Tribunal decisions

The decision

JR-2025-LON-000701
In the Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber)
Judicial Review

In the matter of an application for Judicial Review

The King
on the application of
Ataur Rahman
Applicant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

ORDER AND REASONS

BEFORE Upper Tribunal Judge O’Callaghan

HAVING considered all the documents lodged on behalf of the parties, and having heard from Greg Ó Ceallaigh KC, counsel, instructed by Zyba Law for the applicant, and Michael Biggs, counsel, instructed by the Government Legal Department for the respondent at the hearing on 2 July 2025

AND UPON the handing down of judgment on 7 May 2026

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

1. The application for Judicial Review is granted on grounds 2 to 4 only.

2. The decision of 16 May 2024 is quashed.

3. The respondent is to pay the applicant’s costs to be assessed on the standard basis if not agreed.

4. Permission to appeal refused.

Reasons

1. The respondent has not provided the Government Legal Department with instructions to date as to whether she wishes to appeal the decision of the Upper Tribunal. In any event, I am required to consider permission to appeal.

2. The respondent was successful in respect of ground 1.

3. In respect of issue ii, encompassing grounds 2 to 4, the Upper Tribunal was required to make a fact specific assessment. Whilst the respondent could reasonably rely upon the applicant leaving the takeaway, being seen to throw an apron in a bin and making admissions in an initial interview, the decision-maker curtailed leave under an irrelevant and in any event repealed statutory provision. Further, the decision-maker could not reasonably be said to have exercised discretion nor appear to understand that discretion could be exercised. Being mindful that a request by the applicant for the manager of the takeaway be approached to confirm his position was not acted upon, and both the manager and a company director has since written letters supportive of the applicant, it cannot properly be said that there is only one answer to the exercise of discretion. The decision-maker had not taken appropriate, and fair, steps to identify the full picture including the applicant’s personal circumstances.

4. Consequently, for the reasons addressed above, there is no arguable basis for an appeal.

D O’Callaghan
Upper Tribunal Judge
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

7 May 2026

The date on which this order was sent is given below

For completion by the Upper Tribunal Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Sent / Handed to the applicant, respondent and any interested party / the applicant's, respondent’s and any interested party’s solicitors on (date): 07/05/2026

Solicitors:
Ref No.
Home Office Ref:

Notification of appeal rights

A decision by the Upper Tribunal on an application for judicial review is a decision that disposes of proceedings.

A party may appeal against such a decision to the Court of Appeal on a point of law only. Any party who wishes to appeal should apply to the Upper Tribunal for permission, at the hearing at which the decision is given. If no application is made, the Tribunal must nonetheless consider at the hearing whether to give or refuse permission to appeal (rule 44(4B) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008).

If the Tribunal refuses permission, either in response to an application or by virtue of rule 44(4B), then the party wishing to appeal can apply for permission from the Court of Appeal itself. This must be done by filing an appellant’s notice with the Civil Appeals Office of the Court of Appeal within 28 days of the date the Tribunal’s decision on permission to appeal was sent (Civil Procedure Rules Practice Direction 52D 3.3).

Case No: JR-2025-LON-000701
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
(IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER)
Field House,
Breams Buildings
London, EC4A 1WR

7 May 2026
Before:

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE O’CALLAGHAN

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Between:

THE KING
on the application of
ATAUR RAHMAN
Applicant
- and -

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Greg Ó Ceallaigh KC
(instructed by Zyba Law), for the applicant

Michael Biggs
(instructed by the Government Legal Department) for the respondent

Hearing date: 2 July 2025

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

J U D G M E N T

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Judge O’Callaghan:
Introduction
1. This judicial review claim concerns a decision of the respondent to cancel the applicant’s leave to enter as a Skilled Worker.
The issues
2. The applicant contends that the cancellation decision is unlawful. It was taken by reference to the wrong legal provisions and without regard to the discretion conferred by both statute and the Immigration Rules.
3. There is an acceptance on the part of the applicant that the materiality of these errors depends on the extent to which his accepted activities were, in fact, in breach of his visa requirements.
4. The applicant has permission to advance four grounds in his substantive challenge. On his behalf, Mr Ó Ceallaigh KC confirmed ground 1 was properly to be considered “issue 1” and the remaining grounds combined constituted “issue 2”.
5. Consequently, this claim raises the following issues:
(1) Is volunteer work for a private business, by a person provided with food only, permitted under the Immigration Rules concerned with Skilled Workers?

(2) Were the circumstances of the applicant’s interview procedurally unfair?
Relevant chronology
6. The applicant is a national of Bangladesh and is aged 26. On 17 October 2023, he was granted entry clearance as a Skilled Worker valid until 16 July 2028. He subsequently entered the United Kingdom on 15 November 2023.
7. He accepts that he began to volunteer as a chef in exchange for food from 4 April 2024, less than six months after his arrival in this country.
8. On 16 May 2024, he was encountered at an Indian takeaway located in Tunbridge Wells, Kent. He was interviewed at the premises without a solicitor. The respondent detained him and curtailed his leave on the same day by notice:
“This notice explains that you are liable to be removed from the United Kingdom (UK). This notice explains that you are a person who is liable to be removed from the United Kingdom (UK).

You do not have permission to enter or stay in the UK.

What this means for you

You are to be detained. The reasons for this are given in the separate notice of reasons for detention.

You do not have a right of appeal against this decision.

The reasons for this decision are set out in the ‘reasons for decision’ section.

Information about help and advice on returning home is in the ‘next steps’ section.

If you want to seek legal advice you must do so now.”
9. The notice is in error as to the applicant not having permission to enter the United Kingdom at the relevant time.
10. The accompanying reasons provided:
“You were encountered by Immigration Enforcement Officers on 16 May 2024 when you ran from the rear of [...] Tunbridge Wells, Kent [...] and were seen to throw your apron in a bin. You stated that you have been working at [...] since 4th April for 20 hours per week. You stated that you work between 1 and 5 hours per day. You stated that your job role is cooking curries part time. You stated that you received food in exchange for working.

You are specifically considered a person who is working in breach of your visa conditions because you entered the United Kingdom on a Skilled Worker Migrant Health & Care visa which was valid from 17th October 2023 to 16th July 2028. The conditions of your visa stated you are allowed to work in the Health and Care sector. You were allowed to do additional work however this has to be in an eligible skilled worker occupation. Working as a cook in a take away is not on this list.

