Tribunal decisions

The decision

Case No: JR-2025-LON-001377
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
(IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER)
Field House,
Breams Buildings
London, EC4A 1WR

6th August 2026

Before:

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HOFFMAN

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Between:

THE KING
on the application of
PANDIAN PERIAKARUPPAN
Applicant
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SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

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Mr J Martin
(instructed by Indra Sebastian Solicitors), for the applicant

Mr J Fletcher
(instructed by the Government Legal Department) for the respondent

Hearing date: 1st July 2026

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J U D G M E N T

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Judge Hoffman:

Introduction

1. The applicant seeks judicial review of the respondent’s decision dated 20 February 2025 to certify his asylum claim as clearly unfounded pursuant to s.94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (“the 2002 Act”). The effect of the certificate is that the applicant is not entitled to an appeal against the respondent’s decision.

2. The applicant’s amended grounds of claim raise two separate heads of challenge. However, as the respondent observes in her detailed grounds of defence, the second ground is essentially a re-wording of the first. Furthermore, the applicant’s skeleton argument also acknowledges that there is a single issue to be determined in this case: whether the applicant’s asylum claim is clearly unfounded; in other words, does it have a realistic prospect of success on appeal before an immigration judge.

3. For the reasons set out below, the claim is dismissed.

Background

4. The applicant is a national of India, born in 1983.

5. In 2019, he made two unsuccessful applications for visas to travel to the United Kingdom. Thereafter, he arrived in the country illegally on 12 November 2022 by small boat and was immediately detained. He claimed asylum two days later following which he was released on bail. An asylum screening interview took place on 8 December 2022; however, it was not until 19 July 2024 that his substantive asylum interview was arranged.

6. During the course of his screening interview, the applicant claimed that he was fleeing India because he would “be chopped up and killed” on account of “an ongoing family feud”.

7. However, by the time of the substantive interview, his claim had changed significantly. He now contended that he would be at risk from other members of the BJP because he was unable to repay a loan they had given him to set up his business. He had taken out a bank loan to repay the men, but then had to spend that money on repairing his house after it was attacked. Furthermore, local Muslims associated with the rival DMK party, who held power in the state, had boycotted his shop because of his association with the Hindu BJP. According to the applicant, he had nevertheless been tasked by the BJP with infiltrating a DMK meeting in early February 2020 at which he challenged a politician named Siva Meiyanathan who had given a speech criticising the BJP. The applicant was then assaulted and abused by the DMK supporters. He escaped, but his shop was vandalised and destroyed later that night. The police failed to investigate his complaint. In June 2020, the applicant witnessed a fight between DMK supporters and unspecified others. The DMK supporters told Mr Meiyanathan that the applicant had been responsible for the fight and Mr Meiyanathan used his political influence to bribe the police to arrest him. The applicant was arrested the following day and jailed for eight days. He was released on bail. Unable to work, the applicant struggled to make ends meet. In June 2022, the police returned, took him to a forest, and beat him up. The BJP officials refused to help him because he owed them money. The applicant therefore paid a Sri Lankan agent to help him travel to the United Kingdom.

8. On 16 August 2024, the respondent refused the applicant’s asylum claim and certified it as clearly unfounded. However, the respondent subsequently withdrew that decision after the applicant complained that the respondent had failed to give him the opportunity to forward translations of documents he had received from India.

9. On 14 February 2025, the applicant was referred to the National Referral Mechanism as a potential victim of modern slavery. However, on 20 February 2025, a negative reasonable grounds decision was made.

10. On 20 February 2025, the respondent revisited and refused and certified the applicant’s asylum claim. That is the decision under challenge in these proceedings.

The respondent’s decision

11. The respondent’s decision dated 20 February 2025 refused the applicant’s asylum and human rights claim and certified it as clearly unfounded under s.94 of the 2002 Act, concluding that any appeal would be bound to fail and therefore attracted no in-country right of appeal.

