Tribunal decisions

The decision

Case No: JR-2024-LON-003343
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
(IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER)
Field House
Breams Buildings
London, EC4A 1WR

9 October 2025

Before:

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE GREY

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Between:

THE KING
on the application of
Shajna Begum
Applicant
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ENTRY CLEARANCE OFFICER
Respondent
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Mr Michael Biggs
(instructed by Legit Solicitors) for the applicant

Mr Jack Holborn
(instructed by the Government Legal Department) for the respondent

Hearing date: 24 September 2025

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J U D G M E N T

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References in square brackets to “(HB/X)” are to pages in the hearing bundle

Judge Grey:

1. By way of this judicial review claim, issued on 6 December 2024, the applicant challenges the respondent’s decision dated 4 October 2024 to refuse her visit visa entry clearance application (“the Decision”). The stated purpose of the application was principally for the applicant to visit her cousin in the UK to provide her cousin with support around the time of her expected childbirth.

Relevant background and procedural history

2. There has been significant litigation history in respect of this matter.

3. The applicant is a national of Bangladesh where she has lived all her life. She lives with her husband and two minor children. She applied for a visitor visa on 5 December 2023. At the time of her application the applicant was 39 years of age, and her children were 15 and 13 years old.

4. The application was supported by an eight-page letter dated 10 December 2023 (HB/92) from the applicant’s representatives and supporting documents (listed at HB/299 to 300).

5. The stated purpose for the visa was a “family visit to help my cousin sister who is expecting to give birth on 14 January 2024”. Subsequent correspondence from the applicant’s representatives states that the sponsor is the applicant’s first cousin and they were born and raised in the same house.

6. In the application form the applicant describes herself as self-employed and states that her “job” is a “home owner”. The form states that the applicant earns BDT 40,000 a year, although the representative’s letter supporting the application clarifies that the application form incorrectly provided the applicant’s monthly income instead of annual income which is BDT 480,000. This correction is accepted by the respondent. In relation to other financial matters the application form discloses savings in the sum of £10,699.40 and monthly expenditure of BDT 20,000.

7. In relation to the question of whether the applicant has any family in the UK, the application form identifies the applicant’s sponsor cousin, her cousin’s husband (a co-sponsor) and their two young children. In response to the question “Does anyone rely on you for financial support” the applicant has responded “no”.

8. Amongst the documents submitted with the application are documents demonstrating the applicant’s joint ownership of a house (HB/169); rental agreements in relation to this property (HB/119 -130) and some rent receipts (HB/113-118); a statement of account with Uttara Bank plc (HB/111) showing the balance on a savings account/product at 16 January 2023; and a bank statement of Dutch-Bangla Bank Limited for the period 1 June 2023 to 29 November 2023 (HB/112).

9. The applicant’s application was refused on 19 December 2023 (“decision 1”- HB/88). The application was refused under paragraph V4.2 (a) and (c) of the Immigration Rules on the basis the respondent was not satisfied the applicant was a genuine visitor and would leave the UK at the end of her visit. The decision states that the decision-maker is unable to verify that the cash deposits in the applicant’s bank account are paid directly from her stated income; the savings account statement only refers to the balance on the account on one particular day; and, it is not clear what family the applicant has in her home country. The decision-maker was therefore not satisfied that the applicant has any significant personal ties to her country of residence that would encourage her to depart from the UK.

10. Following the receipt of a Pre-action Protocol (“PAP”) letter before action dated 4 January 2024 setting out further details regarding the applicant’s finances, familial and social ties in Bangladesh (HB/77), the respondent agreed to reconsider decision 1. The application was refused again on 2 February 2024 (“decision 2” - HB/71) which led to further PAP correspondence initiated on 15 February 2024 (HB/55) following which the respondent agreed to reconsider decision 2. In decision 2 the reasons for refusal made the same point in relation to the applicant’s saving account as had been made in decision 1. It also stated that the decision-maker was not satisfied that the applicant has a genuine relationship with her sponsor.

11. Following reconsideration of decision 2, on 6 March 2024 the respondent again refused the applicant’s application (“decision 3” - HB/100). The basis of the refusal was in relation to the applicant’s financial circumstances because the decision-maker had based the decision on the application form which referred to annual income of BDT 40,000 (rather than the corrected figure of 480,000 provided in the covering letter dated 10 December 2023). In addition, the same issue was raised regarding the applicant’s relationship with the sponsor which had been raised in decision 2.

12. The applicant sought to challenge decision 3 by way of judicial review proceedings (JR-2024-LON-000845) which were settled by way of Consent Order on 15 August 2024 following the grant of permission by Upper Tribunal Judge Owens and Upper Tribunal Judge Hoffman at an Oral Permission Hearing on 19 July 2024. The terms of the Consent Order required the respondent to reconsider the decision of 6 March 2024.

13. On 4 October 2024, the respondent completed the reconsideration process and again refused the application (HB/47). This is the decision challenged in these proceedings and the fourth refusal decision.

