to refuse the applications;
e) The decision was contrary to the Respondent’s Guidance on dependent family members in work routes; and
f) The Administrative review decision was contrary to section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009.
Ground 2 - Irrationality
Given the documents provided, the decision was not one which any decision-maker acting rationally could have taken.
Ground 3 – Article 8 ECHR
The decisions constituted a breach of the Applicants’ rights pursuant to Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

Grant of Permission

19. The permission judge extended time to admit the applications. Permission was granted on 17 December 2024 on the basis that it was irrational to refuse the applicant’s application under 9.9.1 when he did respond to the request for further information within ten days. The grant does comment that it is unclear whether this ground was raised squarely in the JR grounds. The judge also found that it was arguable that the refusal was not in accordance with the policy because the ECO overlooked evidence and that it is arguable that the respondent failed to have regard to her s55 duties.

20. I comment here briefly for the sake of clarity that the 9.9.1 argument was not pleaded squarely in the grounds and no submissions were made on it and that there is a misunderstanding by the permission judge (as a result of the confusing grounds) in relation to which documents were in front of the original decision maker. The s55 argument is dealt with below.
Documents
21. The documents before the Tribunal consisted of the applicant’s bundle, which included a skeleton argument, the respondent’s skeleton argument, the respondent’s detailed grounds of defence, the respondent’s supplementary bundle and an authorities bundle from both parties. Both parties confirmed they had had sight of all of the documents. Mr Fazli apologised for the haphazard service of the documents and the loose references to the evidence submitted. He agreed at the outset of the hearing that the chronology, as provided by the respondent, was an accurate chronology and accurately reflected which documents had been submitted on which dates.
Submissions

22. Mr Fazli clarified his arguments in submissions and Ms Barnes responded. The submissions are set out in the record of proceedings. The relevant parts of the submissions will be dealt with in the analysis section of this decision.

Chronology of the submission of documents

23. In this application the chronology of when documents were submitted is crucial to deciding the legality of the decisions and I set it out in some detail.

24. In support of their original applications, the applicants submitted (in respect of their identity and relationship to the sponsor):

i. Original birth certificates issued on 25 October 2021
ii. Scans of their passports issued on 23 July 2023
iii. NADRA family certificate issued on 13 October 2023

25. I note here that the NADRA family certificate was issued after the date of the applications, but it is accepted by both parties that it was submitted shortly after the application and was before the original decision maker.

26. On 18 October 2023, the respondent wrote to each of the applicants separately to ask them why there was a delay in registering their births and what evidence they were required to provide in 2021 in order to register the births. The delay amounted to 14 years in respect of the first applicant. The respondent also asked for any further documentary evidence of the children’s relationship with their sponsor father Mr Kalhoro and mother Mrs Nawaz. The applicants were asked to provide the documents within ten working days, failing which, the application would be considered based on the information and evidence already submitted.

27. On 21 October 2023, the first applicant requested an extension of fifteen days to provide the evidence sought in the respondent’s email of 18 October 2023. He indicated that a DNA test, school and national database document had been requested and would be provided in due course.

28. On 30 October 2023, the first applicant sent an email to the respondent which explained that “at the time of our client’s birth, there was no official requirement for issuing a birth certificate and registered children birth in local union council or doctor be provided with a birth certificate[sic]. Our client’s medical birth certificate registered on 11 February 2007[sic]…. Please see the attached medical birth certificate by Dr Rizwana Shaikh”.

29. Attached were the following documents:

(a) a document dated 11 February 2007 signed by a Dr Rizwana Shaikh which stated that Ms Bushra Nawaz was delivered of a boy on 11 February 2007;

(b) a document headed “translation of B form” issued on 30 October 2021 and stating that “three children under 18 years of age of the family listed above are recorded in our record”;

(c) the first applicant’s school leaving certificate dated 30 June 2021; and

(d) an affidavit from Mr Kalhoro dated 24 October 2023 dealing with the delay in the registration of the first applicant’s birth.

30. The remaining applicants did not respond to the request for further documentary evidence and their applications were refused on 29 November 2023 with a right to Administrative Review.