12. The respondent took the facts of the applicant’s case at their highest, and raised no issue about the inconsistencies between the reasons given by the applicant for claiming asylum in his screening and substantive asylum interviews. The decision found that the incidents relied upon – said to involve threats from local political actors, police, and others arising from his BJP involvement – did not amount to persecution and were characterised as isolated acts of “rogue” actors rather than evidence of systemic or state-sanctioned harm. It was further concluded that the applicant had not demonstrated a well-founded fear of persecution or a real risk of serious harm on return, given the availability of effective state protection in India, including avenues of redress against police misconduct, and the absence of evidence that those he feared had the reach or influence to harm him nationwide. The respondent also found that internal relocation within India, including to major cities such as New Delhi, Chennai, Hyderabad or Mumbai, would be reasonable and not unduly harsh, taking into account the applicant’s personal circumstances, work history, language, and family support.

13. For similar reasons, the respondent rejected the applicant’s claims under Articles 2 and 3 ECHR, concluding there was no real risk of death, torture, or inhuman or degrading treatment, and she found no basis for a grant of leave on Article 8 grounds given the absence of family life in the UK or very significant obstacles to his reintegration. Humanitarian protection and discretionary leave were refused, including on medical grounds, on the basis that appropriate treatment was available in India. The claim was therefore certified as wholly lacking in substance and bound to fail on any legitimate view.

The application for judicial review

14. The applicant filed his application for permission to apply for judicial review on 30 April 2025.

15. Permission was refused on the papers by Upper Tribunal Judge Lane on 29 December 2025; however, the applicant renewed his application and permission to apply for judicial review was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge O’Brien on 28 January 2026. In granting permission, Judge O’Brien observed that the applicant’s barrister, Mr Martin, had argued the case in a way that was not sufficiently explained in the written grounds of claim. Directions were therefore set requiring the applicant to file amended grounds of claim before the respondent lodged her detailed grounds of defence.

16. As explained already, the amended detailed grounds raise two matters, but they cover the same territory.

17. The amended grounds of claim challenge the respondent’s decision of 20 February 2025 on the basis that the certification of the applicant’s asylum claim as clearly unfounded was unlawful and irrational, and that the claim was in fact arguable and not bound to fail. It is contended that, taking the applicant’s account at its highest, he had been targeted by politically motivated actors including DMK supporters, BJP members, and the police, had been arrested and placed on reporting conditions which he had breached, and was therefore arguably of continuing adverse interest such that he would face a real risk of detention and ill-treatment on return. The respondent is said to have erred by characterising these actors as “rogue”, by failing properly to consider relevant authority on the high threshold for certification and the possibility that an independent tribunal might reach a different conclusion, and by inadequately addressing the implications of the applicant’s alleged adverse profile, including the likelihood of him being traced through the Aadhaar system. It is further argued that, in light of the alleged involvement of state actors, the lodging of a criminal allegation against him, and the prior failure by the police to investigate the case, the availability of effective protection and internal relocation were at least arguable issues, such that the claim could not properly be said to be one which was bound to fail.

The legal framework

18. Section 94 of the 2002 Act (as amended) provides, so far as is relevant:

“(1) The Secretary of State may certify a protection claim or human rights claim as clearly unfounded.

(3) If the Secretary of State is satisfied that a claimant is entitled to reside in a State listed in subsection (4) he shall certify the claim under subsection (1) unless satisfied that it is not clearly unfounded.

(3A) A person may not bring an appeal under section 82 against a decision if the claim to which the decision relates has been certified under subsection (1).

(4) The States are—
[…]
(y) India
[…].”

19. The clearly unfounded test was considered by the Court of Appeal in ZL & VL v Secretary of State for the Home Department & Anor [2003] EWCA Civ 25. The Court found when taking a proper approach to determining whether a claim is clearly unfounded,

“… the decision maker will –

i. consider the factual substance and detail of the claim

ii. consider how it stands with the known background data

iii. consider whether in the round it is capable of belief

iv. if not, consider whether some of it is capable of belief

v. consider whether, if eventually believed in whole or in part, it is
capable of coming within the convention.

