JR-2025-LON-001942
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The decision
JR-2025-LON-001942
In the Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber)
Judicial Review
In the matter of an application for Judicial Review
The King on the application of
Ajibola Ibraheem Adams
Applicant
and
Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent
ORDER
BEFORE Upper Tribunal Judge Loughran
HAVING considered all documents lodged and having heard the Applicant, a litigant in person and Ms J Thelen of counsel, instructed by GLD, for the Respondent at a hearing on 15 October 2025
IT IS ORDERED THAT:
(1) The application for judicial review is dismissed for the reasons in the attached judgment.
(2) The Respondent shall pay the Applicant’s reasonable costs to (and including) 26 June 2025, as a litigant in person.
(3) The Applicant shall pay 50% of the Respondent’s reasonable costs from 27 June 2025, costs to be assessed if not agreed and set off against (2) .
(4) Permission to appeal is refused because it was not sought and there is in any event no arguable legal error in the judgment.
Signed: G. Loughran
Upper Tribunal Judge Loughran
Dated: 17 December 2025
The date on which this order was sent is given below
For completion by the Upper Tribunal Immigration and Asylum Chamber
Sent / Handed to the applicant, respondent and any interested party / the applicant's, respondent’s and any interested party’s solicitors on (date): 17/12/2025
Solicitors:
Ref No.
Home Office Ref:
Notification of appeal rights
A decision by the Upper Tribunal on an application for judicial review is a decision that disposes of proceedings.
A party may appeal against such a decision to the Court of Appeal on a point of law only. Any party who wishes to appeal should apply to the Upper Tribunal for permission, at the hearing at which the decision is given. If no application is made, the Tribunal must nonetheless consider at the hearing whether to give or refuse permission to appeal (rule 44(4B) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008).
If the Tribunal refuses permission, either in response to an application or by virtue of rule 44(4B), then the party wishing to appeal can apply for permission from the Court of Appeal itself. This must be done by filing an appellant’s notice with the Civil Appeals Office of the Court of Appeal within 28 days of the date the Tribunal’s decision on permission to appeal was sent (Civil Procedure Rules Practice Direction 52D 3.3).
Case No: JR-2025-LON-001942
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
(IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER)
Field House,
Breams Buildings
London, EC4A 1WR
17 December 2025
Before:
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LOUGHRAN
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Between:
THE KING
on the application of
Ajibola Ibraheem Adams
Applicant
- and -
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
The Applicant appeared in person and was not represented
Ms J Thelen
(instructed by the Government Legal Department) for the Respondent
Hearing date: 15 October 2025
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
J U D G M E N T
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Judge Loughran:
The Challenge
1. The Applicant is a Nigerian national who entered the UK on 5 June 2019. He is not legally represented. However, he has conducted this litigation carefully and to a high standard.
2. By a judicial review application issued on 10 June 2025, the Applicant sought to challenge the Respondent’s decision of 18 July 2019 to designate him as an illegal entrant under section 26(1)(c) of the Immigration Act 1971 and the consequent refusal to recognise that he was entitled to statutorily extended leave by virtue of section 3C of the Immigration Act 1971 from the date of his asylum claim.
3. In an order dated 19 June 2025 Upper Tribunal Judge Blundell properly identified that the Applicant’s challenge was not to the Respondent’s decision of 18 July 2019 (which would have been out of time), but to the Respondent’s failure not to cancel the Applicant’s bail conditions and treat the Applicant as though he had statutorily extended leave.
Relevant Background
4. On 5 June 2019, the Applicant entered the UK on a valid medical visitor visa.
5. On 18 July 2019, the Applicant attended at AIU Croydon, claimed asylum and was screened. The Applicant was also designated as an illegal entrant, having used deception, pursuant to section 26(1)(c) of the Immigration Act 1971. The Applicant was released on immigration bail. At the time, the Applicant was served with forms ILL EN 101 and BAIL 201 indicating the same.
6. In 2024, the Applicant’s then representatives made a subject access request on the Applicant’s behalf. The Applicant claims that it was only on receipt of his file that he discovered that he had been classified as an “illegal entrant”.
7. The Applicant approached his MP who wrote to the Respondent on his behalf on 16 April 2025 and 6 May 2025.
8. On 15 May 2025, the Applicant sent the Respondent a letter before claim under the pre-action protocol challenging the Respondent’s unlawful designation of him as an “illegal entrant.” It does not appear that the Applicant received a response to this letter.