31. On the same day (29 November 2023) the respondent wrote to the first applicant stating that additional evidence was required and asking the first applicant to provide the following available evidence:

(a) pregnancy records;
(b) maternity records;
(c) child health record book or other medical records;
(d) other medical records that verify his date of birth;
(e) family photographs dating from birth to present day that confirm the first applicant’s age and family relationship;
(f) education records that verify the first applicant’s age and who is named as your parental contact; and
(g) evidence to demonstrate that suitable arrangements had been made for the first applicant’s care and accommodation.

32. The first applicant did not respond to the respondent’s request for further information.

33. On 14 December 2023 the first applicant’s application was refused with a right of Administrative Review.

34. Administrative Review applications were lodged on 14 December 2023.

35. On 10 January 2024 the applicant’s solicitors sent a letter containing representations in support of the application for Administrative Review. This enclosed further evidence including a DNA report dated 1 November 2023 for the first applicant (and chain of custody documentation); six pass certificates from Kehkashan School for the second to fourth applicants; the first applicant’s school pass certificate and examination report; three family pictures; and the affidavit from Mr Kalhoro and document from Dr Sheikh which had already been provided on 31 October 2023.

36. On 25 June 2024 the applicant’s solicitors emailed the respondent providing a new version of the “translation of B form” along with a certificate dated 3 June 2024 stating that an error was made in the original translation and it should have said “The five children under 18 years of age of the family listed above are recorded in our record”. This email also enclosed further evidence including the family pictures, the exam timetables for the first applicant for 2022 and 2023, and a school report for the second applicant dated 2 December 2023.