14. The applicant’s legal representatives sent a PAP Letter Before Claim on 23 October 2024 to the respondent challenging the Decision. The respondent’s response dated 5 November 2024 maintained the Decision and the applicant lodged judicial review proceedings on 4 December 2024. Permission was initially refused on the papers by Upper Tribunal Judge Kamara.

15. Permission for judicial review was granted following an Oral Permission Hearing on 1 April 2025 (HB/7-8). The Order of Upper Tribunal Judge Keith provides the following reasoning for the grant of permission:

“(1) The applicant challenges the respondent’s decision dated 4th October 2024 to refuse her application to enter the UK, to visit her cousin, to provide support around the time of the cousin’s expected week of childbirth. Importantly, there is a significant litigation history resulting in previous decisions having been withdrawn as a result of pre-action correspondence. As a consequence, the issues have narrowed between the parties. The respondent accepts that the applicant is related, as claimed, to the sponsor and the sponsor would provide accommodation and financial support to the applicant when she is in the UK. The respondent also accepts the applicant is claiming a monthly income of 40,000 Bangladeshi takas, as opposed to what was erroneously stated in the application form. Instead, the issues are around the transactions into the applicant’s two bank accounts; and her wider ties, both economically and due to familial relationships in Bangladesh, not least with her husband and two minor children.

(2) Another important part of the litigation history is that a consent order was agreed and sealed on 19th August 2024 in which the respondent agreed to reconsider an earlier decision. Mr Biggs pointed to subsequent pre-action correspondence, which predates impugned decision, dated 15th February 2024, which sought to address previous concerns about the source of the applicant’s income, referring specifically to cash deposits and the joint nature of the finances between the applicant and her husband. In the circumstances, whilst I am conscious of the significant degree of latitude which the respondent has in considering applications for entry clearance, it is at least arguable that the respondent failed to consider the subsequent explanations, which predated the impugned decision relating to the cash deposits of the rental income, and familial ties which included not only the applicant’s husband and children, but also numerous other relatives (23 claimed nephews and nieces in Bangladesh). The arguable failure to consider material which was relevant to the applicant’s intentions also arguably rendered the respondent’s refusal of entry clearance at least arguably irrational. “

16. Following the Oral Permission Hearing the respondent filed Detailed Grounds of Defence on 7 May 2024 in which the respondent maintained the position set out in the PAP response dated 5 November 2024 (HB/36) and the Summary Grounds of Defence (HB/339).

The Decision dated 4 October 2024

17. The Decision states that the application was considered according to the requirements of Appendix V: Visitor of the Immigration Rules and that the decision-maker has considered “your application and any additional relevant information you have provided with it” and “your immigration history”. In the section under “The decision” it states:

“In assessing your eligibility for entry to the UK, I have considered all the documents and information submitted with your visa application and the information you have provided about your personal and financial circumstances in your country of residents.”

18. The Decision indicates that the respondent accepts the position set out in the application concerning the applicant’s sponsors and arrangements for the sponsors’ financial contributions towards the applicant’s trip and accommodation in the UK. No issue was taken with the applicant’s relationship with her sponsors which had been a significant part of the reasoning in decision 2 and decision 3. The Decision provides the following reasoning in relation to the respondent’s assessment of the applicant’s “personal and economic circumstances”:

“In support of your application, you have provided a bank statement (account number ending 0597) and savings deposit (account number ending 1684). While I note there are some credits that correspond the stated income, the overall statement does not match your declared income and spending. The documents provided also do not demonstrate the origin of funds seen in your savings deposit. Furthermore, I acknowledge you have provided house ownership certificates and lease agreements; however, I note that these are all also in your spouse’s name. From the documents provided, it is therefore not clear what income do you derive from your rental agreements and whether these funds are for your exclusive (sic). I am therefore not satisfied you have provided an accurate reflection of your circumstances which undermines the credibility of this application and leads me to doubt your true intentions as a visitor to the UK.

Lastly, while I acknowledge you have demonstrated you (sic) spouse and children in your home country, you have declared no dependants, and I am not satisfied you have demonstrated any economic ties that would necessitate your departure from the UK.

On the evidence before me, and the balance of probabilities, I am not satisfied that you have accurately presented your circumstances or intentions in wishing to enter the UK. Taking all of the above into account, I am therefore not satisfied that you are a genuine visitor who will leave the UK at the end of your visit or who is genuinely seeking entry for a purpose that is permitted by the visitor routes. Your application has therefore been refused under paragraph V4.2 (a) and (c) of the Immigration Rules.”

Legal Framework

19. Appendix V: Visitor of the immigration Rules provides, so far as is relevant:

“V 4.2. The applicant must satisfy the decision maker that they are a genuine visitor, which means the applicant:

(a) will leave the UK at the end of their visit; and

(b) will not live in the UK for extended periods through frequent or successive visits, or make the UK their main home; and

(c) is genuinely seeking entry or stay for a purpose that is permitted under the Visitor route as set out in Appendix Visitor: Permitted Activities and at V 13.3; and

(d) will not undertake any of the prohibited activities set out in V 4.4. to V 4.6; and

(e) must have sufficient funds to cover all reasonable costs in relation to their visit without working or accessing public funds, including the cost of the return or onward journey, any costs relating to their dependants, and the cost of planned activities such as private medical treatment. The applicant must show that any funds they rely upon are held in a financial institution permitted under FIN 2.1 in Appendix Finance.”