9. On 16 May 2025, the Respondent emailed the Applicant’s MP concerning his status. The email was forwarded to the Applicant on 3 June 2025. It stated:
“At the time Mr Adams was served a notice of verbal deception this was the procedure followed at the time. This process is no longer in place and any applicant who claims asylum whilst in possession of a valid Visa retains their 3C rights.
We will therefore cancel Mr Adams’ bail and issue him with an IS.248 that carries over his VISA conditions.
We will also request a new ARC (Application registration card) to reflect the change in Mr Adams’ conditions .”
10. On 10 June 2025, this application for judicial review was issued. The Applicant sought to challenge:
(1) The Respondent’s decision dated 18 July 2019 to designate him as an illegal entrant under section 26(1)(c) of the Immigration Act 1971;
(2) The Respondent’s failure to notify the Applicant of the designation;
(3) The Respondent’s failure to recognise that he has statutorily extended leave by virtue of section 3C of the Immigration Act 1971;
11. As outlined above, in an order dated 19 June 2025, Upper Tribunal Judge Blundell identified the scope of the Applicant’s challenge as follows:
“(3) …. Properly understood, therefore, this claim is not a challenge to a decision from 2019, it is a challenge in which the applicant seeks to hold the applicant to her word, given much more recently.
(4) On the face of it, the respondent told the applicant’s MP that she would do something which she has failed to do. That justifies expedition in circumstances in which the applicant is subject to ongoing reporting restrictions. The respondent can readily be expected to respond to such a point within seven days, and that is the order I make.”
12. On 26 June 2025, the Respondent wrote to the Applicant stating:
“We have reviewed your case and therefore withdrawn the illegal and Bail papers (that is, forms ILL EN 101 and BAIL 201) which were previously served to you in error. We apologise for the error.
Please see enclosed the following substituted document (ticked) for you to retain:
• NOTICE OF RESTRICTION TO A PERSON WHO HAS MADE AN IN-COUNTRY IN-TIME CLAIM FOR ASYLUM (IS.248)”
13. The IS.248: Notice of Restriction to a Person who has Made an In-Country Claim for Asylum informed the Applicant that he is not allowed to work, he must continue to report as requested and must inform the Home Office of any change in circumstances, address or contact details. These restrictions were imposed under section 71 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (“NIAA 2002”), which applies to a person who makes a claim for asylum at a time when he has leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom.
14. The Respondent filed her acknowledgment of service and summary grounds of defence on 26 June 2025 focussing on the scope of the application as identified by Upper Tribunal Judge Blundell. The Respondent’s position was that as a result of the letter dated 26 June 2025 she had now cancelled the Applicant’s bail conditions and treated the Applicant as though he had statutorily extended leave and therefore complied with what she had said she would do in the letter to the Applicant’s MP on 16 May 2025. The Respondent therefore submitted that the claim was academic. The Respondent also agreed to pay the Applicant’s reasonable costs to 26 June 2025, the date of the acknowledgment of service.
15. In an order issued on 4 July 2025, Upper Tribunal Judge Norton-Taylor granted the Applicant permission only in respect of the scoped challenge identified by the Upper Tribunal Judge Blundell. Permission was refused in respect of the grounds as originally pleaded by the Applicant. In granting permission Upper Tribunal Judge Norton-Taylor was not persuaded that the entirety of the application for judicial review had become academic stating:
“6….’The scoped challenge, as identified by Judge Blundell at [3] of his decision, includes the seeking of declaratory relief as to the applicant’s true status from 2019 onwards, and damages in respect of claimed losses/harm caused by the incorrect designation as an illegal entrant. These matters are deserving of more detailed consideration by the Tribunal.
7. In respect of the conditions imposed by the respondent’s notice of 26 June 2025, section 71 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 entitles the respondent to impose certain conditions on individuals in the applicant’s position, notwithstanding that they are not on immigration bail. At this stage, I see no arguable unlawfulness in respect of the conditions which have now been imposed.”
16. Upper Tribunal Judge Norton-Taylor cautioned that the Applicant “should now carefully consider his position” and “should think carefully before expending additional costs on judicial review proceedings and should also bear in mind the fact that the respondent has agreed to pay the reasonable costs of the current proceedings thus far.” Upper Tribunal Judge Norton-Taylor noted that the Applicant had a pending appeal in the First tier Tribunal where he could put forward arguments about the Respondent’s conduct.