Therefore, you are considered to be working in breach of your visa conditions which is an offence of Section 24(1)(b)(ii) of the Immigration Act 1971 (as amended). As a result, your permission has been curtailed with immediate effect.”
11. The applicant denies that he was employed by the business. He contends that he was volunteering in return for food.
12. On 21 May 2024, the respondent served the applicant with Notice of Intention to Remove and removal directions. The applicant was informed that he would be removed to Bangladesh on 2 June 2024.
13. The following day, the applicant served a pre-action protocol letter prepared by his present legal representatives.
14. On 30 May 2024, the applicant submitted a human rights claim based on article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights, incorporated domestically by the Human Rights Act 1998. Removal directions were subsequently deferred.
15. This claim for judicial review was filed with the Administrative Court on 5 June 2024, with an attendant unlawful detention challenge, and the applicant was released on immigration bail from detention two days later, on 7 June 2024.
16. Permission to apply for judicial review was initially refused following a paper consideration, but was granted by Adrian Eardley KC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, at a hearing held on 23 January 2025. The unlawful detention claim has been transferred to a County Court, and the remainder of the judicial review claim was transferred to the Upper Tribunal.
Legislative Framework
Conditions of leave to enter and remain
17. The respondent’s power to grant and refuse leave to remain, and to impose conditions as an aspect of that leave to remain, is conferred by the Immigration Act 1971 and the Immigration (Leave to Enter and Remain) Order 2000.
18. Section 3 of the 1971 Act provides, as far as is relevant:
“(1) Except as otherwise provided by or under this Act, where a person is not a British citizen … (b) he may be given leave to enter the United Kingdom (or, when already there, leave to remain in the United Kingdom) either for a limited or for an indefinite period;

...

(c) if he is given limited leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom, it may be given subject to all or any of the following conditions, namely -

(i) a condition restricting his work or occupation in the United Kingdom; …’

“(3) In the case of a limited leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom, -

(a) a person’s leave may be varied, whether by restricting, enlarging or removing the limit on its duration, or by adding, varying or revoking conditions, but if the limit on its duration is removed, any conditions attached to the leave shall cease to apply; and

(b) the limitation on and any conditions attached to a person’s leave (whether imposed originally or on a variation) shall, if not superseded, apply also to any subsequent leave he may obtain after an absence from the United Kingdom within the period limited for the duration of the earlier leave.”
19. Articles 2 to 5 of the 2000 Order provides for an automatic conferral of leave to enter where a person with entry clearance enters the United Kingdom.
20. The 1971 Act furnishes the power to make leave to remain conditional by reference to work at section 3(1)(c)(i) (as amended):
“(1) Except as otherwise provided by or under this Act, where a person is not a British citizen -

...

(c) if he is given limited leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom, it may be given subject to all or any of the following conditions, namely -

(i) a condition restricting his work or occupation in the United Kingdom; ...”
21. The sole definition of “work” in the 1971 Act is that provided in section 24B which creates the offence of illegal working. Section 24B(1)):
“The reference in subsection (1) to a person working is to that person working -

(a) under a contract of employment,

(b) under a contract of apprenticeship,

(c) under a contract personally to do work,

(d) under or for the purposes of a contract for services,

(e) for a purpose related to a contract to sell goods,

(f) as a constable,

(g) in the course of Crown employment,

(h) as a relevant member of the House of Commons staff, or

(i) as a relevant member of the House of Lords staff.”
Cancellation / Curtailment
22. The term “cancellation” was introduced on 1 December 2020. It replaced the term “curtailment”, although “curtailment” is still used in some sections of the Rules.
23. The 1971 Act provides a power to cancel leave to remain by reason of a breach of conditions. Section 3(3)(a) confers power on the respondent to vary limited leave to remain by reducing its duration, including by ending the remaining period of leave by an immediate cancellation of that leave:
“(3) In the case of a limited leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom, -

(a) a person’s leave may be varied, whether by restricting, enlarging or removing the limit on its duration, or by adding, varying or revoking conditions, but if the limit on its duration is removed, any conditions attached to the leave shall cease to apply; and…”
24. In this matter, the respondent purported to curtail the applicant’s leave by reference to section 24(1)(b)(ii) of the 1971 Act, which is the criminal offence of knowingly breaching conditions:
“(1) A person who is not a British citizen shall be guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction with a fine of not more than level 5 on the standard scale or with imprisonment for not more than six months, or with both, in any of the following cases: -

...

(b) if, having only a limited leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom, he knowingly either -

(i) Remains beyond the time limited by the leave; or

(ii) fails to observe a condition of leave.”
25. Section 24(1)(b)(ii) of the 1971 Act was repealed on 28 June 2022 by the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 (Commencement No. 1, Transitional and Saving Provisions) Regulations 2022 (SI 2022/590).
26. The statutory provision in its present form, and at the date of the respondent’s decision, is section 24(1)(b) (as amended):
“(b) if, having only a limited leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom, he knowingly fails to observe a condition of leave.”
27. At the time of the respondent’s decision the basis on which leave to remain shall be curtailed was set out in Part 9 of the Rules concerned with grounds for refusal. Part 9 has since been replaced by Part Suitability.
28. The respondent could have considered cancelling the applicant’s leave under the then existing paragraph 9.8.8 of the Rules:
“9.8.8. Permission (including permission extended under section 3C of the Immigration Act 1971) may be cancelled where the person has failed to comply with the conditions of their permission.”
29. “Permission” is defined in paragraph 6.2 of the Rules to mean leave to enter or remain. Paragraph 9.8.8 established a discretionary power.
Skilled Worker
30. The issues arose within the extended framework of Skilled Worker as established in Appendix Skilled Worker to the Rules and by reference to statute.
31. Appendix Skilled Worker provided as to conditions of grant at the material time
“SW 18.2. The grant will be subject to all the following conditions:

...