20. Guidance on how to apply the Immigration Rules within Appendix Visitor is provided by published guidance called the “Visit guidance” (“the Guidance”). The version relevant to the Decision is version 14, published on 31 January 2024. The Guidance provides, so far as is relevant:

“Standard and burden of proof and evidence

When assessing whether the applicant meets the requirements of the Visitor rules the burden of proof is on the applicant to show they meet the validity and eligibility requirements, but when considering suitability the burden of proof may shift to the Home Office.

The standard of proof you must apply is the balance of probabilities (which means it is more likely than not).

You must assess the applicant’s credibility and intentions to visit the UK or to extend their stay as a visitor and decide whether they meet the requirements in the Visitor rules. You must be satisfied that the applicant is a genuine visitor.

Assessing an applicant’s genuine intentions to visit

See: paragraph V 4.2 of Appendix V: Visitor.

You must be satisfied that the applicant meets all the requirements of V 4.2 to V 4.6 of the Visitor rules and is a genuine visitor. If you are not satisfied, you must refuse their application.

Assessing an applicant’s personal circumstances

See: paragraph V 4.2 of Appendix V: Visitor.

The following factors will help you assess if an applicant is a genuine visitor:

• their previous immigration history, including visits to the UK and other countries
• the duration of previous visits and whether this was significantly longer than they originally stated on their visa application or on arrival - if this is the case, you should not automatically presume that the visitor is not genuine, but this may be a reason to question the applicant’s overall intentions
• their financial circumstances as well as their family, social and economic background
• their personal and economic ties to their country of residence
• the cumulative period of time the applicant has visited the UK and their pattern of travel over the last 12-month period, and whether this amounts to ‘de-facto’ residence in the UK
• whether, on the balance of probabilities, the information and the reasons for the visit or for extending their stay provided by the applicant are credible and correspond to their personal, family, social and economic background

Reasons for doubting whether the applicant is a genuine visitor

See: paragraph V 4.2 of Appendix V: Visitor.

This is not an exhaustive list but may help with your assessment. If:

• the applicant has few or no family and economic ties to their country of residence, and has several family members in the UK - for example a person with most of their family in the UK and no job or studies in their own country may be considered to have few ties to their home country
• the applicant, their sponsor (if they are visiting a friend or relative) or other immediate family member has, or has attempted to, deceive the Home Office in a previous application for entry clearance, permission to enter or stay
• there are discrepancies between the statements made by the applicant and the statements made by the sponsor, particularly on points where the sponsor could reasonably be expected to know the facts but does not
• it has not been possible to verify information provided by the applicant despite attempts to do so
• the information that has been provided or the reasons for the visit stated by the applicant are not credible
• a search of the applicant’s baggage and vehicle at the border reveals items which demonstrate they intend to work or live in the UK”

The Grounds

21. The grounds of challenge in these proceedings are that the respondent failed to take material evidence into account, in particular the content of the PAP letter of 15 February 2024 challenging decision 2; and that the Decision is Wednesbury irrational.

The case for the applicant

22. The case for the applicant is set out clearly in Mr Biggs’ helpful skeleton argument. In submissions before me Mr Biggs addressed and expanded upon the matters identified in the skeleton. I have referred to any relevant submissions where required in my analysis below.

23. In summary, it is the applicant’s case that the decision-maker was under a public law duty to have regard to material considerations which included the explanations provided in the PAP letter of 15 February 2024. The applicant contends that the respondent demonstrably failed to do so and argues that this amounts to a material public law error. Further, the applicant contends that on the basis of the totality of the material that was before, or should have been before, the decision-maker, the reasons given for determining that the applicant was not on balance a genuine visitor are unsustainable applying Wednesbury principles. In essence, the applicant contends that a rational decision-maker would be unable to reach such conclusion on the basis of the reasons given in the Decision.

24. In Mr Biggs’ submission the decision-maker was required to consider matters set out in the PAP letter of 15 February 2024 applying the reasoning in R v Somerset County Council, Ex p. Fewings [1995] EWCA Civ 24; [1995] 1 WLR 1037, (‘Fewings’) (considered by the Supreme Court in R (Friends of the Earth Ltd) & Ors v Heathrow Airport Ltd [2020] UKSC 52). He submits that the material in question would fall into the third category identified in Fewings at p.1049. This is on the basis that any reasonable decision-maker would have taken it into account, given that it set out representations which had apparently caused or influenced the abandonment of an earlier decision and reconsideration of the application, and which were “highly salient” to the decision-making. It is the applicant’s case that the respondent was under a Tameside duty to ensure that they had obtained relevant material, including the letter of 15 February 2024, for the decision-making process.