17. On 21 July 2025, the Respondent made an application for clarification on the scope of the grant of permission. On 18 August 2025, Upper Tribunal Judge Norton-Taylor refused the application because it was not required and the grant of permission “speaks for itself”. Upper Tribunal Judge Norton-Taylor granted the Respondent’s application for an extension of time to file and serve her detailed grounds of defence and again noted that the Applicant “should give careful consideration to the merits of his case.”
18. On 11 September 2025, the Respondent filed and served her detailed grounds of defence outlining her position that the Respondent had complied with the order of Upper Tribunal Judge Blundell by cancelling the Applicant’s bail conditions and treating him as a person who continues to enjoy statutorily extended leave. The Respondent submitted that there was no cause of action arising from her actions in 2019, because permission had been refused and no renewal had been sought. Accordingly, no remedies could follow.
19. In a decision dated 6 October 2025, the Applicant’s appeal against the refusal of his protection claim was allowed by the First-tier Tribunal.
The Parties’ Positions
20. I have considered all the pleadings relied on by the parties, including their skeleton arguments.
21. Having heard from the parties, I am satisfied that the issue I am required to determine is a narrow factual issue. As a result I am not required to refer to the caselaw relied on by the parties.
22. The Applicant confirmed that he does not seek to challenge the original decision designating him as an illegal entrant under section 26(1)(c) and the consequent refusal to recognise that he was entitled to statutorily extended leave by virtue of section 3C Immigration Act 1971. In any event, the Respondent has accepted that the decision was made in error.
23. The Applicant confirmed that he does not seek to challenge the notice that substituted his bail papers i.e. the Notice of Restriction to a Person who has Made an In-Country Claim for Asylum (IS.248).
24. The Applicant confirmed that he is not seeking damages.
25. It is the Applicant’s case that there are “three dimensions of unfairness” (1) the original wrong, which the Respondent has admitted; (2) the Respondent’s promise to fix the wrong (in her letter to the Applicant’s MP dated 16 May 2025) and (3) the Respondent’s failure to honour her promise to fix the error.
26. The Applicant does not accept that the Respondent has fixed her earlier error and is not satisfied that this was done by virtue of the Respondent's letter dated 26 June 2025. He therefore does not accept that the claim is academic.
27. Accordingly, the only issue I am required to determine is whether the Respondent has, as a matter of fact, done what she undertook to do in her letter to the Applicant’s MP dated 16 May 2025.
28. The Applicant submits that the Respondent has not effectively corrected her records and that he has been (and will continue to be) erroneously treated as being an illegal entrant as a result.
29. The Applicant clarified that he has pursued this judicial review in order to seek a declaration as to the actual state of affairs and a mandatory order that the Respondent correct her “database”, delete all references to the Applicant having been an illegal entrant and provide evidence that this has been done.
30. The Applicant is concerned about being mistaken for having entered the UK illegally when in fact he entered lawfully.
31. The Applicant highlights that he has not been issued with an ARC to reflect his change in status.
32. The Applicant relies on two documents in support of his submission that the Respondent has not effectively corrected her records: (1) A GCID Case Record Sheet recording that 31 August 2020 is the Applicant’s Section 3C Expiry Date and (2) A notification of breach of bail condition dated 16 September 2025 (notification of breach of bail).
33. The GCID Case Record Sheet is an entry from the Respondent’s computer database. The entry relied on by the Applicant is dated 10 December 2020. Under the heading “Exit Checks Event History” it states
“10/MAR/2020 – CID Outcome “Asylum Refused – Non Certified” on “Asylum Claim” – AIU”
31/AUG/2020 – CID 3C Leave Expiry Date – on “Asylum Claim – AIU” (18-Jul-2019)”
34. It is the reference to 31 August 2020 being the Applicant’s “3C Leave Expiry Date” that the Applicant submits demonstrates that the Respondent has not effectively corrected her records.
35. The notification of breach of bail condition dated 16 September 2025 states:
“It has come to our attention that you have failed to comply with the following condition/s of your immigration bail:
REPORTING condition
You have been granted immigration bail subject to a condition that you report to an Immigration Official/Police Officer at 2 Ruskin Square on 12/09/25
You failed to report as required.