(b) work is permitted only in the job the applicant is being sponsored for, subject to (c) to (e); and

(c) supplementary employment is permitted, providing the person continues to work in the job for which they are being sponsored (and where the supplementary employment takes place during the 4-month period after the end date of their certificate of sponsorship referred to in SW 18.1A the requirement to continue to work for the sponsor will not apply); and

(d) voluntary work is permitted; and

(e) working out a contracted notice period is permitted, for a job the applicant was lawfully working in on the date of application; ...”
32. Generally, Skilled Workers must work for the sponsor, and in the employment, specified on their Certificate of Sponsorship.
33. Skilled Workers are permitted to undertake voluntary work in addition to the work for which their Certificate of Sponsorship was assigned.
34. “Voluntary work” is defined in paragraph 6.2 of the Rules:
““Voluntary work” has the same meaning as applies to a voluntary worker in the National Minimum Wage Act 1998.””
35. For the purposes of this case, it is relevant to note the definition of “voluntary fieldwork” provided in paragraph 6.2.:
“”Voluntary fieldwork” means activities which would not normally be offered at a waged or salaried rate and which contribute directly to the achievement or advancement of the sponsor’s charitable purpose. It does not include work ancillary to the sponsor’s charitable purpose including, for example, routine back office administrative roles, retail or other sales roles, fund-raising roles and roles involved in the maintenance of the sponsor’s offices and other assets.”
36. Section 44 of the National Minimum Wage Act 1998 provides for an exclusion to the National Minimum Wage for voluntary workers:
“Voluntary workers.

(1) A worker employed by a charity, a voluntary organisation, an associated fund-raising body or a statutory body does not qualify for the national minimum wage in respect of that employment if he receives, and under the terms of his employment (apart from this Act) is entitled to, -

(a) no monetary payments of any description, or no monetary payments except in respect of expenses -

(i) actually incurred in the performance of his duties; or

(ii) reasonably estimated as likely to be or to have been so incurred; and

(b) no benefits in kind of any description, or no benefits in kind other than the provision of some or all of his subsistence or of such accommodation as is reasonable in the circumstances of the employment…

...

(4) In this section -

...

“voluntary organisation” means a body of persons, or the trustees of a trust, which is established only for charitable purposes (whether or not those purposes are charitable within the meaning of any rule of law), benevolent purposes or philanthropic purposes, but which is not a charity.”
37. Section 44 is grouped within sections 43 to 45 of the Act under the hearing “Exclusions”. It protects the position of charities and other organisations that rely upon the services of unpaid volunteers who are termed “voluntary workers” under the Act.
38. Section 54 defines “worker” for the purpose of the 1998 Act:
“(3) In this Act “worker” (except in the phrases “agency worker” and “home worker”) means an individual who has entered into or works under (or, where the employment has ceased, worked under)—
(a) a contract of employment; or
(b) any other contract, whether express or implied and (if it is express) whether oral or in writing, whereby the individual undertakes to do or perform personally any work or services for another party to the contract whose status is not by virtue of the contract that of a client or customer of any profession or business undertaking carried on by the individual;
and any reference to a worker’s contract shall be construed accordingly.”
Relevant policy guidance
i. Skilled Worker caseworker guidance
39. The relevant Skilled Worker guidance in effect on the date of the decision was the respondent’s “Skilled worker caseworker guidance”, Version 11.0 (4 April 2024). As far as relevant, it states at page 64:
“Conditions of stay

This section tells you about the conditions an applicant must meet if they are granted permission on the Skilled Worker route.

Applicants granted entry clearance or permission to stay in the Skilled Worker route are subject to the following conditions:

• they cannot take employment except:

• working for the sponsor in the job recorded on their certificate of sponsorship

• supplementary employment

• voluntary work

• working out a contractual notice period for any job they were lawfully working in on the date of application

• they have no access to public funds

• study (with no limit on the number of study hours if it doesn't interfere with the job they have been sponsored to do) subject to the restriction below

The applicant can do voluntary work in any sector. They must not be paid or receive other money for the voluntary work, except reasonable expenses as described in section 44 of the National Minimum Wage Act.”

ii. Cancellation and Curtailment of permission
40. The respondent’s guidance in respect of cancellation at the time of the decision was “Cancellation and curtailment of permission”, Version 5.0 (5 March 2024). At page 53 the policy addressed the use of discretion when considering cancellation:
“In cases where the reasons for cancellation are discretionary, you must not automatically cancel an individual’s entry clearance or permission if there are reasons that suggest it may not be appropriate to do so.

It is the Secretary of State’s responsibility to establish the reasons why an individual’s entry clearance or permission is to be cancelled. You must establish the relevant facts and then carefully consider all an individual’s relevant circumstances and the proven facts of the case before you make a final decision.

You must consider any other facts or evidence about the individual’s circumstances, such as those recorded on CID, provided with an application or stored on a case file that is relevant to your decision.

In cases where you must consider discretion, you must record your consideration and the reasons for your decision on whether to exercise discretion on the casework system. You must also explain your decision on whether you exercised discretion in the decision letter, so an individual can see that you considered the circumstances of their case.”

iii. Enforcement interviews
41. The respondent’s “Enforcement Interviews” Version 2.0 (22 December 2020) applies to investigative interviews in connection with administrative interviews. It confirms in its introduction:
“Immigration enforcement officers may choose to try and engage any person they encounter in normal conversation but, where the purpose of the conversation is to gather information for a law enforcement purpose it is a formal interview and must be conducted in accordance with this guidance. An enforcement interview is distinct from a normal conversation in that its purpose is to seek out and evaluate information for a specific purpose.

The different types of enquiry or investigation commonly conducted by Immigration Enforcement officers are:

Administrative enquiries - interview(s) that follow 3 distinct stages:

• exploratory questioning

• initial examination under paragraphs 2 or 2A of schedule 2 to the Immigration Act 1971

• further examination – usually away from the scene.”
42. At page 6:
“In the case of Singh v Hammond, the Court held that:

‘An examination [under paragraph 2 of Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act 1971] ... can properly be conducted by an immigration officer away from the place of entry and on a later date after the person has already entered ... if the immigration officer has some information in his possession which causes him to enquire whether the person being examined is a British citizen and, if not, ...whether he should be given leave and on what conditions.’