37. It is agreed that all of the further evidence was submitted after the original decisions had been taken and prior to the Administrative Review decisions.
The Legal Framework
Immigration Rules Appendix Skilled Worker: the version in force at the time of the EC applications provided under the heading ‘Relationship requirement for a dependent child of a Skilled Worker’:
‘SW 30.1 The applicant must be the child of a parent (P) where one of the following applies:
(a) P has permission on the Skilled Worker route; or
(b) P is, at the same time, applying for (and is granted) entry clearance or permission on the Skilled Worker route; or
(c) P is settled or has become a British citizen, providing P had permission on the Skilled Worker route when they settled and the applicant had permission as P’s child at that time.’
Immigration Rules: Appendix AR -Administrative Review:
AR 1.2 of the current version of the rules provides:
‘Where a person made a valid application on a specified route eligible for administrative review before 4 April 2024 [the Applicants did make such a valid application 1] the requirements of Appendix AR: administrative review in force on 3 April 2024 will apply, apart from applications under Appendix HM Armed Forces where the requirements in force on 10 April 2024 will apply.’
The rules in place as of 3 April 2024 provide:
‘Administrative review will consider whether an eligible decision is wrong because of a case working error and, if it is considered to be wrong, the decision will be withdrawn or amended as set out in paragraph AR2.2 of this Appendix.’
AR 2.4 of those rules provides:
‘The Reviewer will not consider any evidence that was not before the original decision maker except where:
(a) Evidence that was not before the original decision maker is submitted to demonstrate that a case working error as defined in paragraph AR 2.11 (a), (b) or (c) has been made; or
[(b) is not relevant since it relates to applications for permission to stay].’
AR 2.11 defines case working errors
‘a) Where the original decision maker’s decision to:
(i) refuse an application on the basis of paragraph 9.1.1, 9.7.2, 9.8.1 or 9.8.2 of Part 9 of these Rules; or at 3 April 2024
(ii) cancel entry clearance or permission which is in force under paragraph 9.7.3 of Part 9 of these Rules; or
(iii) refuse an application of the type specified in paragraph AR3.2 (d) of this Appendix on grounds of deception is incorrect.
b) Where the original decision maker’s decision to refuse an application on the basis that the date of application was beyond any time limit in these Rules was incorrect;
c) Where the original decision maker’s decision not to request specified documents under paragraph 245AA of these Rules was incorrect;
d) Where the original decision maker otherwise applied the Immigration Rules incorrectly; or
e) Where the original decision maker failed to apply the Secretary of State’s relevant published policy and guidance in relation to the application.’
AR 2.6 provides:
‘The Reviewer will not consider whether the applicant is entitled to remain on some other basis and nothing in these rules shall be taken to mean that the applicant may make an application for leave or vary an existing application for leave, or make a protection or human rights claim, by seeking administrative review.’
Section 55 BCIA
Section 55 BCIA provides:
‘(1) The Secretary of State must make arrangements for ensuring that –
(a) the functions mentioned in subsection (2) are discharged having regard to the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of children who are in the United Kingdom; and
(3) A person exercising any of those functions must, in exercising the function, have regard to any guidance given to the person by the Secretary of State for the purpose of subsection (1).
Paragraph 2.34 of the ‘Every Child Matters’ Guidance
‘The statutory duty in section 55 of the 2009 Act does not apply in relation to children who are outside the United Kingdom. However, UK Border Agency staff working overseas must adhere to the spirit of the duty and make enquiries when they have reason to suspect that a child may be in need of protection or safeguarding or present welfare needs that require attention.’
In T (Jamaica) v Entry Clearance Officer [2011] UKUT 483 (IAC), the UT found: ‘that there was no statutory duty on the ECO to take account of or apply statutory guidance issued under s. 55(3) because the scope of the duty under s. 55(1) is clearly and unambiguously restricted to children in the UK and because the guidance itself accurately reflects the duty in explaining that there is no such duty in respect of children abroad.’ (§21).
The UT went on at [23]:
‘We do not accept that the request in paragraph 2.34 of the statutory guidance to have regard to the spirit of s.55 means that the present decision is ‘not in accordance with the law’. We observe:
a. The statutory duty to take measures to safeguard welfare does not arise, and the guidance itself cannot extend the duty to overseas cases.
b. The reference to ‘the spirit of s.55’ is too vague as to the subject of a separate common law duty to take a particular course when assessing the case.
c. ‘The spirit of s.55’ would apply when the ECO had reason to suspect that the child was in need of protection, and it appears from the decision letter that the ECO did not conclude that was the case.
d. Whether the ECO was right or wrong to reach that conclusion depends on a resolution of disputed issues of fact rather than a remittal back to the ECO for compliance with an unspecific policy that neither imposes a duty nor directs a particular response to this application.’ (§23).
Guidance
The ‘Appendix Children’ guidance sets out guidance to decision-makers who are deciding applications from children applying as a dependent child of, amongst others, a Skilled Worker. The version in force at the time of the EC applications was published on 6 October 2023.
Under ‘The children duty’, the guidance provides:
‘Section 55 Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 requires the Home Office to ensure that immigration and nationality functions are discharged having regard to the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of children in the UK. The consideration of the child’s best interests is a primary, but not the only consideration in considering applications from children.