If the answers are such that the claim cannot on any legitimate view
succeed, then the claim is clearly unfounded; if not, not.”

20. In ZT (Kosovo) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] 1 W.L.R 348, Lord Carswell reaffirmed the opinion of the House of Lords in R (Yogathas) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] 1 AC 920 that because of the “draconian nature” of the certification power, “that in order to justify its exercise the claim must be so clearly lacking in substance that it is bound to fail”: see [58]. He went on: “It is necessary accordingly that the matter must receive the most anxious scrutiny before a certificate is issued”: ibid; see also Lord Phillips at [21].

21. The principles applicable when a court or tribunal judicially reviews a decision to certify a claim were drawn together by the Court of Appeal in R (FR) & Anor (Albania) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] EWCA Civ 605, [2016] Imm AR 1341. While focussed on a previous iteration of the certification power, the principles remain applicable to the current version of s.94.

22. The Court of Appeal reiterated in FR that:

a. The respondent has a certain “gate-keeping” or “screening” function in respect of s.94 (FR at [62]).
b. Section 94 certification decisions are subject to Wednesbury review (FR at [61]-[62] and [100]).
c. In reviewing a s.94 certificate, the Tribunal should ensure that the decision-maker has acknowledged that certification requires a separate evaluation to that required in respect of their assessment of the merits of the claim, and that in determining whether that separate consideration has been properly and reasonably conducted the tribunal “will be concerned with the substantive integrity of the analysis displayed in the decision letter …” (FR at [99]-[100]).
d. When considering whether to make a s.94 certificate, decision-makers should consider whether the claim is capable of being accepted, and if it is, the claim should be taken at its highest.

23. In SP (Albania) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 951, [2019] Imm AR 1288, the Court of Appeal explained at [25]:

“The correct approach when considering a claim at its highest following FR (Albania) is to consider the claim that has in fact been put forward by the appellant including all the information she has provided. If there is material provided by the appellant, including her answers during interview, which is capable of being objectively well founded and sufficient to establish a claim but which is not accepted by the Secretary of State, then an opportunity to have that evidence tested before a judge of the First-tier Tribunal should be provided i.e. certification by the Secretary of State would not be appropriate.”(Underlining added)

24. When deciding whether an asylum claim is capable of succeeding on appeal, the facts of the applicant’s case must be taken at their highest: see EM (Eritrea) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] AC 1321 at [8].

The hearing

25. At the outset of the hearing, I raised several preliminary issues with the parties. Mr Fletcher apologised for the absence of a respondent’s skeleton argument and confirmed that he intended to rely on the detailed grounds of defence. Mr Martin likewise apologised for the failure of his instructing solicitors to include the amended grounds of claim, the detailed grounds of defence, and the order granting permission in the hearing bundle.

26. Given that challenges to certification decisions are subject to Wednesbury review, I also invited submissions as to whether my consideration was confined to matters that were before the respondent at the date of decision, or whether it could extend to material that would be before the hypothetical judge determining the applicant’s asylum appeal. This issue arose because the applicant sought to rely on articles concerning the Indian Aadhaar identity card system which had not been before the respondent, while the respondent, in the detailed grounds of defence, highlighted the inconsistencies between the applicant’s answers in his screening and substantive asylum interviews which had not been identified in the decision letter. Both representatives agreed that, as this was a review, my consideration was confined to material before the respondent at the date of decision. Mr Martin nevertheless submitted that information about the Aadhaar system formed part of the respondent’s Country Policy Information Note (CPIN) India: Religious minorities and Scheduled Castes and Tribes (Version 4.0; April 2024), was in the public domain, and should therefore be treated as within her knowledge at the relevant time, notwithstanding that the point had not been raised when the claim was made.