Where you have information (including from observations) that leads you reasonably suspect that the person is in breach of immigration law, the judgement of the court in Singh v Hammond supports the exercise of your power to conduct an in-country examination of the person to establish their immigration status.”
43. Establishing whether a person is liable to be examined under Schedule 2 to the 1971 Act is addressed at pages 6 and 7.
44. Guidance is provided as to cooperation with exploratory questioning at pages 8 and 9. Reference is made to:
“If, as a result of your exploratory questioning, you form reasonable grounds to suspect that the person may be in breach of immigration law you may lawfully question that person about their identity and status by means of an initial examination interview under Paragraph 2 of Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act 1971.”
45. As to initial administrative interviews, the guidance provides, inter alia:
“An initial examination interview takes place where, as a result of exploratory questioning or other information, you have established reasonable grounds to suspect that the person is subject to immigration control, may be in breach of the immigration rules or have committed an offence under immigration law.”

“The purpose of an initial administrative interview is formally to:

• establish whether a person has committed a breach of immigration law and/or

• gather evidence or supporting information in relation to (1) from a third party (see: interviewing witnesses in administrative cases)

• identify whether a person is liable to be detained and removed under administrative powers.”
46. Administrative interviews may be conducted in the field or may be pre-arranged and conducted in an office.
47. Further examination is addressed at pages 13 to 14. Guidance includes:
“A further examination under Paragraph 2 and 2A of Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act 1971 is one intended to elicit further information or clarify information given during the initial examination. It is usually conducted at a place other than the original place of arrest; such as a police station or immigration office.

Before a person is interviewed as part of further examination, they and, if they are represented, their legal representative, must be given sufficient information to enable them to understand the nature of any such breach, and why they are suspected of committing it.”
48. Guidance on legal representatives and their role during an interview is addressed at page 24:
“It is Home Office policy to allow persons being administratively interviewed about their status under the Immigration Act 1971 to be legally represented at their own cost. They may also request to be accompanied by a friend or companion. The role of the friend or companion is solely to provide emotional or physical support and they must not intervene during the interview.

Legal representatives should be given the opportunity to privately consult with their client before an interview takes place. ...”
Relevant case law
Voluntary work
49. In R (Andrews) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWHC 64 (Admin) the claimant entered the United Kingdom on a Skilled Worker visa for healthcare on 8 June 2023 for the purpose of commencing work on 1 July 2023. She was encountered by Immigration Enforcement while working in a convenience store on 28 June 2023. The claimant said she was merely volunteering in a friend’s store in order to give assistance. The High Court confirmed that in order to be carrying out “voluntary work” for the purpose of the Rules, an individual had to not merely be working for no remuneration, but also had to be employed by a charity, voluntary organisation, associated fund-raising body or statutory body. HHJ Walden-Smith, sitting as a Judge of the High Court, at paragraphs 23 to 25, 28 and 32:
“23. Consequently, to be a voluntary worker within the meaning given by section 44 of the [National Minimum Wage Act] 1998, an individual is not merely working for no remuneration. The worker has to be employed by a charity, voluntary organisation, an associated fund-raising body or a statutory body who is not entitled to any monetary payments of any description and no benefits in kind.

24. Insofar as there is a conflict between the interpretation of the rules and regulation and guidance, the former takes precedent (as set out in [Cakani v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] EWHC 16 (Admin)]). Lady Carmichael in the Scottish case (RF) & Another v SSHD [2017] CSOH 130 held that: "The rules are, as the Upper Tribunal indicated in [Sultana and Others (rules: waiver/further enquiry; discretion) [2014] UKUT 450 (IAC)], hierarchically superior to statements of policy in immigration directorate instructions. The content of prescribed applications forms likely cannot override or modify the statements of policy in the rules."

25. The hierarchy is, therefore, the statute, the rules and regulations, and then the guidance. In this matter, where the rules refer to “voluntary work” the meaning is to be taken from the NMWA 1998. "Voluntary work is not only for no remuneration but is, crucially, for the benefit of a charity, voluntary organisation or related fund-raising or other statutory body.”

“28. Section 44(4) of the NMWA 1998 provides a definition for the various organisations referred to in section 44(1) as providing voluntary employment, namely a charity, a voluntary organisation, an associated fund-raising body or a statutory body. It is not suggested that the Charlton Convenience Store fulfils any of these definitions. The definition given to "voluntary fieldwork" within the Immigration Rules gives support to the interpretation that "voluntary work" is not merely that it is work that is not paid for but has to be work for a charity or voluntary organisation, or similar. The definition of "voluntary fieldwork" being "activities which would not normally be offered at a waged or salaried rate, and which contribute directly to the achievement or advancement of the sponsor's charitable purposes."

“32. Insofar as there is any conflict between what is given as guidance and the rules or statute, then the Immigration Rules prevail over any guidance and the statute (namely the Immigration Act 1971) takes precedence over both the Rules and regulations and the guidance. Voluntary work is permitted for someone with a specific job to take up but only in accordance with the regulations. Ms Andrews was not working in accordance with the regulations.”
Parties’ submissions
Applicant
50. The applicant submits that the respondent’s decision is unlawful. She purported to curtail his leave by reference to section 24(1)(b)(ii) of the 1971 Act that provides her with no such power. Moreover, the power she could have exercised is one that confers a discretion which, presumably because she did not apply it, was unarguably not exercised.
Issue 1
51. Volunteering in a private business is permissible because the Rules do not limit voluntary work to the organisations set out in section 44 of the 1998 Act. The Rules could easily have established a limit for example as they do for “voluntary work” which is done by a person who “is” a voluntary worker for the purposes of section 44, or who works for a “voluntary organisation” as defined in section 44(4). The Rules therefore regulate “voluntary work”, by reference to the remuneration, and do not define who undertakes it. This is consistent with the statutory scheme, which when reading section 3(1)(c)(i) of the 1971 Act consistently with section 24B(10) of the same Act does not permit a ban on voluntary work at all. The latter provision tightly defines the circumstances in which a person is considered to be “working” for the purposes of the illegal working offence. A power to prohibit volunteering, a draconian state of affairs, cannot simply be assumed.
52. There is no limitation on individuals on certain visas volunteering in other sectors, whether to obtain further experience, or contacts, or for social reasons. There is a clear social value to such work being permitted, always provided it is not disguised alternative employment, that is that those with relevant visas are not remunerated in breach of the rules “as applied to” a person who is a voluntary worker for the purposes of the 1998 Act.
53. The definition of “voluntary work” as it applies to a voluntary worker in section 44 of the 1998 Act is work that results in: (i) no financial remuneration; and (ii) no benefits in kind, save for the provision of subsistence. The applicant contends that this precisely describes his volunteering.
54. As for the decision in Andrews, the applicant submits:
i. It is not clear the extent to which the Judge of the High Court was actually addressed on the question of whether there is a distinction between a “voluntary worker” and “voluntary work”, but appears to have largely presumed that they are the same, at paragraphs 22 to 23 of the decision. Certainly, the arguments now advanced by the applicant in respect of the statutory scheme or the language of the provisions are not addressed at all.

