Tribunal decisions

The decision

JR-2025-LON-000493

In the Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber)
Judicial Review

In the matter of an application for Judicial Review

The King on the application of

DD

(anonymity granted)
Applicant

and

Luton Borough Council

Respondent

ORDER

BEFORE Upper Tribunal Judge Neville

UPON handing down the annexed judgment

IT IS ORDERED AND DECLARED THAT:-

(1) Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the applicant and his brother are each granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including their names, likely to lead members of the public to identify them. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
(2) The application for judicial review is granted.
(3) The Applicant was born on 3 February 2007.
(4) The Respondent’s Age Assessment dated 23 May 2024 is quashed.
(5) The Respondent shall continue to provide the Applicant with support as a former relevant child under the Children Act 1989 in accordance with his declared age.
(6) The Respondent shall pay the Applicant’s reasonable costs of these proceedings on the standard basis, to be assessed if not agreed.
(7) The Respondent shall make a payment on account of the Applicant’s costs in the sum of £40,000 within 21 days of this order being sealed.
(8) The Claimant’s publicly funded costs are to be subject to detailed assessment in accordance with The Civil Legal Aid (Costs) Regulations 2013.
(9) No application having been made for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal, pursuant to rule 44(4B) the Tribunal must grant or refuse permission itself. Permission is refused.
Reasons:- An appeal would have no real prospect of success, nor is there any other compelling reason why an appeal should be heard.

Signed: J Neville

Upper Tribunal Judge Neville

Dated: 13 October 2025

The date on which this order was sent is given below

For completion by the Upper Tribunal Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Sent / Handed to the applicant, respondent and any interested party / the applicant's, respondent’s and any interested party’s solicitors on (date): 14/10/2025

Solicitors:
Ref No.
Home Office Ref:

Notification of appeal rights

A decision by the Upper Tribunal on an application for judicial review is a decision that disposes of proceedings.

A party may appeal against such a decision to the Court of Appeal on a point of law only. Any party who wishes to appeal should apply to the Upper Tribunal for permission, at the hearing at which the decision is given. If no application is made, the Tribunal must nonetheless consider at the hearing whether to give or refuse permission to appeal (rule 44(4B) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008).

If the Tribunal refuses permission, either in response to an application or by virtue of rule 44(4B), then the party wishing to appeal can apply for permission from the Court of Appeal itself. This must be done by filing an appellant’s notice with the Civil Appeals Office of the Court of Appeal within 28 days of the date the Tribunal’s decision on permission to appeal was sent (Civil Procedure Rules Practice Direction 52D 3.3).

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: JR-2025-LON-000493

Field House,
Breams Buildings
London, EC4A 1WR

13 October 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE NEVILLE

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Between

THE KING
on the application of
DD
Applicant
- and -

LUTON BOROUGH COUNCIL
Respondent

Ms M Butler, counsel
(instructed by Leigh Day), for the applicant

Mr H Harrop-Griffiths, counsel
(instructed by the Luton Borough Council Legal Services) for the respondent