The parties’ submissions

27. On behalf of the applicant, Mr Martin submitted that the certification decision was unlawful because the respondent’s analysis of future risk was fundamentally flawed. He argued that the decision-maker had wrongly characterised the risk as arising only from “rogue state actors”, and had failed properly to engage with the applicant’s evidence that he was wanted by the police following his arrest, bail, and alleged breach of conditions, and that the police had continued to seek him out, including visiting his family home. This error, he submitted, infected the conclusions on sufficiency of protection and internal relocation: if the feared harm emanated from the police themselves, then the availability of state protection was illusory and past mistreatment by the police gave rise to a real risk of repetition. Mr Martin further contended that internal relocation was not viable because police interest would extend nationwide and that the Aadhaar card scheme meant he could be traced to wherever in India he was living. He accepted that the supporting material about the Aadhaar card had not been before the decision-maker but he submitted that it reflected information publicly available at the time and should have been in the respondent’s knowledge. Taken cumulatively, he said, these matters demonstrated that the claim was at least arguable and could not rationally have been certified as bound to fail.

28. For the respondent, Mr Fletcher submitted that the sole issue was whether the certification decision had been Wednesbury unreasonable, and that it had plainly been open to the decision-maker on the material before her. He argued that the decision had properly recorded and accepted the applicant’s case at its highest, including his alleged fear of the police, and had reasonably concluded that any past ill-treatment was attributable to rogue officers against whom effective safeguards and remedies existed. The respondent maintained that the country evidence supported a finding that India had a functioning system of legal protection, with mechanisms to challenge police misconduct, and that the applicant could have sought assistance from lawfully acting authorities elsewhere in the country. On internal relocation, Mr Fletcher submitted that the Aadhaar-based arguments had not been raised before the decision-maker and were unsupported by adequate evidence in any event, including any proof that the police were able to trace a person nationwide or even that the applicant possessed such a card; the respondents’ reliance on the country guidance case of MD (same-sex orientated males: risk) India CG [2014] UKUT 00065 (IAC), which found no evidence of a centralised police database, was, therefore, reasonable. Accordingly, he contended that the decision-maker had applied the correct legal tests, given cogent reasons, and had been entitled to conclude that the claim was bound to fail and thus to certify it.

29. At the end of the hearing, I reserved my judgment.

Discussion

30. In considering the lawfulness of the respondent’s decision, I am mindful that the applicant’s case has to be taken at its highest. That means setting aside the credibility issues that arise from the change in the applicant’s account between his screening and substantive asylum interviews that are referred to in the detailed grounds of defence.

31. As explained above, the applicant’s asylum claim is multifaceted: he claims to fear supporters of the DMK party, who have brought false charges against him, and the local police force under the influence of a DMK politician, Mr Meiyanathan, as well as members of his own party, the BJP, to whom he claims to owe money.

32. I am satisfied that the respondent was reasonably entitled to find that, at its highest, the applicant claims to fear local non- or rogue state actors; it is not suggested that either Mr Meiyanathan, the local police or the BJP members who had lent him money were acting in a state-sanctioned way. Mr Meiyanathan and his supporters are said to have a personal animosity towards the applicant; the police are purported to be corruptly acting in accordance with Mr Meiyanathan’s wishes; and the BJP dispute involves a personal debt issue.

Sufficiency of protection

33. As the respondent contends, the high point of the applicant’s evidence is a bail form dated 25 June 2020. Although issued by a magistrates’ court and written in English, the document is poorly drafted and, in places, difficult to follow. Nevertheless, it records the applicant’s claim that he had been falsely accused of an offence allegedly committed on 20 June 2020, during which he and eight others were said to have attacked and intimidated “the de facto complainant and his parties”. The magistrate granted the applicant bail on condition that he “shall report before the respondent police station daily at 05:00 p.m. for the period of 15 days”. The applicant did not leave the country until November 2022, more than two years later.