ii. Whilst the Judge of the High Court was plainly right to hold that the respondent’s policy, which at the material time supported the applicant’s interpretation of the Rules and has since been changed to reflect the respondent’s new position, cannot be used as an aid to interpreting the Rules, this is not and never has been the applicant’s argument. The applicant simply says that the guidance as it stood then correctly stated the position and is the obvious meaning of the Rule.

iii. Insofar as the Judge of the High Court considers that the definition of “voluntary fieldwork” elsewhere in the Rules lends support to her conclusions, that is not explained. If anything, the fact of the separate provisions supports the applicant’s case. CW 4.2. of Immigration Rules Appendix Temporary Work - Charity Worker, concerned with sponsorship requirements for a charity worker, which, while making it plain these are entirely separate matters, strongly indicates that the key issue for the present Rule is remuneration rather than the nature of the organisation:

“CW 4.2. The sponsor must ensure the role meets the following requirements:

(a) it is voluntary fieldwork which contributes directly to the achievement or advancement of the sponsor’s charitable purpose; and

(b) it must be voluntary work and not be paid or otherwise remunerated, including receipt of benefits in kind, except for reasonable expenses and the provision of accommodation as is reasonable in the circumstances as defined in the National Minimum Wage Act 1988; and

(c) the applicant must not be filling a permanent position, including on a temporary basis.”
55. The applicant contends that the High Court erred in Andrews by asking the wrong question at paragraph 23. The rule is concerned with “voluntary work”, which is a term of art, and so the Court should have asked itself “what is voluntary work?” Instead, it asked itself what is a voluntary worker? When the correct question is asked, the answer “work for free” applies to the applicant.
56. The applicant submits his analysis is convenient, well-used and perfectly sensible shorthand for the limitations on voluntary work: that it must be work that is not in any meaningful sense paid.
57. He observes that the respondent does not dispute that he was volunteering at the business. It follows that the voluntary work undertaken by the applicant was not in breach of his visa condition and any decision to cancel his leave to remain, had it been taken by reference to the correct legal powers and by reference to the correct Rules, and had discretion been exercised, would have been unlawful in any event.
Issue 2
58. In the alternative, the decision to cancel the applicant’s leave to remain was unlawful because the interview to which he was subjected was procedurally unfair. At the time of the interview, he was plainly in jeopardy, akin to the situation in R (Kumar) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWHC 1741 (Admin), [2023] 4 WLR 66. On no proper view could it be seen as an “initial interview”; it was specifically for the purpose of cancelling his leave and so the need for procedural protections identified in Kumar applies a fortiori.
59. Mr Ó Ceallaigh acknowledged that he was not running a “Tameside” argument: Secretary of State for Education and Science v Tameside MBC [1977] AC 1014. The applicant’s case was narrower than the decision-maker in this matter being required to seek out the relevant information to make their decision. The applicant should have been apprised of the danger he was in and should have been given the opportunity to have legal representation. He was not. The prejudice that flowed is best illustrated by the fact that the decision was ultimately made: (i) by reference to the wrong statute; and (ii) without reference to a discretion that had to be exercised in the correct statutory and Rules and policy framework; and (iii) on the incorrect basis that volunteering is in fact working for the purposes of the Act and the Rules.
Respondent
Issue 1
60. In short, the respondent submits that the answer to issue 1 is that the applicant was not undertaking “voluntary work” for the purposes of paragraph SW18.2(d) and paragraph 6.2 of the Rules, having regard to the decision of Andrews.
61. The respondent submits the words “as applies to” in the paragraph 6.2 definition merely direct attention to section 44(1) of the 1998 Act, which, as was explained in Andrews, amongst other things, only covers voluntary work undertaken for particular types or categories of employers, that is for particular categories of "voluntary worker”. The applicant’s argument ignores the words “as applies to a voluntary worker in the National Minimum Wage Act 1998” which make clear that the definition is constituted by those “voluntary worker[s]” covered by section 44 (1), and is not concerned merely with the nature of the work that is undertaken, let alone with the remuneration (or absence of remuneration) that is provided for that work.
62. Additionally, contrary to the applicant’s submission, the definition of ‘voluntary fieldwork’ in paragraph CW 4.2 is clearly inconsistent with his proposed meaning of the paragraph 6.2 definition of “voluntary work”, as was observed in Andrews. Paragraph CW 4.2 specifically requires that the work is both “voluntary work” (a reference to the paragraph 6.2 definition) and that the work be for no pay or other form of remuneration.
Issue 2
63. The respondent’s position is that the applicant was not treated procedurally unfairly. He was interviewed before the cancellation decision was made, and the interview gave the applicant a fair opportunity to advance his case. There was no duty to do more. Additionally, he was not treated unfairly because he was interviewed, and the decision made, without him requesting legal advice and assistance. In all the circumstances, the applicant received a fair procedure.
64. The Tribunal was invited to be sensitive to the need to ensure that the administrative and legal scheme is not undermined by the content of the duty to act procedurally fairly, which would tend to be undermined by procedural fairness duties that do not permit immediate cancellation of leave in appropriate cases.
Discussion
65. By her decision dated 16 May 2024, the respondent curtailed the applicant’s leave to enter as she considered that he was working in breach of his visa conditions which “is an offence under section 24(1)(b)(ii) of the Immigration Act 1971 (as amended)”. Both this statutory provision and its successor are concerned with establishing a criminal offence; not with cancellation or curtailment.
66. Mr Biggs contended on behalf of the respondent that though the text of the decision letter did not address discretion, it was lawful as it is quite clear the decision-maker thought the breach of conditions was sufficiently severe and that was the answer in respect of discretion. There was no need to repeat this conclusion by separate text.
67. I conclude that it cannot properly be read from the citing of a repealed statutory provision concerned with criminality that discretion not to curtail leave was lawfully considered. There is no clear identification by the decision maker that they could exercise discretion vested in them, nor that they actively exercised it. I consider that it is insufficiently clear that discretion could not lawfully have been exercised in the applicant’s favour.