Hearing date: 23-25 September 2025

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J U D G M E N T

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1. The Applicant, anonymised as DD, is a Sudanese national from West Darfur who arrived in the United Kingdom in February 2024. He claims to have fled Sudan due to threats of forced recruitment by militia, and to have been trafficked and tortured during his journey through North Africa. He travelled through Tunisia, Italy, and France before arriving in the UK.
2. Because DD claimed to have just turned 17, he was taken into the care of Luton Borough Council. A ‘brief enquiry’ conducted by a social worker on 4 March 2024 assessed him as being 25-30 years old. A subsequent full age assessment completed on 23 May 2024 reached the same conclusion. A date of birth of 3 February 1999 and age of 25 was therefore assigned, and DD was moved into adult accommodation.
3. DD subsequently began judicial review proceedings challenging the assessment. On 15 November 2024, the Administrative Court granted permission on all grounds and ordered that Luton treat DD in accordance with his claimed age pending final resolution of the claim. DD was transferred back into Luton’s care and these proceedings transferred to the Upper Tribunal for determination.
4. Anonymity orders have been made in respect of DD and his brother. Considering their age and vulnerability, as described later in this judgment, and their refugee and looked-after status, I consider it appropriate to continue those orders. Of my own motion, I also make an anonymity order in respect of DD’s friend who gave evidence on his behalf; his relevant circumstances are largely the same. Derogation from the principle of open justice is justified by the harm that would arise from any publicity, as well as by the importance of maintaining the integrity of the UK’s systems for identifying and supporting unaccompanied asylum-seeking children.
5. To preserve that anonymity, in this judgment I shall refer to DD’s brother as Ismail and his friend as Abakar. Those are not their real names.
How to approach age assessment
Merton
1. The judgment of Stanley Burton J in R. (B) v Merton LBC [2003] EWHC 1689 (Admin) led to the development of a so-called “Merton compliant age assessment”. I respectfully adopt the convenient summary given by Swift J in R. (HAM) v London Borough of Brent [2022] EWHC 1924 (Admin):
10. Overall, several important matters can be taken from the judgment in Merton. First, when it is necessary to determine whether a person is a child (i.e. under 18 years old) for the purposes of the 1989 Act, there is no burden of proof, and so no assumption either way. Rather, the assessment required must be undertaken on its own terms. Second, the assessment decision must be made based on reasonable enquiry – the local authority must take the steps reasonable in the case in hand to obtain the information needed to take the decision it is required to take. What this requires will depend on the circumstances of the case. Stanley Burnton J recognised that there may be occasions when a decision that meets the requirement for fairness can be taken based on evidence of appearance and demeanour alone (see his judgment at paragraph 27). However, he also recognised that such occasions are likely to be rare, and that when the person being assessed might appear to be of an age close to 18 (say between 16-20), fairness might ordinarily require the decision-maker to make further enquiries, either through an interview with the person to obtain his history, or otherwise (see his judgment at paragraph 28).
11. Third, when such an interview or other form of enquiry was undertaken it must be undertaken fairly. One matter was emphasised. If the person's credibility was an issue that should be made clear and should be dealt with head on during the investigation process. In cases where the local authority was minded to conclude the person claiming to be a child was lying, that provisional view and the reasons for it should be explained to him and he should have an opportunity to respond before a final decision was taken.
12. Fourth, that although there may be a range of things that a public authority might do to ensure the procedure followed was fair, those matters would not be requirements of fairness in every case. This category included matters such as whether the assessment be conducted by one social worker or two; whether a medical opinion or information from other professionals such as resident social workers or teachers may be appropriate; whether the assessment should be completed during a single interview or be undertaken over a more extended period; whether there should be verbatim notes of interviews; whether when an interpreter was required it was necessary for him to be present in person rather than by phone or video call.
13. The judgment in Merton did not rule out the possibility that on the facts of other cases some or other of these measures might be requirements of fairness. However, it is equally clear that Stanley Burnton J did not equate the legal requirement for any fair procedure with any sort of checklist. Fairness in this context, as in any other, is a matter of substance not simple form. This is the origin and essence of the observations at paragraph 50 of his judgment.
1. The Association of Directors of Children’s Services (ADCS) has issued Age Assessment Guidance. The following relevant summary was endorsed by Picken J in R. (MVN) v London Borough of Greenwich [2015] EWHC 1942 (Admin) at [21]:
(1) The assessment must be a holistic one and must start with an open mind, with no imposition on the child to prove his age to the assessing social workers.
(2) Physical appearance and demeanour are notoriously unreliable factors not determinative of age.
(3) Cultural, ethnic and racial context of the young person being assessed must be considered as these may reflect in their presentation as well as their descriptions of their lives.
(4) General credibility is not to be determinative of age. It is more likely that a young person who tells a consistent account of his life which supports his claimed age will be the age he claims to be. Conversely, young people may lie for reasons unrelated to age but related to their claims for protection or the reasons they had to leave their country of origin.
(5) The child should be afforded the benefit of the doubt where evidence can tip one way or the other.
2. It was held in R. (A) v London Borough of Croydon [2009] UKSC 8 that in cases of dispute, the Court or Tribunal hearing a claim for judicial review decides the issue for itself. It does so on the balance of probabilities. Neither party faces a burden of proof, the Tribunal adopting the inquisitorial task of asking itself whether the applicant was a child at the material time: R. (CJ) v Cardiff [2011] EWCA Civ 1590 at [21]-[23]. The Tribunal is accordingly not restricted to choosing between the rival dates of birth put forward by the parties, and performs its own assessment of age: R. (MC) v Liverpool City Council [2010] EWHC 2211.
3. There is no presumption that the local authority’s decision is correct: R. (FZ) v London Borough of Croydon [2011] EWCA Civ 59 at [27]. It nonetheless stands as potentially weighty evidence. As held by Lady Hale in A:
33. … the public authority … has to make its own determination in the first instance and it is only if this remains disputed that the court may have to intervene. But the better the quality of the initial decision-making, the less likely it is that the court will come to any different decision upon the evidence. …
4. All relevant evidence must be considered, and except in very clear cases none is conclusive. As held in Merton, appearance, behaviour and credibility are all matters that reflect on each other.
Assessing credibility and its significance to age
5. A credible history may support an applicant’s assertion as to his age, and a lack of credibility may undermine it, but lies may be told for reasons unconnected with age: Merton at [28]. Much of the age assessment in this case is spent picking over potentially inconsistent or implausible details in DD’s account of leaving Sudan and travelling to Europe. Of course, the holistic nature of the exercise means that nothing of potential relevance should be excluded, and a person pretending to be a child may wish to portray their journey as taking less time than it did. In this case it is nonetheless worth setting out the duty on a fact-finder to carefully consider both their own ability to judge plausibility and, where an account is unclear or inconsistent, the reasons that might be so.
Plausibility
6. As with credibility assessment in claims for international protection, great caution is required when comparing DD’s evidence to what the decision-maker would themselves consider plausible or likely. A classic statement of this principle can be found in HK v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] EWCA Civ 1037, per Neuberger LJ:
29. Inherent probability, which may be helpful in many domestic cases, can be a dangerous, even a wholly inappropriate, factor to rely on in some asylum cases. Much of the evidence will be referable to societies with customs and circumstances which are very different from those of which the members of the fact-finding tribunal have any (even second-hand) experience. Indeed, it is likely that the country which an asylum-seeker has left will be suffering from the sort of problems and dislocations with which the overwhelming majority of residents of this country will be wholly unfamiliar. The point is well made in Hathaway on Law of Refugee Status (1991) at page 81:
“In assessing the general human rights information, decision-makers must constantly be on guard to avoid implicitly recharacterizing the nature of the risk based on their own perceptions of reasonability.”
That common sense applies equally in the present context. It is, in my view, a recognition of a wider principle that a credibility assessment must be properly informed, the fact-finder recognising the limits of their own knowledge before passing judgment on others.