CONSEQUENCES FOR NON-COMPLIANCE
I am formally reminding you that failure to comply with any of the conditions set out in your grant of immigration bail notice have the following consequences:
[…]
WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW
If there is a reasonable excuse for this failure to comply with your immigration bail conditions then you must inform this office…’”
36. It is not in dispute that the Applicant is required to report, by virtue of the conditions imposed by the IS.248: Notice of Restriction to a Person who has Made an In-Country. The Applicant submits that the repeated references to him being on “immigration bail” demonstrate that the Respondent has not effectively corrected her records and that it is not accidental.
37. The Respondent accepts that the notification of breach of bail condition dated 16 September 2025 was sent to the Applicant in error and he had not failed to report. The Respondent relies on an email sent to the Applicant on 28 September 2025 which states:
“Home Office records indicate we have significant data which documents our department recording your reporting events as per your Bail 201 conditions since 13/10/2023…’
On this occasion we can confirm that there will be no negative ramifications for the recorded reporting breach of Immigration Bail 201 for 12/09/25...’
For matters pertaining to your current immigration status, we would suggest you direct such questions towards UK Visa and Immigration (UKVI) or the Asylum Intake Unit (AIU).”
38. The Applicant submits that he should not have been referred to UKVI or the AIU and that the letter should not be worded in that way.
39. The Respondent submits that the references to immigration bail is just the use of a generic term. It is the Respondent’s position that the Applicant does not understand the Respondent’s database and that there is no system to be corrected. It is not possible to amend previous entries. The Respondent submitted that her error finding that the Applicant had not reported was just that an error and it was not caused by any failure to effectively correct her records.
40. The Respondent accepts that an ARC would confirm the Applicant’s legal rights, but submits that this can be requested by the Applicant himself.
Analysis
41. I am satisfied that the Respondent has done what she undertook to do in her letter to the Applicant’s MP on 16 May 2025.
42. The Respondent cancelled the Applicant’s bail and issued him with a IS.248. I note that the Applicant has not been provided with an ARC to reflect the change in his conditions, but the Respondent only undertook to request an ARC. In any event, the Applicant has the IS.248 which details the conditions imposed on him and importantly that they were imposed “under s.71 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (“NIAA 2002”), which applies to a person who makes a claim for asylum at a time when he has leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom.” Accordingly, the Applicant has evidence in writing should he require it.
43. I am not persuaded that the Respondent has not effectively corrected her records.
44. The GCID Case Record Sheet is an entry from 10 December 2020, before the error was corrected. Accordingly, it does not indicate that the Respondent has not corrected her records since she has acknowledged the error. I am not persuaded that the Respondent was required to (or that it would be possible for her to) delete any old references to the Applicant being an illegal entrant.
45. I am not persuaded that the Respondent’s repeated references to the Applicant being on “immigration bail” demonstrates that she has not effectively corrected her records or that she should not have referred the Applicant to the UKVI and AIU because that time, the Applicant had an outstanding appeal challenging the refusal of his asylum claim. I accept the Respondent’s submission that the references to “immigration bail” are just the use of a generic term.
46. I am concerned about the repeated references to “Bail 201”. The Respondent informed the Applicant that she had withdrawn his Bail 201 in her correspondence dated 26 June 2025. Accordingly, it is understandable that the Applicant would be concerned that the Respondent had not in fact withdrawn his Bail 201 if he received correspondence that repeatedly refers to it some three months later.
47. However, the Respondent did not undertake to correct her database or not to make any future errors as a result of the incorrect designation in her correspondence dated 16 May 2025. Therefore I am satisfied that the Respondent’s letter did not create a legitimate expectation of database correction.
48. I am satisfied that the Respondent’s letter dated 26 June 2025 resolved the issue and that the Applicant’s claim for judicial review was academic from that date.
49. The Applicant’s concern is understandable particularly in light of the Respondent’s references to “immigration bail” and “Bail 201”. Had the Respondent not made these errors and/or provided the Applicant with an ARC reflecting the change in his conditions this litigation may have been avoided.
Decision
50. The Applicant’s application for judicial review is accordingly refused.
~~~~0~~~~
Postscript
Costs
51. After the judgment had been circulated in draft, the Respondent confirmed in writing that she was still willing to pay the Applicant’s costs to 26 June 2025, calculated on the basis that the Applicant is a litigant in person, but submitted that from 26 June 2025, she was entitled to her costs.