68. However, my finding as to the failure to exercise discretion is not the conclusion of this matter. On behalf of the applicant, Mr Ó Ceallaigh acknowledges there remains a requirement to establish the materiality of the error and he properly abides by Lord Steyn’s maxim in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Pierson [1998] AC 539, 585D that “in public law the emphasis should be on substance rather than form”.
Is volunteer work for a private business, by a person provided with food only, permitted under the Immigration Rules concerned with Skilled Worker?
69. I turn to issue 1. The respondent contends that there is but one answer namely the judgment of the High Court in Andrews.
70. Mr Ó Ceallaigh invites the Upper Tribunal to depart from the High Court’s interpretation of “voluntary work” in Andrews having heard fuller argument on the basis that the interpretation of the Rules is erroneous. In the circumstances, the establishment of such error was identified as a powerful argument for the Upper Tribunal adopting such approach.
Comity
71. I am required as a preliminary step in my assessment to consider comity, which is part of the law’s concern to maintain continuity in the common law and is based on courtesy, respect and the need for reciprocity. It has been noted, not always favourably, that the principle is of “very elastic content”, it being neither a matter of absolute obligation, on one hand, nor of mere good will, upon the other: see Dicey, Morris and Collins on the Conflict of Law (16th edn, 2022, Sweet & Maxwell) at [7-002].
72. It means respecting the substantive decisions of other judges of a co-ordinate level; and of being bound by the decisions of judges at a higher level. This contributes to coherence and certainty within the legal system and likely contributes to efficient and more cost-effective use of resources with the same point not normally being re-argued at length and cost before different judges of coordinate jurisdiction. In applying the rule of comity, consideration is given to the substance of the issue, not to its form.
73. In Police Authority for Huddersfield v Watson [1947] KB 842, at 848, Lord Goddard CJ explained the principle in respect of the High Court:
“I can only say for myself that I think the modern practice, and the modern view of the subject, is that a judge of first instance, though he would always follow the decision of another judge of first instance, unless he is convinced the judgment is wrong, would follow it as a matter of judicial comity. He certainly is not bound to follow the decision of a judge of equal jurisdiction. He is only bound to follow the decisions which are binding on him, which, in the case of a judge of first instance, are the decisions of the Court of Appeal, the House of Lords and the Divisional Court.”
74. The decision in Huddersfield has since been cited with approval on several occasions, for example in Etihad Airways PJSC v Flöther [2019] EWHC 3107 (Comm), [2020] QB 793, per Jacobs J at paragraph 172, and in D v Persons Unknown [2021] EWHC 157 (QB), per Tipples J at paragraph 78.
75. Unless the position in an earlier substantive decision of a coordinate jurisdiction is properly distinguishable from the circumstances of a case before them, a judge of the High Court should follow the decision unless they are convinced that it is wrong (Robert Goff LJ (as he then was) per curiam in R v Greater Manchester Coroner, ex parte Tal [1985] QB 67, 81A-B) or unless there is a powerful reason for not doing so (Lord Neuberger PSC in Willers v Joyce (No 2) [2016] UKSC 44, [2018] AC 843, at paragraph 9).
76. The High Court has applied the principle of comity in respect of substantive judicial review judgments, for example in R (Jollah) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] EWHC 330 (Admin), per Lewis J (as he then was) at paragraphs 46 and 47.
Application of comity by the Upper Tribunal
77. Under section 3(5) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 the Upper Tribunal is constituted as a superior court of record. Through such status, it can create precedent. It is an authoritative, impartial and independent source for the interpretation and application of relevant statutory texts: R (Cart) v The Upper Tribunal [2009] EWHC 3052 (Admin), [2010] 2 WLR 2012, per Laws LJ at paragraph 94.
78. Whether or not a particular court or tribunal is bound by another court is a matter, ultimately, of Parliamentary intention. A “superior” court binds an “inferior” court. There is no doubt that, when applying the law of England and Wales, the Upper Tribunal is bound by decisions of the Court of Appeal on issues of law in accordance with the ordinary rules of precedent. This follows from its status as a higher court, to which the State provides a direct right of appeal.
79. The Upper Tribunal is not bound by its previous decisions but, as a matter of comity, it should normally follow an earlier substantive decision of one of its Chambers that is directly on point unless satisfied that the decision is wrong so as to avoid confusion on questions of legal principle. This is so because the Upper Tribunal gives respect to decisions of equal status. However, adherence may be deviated from where the Tribunal is satisfied by powerful reasons that the earlier decision is wrong.
80. The legislative structure of the 2007 Act does not have any place for the High Court in the Tribunals’ appeals structure. There is no indication within the statutory regime that High Court decisions have binding effect on the Upper Tribunal.
81. Other than when the High Court is exercising its supervisory jurisdiction, the Upper Tribunal is not bound, as a matter of stare decisis, by decisions of the High Court by Parliamentary intention. This principle is long-established, for example Lawton LJ in Chief Supplementary Benefit Officer v Leary [1985] 1 All ER 1061, at 1064-5. This is replicated in respect of the Employment Appeal Tribunal, also a superior court of record, which asserted a right to depart from High Court decisions as long ago as 1975, although treating them as of “great persuasive authority”: see Portec (UK) v Mogensen [1976] 3 All ER 565. The principle was re-affirmed by Carnwath LJ (as he then was) sitting as the Senior President of Tribunals with HHJ Phillip Sycamore and UTJ Rowland in the Administrative Appeals Chamber of the Upper Tribunal, in Secretary of State for Justice v RB [2010] UKUT 454, at paragraphs 39 to 43.
82. The supervisory jurisdiction has been significantly restricted by section 11A of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007. The Court of Appeal confirmed in R (LA (Albania)) v Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) [2023] EWCA Civ 1337, [2024] 1 WLR 1673 a mere assertion that one of the section 11A(4) exceptions permitting review of an Upper Tribunal decision applied is not sufficient to establish jurisdiction to apply for judicial review of a Upper Tribunal decision; a genuinely disputable question has to be shown.
83. The relationship between the High Court and the Upper Tribunal is characterised by mutual respect and recognition of respective expertise and consequently the principle explained in Police Authority for Huddersfield v Watson is applicable. A decision of the High Court will normally be followed by the Upper Tribunal as a matter of comity unless the Tribunal is satisfied by powerful reasons that the decision is wrong.