7. While the observations in HK concern society and culture, there are other circumstances where someone might not act as we expect. For example, before the plausibility of an account of trafficking and modern slavery is considered, it is necessary to have some idea how such a victim may have acted at the time and how they might present their account now. One source of knowledge can be found in the statutory guidance for Modern Slavery, at Annex D, which includes the following: (I have reproduced only a small selection of the bulleted reasons)
13.11 Victims of modern slavery may initially be unwilling to disclose details of their experience or identify themselves as a victim for a variety of reasons. These reasons include, but are not limited to, the following:
• they may fear reprisals against them, their children, families or friends - in most trafficking situations, agents know, or will attempt to find, personal information about the victim, their home, family and friends. It is very common for agents and traffickers to use threats against the victim’s family, especially children, in order to manipulate and control the victim.
• they may be distrustful of authorities - given their experiences with authorities in other countries or as a result of indoctrination by traffickers or through fear of being accused of being complicit in the modern slavery situation; […]
• they may not be aware of support structures and their entitlements.
• children may not have the same cultural understanding of childhood as is held in the UK and feel they are young adults responsible for earning money for their family - they may see an exploitative situation as a sacrifice to be made for their family.
There is also useful guidance on how to deal with traumatised victims.
8. None of this is to say that assessing the age of a potential victim of trafficking requires expertise in these matters, and sometimes the answer will be obvious to anyone. But before an age assessor can properly find that an aspect of a person’s account damages their wider credibility, they are obliged to take reasonable steps to determine whether this is actually the case.
The relevance of dishonesty
9. Even where an aspect of someone’s account can be safely rejected as untrue, it is necessary to consider whether and how this undermines their account on the actual matter in issue. As recognised in Merton at [28], lies are not conclusive of age, but that consideration is not satisfied by the assessor simply ensuring that something else goes into the mix. Other authorities on the significance of lies clearly establish that their connection to the actual issue being decided must be taken into account.
10. The well-known ‘Lucas direction’ has its origin in criminal trials, but as confirmed in Uddin v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] EWCA Civ 338 its scope is not so limited:
10. While accepting that it did not directly impact upon the decision to be made, the judge expressly recorded her view that the Appellant was not a credible witness with regard to the account he gave of his history. She noted that his account was devoid of almost any detail and that she found some of his claims to be highly implausible. She did not think that he had been wholly open and honest about his circumstances in Bangladesh. There is at least a suggestion that the conclusion to which she came on the credibility of his historical narrative affected her view of his overall credibility.
11. I note in that regard the conventional warning which judges give themselves that a person may be untruthful about one matter (in this case his history) without necessarily being untruthful about another (in this case the existence of family life with the foster mother's family), known as a 'Lucas direction' (derived in part from the judgment of the CACD in R v Lucas [1981] QB 720 per Lord Lane CJ at 723C). The classic formulation of the principle is said to be this: if a court concludes that a witness has lied about one matter, it does not follow that he has lied about everything. A witness may lie for many reasons, for example, out of shame, humiliation, misplaced loyalty, panic, fear, distress, confusion and emotional pressure. That is because a person's motives may be different as respects different questions. The warning is not to be found in the judgments before this court. This is perhaps a useful opportunity to emphasise that the utility of the self-direction is of general application and not limited to family and criminal cases.
11. Noting that authority, in Azizi (Succinct credibility findings; lies) [2024] UKUT 65 (IAC) at [13]-[15] the Upper Tribunal acknowledged that the principle can apply in protection claims. In Re. A, B and C (children) [2021] EWCA Civ 451, Macur LJ explained that a Lucas direction is necessary in fact-finding hearings in family cases where it was proposed that dishonesty be used to support an adverse finding on a different issue: [57]. Submissions should be sought on (i) the deliberate lie(s) upon which they seek to rely; (ii) the significant issue to which it/they relate(s), and (iii) on what basis it can be determined that the only explanation for the lie(s) is guilt: [58]. I do not take the word “only” in (iii) as requiring a fact-finder faced with two possible reasons for a lie to pick the one that better suits the liar’s case; it instead mandates consideration of other possible reasons for lying in order to draw a logical connection between the lie and the issue to be decided. In this case I am satisfied that the representatives have made submissions on the relevant matters, or had a fair opportunity.
12. I see no reason why the above principles should not apply in an age assessment. If not, there is a danger that the assessment of credibility will carry greater weight than justified by authorities such as Merton, as well as disproportionately occupy the age assessor and/or the Tribunal with matters that ultimately lack probative value.
Physical appearance and demeanour
13. Physical appearance and demeanour is much less reliable than our instincts tell us. As held in R. (AM) v Solihull Metropolitan Borough Council [2012] UKUT 118 (IAC):
15. … First, we think that almost all evidence of physical characteristics is likely to be of very limited value. That is because, as pointed out by Kenneth Parker J in R. (R) v Croydon [2011] EWHC 1473 (Admin) there is no clear relationship between chronological age and physical maturity in respect of most measurable aspects of such maturity.
…
19. Our second observation relates to mental maturity and demeanour. So far as mental development is concerned, it is very difficult indeed to see how any proper assessment can be made from a position of ignorance as to the individual's age. Most assessments of mental development are, in essence, an assessment of whether the individual is at average, or below or above average, for his chronological age. Without knowing the age, a person who appears to have a mental age of (say) 15 may be 15, or he may be a bright 13 or 14 year old, or a dull 16 or 17 year old. There is simply no way of telling. So far as demeanour is concerned, it seems to us that there may be value to be obtained from observations of demeanour and interaction with others made over a long period of time by those who have opportunity to observe an individual going about his ordinary life. But we find it difficult to see that any useful observations of demeanour or social interaction or maturity can be made in the course of a short interview between an individual and a strange adult. There may of course be cultural difficulties in such an interview but there are the ordinary social difficulties as well.
20. The asserted expertise of a social worker conducting an interview is not in our judgement sufficient to counteract those difficulties. A person such as a teacher or even a family member, who can point to consistent attitudes, and a number of supporting instances over a considerable period of time, is likely to carry weight that observations made in the artificial surroundings of an interview cannot carry.
21. Reactions from the individual's peers are also likely to be of assistance if they are available. We do not suggest that other young people are qualified specifically to give evidence about the age of a colleague of theirs, nor should they be encouraged to do so. But those who work with groups of young people see how they react with one another and it seems to us likely that evidence of such interaction, if available, may well assist in making an age assessment, particularly if any necessary allowance for cultural differences can be made.
14. I set out below what I consider to be the evidence that has made a material contribution to my overall conclusion, together with what I made of it. I mean no disrespect to the high-quality argument I heard from Ms Butler and Mr Harrop-Griffiths by only setting it out where necessary to explain my conclusions.
DD’s circumstances and characteristics
15. As DD’s credibility is in issue, I start with how it should be approached in light of his circumstances and characteristics. This will also inform the weight to be attached to the conclusions of the age assessors and the views of others who know DD.
DD’s age and origin
16. DD’s account is that he is the eldest of six children and lived with his mother, father, younger brother, and four sisters. His father was a teacher and his mother worked as a cook. He began school around 2013 or 2014 and attended until approximately 2021. His education was disrupted first by poverty, his mother being unable to afford school fees, and later by the escalating conflict in the region. DD saw dead bodies. In 2021, his school was repurposed as a shelter for displaced families whose homes had been destroyed, and it never reopened.
17. DD left Sudan in April 2023, during the month of Ramadan, at the age of 16. His departure was precipitated by escalating violence in West Darfur, and the increasing threat of forced recruitment by the RSF militia. One of his friends was recruited and killed. His mother arranged for him to flee with a group of neighbours. DD travelled first to Chad, where he remained for approximately one week. There, he joined a group of older Sudanese men who were also fleeing conflict and planning to travel to Europe. The group took responsibility for arranging his journey.