Although Section 55 only applies to children in the UK, the statutory guidance, Every Child Matters - Change for Children, provides guidance on the extent to which the spirit of the duty should be applied to children overseas. When considering out-of-country applications you must adhere to the spirit of the Section 55 duty and make enquiries when you suspect that there may be safeguarding or welfare needs that require attention.
Under ‘Relationship requirement’, the guidance provides:
‘Dependent children need to submit evidence that they are related to the person who is applying for, or has been granted, entry clearance or permission to enter or stay. This can be evidenced by the child’s birth certificate that shows the name of the child and parent or parents, however other documentation can also be used to evidence the parental relationship with the child.
Acceptable evidence of a parental relationship would usually be a full birth certificate (which can include the names of one or both parents). Other forms of documentation, such as a government issued household registration certificate, can also be used to demonstrate that the applicant is the child of the person they say is their parent.
Official documents issued by overseas governments may not always be in the same format as a UK birth certificate, but these can be accepted if the document has been issued by a government or a court, clearly demonstrates the relationship, and is either in English or is accompanied by a verified translation.
Guidance to caseworkers on considering requests for Administrative Review published on 3 September 2021 provides that an AR will consider whether an ‘eligible decision’ is wrong because of a case working error and, if it is, correct that error. Examples of caseworking errors include ‘where the original decision maker has not considered all the evidence that was submitted as evidenced in the eligible decision.’
The guidance also provides:
‘A human rights or protection claim made in an administrative review application will not be considered. If the administrative review maintains the decision the applicant will be served with a notice under section 120 of the 2002 Act which will provide an opportunity to make any human rights or protection claim.
If any of the above are the only grounds raised in the administrative review, but the review relates to an eligible decision, you must accept the application if it is otherwise valid and maintain the original decision.’
Analysis
Ground 1 (a) Failure to take into account the documents submitted prior to the entry clearance decision
Ground 1 (d) there was sufficient evidence before the original decision maker to have satisfied the decision maker that they were related as claimed to the sponsor and it was therefore unlawful to have refused the decisions on that basis
Ground 2 -Irrationality
38. I deal with Grounds 1(a) and (d) and Ground 2 together because they overlap. Mr Fazli clarified and expanded on Grounds 1(a) and (d) in submissions. He submitted that the documents that were provided with the original application and which were before the decision maker, in respect of both the first applicant and the second to fourth applicants were in fact sufficient to demonstrate the relationship requirement even in the absence of additional evidence. He submitted that any reasonable decision maker would have come to the conclusion that the balance tipped in the favour of the applicants (Ground 2). I understand his submission to be that the respondent did not sufficiently engage with the documents before her, did not give adequate reasons for explaining why those documents did not establish the relationship or that the documents were so persuasive that no reasonable decision maker could have reached the conclusion that they did not establish the relationship.
39. Mr Fazli pointed to the fact that the applicants had submitted birth certificates, albeit registered late, passports issued by the Pakistani national authorities and a NADRA document issued by a reputable organisation in Pakistan. He submitted that it was highly unlikely that these documents would have been issued if the applicants and their parents were not related as claimed. The birth certificate, the family registration certificate and the NADRA form all identified that the applicants were the children of their parents. They were issued by different organisations.
40. There was also a translated B form from the Interior Ministry of the Government of Pakistan that is in effect a family tree. The document contains each individuals’ registration numbers which are also found in Family Registration Certificate and their passports.
41. In respect of the first applicant there was a school leaving certificate as well as evidence from a doctor that his mother had given birth on his claimed date of birth.
42. He submitted that the respondent had failed to engage with this documentation and had not provided adequate reasons why for example, the family registration document, was not sufficient or why the birth certificates were not enough or why the passports were insufficient in themselves.
43. In his submission, the respondent, having decided that the evidence was partial and had, after requesting further evidence, failed to engage with that evidence which had been provided.
44. He made the point that there was nothing in the decisions to indicate that the respondent questioned the authenticity or genuineness of the birth certificates, nor did the respondent claim that they were unreliable. It was not permissible for the decision maker to go behind these documents when they were official documents. There had been no attempt at verification. He repeated that the decision maker had failed to engage in a meaningful consideration of those documents which had been provided and failed to say why the documents were not acceptable. If the view of the respondent was that the documents were not reliable or genuine, there should have been a “minded to” procedure. The inference from the decisions is that the official documents had been issued by the Pakistani authorities without sufficient evidence.
45. He submitted that the challenge was not only against the Administrative Review decision but against the original decisions because judicial review was the only mechanism by which those decisions could be challenged. The Administrative Review is a limited remedy, and the Administrative Review decision maintained the original decisions.
46. He submitted that these applications had all been made together as a family application and that despite the fact that there were four separate emails requesting further information in respect of each child, only one response was filed. In his submission this was the “family unit” response and the second to fourth applicants had in effect responded with further information.