84. I observe the qualification identified by the then Senior President of Tribunals in Secretary of State for Justice v RB, at paragraph 41:
“41. The one qualification that we would suggest to this formulation arises from the particular nature of the Upper Tribunal’s jurisdiction, in line with the statement of Lady Hale in AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State [2007] UKHL 49 para [30] (repeating comments she had made in the Court of Appeal in Cooke v Secretary of State for Social Security [2001] EWCA Civ 734, [2002] 3 All ER 279). She emphasised the highly specialised character of some legislation before the tribunals, and the need for the higher courts to respect their expertise. Consistently with that approach, where such specialised issues arise before the Upper Tribunal, it may in a proper case feel less inhibited in revisiting issues decided even at High Court level, if there is good reason to do so.”
85. I do not consider the interpretation of statute in this matter to be highly specialised.
86. Consequently, and observing comity, this Tribunal should follow the decision of the Administrative Court in Andrews unless convinced it is wrong or unless there is a powerful reason for not doing so. It is not sufficient simply for a party to contend that fuller argument had been advanced to justify not respecting a substantive decision on point by a judge of a co-ordinate level.
Is volunteer work permitted under the Rules concerned with Skilled Worker?
87. Turning to the applicant’s case, it is said there is a distinction between a “voluntary worker” and “voluntary work”. Further, whilst the Rules regulate “voluntary work” by reference to remuneration the applicant submits that they do not define who undertakes it.
88. I observe that Mr Ó Ceallaigh did not seek to draw a further distinction between “volunteer” and “voluntary work”. He was correct not to do so. The term “volunteer” is not a term of art, and its usual meaning is someone who has an arrangement with an organisation which does not entitle them to a financial rewards or benefit in kind for the work they perform under the arrangement. Additionally, “volunteering” does not have a single statutory definition. On the applicant’s own case, he volunteered as a chef in exchange for food, established by oral contract for services with the necessary mutuality of obligation. Consequently, his case is advanced before this Tribunal in respect of “voluntary work”.
89. The Supreme Court said in Mahad (Ethiopia) v Entry Clearance Officer [2009] UKSC 16, [2010] 1 WLR 48, at paragraph 10, that the Rules should not be construed with the strictness appropriate for a statute or a statutory instrument, but rather should be construed sensibly according to the natural and ordinary meaning of the words used, recognising that they are statements of the respondent’s administrative policy. Consequently, “applies to” has its ordinary everyday meaning in legislation, namely that a rule, statement, or concept is relevant, pertinent, or has bearing. In this matter, “applies to” defines substantive scope.
90. I agree with Mr Biggs that the definition of “voluntary work” under the Rules is to be read in its entirety, namely that it has the “same meaning as applies to a voluntary worker in the National Minimum Wage Act 1998”.
91. In Best v St Austell China Clay Museum Ltd UKEAT/0924/03/TM (11 June 2004), the appellant challenged a decision that he was excluded from entitlement to the national minimum wage. He had been a caretaker for a registered charity, for which he received no wages but free accommodation. He was found by the Employment Tribunal to be employed under a contract of service, so was a worker under section 54(3)(a) of the 1998 Act, but he was a voluntary worker falling within section 44 and so was not protected by the Act. Before the Employment Appeal Tribunal, the appellant contended that “voluntary worker” means a worker who is a volunteer and sought to define the term as a person who assists a charitable organisation without obligation to do so. The Employment Appeal Tribunal concluded on this issue, at paragraph 29, that the meaning and purpose of section 44 of the 1998 Act and its heading “voluntary workers” is pellucidly clear. It concerns (voluntary) workers, as defined in section 54, employed (working) in the voluntary sector as defined in section 44(1), who do not receive pay, but do receive subsistence, expenses or free accommodation in circumstances relevant to employment.
92. I adopt the interpretation of the expert Employment Appeal Tribunal as to the scope and substance of section 44 of the 1998 Act. Such interpretation was established prior to the coming into force of Appendix Skilled Worker on 1 December 2020. The definition provided by paragraph 6.2 is clear as to voluntary work not being concerned merely with the nature of work that is undertaken, nor with the remuneration or its absence. It also covers voluntary work undertaken for identified types or categories of employers, that is for particular categories of “voluntary worker”.
93. The applicant further contends that section 3(1)(c)(i) of the 1971 Act when read consistently with section 24B(10) of the same Act does not permit a ban on voluntary work at all and so the power to prevent it is draconian. The latter was inserted by section 34 of the Immigration Act 2016 from 12 July 2016 and is specifically directed to illegal working. It cannot properly be read as limiting the scope of the 1998 Act which was introduced to establish a general right for workers, lawfully working, to receive a minimum hourly rate of pay.
94. As to the applicant’s submission as to the purported aid provided by the definition of ‘voluntary fieldwork” elsewhere in the Rules, I note that the definition was addressed by the High Court in Andrews. I agree with Mr Biggs that Paragraph CW 4.2 specifically requires that the work is both “voluntary work” (a reference to the paragraph 6.2 definition) and that the work be for no pay or other form of remuneration. This paragraph of the Rules does not aid the applicant.
95. I do not consider the decision in Andrews to be wrong and I observe comity.
96. Noting the ratio in Andrews, in order to be carrying out voluntary work for the purpose of the Rules, the applicant had not only to be working for no remuneration, but he also had to be employed by a charity, voluntary organisation, associated fund-raising body, or statutory body. Working for food at a takeaway in May 2024 was not carrying out voluntary work within the meaning of the Rules.
97. I dismiss the applicant’s challenge on issue 1.
Were the circumstances of the applicant’s interview procedurally unfair?
98. The applicant was encountered by immigration enforcement officers on 16 May 2024. It is said by the respondent that he was observed running from the rear of the takeaway and seen to throw an apron in a bin. The reasons for the respondent’s decision, dated the same day, record an admission by the applicant that he had been working for the business for twenty hours per week from 4 April 2024 and that he worked between one to five hours per day. The applicant’s assertion that he worked as a chef and received food in return for working was noted.