18. From Chad, the group travelled to Libya, where they stayed with a Sudanese contact for about a week. They then moved on to Niger, staying in a large hall used as a transit shelter for around 20 days. The journey continued through Algeria and into Tunisia. At the Tunisian border, the group was intercepted by guards who confiscated all their belongings. In Tunisia, DD sought work to support himself and was picked up with other casual labourers and taken to a construction site near the Libyan border. There, he was subjected to forced labour, physical abuse, and deprivation. He was beaten with sticks and wire, denied food, and sustained a scar on his back from the mistreatment. This period of exploitation lasted approximately 20 days and has since been the subject of a positive reasonable grounds decision on modern slavery. A conclusive grounds decision is still awaited.
19. After escaping from the construction site, the applicant found temporary work on an olive farm, where he was paid. He then joined preparations for the journey to Italy. He travelled by boat for two to three days before being rescued by Italian authorities near Lampedusa. Initially detained, he was later placed in accommodation for minors. He travelled by train to Milan and then onwards north where he stayed briefly with a refugee support organisation. Attempting to cross into France on foot, he was intercepted by French police but allowed to continue to Calais.
20. None of the above is necessarily accepted by Luton, and I should record that the account has gathered some inconsistencies over the occasions on which DD has related it. Nonetheless, his background and reasons for leaving Sudan cannot realistically be doubted and he has been recognised as a refugee. His experiences during his journey are likewise similar to those endured by many others and are not incredible in themselves.
21. A report is provided from Peter Verney. He lived and worked in Sudan between 1977 and 1989, including in DD’s home city, and has spent his career monitoring and reporting on its current affairs. He has given evidence in over 150 cases, and I observe that over the years his expertise has made a major contribution to this Tribunal’s Country Guidance cases on Sudan. He also details his experience with Sudanese official documents. His report complies with the relevant Practice Direction and is careful and thorough. I can place weight on Mr Verney’s opinion.
22. Mr Verney interviewed DD and asked him a number of questions. Giving great detail that I need not repeat, but by which I have been greatly assisted, he concludes that DD’s account is consistent with what is known about Sudan and the journey to Europe made by young people in DD’s position. This provides support for DD’s overall credibility, subject to the fact that his core account could be true and his claimed age false.
23. If DD’s account of his experiences and age are both correct, then he has suffered significant trauma and hardship for a 16 year old. His age and understanding will also mean that he cannot be expected to give the same level of detail and consistency as an adult. Whatever his true age, and even if his experiences have been exaggerated, the hardships inherent in any young person’s flight and journey from Sudan to Europe will have likely had a very significant effect on both his recollection and his behaviour when dealing with authority figures.
Medical evidence
24. DD is the average weight and height for his claimed age, but no-one has told me how he accords with the expected weight and height for a 25 year old so I place little weight on this.
25. Dr Athanasios Tsapas, a consultant psychiatrist, has produced a detailed medico-legal report based on a 3½ hour in-person assessment. His report is thorough and well-compiled, and complies with the relevant Practice Direction. He confirms that the report has been conducted in accordance with the Istanbul Protocol, so account will have been taken of the possibility that someone might feign their symptoms. He was provided with all the relevant documents including the age assessment. No shortcomings in his methodology or report has been identified by Luton, nor is any apparent. I can properly place weight on his conclusions.
26. The account related by DD to Dr Tsapas accords with my summary above. DD additionally described having suffered nightmares and disturbed sleep when travelling through Europe, another migrant eventually refusing to share a tent with him. DD then described his experiences in adult accommodation following the age assessment and prior to the grant of interim relief, and that his sleep problems has resumed:
He reported that throughout his stay he felt unsafe, at times he was threatened and was subjected to verbal aggression by other residents and felt that he had to stay quiet so that he would not be beaten by them. He witnessed frequent fights between the residents and between staff and residents and a number of residents, including one of his roommates, were frequently using cannabis. On one occasion he noticed that his roommate was unwell and [DD] had to alert staff as it transpired that the roommate had taken an overdose and needed to be transferred to hospital.
…
At that time he experienced nightmares up to four nights a week and his sleep was disturbed most nights. He was also worried to fall asleep and his sleep was broken due to the nightmares and due to feeling unsafe. He stated that his mood was very low most of the time. [DD] explained that he felt very isolated when he lived there. He found it very difficult to socialise with others, there were often arguments and fights amongst residents and with the staff and some residents were verbally aggressive and threatening towards him with no reason. As mentioned above, he felt he needed to stay quiet so he would not be physically attacked. He stated that his second roommate did not like Muslims, which made [DD] feel scared because he is a practicing Muslim. At some point his roommate took an overdose. [DD] noticed that the roommate was not feeling well, alerted the staff and the roommate was transferred to the hospital.
27. Dr Tsapas describes DD as suffering from dissociative symptoms, feeling disconnected from his surroundings and drifting away from discussions, as well as sometimes failing to remember people he had talked to or met. He does not remember some parts of his traumatic experiences.
28. Dr Tsapas diagnosed DD with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder attributable to his experiences in Sudan and Tunisia, and concludes that his mental health was worsened by living in adult accommodation. He also diagnosed DD with a moderate depressive disorder. It was unlikely that DD could have feigned his symptoms:
[DD’s] presentation is as clinically expected in the context of his reported past experiences and current situation. His overall presentation is consistent, and in keeping, with his reported symptoms and similar to others presenting with the same set of symptoms and meeting the criteria for the same diagnoses. The fact that he did not answer positively to all of my questions regarding his symptoms increases the plausibility and authenticity of his account. Also, the fact that he did not answer positively to all of the questions from the standardised assessment tools, the fact that he did not answer the questions in a rehearsed way, that his history was internally consistent, and that his behaviour and affect were congruent with his history as he gave it, increases further the credibility of his account, the authenticity of his experiences and symptoms, and reduces the likelihood of him exaggerating or feigning his symptoms.
29. Insofar as DD’s mental health could affect his ability to answer questions and interact with others, in an important passage Dr Tsapas observed:
12.13. Individuals with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder can appear changeable in their presentation. This can include being irritable because they often struggle to regulate their emotions as a result of their condition. [DD] reported that he feels at times irritable with no specific reason. Also, individuals who experience dissociative symptoms, like [DD], can appear withdrawn and disconnected from their surroundings and people around them. This could be perceived by others as lack of interest. Being withdrawn and disinvested from people and one’s surroundings, can also be a symptom of depression, which is also the case for [DD].
30. This will be relevant when I come to consider the age assessment. Dr Tsapas also recommended a scarring report, but due to the recent cyber-attack against the Legal Aid Agency it was the view of DD’s solicitors that they would be unable to obtain funding in time for the hearing.
31. Dr Tsapas’ opinion supports DD’s overall credibility and indicates that irritability, disengagement and withdrawal when answering questions may be attributable to his mental health. It also forms the basis upon which I directed that he be treated as a vulnerable witness in accordance with the Joint Presidential Guidance Note No 2 of 2010: Child, Vulnerable Adult and Sensitive Appellant Guidance. Ms Butler had suggested the way in which questions should be posed, and Mr Harrop-Griffith agreed with that approach. I am satisfied that DD was afforded a fair opportunity to put forward his best evidence and that Luton was afforded a fair opportunity to test it.
Documentary evidence
32. DD has provided photographs of what he claims is a birth certificate, showing a date of birth of 3 February 2007 and issue date of 6 February 2010, and a National Registration Certificate (“NRC”) showing the same date of birth and an issue date of 2 May 2019. He says that these photographs were sent to him from his family, who now live in Chad. DD’s solicitors have attempted to confirm the documents with Sudanese authorities but have received no reply. Luton argues that DD could have obtained either forged documents, or genuine documents completed with false details by bribed officials.
33. Mr Verney considers that neither document is likely to be a forgery, each having the expected format and layout and being consistent with those he has seen in the past. Mr Verney says that the issue date of the NRC coincides with a national insurance registration drive in Sudan, which supports why it might have then been obtained. He says that it is more common to carry the NRC “as quotidian identification” than a birth certificate, which is more commonly kept safe at home.