47. The Administrative Review decision was a decision maintaining two separate decisions, one in respect of the first applicant and one in respect of the second, third and fourth applicant. Although it is trite that I must focus on the scope of the review, and whether the decision maker lawfully maintained the decisions because there was no case working error, essentially this boils down to a consideration of whether the original caseworker’s decision was unlawful or whether the original caseworker erred in applying the immigration rules or the application of the policy when making the original decisions.
48. There is a slightly different factual scenario between the first applicant and the second to fourth applicants because more documents were submitted in respect of the first applicant.
49. I deal with the first applicant first. The first applicant claims to have been born on 11 February 2007 making him 16 years old at the date of his application. In support of his initial application, he submitted a birth certificate which was issued on 25 October 2021, a passport issued on 23 July 2023, and a NADRA family certificate issued on 13 October 2023. All of the documents before the Entry Clearance Officer were issued late in the day and it is clear that the passports flowed from the late registration of the birth certificates and that the date of the issue of the NADRA document was also after the date of the issue of the birth certificates.
50. I am satisfied that the respondent quite reasonably took the view that there was an unexplained delay of 14 years between the first applicant’s birth and the issue of the birth certificate and that the respondent was entitled (and indeed mandated by her policy – see below) to request an explanation for the late registration and further evidence. The respondent requested what information had been provided by the first applicant’s parents to the Pakistani authorities in order to register his birth. A decision maker is plainly entitled to check whether an individual is related to a sponsor as claimed and is who he says he is, including being the age he says he is, to maintain the integrity of the UK immigration system. This is also consistent with the s55 safeguarding duty including the aim of preventing the trafficking of children to the UK. I am satisfied that the request for further information dated 18 October 2023 was reasonable and lawful. The applicant’s representatives responded on 30 October 2023 with an explanation that “at the time of our client’s birth there was no official requirement for a birth certificate”. The first applicant provided a document signed by a doctor, a translation of a B Form and a school leaving certificate. There was also an explanation in an affidavit from the applicant’s sponsor father that there had been a delay in the NADRA registration because there was no urgency to issue documents. The documents had been obtained with the aim of travelling abroad.
51. The doctor’s certificate did not name the first applicant and referred generically to the birth of a boy. The B form was problematic in that it clearly stated that only “three children under 18 years of age are listed” which was inconsistent with the remainder of the information on the form and the applications. The response did not address the specific question of what documents were used to register the birth in 2021. These additional documents manifestly did not assist the respondent to confirm that the first applicant was born when he said he was and that he was related as claimed. I am satisfied that in these circumstances, that it was reasonable for the respondent to request further additional documents to allay the doubts as to whether the first applicant was born in 2007 and was related to the sponsor as claimed. This is clearly the focus of the request for information about the pregnancy, maternity records, medical records, child health book, education records verifying the date of birth and confirming parental contact as well as family photos to birth to present. The list was not mandatory nor prescriptive. The request was sent on 29 November 2023, and he was given 10 working days to respond.
52. It is agreed by both parties that the first applicant did not provide any further documents prior to the entry clearance officer making the decision on the application on 14 December 2023. It is also the case that the applicant did not respond to state that he had no further documents or to request more time. No explanation has been given for the failure to provide these documents, and in particular for the failure to provide the DNA test result which was dated 1 November 2023 and was clearly available to send in support of the application.
53. The decision was taken on those documents before the Entry Clearance Officer.
54. I am satisfied that the original decision by the entry clearance officer in respect of the first applicant is entirely lawful. The decision sets out all of those documents which have been submitted and explains why the decision maker was not satisfied that the first applicant was the child of a skilled worker. The clear reasoning is that the official documents were obtained on the basis of a late birth registration and that the further documentation was insufficient to demonstrate that the first applicant was related as claimed. The decision referred specifically to the B Form and noted that the wording on the form indicated that either one of the children listed as under 18 is not in fact under 18 or that one of the children listed in the form is not on the official records. The reasoning is adequate.
55. In circumstances where the official documents were issued on the basis of a birth certificate issued so many years after the birth, and in the absence of being provided the information that was submitted to obtain those documents, it was entirely rational for the respondent to conclude that the official documents of themselves were insufficient. The decision does not reach the threshold of Wednesbury unreasonable. I am not satisfied that the documents on their own were so persuasive that no reasonable decision maker could have reached the conclusion that they did not establish the relationship.
56. It is agreed that the additional evidence including the DNA certificate was provided after the decision and was not before the original decision maker.
Second, third and fourth applicants