99. By his statement dated 22 May 2024 the applicant details that he understood he was permitted to “play a voluntary role anywhere besides my current sponsorship”. He states that the respondent, “did not want to hear my position and curtailed leave outright”. It is also said that the applicant requested that those at the takeaway be contacted before leave was curtailed to be asked whether he was employed by them, “but they did not want to hear anything and detained me”.
100. The applicant relies upon a witness statement from Sajeda Rahman, a company director, dated 29 May 2024. Mr Rahman states that the applicant “was playing a voluntary role in my takeaway”, and “as he visits us, I offer him food as a complement.” Mr Rahman expressed his frustration that the respondent found the applicant to be an employee without enquiring with him.
101. Reliance is also placed on a witness statement from Kamal Ahmed, dated 21 May 2025. Mr Ahmed is the takeaway manager. He states that the applicant has never been employed at the take-away. He occasionally assists as a volunteer, and in recognition of his voluntary contributions “we provide him with a meal as a complement. The meals provided to him are merely a gesture of goodwill and not a form of payment”.
102. The applicant contends that at the time of being interviewed during the enforcement visit he was plainly in jeopardy, and in no way could the interview be seen as an “initial interview”. Its sole purpose was in relation to making a decision whether to curtail his leave. Consequently, he should have been appraised of the position he was in vis-a-vis the risk to his immigration leave and been given the opportunity to have legal representation. He was informed of neither and his case is that he suffered prejudice.
103. I note the respondent’s enforcement interviews guidance addressed above, particularly the guidance as to administrative interviews, further examination and the role of legal representatives during an interview.
104. The respondent implicitly accepts through Mr Biggs’ skeleton argument that the applicant was not informed that he could seek legal advice and assistance. It is observed that the applicant did not ask for a lawyer’s help, nor did he appear to have ready access to a lawyer at the material time.
105. The Court of Appeal said in R (Kumar) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWHC 1741, [2023] 4 WLR 66 that a distinction could properly be drawn on the facts of the case between the type of short interview conducted at the first point of contact and a subsequent more in-depth interview. Of crucial importance with the latter is that an applicant may be detained without his consent, his permission to be in this country may be suspended, and he would be interviewed to ascertain information which would enable a decision-maker to apply a complex set of rules and potentially exercise a discretion to determine. It was observed by the Court of Appeal that there is no way of appealing or challenging a curtailment decision made following interview other than by an application for judicial review. When a decision-maker is considering curtailing / cancelling leave, the applicant is at that point in jeopardy. The route that the decision-maker then takes depends on the information which he would be asked to provide in interview in the absence of an understanding of the complex rules in play and in the absence of legal advice.
106. When considering whether procedural unfairness flows from an immigration enforcement interview, each case will be fact specific and ultimately it is an objective question for this Tribunal to decide. What fairness demands is dependent on the context of the decision. The Court of Appeal addressed in Balajigari v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 673, [2019] 1 WLR 4647 the requirement placed upon the respondent, when she was minded to make a decision on the basis of dishonesty or other reprehensible conduct, to indicate her suspicion clearly to the applicant to give them an opportunity to respond, and to take that response into account before concluding that there had been such conduct. However, the Court confirmed at paragraph 56 of its judgment that an interview is not necessary in all cases.
107. Upon careful consideration, I agree with Mr Ó Ceallaigh. The decision-maker may well have been influenced by seeing the applicant leave the building, and his subsequent admission as to working at the takeaway for over a month. I accept that the interview was conducted with the applicant when he was at jeopardy of having his leave curtailed. The decision-maker did not pause and consider how to proceed to ensure fairness.
108. I observe that at the material time the relevant decision-maker was unaware of the correct power under which curtailment could operate and so was unaware that the appropriate power was discretionary in nature. The observation of the applicant and his admission may well have influenced the decision maker to assume that the requirements for curtailment were met which resulted in a belief that no further in-depth information needed to be sought. The applicant states that he requested the management of the takeaway be approached to provide information as to the nature of his voluntary work, but this was rejected. The evidence from Mr Rahman and Mr Ahmed confirms that no subsequent enquiries were made of management in respect of the applicant. Further information from the takeaway’s management may have provided a clearer understanding of the applicant’s role. No information was sought that could be of aid to the applicant when the discretion was to be exercised. I conclude that the decision-maker had not taken appropriate, and fair, steps to identify the full picture, nor had the applicant been given adequate opportunity to address any element of his wider personal circumstances that he would wish to be placed in the assessment of discretion.
109. The requirement of procedural fairness applies to both aspects of the decision-making process in this matter, namely the assessment of whether the applicant had failed to comply with a condition of his leave to enter, and the exercise of discretion to cancel leave. The decision at the time of the enforcement visit to curtail the applicant’s leave with immediate effect was vitiated by procedural unfairness in the decision-making process.
110. Mr Biggs requested on behalf of the respondent that if procedural unfairness were found to arise in this matter, relief should be refused as the unfairness was highly likely not to have made a substantial difference to the decision. My attention was drawn to R v Chief Constable of Thames Valley Police, ex parte Cotton [1990] IRLR 344, at paragraph 60, and R (Kanwal) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] EWHC 2071 (Admin), at paragraph 70.
111. Whilst the applicant may have to persuade the respondent to exercise discretion in his favour, I do not accept the respondent can only make one decision in respect of discretion. In reaching this conclusion, I note the evidence of Mr Rahman and Mr Ahmed which will be for the respondent to properly assess.
Conclusion
112. The applicant succeeds on issue 2, which incorporates grounds 2 to 4, and so the respondent’s decision to cancel the applicant’s leave to enter as a Skilled Worker, dated 16 May 2024 will be quashed.
Further Steps
113. I invite the parties to agree an order reflecting my judgment, with attendant consequential orders if deemed necessary.
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