25. It is the applicant’s case that the decision-maker failed to have regard to the material in the 15 February 2024 PAP correspondence. In particular, the applicant argues that the information contained in that correspondence concerning her financial circumstances would have addressed the decision-maker’s concerns regarding the financial documentation and applicant’s financial circumstances. In this regard the applicant points to the explanation provided in the correspondence that she is financially dependent on her husband who is responsible for all the family income and expenditure, and that the applicant has no income other than rent and therefore the cash deposits into her bank account are this rental income.

26. The decision states “Lastly, while I acknowledge you have demonstrated you [sic] spouse and children in your home country, you have declared no dependants, and I am not satisfied you have demonstrated any economic ties that would necessitate your departure from the UK.”. In relation to this the applicant points to the information provided in the PAP correspondence concerning the applicant’s strong ties to her home country, including her two minor children, her husband on whom she is financially dependent, her many other relatives living in Bangladesh (including 23 nieces and nephews) who provide support; and her (joint) property ownership which provides a source of income.

27. In Mr Biggs’ submission, the absence of any clear engagement with clearly relevant information from the correspondence of 15 February 2024 indicates that the decision-maker simply did not consider it. In his submission, it is also telling that the Decision makes no specific mention of the pre-action protocol correspondence when identifying the material considered by the decision-maker which is limited to “all the documents and information submitted with your visa application and the information you have provided about your personal and financial circumstances in your country of residence”.

28. In oral submissions Mr Biggs identified specific paragraphs of the February 2024 PAP letter which, in his submission, provide material information which should have been considered by the respondent. The sections identified by Mr Biggs provide information on: the purpose of the applicant’s visit; the applicant’s parental responsibilities; her various family relationships and relatives; the applicant's property ownership; and, the applicant's and her family’s financial position regarding income and family expenditure including the applicant's financial dependence on her husband.

29. In addition to the above, the skeleton argument identifies at [28] further matters which the applicant asserts were material and were not considered by the decision-maker including the “highly credible purpose of the visit”.

The case for the respondent

30. Mr Holborn’s helpful skeleton argument submitted on behalf of the respondent seeks to clearly and succinctly address the arguments raised on behalf of the applicant.

31. The respondent’s skeleton does not address the applicant's assertion that the respondent was required to consider the material provided in February 2024 PAP correspondence which pre-dated the impugned decision. Simply put, the respondent’s case set out in the respondent’s skeleton is that the decision-maker did indeed plainly consider the PAP correspondence of 15 February 2025.

32. At the outset of the hearing I clarified with Mr Holborn that the respondent did not dispute that the decision-maker should have had regard to the February 2024 PAP correspondence. He confirmed that this was not disputed although he later clarified that the duty on the respondent was to consider only material matters set out in the letter. In oral submissions Mr Holborn did not dispute the materiality of the matters in the letter identified by Mr Biggs referred to at [28] above.

33. Mr Holborn’s skeleton draws attention to the wording of the Decision which states “I have considered all the documents and information submitted with your visa application and the information you have provided about your personal and financial circumstances in your country of residence”. In his submission there can be no doubt that material post-dating the application had been considered, otherwise there would be no reason to refer to “information” twice in this passage of the Decision. In support of this submission the respondent also points to the introductory section of the Decision which states:
“I have considered:

• Your application and any additional you have provided with it

• Your immigration history”

34. The respondent’s position is that the Decision specifically engages with the applicant’s position as to her income and the source of funds, and there is no indication in the analysis that this did not involve consideration of points made in the February 2024 PAP letter in reaching the conclusion that the applicant’s bank statements do not match the applicant’s declared income and expenditure.

35. Although not identified in the Decision, the Detailed Grounds of Defence at [19] identify matters which the respondent asserts support the decision-maker’s conclusion in this regard. The grounds of defence point to the fact the bank statement (Dutch-Bangla Bank Limited – HB/112) covers the period 1 June 2023 to 29 November 2023 but only shows four deposits of BDT 40,000 with no deposit in June 2023 consistent with the applicant’s declared income. The respondent also points to an unexplained bank transfer of BDT 63,000 on 20 June 2023 and various unexplained cheque withdrawals. The respondent’s skeleton makes the further point at [12.b] that although the properties said to provide the applicant with monthly income of BDT 40,000 are jointly owned with her husband, no explanation or evidence has been provided to show that the applicant alone is entitled to the income and, if not, what the split of income actually is.

36. The respondent asserts that the Decision specifically engages with the information provided in the February 2024 PAP letter regarding the applicant’s family ties. The respondent points to the fact the Decision specifically acknowledges the applicant’s husband and children in Bangladesh but makes the point that these family members were not described as “dependents” in the application form, in the February 2024 correspondence, or at any time at all. On this basis, the respondent submits that there is no evidence that the February 2024 PAP correspondence was not considered. The respondent asserts that the content of the Decision and context suggests that it very much was.