57. It is agreed by both parties that in respect of the second, third and fourth applicants, the documents that were put forward to demonstrate their relationship to the sponsor were their birth certificates, their passports and the NADRA family document. Again, Mr Fazli’s submission was that these documents were issued by the Pakistani authorities and were sufficient on their own to meet the requirements of the rules.
58. When the decision maker came to consider these applications, the decision maker decided that in all three cases the birth certificates from which the passports were obtained were all issued late. That is between seven years and three years after the children were born. This quite properly raised doubts in the respondent’s mind in respect of the relationship between the applicants and the sponsor notwithstanding the fact that the birth registration documents clearly named Mr Kalhoro and Mrs Nawaz as the parents of the children.
59. It was reasonable and lawful (and in line with the policy – see below) for the respondent to request the applicants to provide an explanation of why these births had been registered late and what documents had been presented to the Pakistani authorities to obtain the birth certificates and to request further evidence of the relationship.
60. I do not agree with Mr Fazli that the email correspondence replying to the request for further information dated 30 October 2023 was in respect of all four applicants for the following reasons. Firstly, there were four separate emails in respect of each applicant, presumably because each applicant might have separate and different documents to demonstrate their relationship to their claimed parents.
61. The document dated 21 October 2023 requesting more time was sent in the email chain in relation to the first applicant only. The heading of the email refers to the first applicant by name and provides his reference number. It manifestly does not refer to the remaining three applicants, nor enclose their reference numbers. Further, the documents attached to the response dated 30 October 2023 relate mainly to the first applicant for instance the birth document and school report. The affidavit by the applicant’s father gives an explanation for the delay in registering the first applicant’s birth only. It does not address the late registration of the remaining children. Finally, the wording of the email makes it clear that the information was sent in response to the request for information in respect of the first applicant.
62. In any event, even if this was a response to the request for information in respect of the second, third and fourth applicants the information and documentation provided in the B form, did not provide any details of what documents were provided as evidence to register the births and did not explain why their births were registered late and there was an inconsistency in the B form which did not assist the applicants.
63. I am therefore satisfied that the respondent took into account all of the documents submitted prior to the entry clearance decision in respect of the second, third and fourth applicants. The documents are expressly referred to in the decisions. The respondent was entitled to have doubts about the relationship given the late registration and request more information. The respondent was entitled to take into account the failure of the three applicants to provide any further evidence in response to the reasonable request for more information. These decisions were adequately reasoned and open to the decision maker on the evidence before it. They cannot be characterised as Wednesbury unreasonable. The respondent rationally found in respect of the second, third and fourth applicants that the evidence was incomplete and insufficient to demonstrate that they were the children of the sponsor.
64. I also take into account Ms Barnes’ submission that it was open to the applicants to have made fresh applications with the new evidence provided after the decisions.
65. Grounds 1(a) and (d) are not made out.
Ground 1(b)- The respondent deviated from its guidance because further documents were submitted within a timeframe of 10 days;
66. The original grounds state that evidence was provided within the timeframe of 10 days and that the respondent chose to deviate from the policy. I note firstly that the grounds do not specify which policy. There was no reference to the evidential flexibility policy. Mr Fazli did not pursue this argument, and I find that ground 1 (b) is not pleaded properly. I deal with whether the respondent acted in accordance with the policy on Dependent family members under ground 1(e) below and I have dealt with the further information above. Ground 1(b) is not made out.
Ground 1 (e) Did the respondent deviate from her policy guidance on Dependent Family members in work routes?
67. Mr Fazli submitted that the original decisions were not in accordance with the guidance, which he clarified was the “Dependent Family and Workers Guidance.” The version in the appellant’s bundle was not in fact the correct version at the date of decision although both representatives agreed that there was no material difference in that version and the version which was in force at the date that the decision was taken.
68. He took me to the guidance and submitted that there had been no challenge to the authenticity of the birth certificates or passports or registration documents. He submitted that the documentation was sufficient in accordance with the policy. He also drew my attention to Appendix Child, version 5 of which appeared in the appellant’s bundle. Again, this was the incorrect version. The version in force at the date of the decision was 6 October 2023. This guidance focused on a full birth certificate being sufficient evidence of identity.
69. He argued that on its proper construction, the policy guidance was that if no birth certificate were available, other forms of evidence might be sufficient. He then referred to further guidance on birth registrations issued by the HM Passport Office. He argued that the first applicant had provided an explanation as to why the birth had been registered late in accordance with the policy.