34. Addressing the possibility that genuine documents might have been obtained containing false details, Mr Verney does acknowledge that this is a possibility. He nonetheless considers it unlikely, as bribing officials to issue such documents is more common with “higher value” documents such as passports, often leads to extortion from the issuing official, and the purchasers are commonly more wealthy than DD’s family are bound to be given their origin. Mr Verney describes how, in his experience of examining Sudanese documents, very few identity documents are forged or corruptly issued. In comparison, he has concluded that approximately half the arrest warrants he has considered are unreliable and perhaps obtained in the UK. He concludes that DD’s documents are, on the balance of probabilities, authentic, as they have no feature that could suggest otherwise.
35. Following receipt of Mr Verney’s report, Luton put a number of questions to him. These queried the basis of his opinion as summarised in the above paragraph, and also directed his attention to a website where someone can purchase a fake Sudanese birth certificate template. Mr Verney acknowledged that there may be a nascent market for fake proof of age documents but had no reason to think that this was widespread or to suspect DD’s documents in particular. The website referenced by Luton, he pointed out, sold a template for birth certificates issued by South Sudan rather than Sudan, and he was not aware of any similar website selling a template birth certificate from Sudan. He also disclosed his notes of the questions asked to DD to test his account of how the documents were received, which emerged as consistent and plausible.
36. I therefore accept that no feature of the documents undermines the reliance that can be placed on them, and accept Mr Verney’s opinion that obtaining forged or fraudulently-obtained documents is possible but unlikely. They therefore potentially provide support for DD’s claimed age, but the extent to which they can be ultimately be relied upon must be assessed alongside all the evidence.
37. Luton argues that this reliance is undermined by DD’s account of their significance. Mr Harrop-Griffiths pointed to inconsistent evidence on the use to which the documents were put. DD’s witness statement describes the NRC being obtained using his birth certificate in around 2019 “because it was a requirement for me to have a registered national insurance number to continue my education at school.” His brother and his friend disavowed needing the document for that purpose. I do not attach any particular weight to this inconsistency. DD’s evidence is consistent with the registration drive described by Mr Verney, and I would not necessarily expect children (as it is agreed both DD’s brother and friend were) to give reliable or consistent evidence on what documents are required in a particular situation. Such bureaucratic requirements would hardly have been interesting to them, and they were concerned with much more pressing problems.
38. Mr Harrop-Griffiths was on stronger ground concerning a similar inconsistency on whether the NRC had to be carried when out and about – DD said yes, his brother and friend said no – but the same considerations apply. Mr Verney described the NRC as the quotidian form of identification. Moreover, as persuasively argued by Ms Butler, attitudes to risk can vary between families and in relation to particular children and their characteristics. It is plausible that DD was strictly instructed to carry his NRC but his brother and friend were not.
39. The other concerns arising from how DD obtained the documents I shall set out later when considering his evidence.
Age assessment
40. Given that a much wider range of evidence has been deployed in a courtroom setting than was available to Luton’s age assessors, limited weight can attach to the latter’s conclusions on forensic matters such as consistency and plausibility. Mr Harrop-Griffiths still placed positive reliance on the assessors’ conclusion, in light of their experience of working with children and age assessments. He acknowledged that such weight will be reduced where the age assessment was not conducted according to the Merton guidelines or has other shortcomings.
41. Ms Butler makes wide-ranging criticisms of the age assessment. I consider that these are largely well-founded, especially when set alongside the wider evidence now available. In particular, DD is described as over-confident and raising his voice, yet also “holding his hands together tightly or playing with his fingers, which can be construed as being nervous or struggling to recall events”. There is no explanation of this inconsistency or, if DD’s behaviour changed during the interview, the significance that was attached to this. The reader is also left puzzling at DD’s apparent difficulty in communicating with the interpreter (who became frustrated) being taken as an adverse factor when no further check to ensure that the two understood one another is recorded. The section setting out these concerns concludes:
Based on our experience working with separated migrants and our professional capacity, we can only attribute these traits to the behaviour and demeanour of an adult.
No one at the hearing was able to explain to me why a 17-year-old and a 25-year-old would have different and telling interactions with an interpreter who is struggling to get answers from them, nor how two opposite levels of confidence can be observed in the same session yet both be taken to bespeak adulthood.
42. The bulk of the reasoning in support of the age assessment is a description of DD’s journey, which is described as “far-fetched” overall and “lacking a convincing narrative”. Disbelief is expressed as to aspects of DD’s journey, sometimes in breathless terms: “incredibly … DD was able to plan and make difficult decisions throughout his complex journey to the UK as a child; it is “difficult to believe” that he could not remember the age of his brother when starting school; “hard to believe” that at points he was supported for free by the group of Sudanese people with whom he travelled; and his desire to leave an offer of humanitarian support in Tunis so that he could reach Europe was “an indication that [his] initial claim that he left Sudan for safety in Chad was not entirely true.”
43. All of this is, contrary to the assessors’ opinion, entirely plausible: in my experience of assessing protection claims by young migrants there is nothing incredible about a 16 year old having to take on adult decision-making to navigate their way across a continent, and younger children often do so; Mr Verney explains how the support described by DD is entirely what one would expect in Sudanese society, the group of older youths described by DD seeing it as their social duty to look after those they saw as less mature and independent; and the notion that leaving a Chadian camp for Europe undermines the genuineness of any fear in Sudan is both illogical and contrary to the settled Home Office policy that all non-Arab Darfuris are at risk in Darfur.
44. Numerous inconsistencies are also raised in DD’s account, such as how much money his mother gave towards his journey, the actions of the Italian police, how long and on what terms he was made to work in Tunisia, and these plainly carry major weight in the assessors’ decision. Nowhere is there any hint of awareness that his account might disclose trafficking or modern slavery that in turn could inform the way his account was relayed. Nor, and surprisingly for experienced social workers in this area, do the assessors appear to have considered trauma as possibly affecting the way DD answered questions. Dr Tsapas’s report now provides a clear explanation as to why DD might have behaved in the way he did. Relevantly, and contrary to the authorities on age assessment and the significance of lies in general, there is no attempt to draw a logical connection between inconsistency and implausibility surrounding his journey and the actual matter in issue, being his age.
45. Two other matters contributed to the outcome. The first is an incident in DD’s initial placement where he:
“… became aggressive during a key work session when he was advised to comply with a simple health and safety rule at his placement. The email states that he became aggressive and was shouting at staff in his language. He did not listen to their advice, and he banged the door of the fridge in annoyance in the full view of the other housemates. advised that they had to exit the kitchen to avoid further aggression, as they did not want to traumatize the other young persons present.
[DD’s] support worker had previously provided a statement that suggests [DD] appears to be 16 and 17 years old, solely based on being forgetful and needing repeat reminders. The statement equally stated that they find [DD] to be respectful. However, the incident mentioned earlier dated 14/03/2024 suggests otherwise, as he was disrespectful to staff, and they felt that other young people in the placement were traumatized by his behaviour.”
46. It is questioned how such behaviour can be “befitting of a child”. One can well understand why such an incident must not be tolerated, but it is harder to understand why it is more consistent with DD being an adult than a 16-year-old. Sensibly, no such reliance has been placed upon it by Mr Harrop-Griffiths.
47. The second matter is physical appearance, while it was unclear to the assessors whether DD had not yet started shaving, or had shaved very recently, he was considered to have mature skin with dark patches around his mouth and chin and faint but set lines across his forehead.
48. All this was held to justify a conclusion that DD could be anywhere from 25 to 30, making him now aged between 26 and 31. Contrary to the way Luton’s case was initially presented, no one else who has worked with DD agrees with this. Even Mr Murahwa, who is DD’s current social worker and gave evidence on Luton’s behalf, cannot accept he is any older than his early twenties. Nor, for the very little my view on DD’s appearance is worth, can I. If you met DD and were told he was between 18 and 22, you wouldn’t think twice. But if you were told he was 26, you’d probably do a double take. If you were told he was 31 you would be very surprised indeed.