37. In relation to the other public law errors asserted in the applicant’s skeleton argument at [20], the respondent provides a response in the skeleton argument at [17]. This includes the submission that because the February 2024 letter and the application itself had both been considered, and both had mentioned the purpose of the applicant’s trip, then this matter would have clearly been considered by the decision-maker.

The hearing and disclosure correspondence between the parties on 22 and 23 September 2025

38. On the morning of the hearing, I was made aware of very recent correspondence between the parties concerning a request for disclosure made by the applicant to the respondent.

39. On the day before the hearing GLD submitted to the Tribunal a copy of a letter dated 23 September 2025 addressed to the applicant’s representatives. The letter was in response to a request received by GLD the preceding day at 18:21 hours requesting disclosure in the following terms:

“…We write to request full disclosure regarding the Pre-Action Protocol (PAP) letter dated 15 February 2024.

In the Respondent’s skeleton argument dated 17 September 2025, at paragraph 4, it is stated that the Secretary of State for the Home Department’s position is that the February 2024 PAP letter was considered.

Accordingly, please confirm and provide disclosure as proof of the following:

1. Whether the PAP letter dated 15 February 2024 was sent to the Entry Clearance Officer or other decision-maker responsible for the refusal dated 4 October 2024; and
2. If so, whether it was properly taken into account before that decision was made. This request is made as a matter of evidence and pursuant to the Respondent’s duty of candour to provide full and clear disclosure. We would be grateful for your prompt confirmation and proof…”

40. The letter from GLD in response to the applicant’s request states:

“I have consulted my client who has asked the Entry Clearance Office (ECO) responsible for the decision under challenge directly as to whether the PAP letter of 15 February 2024 was considered. The ECO’s position – as has been the consistent position of SSHD throughout this claim, including in the Detailed Grounds of Defence – is that the letter was considered. The letter was uploaded on to SSHD’s system. The decision letter itself is part of your client’s immigration history, which is expressly referred to having been considered in the decision letter. To assist, the ECO has stated that:

“….I can confirm that the PAP letter has been received given the application was then reconsidered on 6/3/2024. Considering our standard reconsideration procedure, I am assuming the contents of the PAP letter were taken into consideration at the time of the assessment. I won’t be able to find the proof of the letter being received as the entire department switched to Poise and we no longer have access to our previous inbox…”

I trust this resolves the query.”

41. In response to the letter from GLD, a letter from the applicant’s representatives dated 23 September 2025 was brought to my attention immediately prior to the hearing. In this letter the applicant’s representatives state that they consider the response to the request for disclosure to be “concerning” and “inadequate”. The letter contends that the detailed Grounds for Defence do not make it clear that the respondent’s case was that the February 2024 PAP letter was sent to the Entry Clearance Officer and was taken into account when making the Decision and that this had only been clearly stated in the respondent’s recent skeleton argument (filed on 17 September 2025). The letter makes the point that this position taken in the skeleton argument appeared to be based on the terms of the Decision but that there was no evidence or disclosure addressing this point.

42. The letter goes on to state:

“You have quoted someone you refer to as “the ECO” in your letter but it is not clear whether this is the person who made the 4 October 2024 decision. Importantly the quoted text makes clear that this person is only “assuming” that the contents of the “PAP letter” were considered. The text also refers to “our standard reconsideration procedure”, but this has not been explained in the pleadings or evidence or disclosure. This is not adequate. It has been known since the permission decision that a crucial issue is whether the PAP letter of 14 February 2024 had been considered by the ECO, but it appears that adequate instructions on this point have not been provided.

The ECO’s duty of candour is extensive- see R (Police Superintendents’ Association) v. Police Remuneration Review Body and Anr [2023] EWHC 1838 (Admin) at [15]. In this case it requires the ECO to make clear whether or not the PAP letter of 14 February 2024 had been sent to the ECO and had been properly considered by them when the October 2024 decision was being made. An assumption is not appropriate and is not a proper basis for the position taken in the ECO’s recent skeleton argument. If the ECO’s assumption is based on a “standard reconsideration procedure” then this must be explained and adequate disclosure in respect of it provided.

As things stand it is clear that the ECO is in breach of the duty of candour. Submissions on this will made to the tribunal tomorrow.”

43. I was informed that Mr Holborn had endeavoured to take further instructions on the matters raised regarding the GLD letter. He was instructed that the reference to “ECO” was to the person “responsible” for the Decision. He had not received any further instructions on the reference to the “standard reconsideration procedure”.

44. In addition to the matters identified by the applicant’s representatives, the GLD letter raises a number of questions. I note the response from the ECO appears to have been based on an assumption that material that should have been considered by the decision-maker for decision 3 (on 6 March 2024) would have also been before the decision-maker of the Decision, which was made seven months later. It may be standard for a decision-maker to have before them the material which had directly led to the respondent’s agreement to reconsider a specific decision, although this is not clear. However, it does not necessarily follow that the decision-maker in a subsequent reconsideration would necessarily have that material before them. There is no evidence before us to confirm the respondent’s standard approach. The February 2024 PAP letter had led to the reconsideration which resulted in decision 3. However, it was the grant of permission in previous judicial review proceedings and the consequent Consent Order which had caused the further reconsideration which resulted in the Decision under challenge.