70. It is clear from the policy that dependent children must provide evidence that they are related to the lead applicant as claimed and this can be evidenced by the child’s birth certificate that shows the name of the child and parents. Other documentation can also be used to evidence the parental relationship with the child if there is no birth certificate. The policy does not state that a full birth certificate will be on its own sufficient evidence of the relationship. The policy goes on to deal with “late birth registration: how to deal with”. I am satisfied that this was the part of the policy that related to these applications because all four births were registered late and in the case of the first applicant, 14 years after the birth.
71. There is no suggestion that the births had been re-registered. The policy then states that “you must ask the customer to give an explanation about why their birth was registered late”. This is precisely what the decision maker did in respect of all four applicants. This was squarely in line with the policy.
72. The second, third and fourth applicants provided no explanation at all for why their births had been registered late and no further evidence in respect of the relationship.
73. The policy then says, “you must decide if you have enough evidence and information about the customer’s birth to deal with the application”. It is clear that the decision maker did not accept that there was enough information in respect of these three applicants because no explanation had been given for the late registration and no further evidence provided. There is no deviation from the policy.
74. The first applicant’s response to the request for further information raised further concerns because of the discrepancy in the B Form.
75. The policy makes it clear that it is possible to accept a relationship when the birth is not registered and gives a long list of evidence required, including but not limited to, as many other supporting documents as possible from around the time of the birth (or as close as possible) as well as other evidence about their life (for example vaccination records, school records or qualification certificates). There is a list of the type of documents which can be provided. The second request for information in respect of the first applicant includes many of the documents in this list and does not deviate from the policy. The only document provided by the first applicant to the decision maker which was around the time of his date of birth was a letter from a doctor stating that his mother had had a male child. The applicant was not named. He did not provide any other medical evidence such as vaccination records or family photographs (or DNA evidence) until after the original decision was taken.
76. I am satisfied that the decisions were properly taken in accordance with the applicant’s guidance, “Dependent Family and Worker Guidance” and Appendix Child. All four applicants were given an opportunity to provide an explanation as to why their births had been registered late and an opportunity to provide further evidence in respect of their births and either failed to provide any evidence or provided insufficient evidence.
77. I am further satisfied that the “Birth Registration” Guidance has no relevance to this claim as it was written to address different issues. It is expressly directed at HM Passport Office staff “working on applications [for British passports] sent from customers in the UK or overseas”. There is no reference to EC applications in this guidance. Ground 1 (e) is not made out.
Ground 1(c) – failure to take into account DNA certificates which confirms the relationship.
78. The original statement of grounds state: “Furthermore the applicants also provided the respondent with their respective DNA certificates which confirmed the relationship between the applicants and their father. The respondent’s doubt in these circumstances amount to clear ignorance of the relevant documents and therefore amounts to be unlawful [sic]”.
79. I firstly note for completeness that only one DNA certificate has been provided which was for the first applicant. Secondly, the original ground as pleaded does not particularise an error of law although it appears to suggest that the decision was unlawful because the DNA evidence was not taken into account in the decision making process.
80. It is not in dispute that this document was supplied in support of the Administrative Review after the original submission. It manifestly could not have been an error of law for the original decision maker to have failed to consider it.
81. Pursuant to Appendix AR, the reviewer is limited to considering whether the original decision “is wrong because of a case working error”, case working error being defined to include incorrect application of the rules and failure to apply the respondent’s published policy and guidance. AR 2.4, as in force at the time, specifically stated that the reviewer will not consider any evidence that was not before the original decision maker except where it is submitted to demonstrate that a case working error was made. I have had regard to the principles in R (Ganeshamoorthy) v ECO (Evidential Flexibility; Administrative Review Gateways) [2025] UKUT 00229 (IAC) at headnote 8 and 9 in this respect.
82. In this case there was no evidence to demonstrate that a caseworking error had been made. The decision was made in accordance with the correct immigration rules, applying the correct policy. The respondent was not required to consider the DNA evidence provided in respect of the first applicant because this was only provided on the 10 January 2024 after the entry clearance officer had refused entry clearance and did not demonstrate a caseworking error. I am satisfied that there was no unlawfulness in the Administrative Review decision as a result of the failure to consider the DNA evidence.
83. To his credit Mr Fazli did not submit in his oral submissions that the Administrative Review was unlawful because the review did not take into account the DNA evidence.
84. I also note Ms Barnes’ submission that the applicants could have chosen to make a fresh application including the evidence requested by the respondent.
85. In his skeleton argument, Mr Fazli argued that the respondent should have exercised discretion to grant the application once the DNA evidence was provided because it was conclusive evidence of the relationship. It was submitted that there is a wide residual discretion. As stated above this was not pleaded in the original grounds and there was no application for permission to amend the grounds and on this basis, I do not deal with this argument. In any event I note that such an approach would be contrary to the to the scheme set out in the rules and to her published policy as set out in the Administrative Review guidance. Similarly, I disregard the argument at paragraph 12 of the applicant’s skeleton because the submission on Administrative Review and credibility was not made in the original grounds and no application was made to amend the grounds. Further, I take into account that the applications were not refused on credibility grounds.