52. The Applicant submitted that there should be no order as to costs from 26 June 2025 because the judgment recognised that “the Respondent’s own correspondence, errors and omissions generated ambiguity as to the Applicant’s true bail status and justified his concerns,” the Applicant had acted reasonably throughout and the Applicant is a litigant in person and a recently recognised refugee who is in a position of financial vulnerability.
53. Rule 10(3)(a) of the Upper Tribunal’s Procedure Rules empowers the Tribunal to make an order for costs in judicial review proceedings without the jurisdictional threshold of unreasonable behaviour that applies in statutory appeals. Nor, save for the overriding objective, do those rules provide any other guidance on how the Tribunal’s discretion should be exercised. It is common for this Tribunal to apply the principles arising out of the Civil Procedure Rules that govern judicial review proceedings in the Administrative Court, notwithstanding that they do not formally apply – see, for example, R. (IX) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Judicial Review; costs) [2025] UKUT 154 (IAC).
54. The ‘general rule’ at CPR 44.2(2)(a) is that the unsuccessful party will be ordered to pay the costs of the successful party. In this case the Respondent is the successful party. However, as I noted in my judgment this litigation may have been avoided had the Respondent issued the Applicant with an ARC card reflecting the change in his conditions and/or not made errors in respect of the Applicant’s conditions.
55. Taking those circumstances into account, I consider that departure from the general rule is justified. Making no order for costs would, take insufficient account of the final result in the Respondent’s favour. However, I am satisfied that a reduction of the costs paid by 50% is justified by the matters discussed in the above paragraph.
In the Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber)
Judicial Review
In the matter of an application for Judicial Review
The King on the application of
Ajibola Ibraheem Adams
Applicant
and
Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent
ORDER
BEFORE Upper Tribunal Judge Loughran
HAVING considered all documents lodged and having heard the Applicant, a litigant in person and Ms J Thelen of counsel, instructed by GLD, for the Respondent at a hearing on 15 October 2025
IT IS ORDERED THAT:
(1) The application for judicial review is dismissed for the reasons in the attached judgment.
(2) The Respondent shall pay the Applicant’s reasonable costs to (and including) 26 June 2025, as a litigant in person.
(3) The Applicant shall pay 50% of the Respondent’s reasonable costs from 27 June 2025, costs to be assessed if not agreed and set off against (2) .
(4) Permission to appeal is refused because it was not sought and there is in any event no arguable legal error in the judgment.
Signed: G. Loughran
Upper Tribunal Judge Loughran
Dated: 17 December 2025
The date on which this order was sent is given below
For completion by the Upper Tribunal Immigration and Asylum Chamber
Sent / Handed to the applicant, respondent and any interested party / the applicant's, respondent’s and any interested party’s solicitors on (date): 17/12/2025
Solicitors:
Ref No.
Home Office Ref:
Notification of appeal rights
A decision by the Upper Tribunal on an application for judicial review is a decision that disposes of proceedings.
A party may appeal against such a decision to the Court of Appeal on a point of law only. Any party who wishes to appeal should apply to the Upper Tribunal for permission, at the hearing at which the decision is given. If no application is made, the Tribunal must nonetheless consider at the hearing whether to give or refuse permission to appeal (rule 44(4B) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008).
If the Tribunal refuses permission, either in response to an application or by virtue of rule 44(4B), then the party wishing to appeal can apply for permission from the Court of Appeal itself. This must be done by filing an appellant’s notice with the Civil Appeals Office of the Court of Appeal within 28 days of the date the Tribunal’s decision on permission to appeal was sent (Civil Procedure Rules Practice Direction 52D 3.3).
Case No: JR-2025-LON-001942
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
(IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER)
Field House,
Breams Buildings
London, EC4A 1WR
17 December 2025
Before:
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LOUGHRAN
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Between:
THE KING
on the application of
Ajibola Ibraheem Adams
Applicant
- and -
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
The Applicant appeared in person and was not represented
Ms J Thelen
(instructed by the Government Legal Department) for the Respondent
Hearing date: 15 October 2025
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
J U D G M E N T
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Judge Loughran:
The Challenge
1. The Applicant is a Nigerian national who entered the UK on 5 June 2019. He is not legally represented. However, he has conducted this litigation carefully and to a high standard.