45. I also noted the indication in the ECO’s response that the department in question had changed IT systems (to “Poise” at some point). There was no indication in the response when this change had occurred, including whether this was before the Decision on 4 October 2024. This raises the question whether the change would have affected what historic material relating to the application was then accessible to the decision-maker, particularly in light of the statement in the GLD letter that “we no longer have access to our previous inbox”.

46. In Mr Biggs’ submission there were indications from past decision-making in this matter which may point to a decision-maker not having all previous material available on a reconsideration. As an example, he highlighted the reasoning in decision 3 regarding the applicant’s declared annual income of BDT 40,000, despite this having been addressed by the letter of 10 December 2023 and accepted by the respondent in previous decisions.

47. Further information on these issues and detail of the respondent’s “standard reconsideration process” would have assisted the Tribunal in this matter by having a full picture of the decision-making process that had led to the Decision.

48. In Mr Biggs’ submission, in light of the content of the permission decision of UTJ Keith issued on 3 April 2025, the respondent should have made enquiries at that stage and provided clear information on whether the February 2024 letter had been considered by the decision-maker. In his submission the respondent’s position that the letter had been considered was only directly asserted for the first-time in the respondent’s skeleton and was not directly asserted in the Summary or Detailed Grounds of Defence. Mr Biggs’ perception at the Oral Permission Hearing of the respondent’s position was that the decision-maker was not required to consider the February 2024 PAP letter, although he was clear that he did not seek to rely on this point, the respondent having been represented by different counsel at the permission hearing. There is no documentary evidence before me to indicate what was the respondent’s position at the permission hearing. However, I accept that UTJ Keith’s Order provides a clear indication that a key issue to determine in these proceedings is the extent to which, if at all, the explanations provided in the February 2024 letter were taken into account in the reconsideration which led to the Decision. Therefore, in my view, the request for disclosure was entirely appropriate and permissible. The GLD response raises more questions about the decision-making process than provides answers.

49. Despite the submission on behalf of the applicant that the respondent had breached the duty of candour, an adjournment was not sought by either party.

50. In Mr Biggs’ submission there has been a clear breach of the duty of candour by the respondent as a result of which the Tribunal was entitled to draw an inference that the February 2024 PAP letter was not considered in making the Decision, if there remained doubt on this issue. In submissions he referred me to the judgment of Fordham J in R (Police Superintendents’ Association) v The Police Renumeration Review Body and SSHD [2023] EWHC 1838 (Admin) at [15] in relation to the principles of candid disclosure and R (Das) v SSHD [2014] EWCA Civ 45 at [80] regarding the possibility of drawing inferences of fact against a party in circumstances where there has been a failure to produce evidence to explain a decision-making process and the reasoning underlying a decision.

51. Mr Holborn indicated that the respondent was not seeking to rely on the ECO’s statement in the GLD letter and invited the Tribunal to focus on the Decision itself, which in his submission makes it tolerably clear that the February 2024 PAP letter was considered. In Mr Holborn’s submission the respondent did not have anything relevant to the issues in the claim to rely upon beyond the Decision and referred me to [22] of SSHD v R(IAB) [2023] EWHC 2960 (Admin) which states:

“As Lewis LJ states in his textbook Judicial Remedies in Public Law (6th Edition, 2021), in the passage cited by Swift J, the duty of candour is an obligation of explanation. The respondent to a judicial review claim has a duty to explain the reasoning process underlying the decision under challenge. The explanation may be given in witness statements, or by the disclosure of relevant documents, or both. If the respondent chooses to discharge the duty of candour by disclosure of documents it is to be assumed that this is because they are relevant to the issues in the claim.”

52. In relation to any suggestion that a witness statement from the actual decision-maker who undertook the reconsideration process and made the Decision should have been adduced, Mr Holborn referred me to R (United Trade Union Group & Ors) v TFL and Mayor of London [2021] EWHC 73 (Admin) in relation to the usefulness (or lack thereof) and relevance of ex post facto evidence from a decision-maker.

Analysis and decision

53. I approach my analysis on the basis the respondent does not dispute the legal duty to have regard to the PAP letter of February 2024 in reconsidering the application. Mr Holborn accepts on behalf of the respondent that the decision-maker was under a duty to consider material matters in this letter. In submissions he did not address Mr Biggs’ assertion as to which matters in the February 2024 PAP letter should be regarded as material.

54. This matter is one with a substantial decision-making history. There have been three reconsiderations and three previous refusal decisions as well as previous judicial review proceedings. In my view, a rational decision-maker would ensure they had obtained all relevant documentation including the February 2024 PAP letter for the reconsideration process. The rational decision-maker would appreciate, in the context of this case, that it was at least likely previous PAP correspondence would contain information and representations relevant to the reconsideration process.