Ground 1(f)- The review decision was contrary to s 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009.
86. The original grounds assert that the decision is contrary to s55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009. It is asserted that the refusal decision has breached the Respondent’s policy and subsequently put the applicants at risk of lacking care [sic] from their parents damaging the children’s safeguarding[sic].
87. Mr Fazli expanded on these grounds in his further submissions. He submitted that the decision maker had failed to take into account the best interests of the children in accordance with Appendix Children. The respondent had a duty to ascertain the wellbeing and best interests of the child. He referred me to T (Entry Clearance) Jamaica [2011] UKUT 00483 (IAC). He submitted that the respondent could have undertaken further investigations. Although this point was not raised explicitly in the grounds, he said that in the context of the best interests of the children, the respondent should have made further enquiries about the age of the children given that this issue was the only reason for refusal.
88. He submitted that at the Administrative Review stage, the respondent was required to look into the best interests of the children adequately and had a wide discretion to do so and by that point DNA evidence at least in respect of the first applicant was before her. The respondent should have made enquiries to protect the welfare and the best interests of the children. Although the respondent does not have a statutory duty to secure the best interests of the child in entry clearance applications, she must act in the spirit of the guidance and must make further enquiries if there are suspicions about safeguarding or the children’s welfare needs. He submitted that although the Administrative Review decision referred to Section 55 it is not enough to demonstrate that proper enquiries have been made.
89. Ms Barnes submitted that the best interests of the children had been taken into consideration and in any event, there is no statutory duty to take into consideration the best interests of children outside the jurisdiction although the caselaw clarifies that decision makers should adhere to the spirit of this. This duty extends to making enquiries if there was a reasonable suspicion that a child would be in need of protection or had particular vulnerabilities. The Upper Tribunal in T (Jamaica) made various observations on the scope of his duty and the limited duty is reflected accurately in Appendix Children. Applying the law to the facts, there is no reason to suspect that any of these children were in need of protection or would come to any harm. There was nothing to suggest that the parents would choose to come to the United Kingdom if entry clearance was not granted to the children. It was not suggested that the parents would leave without making appropriate arrangements for the children or that there were any safeguarding issues.
90. I am in agreement with Ms Barnes that in the case of children outside the jurisdiction, the duty to make further enquiries is triggered by a suspicion that there may be safeguarding needs or welfare needs which require attention in accordance with the wording in Appendix Children and on the facts of this case there were no such concerns. The Administrative Review decision states “it is open for your parents to return to Pakistan or visit; and we are certain that your parents will have made suitable arrangements for your care. As such we are satisfied that your welfare needs will continue to be met”. I am satisfied that this is sufficient to discharge the duty.
91. I do not agree that the duty is wider than this as suggested by Mr Fazli and would extend to interviewing the children in the light of the post decision material to ascertain whether they met the requirements of the immigration rules. This would be contrary to the immigration rules and policy in respect of Administrative Review. I am satisfied that there was no unlawfulness in the approach to s55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009.
Ground 3 – Breach of Article 8
92. The original grounds of review assert that the refusal will separate the children from their parents. The children would be left in a rural area in the absence of parental care.
93. Mr Fazli indicated that he would not pursue this strongly. He submitted that Article 8 was engaged because there was family life between the applicants and the parents. He submitted that refusing the applications for entry clearance was an interference with that family life and the interference was disproportionate. He clarified that Mr Kalhoro and Mrs Nawaz can no longer apply to bring their children with them under the health visa scheme because the route has now closed.
94. Ms Barnes pointed to AR 2.6 in which it is manifest that it is not possible to pursue an Article 8 claim on an application for Administrative Review because the scheme envisaged under the Rules does not encompass any Article 8 considerations.
95. Ms Barnes also relied on her comments in her skeleton argument about the applicability of Article 8 ECHR, which she asserted was not relevant to an application for Administrative Review. These applicants had not made human rights applications; they had made applications as dependants of migrant workers.
96. I am in agreement with Ms Barnes’ submissions as set out above.
97. I am also satisfied that this ground is entirely misconceived. Firstly, the decision maker was not satisfied that the children are the children of the sponsor and therefore there is no family life. Secondly the scope of Article 8 ECHR is territorial and none of the applicants have established family life with an individual in the UK, nor do any of the applicants have an established private life in the UK. The decisions do not interfere with their ability to exercise their family life in Pakistan together. If the applicants wished to come to the UK as a family unit the onus was on them to ensure that each family member provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate that they met the requirements of the immigration rules.
98. Ground 3 is not made out.

99. For the reasons above the application is refused.