34. As the respondent submits, any hypothetical judge determining the applicant’s asylum appeal would inevitably note that the 15-day bail period expired several years ago and, at its highest, there is no evidence to demonstrate either that the bail conditions were extended or that any criminal proceedings subsequently followed. Mr Martin argued, however, that, taking the applicant’s case at its highest, he had also produced an undated letter from his wife stating that, on 1 July 2024, four police officers visited her home, made enquiries about the applicant “in a threatening manner”, and indicated that they were seeking him in connection with the 2020 case. According to his wife, the officers told her that the applicant had to surrender himself “immediately”, failing which “they would ‘ENCOUNTER’ you and finish off the case”. In addition, the applicant’s wife stated that “Officers from the Indian Overseas Bank (IOB)… too visited our house”. She alleged that they threatened her, saying that their response would be “very different” if the applicant failed to visit the bank. She therefore implored her husband not to return to India.

35. I remind myself that my role is not to assess the plausibility of this evidence, but to consider the applicant’s claim at its highest. For the purposes of reviewing the certification decision, I must therefore proceed on the basis that the local police continue to have an interest in the applicant. By contrast, the applicant’s asylum claim is not based upon any fear of bank officials and, given that he does not dispute owing money to the bank, that issue appears to concern a civil matter.

36. The question then becomes how a hypothetical immigration judge would assess the risk on return. Such a judge would be bound to take into account that, although the applicant claims to have been arrested in June 2020, he was subsequently released on bail by a magistrate pending the outcome of the investigation. The judge would be entitled to find that the grant of bail would tend to support the respondent's conclusion that judicial oversight and legal remedies were available to the applicant. The judge would also have to take into account the absence of any official evidence demonstrating either that the bail period was extended or that formal criminal charges were brought against the applicant, having regard to the guidance of the Court of Appeal in MAH (Egypt) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 216 to decide whether the applicant had provided a satisfactory explanation for not obtaining such evidence.

37. Mr Martin submitted that, taking the applicant’s case at its highest, it must also be accepted that, in June 2022, he was taken into a forest by police officers and assaulted, and that it could not therefore be discounted that he would face similar ill-treatment if he came into contact with them again. However, even accepting this aspect of the claim at its highest, the applicant’s account was that the officers stopped beating him and left when they heard the sound of an approaching jeep, which he believed belonged to a forest officer. As the respondent observes, the fact that the officers allegedly took the applicant to a secluded location before assaulting him, and then fled upon hearing an approaching vehicle, is not consistent with the behaviour of individuals who believed they could act with complete impunity.

38. Mr Fletcher submitted that the respondent was reasonably entitled to conclude that, even if a localised risk persisted in the applicant’s home area, effective state protection would remain available to him elsewhere in India. In particular, at paragraphs 37 and 38 of the decision letter, the respondent relied upon CPIN India: Actors of Protection (Version 2.0, June 2023) and a US State Department human rights report. Those sources indicate that policing in India is primarily organised on a state-by-state basis, subject to overarching policy oversight from the central government; that mechanisms exist for reporting police misconduct, including complaints to the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC); and that there are reports of police officers being investigated and prosecuted for wrongdoing.

39. I accept Mr Fletcher’s submission. Taking his claim at its highest, the applicant is an adherent of Hinduism, India’s majority religion, and a member of the BJP, the party in power at the national level. He claims to face persecution from Muslims, a religious minority in India, who are supporters of a rival political party exercising power only at the state level. Even taking into account his claim to owe money to local BJP members, there is no obvious reason to suppose that, outside his home area, his complaints would fall on unsympathetic ears. A hypothetical judge would therefore be bound to take into account that the applicant could seek redress by making complaints to, or otherwise seeking the protection of, other law enforcement authorities or the NHRC, and there is no evidential basis for concluding that he would be unable to do so from elsewhere within India.