55. Although there is no ‘reasons challenge’ before me, in my view, having regard to the decision-making history of this case, the rational decision-maker should also ensure, as a matter of fairness, that adequate and intelligible reasons are provided which deal with the substantial points raised by the applicant.

56. In light of the conclusions regarding whether the decision-maker was required to consider the February 2024 PAP letter, my focus is on whether the decision-maker did in fact have sight of this letter and consider the material information set out therein. Mr Holborn conceded in submissions that should I find the letter was not considered by the decision-maker, the applicant should succeed in her claim.

57. For the reasons set out below, on balance, I unable to conclude that the decision-maker did have regard to the content of the February 2024 PAP letter.

58. In Mr Holborn’s submission the introductory wording in the Decision which refers at the start to a consideration of “your immigration history” at the second bullet point, and the subsequent wording referring to “information” twice in the same sentence connected by the word “and”, demonstrate that the decision-maker “plainly” took the February 2024 PAP letter into account.

59. I am unable to accept Mr Holborn’s submission that “there can be no doubt” the material in question was considered. There is no specific reference to having considered the PAP letter of 15 February 2024 (or the previous PAP letter of 4 January 2024 with very similar content). It is not at all clear what is meant by “your immigration history” in the context of this case.

60. Based on the ECO’s statement in the GLD disclosure letter of 23 September 2024, it appears to be the respondent’s case that the decision-maker for decision 3, made on 6 March 2024, would have had sight of February 2024 PAP letter. However, decision 3 only refers to the decision-maker having considered “your application and any additional information you have provided with it”. It does not adopt the wording used in the Decision, so this wording cannot be an indication of what was considered either way.

61. In a decision which appears to lack some care in terms of the drafting at various points, I am unable to conclude that the reference to “information” twice and the reference to “and”, were carefully chosen to indicate that the February 2024 PAP letter or other post-application material were considered.

62. Having carefully considered the documentation in the bundle before me, it is my view that there is no specific indication from the content of the Decision that the February 2024 letter was considered. The information referred to by the decision-maker in the body of the decision concerning the applicant’s circumstances was available to the decision-maker from the application itself or the supporting documentation provided with the application. Of course, this does not necessarily mean the decision-maker did not have the February 2024 PAP letter or consider the information therein.

63. I have therefore carefully considered the reasoning within the Decision for indications of whether or not the February PAP letter was before the decision-maker and whether the material content was considered adequately, or at all, in reaching the Decision.

64. The Decision refers to the two bank statements provided by the applicant in support of her application. It then goes on to make two observations. Firstly, after acknowledging some credits which correspond with the applicant’s stated income, it states that the “overall statement does not match your declared income and spending”. The Decision does not identify any specific perceived inconsistences (as accepted in the respondent’s skeleton at [12.a]). Secondly, it states that the documents do not demonstrate the source of the funds seen in the applicant’s savings account.

65. The next observation made in the Decision was that the documents provided demonstrate that the applicant owns property jointly with her husband but that the documents provided do not make it clear what income the applicant derives from the rental agreements and whether the funds are for her exclusive use.

66. These observations appear to have come from the documentation submitted with the application. There is no reference to the further financial information provided in the February 2024 PAP letter. Again, this does not necessarily indicate that the information was not considered. It is possible that it was considered by the decision-maker who may have determined that it did not address the concerns raised.

67. In Mr Biggs’ submission the February 2024 letter does address the concerns raised about these financial matters. He points to explanations provided that the applicant is financially dependent on her husband who maintains the family income. He submits that the applicant and her husband receive rental income of BDT 40,000 each month jointly. He submits that the applicant and her husband essentially operate as a single economic unit as a married couple and the income is used to fund the couple’s household.

68. I accept that Mr Biggs’ submissions are consistent with an interpretation of the overall picture of the applicant’s financial circumstances provided by the February 2024 letter. However, this is not stated in the letter itself in quite such clear terms. This may be because the specific concerns raised in the Decision had not been raised previously and were therefore not set out with this clarity. However, I find some force to Mr Holborn’s submission that the applicant’s skeleton puts a “gloss” on previous explanations set out in previous PAP correspondence.

69. The explanations and detail provided in the February 2024 PAP letter do not necessarily provide a complete answer to the concerns expressed by the decision-maker. Although it may have been helpful to have referred to them in the analysis of financial matters in the Decision, I find the failure to do so does not necessarily indicate that they were not considered. My analysis of the Decision up to this point does not, I find, conclusively point one way or another. However, I find the analysis of the remainder of the letter provides a stronger indication that that the February 2024 letter was not considered.

70. After setting out the concerns regarding financial matters, the Decision acknowledges “lastly” that the applicant has a husband and children in her home country but goes on to state that “you have declared no dependants, and I am not satisfied you have demonstrated any economic ties that would necessitate your departure from the UK”. This is the end of the reasoning in the Decision before the conclusion that the decision-maker was not satisfied that the applicant has accurately presented her circumstances and intentions in wishing to enter the UK.