49. For all these reasons I am unable to place any meaningful reliance on the assessors’ conclusions. Those problems also make it more likely that DD is giving a reliable account of the assessment’s procedural shortcomings, which can be summarised as a lack of patience and space to let him answer, and a lack of concern at his problems understanding an interpreter who spoke a non-Sudanese dialect of Arabic. DD’s first witness statement raises a number of interpretation concerns that do, in my view, have a genuine ring of poor interpretation.
50. According to Luton’s records there were five meetings in total, the brief assessment of 4 March 2024, an introductory session on 29 April that had to be cancelled as no interpreter attended, two substantive sessions on 2 and 8 May (with the same interpreter), a “Minded to know” session on 9 May, and a meeting on 23 May 2024 to inform DD of the outcome. There is a dispute on whether the session on 9 May took place; Luton’s records are likely more reliable than DD’s recollection in this respect but I reject that the issue materially contributes to my decision.
51. One of the age assessors has provided a witness statement. He was not called to give oral evidence and nothing in the statement materially assists me in any event.
Ismail – DD’s brother
52. DD’s brother Ismail arrived in the UK separately in August 2023, having left Sudan shortly after DD. His date of birth of 2 May 2008 has been accepted, and he is in the care of a different local authority. It is also accepted that the two are brothers. He does not claim to have any direct knowledge of DD’s date of birth, but had always understood him to be around a year older. He also repeats some of the background to DD’s account. He gave oral evidence; in view of his circumstances I had previously directed that he could do so by video link and that questions would be asked in a way that was appropriate to his age.
53. As I shall go on to describe in relation to DD’s credibility, Ismail’s evidence was deliberately misleading as to whether he had met DD while they were both still in France. This can only have been by collusion between them. Despite Ms Butler’s well-argued point that DD was unlikely to put his brother’s accepted account and secure position at risk by having him lie, he clearly did so on that specific subject. That general indicator aside, no other aspect of his evidence gave specific cause for doubt. While Mr Harrop-Griffiths put forward some other inconsistences, including the need for documents and concerning when each attended school, these are sufficiently minor and inconsequential that they more likely arise from misunderstanding or mis-recollection than deceit.
Abakar – DD’s friend
54. Abakar was born on 8 May 2007 and Luton has always accepted his date of birth. He left Sudan in 2023 for the same reasons as DD, also travelling via Chad and Libya to Europe, then through Italy into France. He met DD in a camp near Calais and the two became friends and boarded the lorry that brought them to the UK together. Like DD, he has been granted refugee status.
55. He gave evidence that when he met DD he had never doubted that they were a similar age due to his appearance and presentation. He remembers DD giving a date of birth of 3 February 2007 to the French authorities whenever they were encountered, and gave what I considered to be a detailed and plausible account of the circumstances in which that would happen.
56. I do not consider that any specific adverse credibility concerns arose from Abakar’s evidence, and he remained helpful, responsive and consistent throughout Mr Harrop-Griffith’s careful cross-examination. He struck me as much less guarded and vigilant than DD, with the result that his answers were more detailed and thoughtful. He gave a particularly striking and contextualised description of how the older Sudanese youths excluded him and DD from decision-making due to their perceived lack of maturity. Through no fault of his however, I must exercise caution in case DD has conspired with him as he did with Ismail.
Washington Murahwa
57. Mr Murahwa has been DD’s social worker since DD returned to Luton’s care in October 2024. As DD turned 18 on his own account in February 2025, and has now moved into supported adult accommodation, he now needs less support. Mr Murahwa has nonetheless met DD several times over the past 11 months for the necessary visits and been in telephone contact if something else is needed. As already noted, he thinks that DD is aged 21 to 25 but disagrees with the 25 to 30 range decided in the age assessment last year.
58. Mr Murahwa’s view on age arises in part from DD’s appearance and demeanour, but Mr Murahwa also raises some specific matters that I find are major contributors to his opinion. First, Mr Murahwa has always offered to arrange contact between DD and Ismail, and facilitate it with support for travel costs and so on. He has been surprised by DD’s lack of interest in response. In his experience, a child would be much more likely to seek such family contact than a young adult.
59. In response to this, a number of points were raised. First, DD has been in contact his brother, as shown by him coming forward and giving evidence; it therefore appears that DD’s reluctance is actually to have such contact arranged by Luton. I also observed to Mr Murahwa that, in my provisional view, the overall evidence showed that DD has tended to be evasive whenever the subject of his brother is raised. Mr Murahwa fully agreed with this, and that DD is reticent with him and unwilling to share information about his brother. He does not think that DD is hiding any “damaging information”, however.
60. I understand why Mr Murahwa attributes DD’s reticence to a lack of interest in seeing his brother, but the wider range of evidence I have available shows this to be incorrect. DD met up with his brother in France, a fact that he tried to conceal, and it appears that he instigated and continued contact with him in the UK behind Luton’s back. As observed by Ms Butler, age as a motivator for contact is somewhat undermined by DD’s brother, who is a child, never having taken steps with his own social worker to reach out to Luton – Mr Murahwa confirmed that no one from Ismail’s local authority had been in contact.
61. The evidence creates a strong overall impression that DD is habitually evasive when it comes to his brother, has no trust in Luton, and is suspicious of Mr Murahwa. As will be relevant to DD’s overall credibility, the sullenness and reticence described in all the encounters with Luton’s social workers is entirely absent from his interactions with Dr Tsapas, Mr Verney, and others unconnected with Luton, who all give an entirely opposite description. I also detected none of it in oral evidence save when questions related to his brother, when DD’s answers became markedly shorter and more defensive. Of course Mr Murahwa has done nothing to actually deserve DD’s suspicion, and I was struck by his obvious compassion for DD and his willingness to provide proper support despite his concerns about DD’s true age. But DD’s mistrust does not have to be well-founded to be real.
62. Another point put forward by Mr Murahwa as suggesting that DD is an adult is that once he returned to Luton’s care he asked for help in getting universal credit, an adult benefit. He was unable to meaningfully expand on this example in evidence, I consider it to be better explained first by DD simply being confused by having been told to claim benefits and support as an adult for several months until interim relief was granted, and second (as he apparently told Mr Murahwa at the time) because universal credit would give him more money than the allowance he receives as a looked after child. Mr Murahwa acknowledged that anyone can be confused by benefit entitlement and he didn’t think that DD had a good understanding of the nature of the interim relief ordered. I consider it plausible that DD thought he had a choice between the two types of support, and was confused by his change of status in any event. Preferring the type of the support that provides the most immediate cash over that which has far greater value in the long term is, in my view, classically immature behaviour. DD trying to claim an adult benefit because he is, in truth, an adult, is not only over-simplistic, but would in any event be inconsistent with Luton’s overarching case that DD is engaged in a longstanding and sophisticated masquerade. While I therefore place minor weight on Mr Murahwa’s overall perception of DD’s age as it relates to appearance and demeanour, I reject the remainder of his rationale.
Bea Angier
63. Bea Angier is employed by the charity Young Roots, which supports refugee and asylum-seeking youth in London. Initially serving as a Youth Development Worker and later as a Youth Welfare Officer, Ms Angier worked directly with DD following his registration with Young Roots in May 2024. Her witness statement describes how she facilitated youth activities and provided one-to-one casework support, observing DD regularly in both group and individual settings. She describes DD as exhibiting behaviour and demeanour typical of a 16–17-year-old, including playful interactions and difficulty weighing long-term consequences. An example of the latter was during Ramadan, where fasting meant DD lacked energy. He kept choosing to miss appointments, for example with his solicitors, because he was tired, something she found childish and immature.
64. Ms Angier maintained the above views in the face of cross-examination, and I was impressed by the care with which she gave evidence and her acknowledgement of the difficulty in ever being sure about someone’s age. In oral evidence she was asked whether she had any comment on DD’s appearance and demeanour. She stated that when he was introduced to her as a seventeen year old she had no doubts about his age. She accepted the possibility that he could be older, but thought it very unlikely that he was now 26 as suggested by the age assessment.
65. Mr Harrop-Griffiths argued that less weight should be placed on Ms Angier’s perception than that of Mr Murahwa, the latter being a qualified registered social worker who has been trained in age assessment. While I agree that Mr Murahwa’s professional training and regulation is relevant, the extent and nature of the time spent with DD by Ms Angier more than makes up for it. She may not have been trained in age assessment, but the time she has spent with DD, her observation of his interactions with others who are his claimed age, and the other indicators upon which she relies are the very ones commended by the authorities – see in particular AM at [20]-[21] and the ADSC guidelines. Mr Murahwa has spent much less time overall in personal contact with DD and its purpose has been largely functional, responding to specific requests or undertaking statutory checks.