40. For those reasons, I am satisfied that the respondent was reasonably entitled to characterise the conduct of the officers in question as that of “rogue” police officers and to conclude that India generally has a functioning police and justice system. Accordingly, the applicant would be able to seek protection and pursue available avenues of redress against any corrupt officers and his other claimed persecutors.

Internal relocation

41. As regards the Aadhaar system, it did not form part of the applicant’s case at the date of decision that he could be traced throughout India by means of it. Contrary to Mr Martin’s submissions, I do not accept that the respondent was under any obligation to identify that issue of her own motion and then undertake independent open-source research into it. The reference to the Aadhaar system contained within the CPIN India: Religious minorities and Scheduled Castes and Tribes merely states that “welfare payments are available through” it (paragraph 5.1.8). The burden rested upon the applicant to establish the factual basis of his protection claim and the respondent was therefore entitled to assess the claim as advanced and on the evidence provided.

42. Even taking into account the materials subsequently included in the hearing bundle, they would not assist the applicant in any event. Those materials consist of an opinion piece published on the Open Democracy website on 3 October 2025 entitled Digital ID cards will put the UK on a dangerous path – just ask India; an article published on the Henry M Jackson School of International Studies website on 9 May 2019 entitled The Aadhaar Card: Cybersecurity Issues with India’s Biometric Experiment; and an article published on the Nivarana website (described as “India’s Public Health Platform”) on 14 December 2025 entitled Beware of Aadhaar: A Warning on India’s Biometric Identity Model. Two of those articles post-date the respondent’s decision and therefore could not have been taken into account by her in any event. More fundamentally, although the articles refer to controversies surrounding the system, including data leaks and cybersecurity vulnerabilities, none suggests that Aadhaar is accessible to police forces across India or that it functions as a nationwide law enforcement tracking tool. In those circumstances, the respondent was, in my judgment, reasonably entitled to rely upon the country guidance decision in MD and to conclude that the local police in the applicant’s home area would be unable to trace him elsewhere within India. In MD, the Upper Tribunal observed that it had “not been drawn to any evidence that there is a central registration system in place which would enable the police to check the whereabouts of inhabitants in their own state, let alone in any of the other states or unions within the country” (at [154]).

43. A hypothetical judge, properly directing themselves on the law, would be bound to treat that country guidance as authoritative unless there were very strong grounds, supported by cogent evidence, to justify departing from it: see SG (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] EWCA Civ 940 at [47]. No such cogent evidence was before the respondent at the date of decision. Moreover, the material subsequently included in the hearing bundle falls well short of establishing a basis for departing from the guidance in MD. Neither can it simply be inferred that the mere existence of a Central Bureau of Investigation means that MD should no longer be followed.

44. Similarly, even taken at its highest, the evidence provides no basis upon which a hypothetical judge could conclude that local DMK or BJP supporters, or politicians alleged to harbour animosity towards the applicant, would possess either the means or the inclination to trace him throughout India by means of Aadhaar or any other system. That is particularly so given the absence of any evidence to suggest that such individuals would even become aware of his return to India in the first place.

45. Accordingly, I am satisfied that any appeal would, in any event, be bound to fail on the issue of internal relocation alone.

Conclusion on certification

46. I do not accept Mr Martin's submission that the respondent merely paid lip service to the certification exercise. Read fairly and as a whole, the decision letter demonstrates a separate and anxious consideration of whether an immigration judge, properly directing themselves in law, could realistically allow the appeal. The respondent did not simply rely upon the reasons for refusal but expressly addressed the certification question at paragraphs 75 to 77 and gave distinct reasons for concluding that any appeal would be bound to fail.

47. Drawing together my conclusions on the issues of sufficiency of protection and internal relocation, I am satisfied that an immigration judge, properly directing themselves in accordance with the relevant legal principles, would be bound to dismiss the applicant’s asylum and humanitarian protection appeal. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the respondent was reasonably entitled to conclude that the appeal is bound to fail.

Conclusion

48. For the reasons given above, the application for judicial review is dismissed.

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