71. It is important to note that it would be clear from the application itself and supporting letter that the applicant had a husband and two children. The reference to these family members does not provide support for respondent’s position that the February 2024 PAP letter had been considered by the decision-maker.

72. Much has been made in the PAP response and pleadings, as well as stated in the Decision, that the applicant declared in the application form that she had no dependants. In light of the circumstances set out in the February 2024 PAP letter this is not surprising. In the PAP correspondence it states that the applicant is financially dependent on her husband and that all the family income and expenditure is maintained by him. It is important to note that the wording of the relevant question in the application form asks, “Does anyone rely on you for financial support?”. The applicant’s response to this question must be seen in light of the circumstances set out in the PAP letter. However, there was no engagement with these matters in the Decision.

73. There was no engagement in the Decision with other forms of dependency that may exist for the applicant and provide significant ties to her home country which may inform a decision-maker in an assessment of the applicant’s bona fides. The applicant is described in the PAP correspondence as being the primary carer for her minor children. There will undoubtedly be ties of love and affection between the applicant and her children and they will be dependent on her for care and support. In the Decision the assessment of whether the applicant was a genuine visitor began and ended with an assessment of her economic ties. Whilst this may provide an adequate assessment of an applicant who claims to be economically active in the employment market or as a business owner, in my view it is highly questionable whether this amounts to a fair assessment of this applicant’s circumstances in assessing her bona fides.

74. The rational decision-maker is required to have regard to the published Guidance which identifies factors to help them in the assessment of whether an applicant is a genuine visitor. The guidance refers inter alia to an assessment of “their financial circumstances as well as their family, social and economic background” and “their personal and economic ties to their country of residence” (my emphasis). Despite the detailed information provided in the February 2024 PAP correspondence of the applicant’s familial and personal ties to her home country, there is no engagement with these matters in the Decision.

75. It is possible that these matters were considered by the decision-maker, and it was determined that the concerns regarding the financial circumstances and/or documentation were so grave that the applicant’s other ties to her home country were incapable of outweighing those concerns. However, in the context of a matter with such significant decision-making history and where the applicant has provided significant information and explanations about her family, numerous relatives and personal circumstances, one might reasonably expect some acknowledgement of these matters to indicate that the decision-maker had engaged with this information in the overall assessment.

76. I note that a key concern raised in decision 1 concerned what family the applicant had in her home country. This matter was subsequently addressed by the applicant in the PAP correspondence.

77. On balance, and having regard to the matters identified in the Guidance for a decision-maker to consider, I find the most likely explanation for silence in the Decision on the applicant’s explanations regarding her numerous relatives and personal ties to her home country detailed in the February 2024 PAP letter, is because the letter was not considered by the decision-maker.

78. In light of this conclusion, I do not need to go so far as to determine whether I consider the respondent to be in breach of the duty of candour due to the issues raised concerning the disclosure in the GLD letter of 23 September 2025. I do, however, find the ECO’s comments in the GLD letter raise important questions in relation to the key disputed issue in this matter. As a result of this, in the absence of further disclosure from the respondent, I do not have a clear picture of the decision-making process in this case.

79. I have considered the authorities to which I was referred at the hearing ([50] to [52] above) and have also considered the decision of the Court of Appeal in R (Quark Fishing Ltd) v SS Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs [2002] EWCA Civ 1409 at [50] which states:

“Mr Parker submits, correctly, that there is no duty of general disclosure in judicial review proceedings. However there is – of course – a very high duty on public authority respondents, not least central government, to assist the court with full and accurate explanations of all the facts relevant to the issue the court must decide. The real question here is whether in the evidence put forward on his behalf the Secretary of State has given a true and comprehensive account of the way the relevant decisions in the case were arrived at. If the court has not been given a true and comprehensive account, but has had to tease the truth out of late discovery, it may be appropriate to draw inferences against the Secretary of State upon points which remain obscure: see Padfield [1968] AC 997, per Lord Upjohn at 1061G – 1062A.”

80. This is not a case where it can be said that the truth has had to be ‘teased out of’ the respondent. However, I find it is undoubtedly the case that there are matters of fact that remain “obscure”. On the basis of the information before me it is impossible to know for sure whether the decision-maker had sight of or regard to the content of the February 2024 PAP letter.

81. Whilst I find it may be open to me to draw an inference that the letter was not considered in light of the inadequacies of the ECO’s disclosure, I find it is not necessary to do so to determine the ground of challenge. On an examination of the Decision itself and the circumstances of this case, on balance, I am not satisfied that the decision-maker had regard to the February 2024 PAP letter which contained material matters which the rational decision-maker should have had regard to. The failure to so amounts to a public law error in the manner asserted and on this basis the Decision should be quashed.

82. In the circumstances I am not required to determine the matter of whether the decision reached was within the range of reasonable responses available to a rational decision-maker.

83. Judicial review is granted, and the Decision dated 4 October 2024 refusing the applicant’s visit visa application is quashed.

84. The parties are invited to agree a draft Order giving effect to my decision and addressing the matter of costs.

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