Individuals who did not give oral evidence
66. Rebecca Merry is a Senior Caseworker and Age Dispute Team Coordinator at Care4Calais. Her written evidence simply relates how DD was referred to the organisation in June 2024 and that he then provided copies of his documents by Whatsapp that were in turn passed to his solicitors.
67. Joshua Singer was DD’s Litigation Friend when these proceedings were commenced, working at the Refugee Council as a Children’s Adviser. In his witness statement dated 21 August 2024, Mr Singer explained that his role involved supporting unaccompanied asylum-seeking children whose age had been disputed, ensuring they had access to legal advice and safeguarding. He met the applicant in person and formed the view that the applicant’s physical appearance, demeanour, and behaviour were consistent with that of a 17-year-old Sudanese child. Mr Singer expressed disbelief at the local authority’s decision to assign the applicant a date of birth that made him 25 years old, stating that this was in stark contrast to his own experience of the applicant. Mr Singer has since left the Refugee Council and efforts by DD’s solicitors to contact him have been unsuccessful. DD was given permission to rely on his witness statement at a previous case management hearing. I do take note of his views, but they inevitably carry very minor weight given that he did not give oral evidence and only spent significant time with DD on two occasions.
68. Finally, I was asked to have regard to a report by an unnamed support worker who worked with DD for two weeks in his first placement on arrival. They described DD as appearing to be between 16 and 17 “based on his forgetfulness and need for repeated reminders”, his “appearance and mannerism” and behaviour, and that he “sometimes watches cartoons on TV and always in the company of [other] teenagers”. The age assessment appears to record that someone at the placement (redaction means I cannot tell if it is the same support worker) subsequently accepted the assessment of DD as 25-30. None of this carries any meaningful weight when set aside the more direct evidence provided.
Assessing credibility in DD’s interviews and his evidence
69. Having set out other sources of evidence against which DD’s credibility can be measured, I set out my assessment of what he has said in the various interviews and in his evidence before the Tribunal.
General observations
70. During most of his evidence, DD came across as candid and helpful. With the exception of some matters, to which I shall turn, when inconsistencies noted in the age assessment and elsewhere were put to him, it seemed to me that he did his best to explain them where he could. One of those inconsistencies involved how much money had been given to DD by his mother, on which he had given different figures. DD explained that he kept being pushed for an exact number so had just given one so that he could move on from the subject. I note a connection between that answer and the notes from the “minded to” session where previous inconsistences were put to DD for comment:
“We wanted information about his brother in London, clarification on the inconsistencies in his presentation, and details about his journey. [DD] suddenly insisted that the interpreter added the word 'approximate' to any information he provided, particularly relating to dates and times.”
71. The use of the word ‘insisted’ is consistent with a requirement by the assessors for exact answers, and also consistent with DD then realising that his previous brush-offs were having forensic consequences.
72. DD has consistently claimed problems with non-Sudanese Arabic interpreters being provided during his various interviews, and there is reason to believe him. Unfortunately the Arabic interpreter supplied for the hearing did not speak Sudanese Arabic. DD immediately raised his concerns when introduced to the interpreter, which supports the truth of his claimed adverse experiences with non-Sudanese Arabic in the assessment process. The interpreter was nonetheless conscientious and diligent, and with the support and care of counsel and myself I am satisfied that DD was able to effectively communicate his evidence. This was accepted by DD and Ms Butler on his behalf, as well as by Mr Harrop-Griffiths.
73. All that difficulty was instructive on the risk of interpretation that does not include such safeguards. So too was the experience on the second day of the hearing when DD’s brother gave evidence. The Tribunal-supplied interpreter on that occasion did speak Arabic in a Sudanese dialect, but interpreting questions to and from English was still relatively difficult even for uncontroversial and simple questions. It is an easy thing to claim poor interpretation in response to an apparent inconsistency, but in this case where there is room for doubt then DD should be given the benefit of it.
Negative indicators
74. Mr Harrop-Griffiths structured his submissions on credibility around what he termed “three big lies” in DD’s account. I take each in turn.
Whether DD saw his brother in France
75. As already noted, DD has always been reluctant to share his brother’s contact details with Luton. This is noted in the age assessment as well in subsequent case notes made much later by Mr Murahwa. There have also been numerous occasions on which DD has either claimed not to have seen his brother between leaving Sudan and arriving in the UK, or could reasonably have been expected to say if he had, of the following is only a selection. In DD’s screening interview, conducted in May 2024, DD said he had last seen his brother “about one year ago”. In DD’s witness statement of 28 August 2024 he said:
The Brief Enquiry notes that I explained that I had four siblings who were all sisters and who remained in Sudan. It does not note that I have a brother. However, by this time, I believed that my brother was in the UK. I believed this because I had heard from people I knew in Calais and from people when I first arrived in the UK that they had seen him and that he had gone to the UK. So, I thought I was only being asked about my family who remained in Sudan, rather than family who I believed were in Europe. I felt more sure that my brother was not in Sudan than sure that my mother and sisters were no longer in Sudan because those who told me of his whereabouts had actually seen him.
and
I did not know the circumstances of either my brother or my mother’s departure from Sudan at the time of the in-person interviews, as I only directly spoke with my mother and brother after the interviews.
76. DD also related how during his journey he had gone to see his cousin who lives in Paris, staying with him for about 20 days. He describes what they did and who they saw. Nowhere does he mention seeing his brother. After he gave oral evidence in similar terms, DD’s solicitors very properly drew further documents to Mr Harrop-Griffiths’ attention. By agreement, not all DD’s social media disclosure had been included in the hearing bundle. The evidence now handed up was a series of Instagram posts from DD’s brother’s account, which plainly showed him, DD and their cousin all posing for photographs in front of the Eiffel Tower. DD then admitted that he had seen his brother in Paris, but only once and very briefly.
77. DD denied having lied, saying that he understood “meeting” his brother to connote a long stay and, further, that “if I were lying I would say I don’t have a brother at all”. I entirely reject the former as explaining the absence of DD’s brother from his account of travelling through France. The latter explains DD’s consistent evasion and equivocation and what on this occasion can only rationally be interpreted as untruthfulness when it comes to his brother.
The Chadian family document
78. This arises from the record of the age assessment:
[DD] reported that his mother has a national ID from Chad with the names and dates of birth of the entire family. [DD] asserted that he only got to know his age when he asked his mother about two months ago when he was already in the UK. When asked why his mother secured another ID from Chad, [DD] said his family left Sudan hurriedly and left their national IDs behind.
…
On the first day of the assessment, [DD] briefly showed us an ID document for his sisters and mother, and we requested these be shared with us once [DD] was back at the placement and able to connect to the wifi. [DD] also agreed to provide us with a telephone number for his brother who he claims lives in London and a photo of him. However, on the second day of the assessment, [DD] stated that he had changed his phone sim card and lost this information including the photo of his brother not realising that staff had already supported him to send us a photo of his brother, which we currently possess. We conclude that upon reflection, [DD] may have had a rethink about providing us with this information, as it may discredit his previous statement.
79. In DD’s witness statement he states that he has never heard of the document the assessors describe, nor has he shown it to anyone. He also says that he offered to send them the photograph there and then if he could connect to the internet, which is not inconsistent with the record. Mr Harrop-Griffiths argued that DD failed to send the family ID document because he realised it showed his true date of birth.
80. I am unable to treat this matter as materially undermining DD’s credibility. The assessment suffers from the shortcomings I have described earlier in this judgment. The scope for misunderstanding in interpretation reduces its reliability; one reason why this matter may have had to play a central role in Luton’s case is that numerous other inconsistencies are so plausibly explained in DD’s witness statement by reference to misinterpretation that I heard nothing more about them. Ms Butler referred me to the following well-known passage in JA (Afghanistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] EWCA Civ 450:
24. In the absence of a statutory provision of the kind to be found in section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, I do not think that in proceedings of this kind the tribunal has the power to exclude relevant evidence. It does, however, have an obligation to consider with care how much weight is to be attached to it, having regard to the circumstances in which it came into existence. That is particularly important when considering the significance to be attached to answers given in the course of an interview and recorded only by the person asking questions on behalf of the Secretary of State. Such evidence may be entirely reliable, but there is obviously room for mistakes and misunderstandings, even when the person being questioned speaks English fluently. The possibility of error becomes greater when the person being interviewed requires the services of an interpreter, particularly if the interpreter is not physically present. It becomes greater still if the person being interviewed is vulnerable by reason of age or infirmity. The written word acquires a degree of certainty which the spoken word may not command. The "anxious scrutiny" which all claimants for asylum are entitled to expect begins with a careful consideration of the weight that should properly be attached to answers given in their interviews. In the present case the decision-maker would need to bear in mind the age and background of the applicant, his limited command of English and the circumstances under which the initial interview and screening interview took place.
81. While Moore-Bick LJ was discussing screening interviews conducted with asylum claimants, the same caution clearly applies to the age assessment. Indeed, at least a screening interview is an attempted record of the questions asked and the answers given. Here I have been provided with no contemporaneous notes, only the post-interview summary of what was said in the final report. That report species the “Assessment Start Date” as 21 May 2024, which I take as being the date when the author began to fill in the template given that the interviews described took place around two weeks beforehand. This further increases the caution that must be exercised.
82. I also agree with Ms Butler that it would be a surprising slip if DD had given a consistently false date of birth on multiple occasions, while carrying round a document containing a different one and brazenly showing it to the social workers; they had already explained the purpose of the interview. He may well have been as surprised as I am to find out that Luton conducts such interviews without any facility to give young vulnerable migrants internet access. This must regularly cause similar problems.
83. As to the photograph of DD’s brother, I accept that other details were provided at around a similar time. The explanation in DD’s witness statement as to how he lost his Whatsapp messages is consistent with the way in which Whatsapp can work. In any event, I have already found that DD’s credibility is damaged by his evasiveness about his brother, and it makes no difference whether this is another example of it.
The circumstances in which DD obtained his documents
84. It is part of DD’s account that between the substantive session and the outcome interview he coincidentally re-established indirect contact with his mother, by this time in Chad with his sisters. It was then, at the suggestion of peers in the UK, he was able to obtain the photographs of his documents already described above. At the next meeting on 23 May 2024, arranged to inform him of the age assessment outcome, he tried to tell the assessors he now had identity documents but they would not let him explain, instead talking over him to say that a decision had now been made.
85. Mr Harrop-Griffiths argued that it is simply too convenient that this contact had been re-established just after a meeting at which DD had been pressed for any proof of his age. I accept this in principle. While Ms Butler argued that there is no reason why DD should lie about trying to tell the assessors about the document at the 23 May meeting when it is established by documentary evidence that he sent them to Care4Calais just three weeks later, I can see how obtaining the documents before being informed of the negative outcome would be less apt to invite an adverse inference than doing so afterwards. I accept that the convenient timing does carry some minor adverse weight against DD’s credibility. So too does DD’s belief that his mother managed to take his documents with her to Chad, but left her own – he was unable to explain why this would be so.
86. I do reject Mr Harrop-Griffiths’ argument that an email from the Home Office expresses doubt as to the documents’ reliability. While sent in reply to an email enclosing DD’s documents, the email can be seen to describe general difficulties rather than referring to these documents, or indeed to Sudan, in particular.
Positive indicators
87. Describing inconsistencies takes many more words than describing consistencies, so it can be easy to conflate the time spent on them with the weight they carry. DD’s oral evidence was detailed and consistent on a wide range of topics. I agree with Ms Butler that this reflects his prior interviews, containing a great deal of detail on life in Sudan, family details, when he left and on many aspects of the journey, all of which has remained consistent. His account has likewise been consistent with the information recorded on the documents, and survived exposure to Mr Verney’s significant knowledge about Sudan. I have already set out Dr Tsapas’ view that DD’s symptoms and presentation is consistent with his account.
88. Some very minor positive weight is afforded by the grant of refugee status; the Secretary of State may well have only satisfied herself that he is a non-Arab Darfuri rather than assessed his wider account. The positive reasonable grounds decision is likewise only a provisional conclusion.
Consideration
89. I balance all the positive and negative indicators discussed above, without belabouring an already long judgment by repeating all of them. They are also not an exhaustive list, and those matters put forward by Mr Harrop-Griffiths that I have not mentioned should be taken as providing me with no material assistance in deciding credibility even if established. The account of any genuine 17 year old having been through DD’s experience and undergoing the age assessment process as I have described it would have occasional and minor aspects that are inconsistent or unexplained. While the timing of DD obtaining his documents is convenient, it also came at a time when he would have been developing contacts and links to enable it.
90. What to make of the more major concern, being DD’s attempts to conceal evidence about his brother? Addressing this, Ms Butler reminded me that claimants for international protection, and especially children, might lie for all sorts of reasons that are unconnected to the fact actually in issue; DD lying about his brother does not mean he has been lying about his age. This is right, of course, as set out in Merton and in the principle arising from Lucas, by which I direct myself. While I agree with Mr Harrop-Griffiths that the matter deserves attention as potentially concealing biographical detail, I find it difficult to see how it can do so. The obvious and clumsy way that DD is evasive on this narrow topic does him no obvious benefit; if his worry were that Ismail would reveal his true age then he would not have put his solicitors in touch with him so that he could give evidence. If any documents were relied upon by Ismail that likewise undermine DD’s case the same applies, and DD would have had no reason to think that these could not be obtained by Luton from the other local authority in any event (perhaps with an order from the Tribunal).
91. The much more likely explanation for DD’s ‘big lie’ and his general evasiveness about Ismail is a combination of DD’s mistrust for Luton’s social workers and misguided protectiveness towards his brother. I can well imagine DD considering that he has to keep his brother as far away from Luton’s investigation as possible, lest they do to Ismail what was done to him and question his age. There may well also be an attempt to conceal the arrangements whereby Ismail was brought to Europe and into the UK – the secrecy urged by people smugglers, often in extreme terms, is well recognised. While those potential explanations are speculative, they are no more speculative than DD is hiding something that might emerge. While DD’s lie about France was objectively foolish, it cannot be logically explained by him also lying about his age.
92. That conclusion reached, it can be seen that there is very little evidence to suggest that DD is any older than he claims. We are left with his assertion, an account that is consistent with his age, mental state and the country evidence, and with apparently plausible official documents. I accept DD’s claimed date of birth of 3 February 2007, and find that on the date of the age assessment he was 17 years old. While very little significance can be placed on his appearance and demeanour, it is not inconsistent with that conclusion.
93. As a postscript, I recall Lady Hale’s remarks that “the better the quality of the initial decision-making, the less likely it is that the court will come to any different decision upon the evidence”. The age assessment embarked on a freewheeling credibility analysis and afforded it significant weight in the decision. While there are ways in which an incredible account of coming to Europe might reflect on age in a hypothetical case, that logical link must still be drawn, and be capable of being drawn, in the actual case being considered. Moreover, if the credibility of an account including trafficking and modern slavery is to be assessed, then those assessing it are under a duty to take into account how potential victims should be interviewed and how they present their accounts. The age range settled on by the assessors is one with which nobody who has worked with DD agrees. Correcting those matters in this case may have saved Luton expending its scant resources disputing DD’s age, and more fundamentally saved DD from the damage to his mental health described by Dr Tsapas.

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