2. By a judicial review application issued on 10 June 2025, the Applicant sought to challenge the Respondent’s decision of 18 July 2019 to designate him as an illegal entrant under section 26(1)(c) of the Immigration Act 1971 and the consequent refusal to recognise that he was entitled to statutorily extended leave by virtue of section 3C of the Immigration Act 1971 from the date of his asylum claim.
3. In an order dated 19 June 2025 Upper Tribunal Judge Blundell properly identified that the Applicant’s challenge was not to the Respondent’s decision of 18 July 2019 (which would have been out of time), but to the Respondent’s failure not to cancel the Applicant’s bail conditions and treat the Applicant as though he had statutorily extended leave.
Relevant Background
4. On 5 June 2019, the Applicant entered the UK on a valid medical visitor visa.
5. On 18 July 2019, the Applicant attended at AIU Croydon, claimed asylum and was screened. The Applicant was also designated as an illegal entrant, having used deception, pursuant to section 26(1)(c) of the Immigration Act 1971. The Applicant was released on immigration bail. At the time, the Applicant was served with forms ILL EN 101 and BAIL 201 indicating the same.
6. In 2024, the Applicant’s then representatives made a subject access request on the Applicant’s behalf. The Applicant claims that it was only on receipt of his file that he discovered that he had been classified as an “illegal entrant”.
7. The Applicant approached his MP who wrote to the Respondent on his behalf on 16 April 2025 and 6 May 2025.
8. On 15 May 2025, the Applicant sent the Respondent a letter before claim under the pre-action protocol challenging the Respondent’s unlawful designation of him as an “illegal entrant.” It does not appear that the Applicant received a response to this letter.
9. On 16 May 2025, the Respondent emailed the Applicant’s MP concerning his status. The email was forwarded to the Applicant on 3 June 2025. It stated:
“At the time Mr Adams was served a notice of verbal deception this was the procedure followed at the time. This process is no longer in place and any applicant who claims asylum whilst in possession of a valid Visa retains their 3C rights.
We will therefore cancel Mr Adams’ bail and issue him with an IS.248 that carries over his VISA conditions.
We will also request a new ARC (Application registration card) to reflect the change in Mr Adams’ conditions .”
10. On 10 June 2025, this application for judicial review was issued. The Applicant sought to challenge:
(1) The Respondent’s decision dated 18 July 2019 to designate him as an illegal entrant under section 26(1)(c) of the Immigration Act 1971;
(2) The Respondent’s failure to notify the Applicant of the designation;
(3) The Respondent’s failure to recognise that he has statutorily extended leave by virtue of section 3C of the Immigration Act 1971;
11. As outlined above, in an order dated 19 June 2025, Upper Tribunal Judge Blundell identified the scope of the Applicant’s challenge as follows:
“(3) …. Properly understood, therefore, this claim is not a challenge to a decision from 2019, it is a challenge in which the applicant seeks to hold the applicant to her word, given much more recently.
(4) On the face of it, the respondent told the applicant’s MP that she would do something which she has failed to do. That justifies expedition in circumstances in which the applicant is subject to ongoing reporting restrictions. The respondent can readily be expected to respond to such a point within seven days, and that is the order I make.”
12. On 26 June 2025, the Respondent wrote to the Applicant stating:
“We have reviewed your case and therefore withdrawn the illegal and Bail papers (that is, forms ILL EN 101 and BAIL 201) which were previously served to you in error. We apologise for the error.
Please see enclosed the following substituted document (ticked) for you to retain:
• NOTICE OF RESTRICTION TO A PERSON WHO HAS MADE AN IN-COUNTRY IN-TIME CLAIM FOR ASYLUM (IS.248)”
13. The IS.248: Notice of Restriction to a Person who has Made an In-Country Claim for Asylum informed the Applicant that he is not allowed to work, he must continue to report as requested and must inform the Home Office of any change in circumstances, address or contact details. These restrictions were imposed under section 71 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (“NIAA 2002”), which applies to a person who makes a claim for asylum at a time when he has leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom.
14. The Respondent filed her acknowledgment of service and summary grounds of defence on 26 June 2025 focussing on the scope of the application as identified by Upper Tribunal Judge Blundell. The Respondent’s position was that as a result of the letter dated 26 June 2025 she had now cancelled the Applicant’s bail conditions and treated the Applicant as though he had statutorily extended leave and therefore complied with what she had said she would do in the letter to the Applicant’s MP on 16 May 2025. The Respondent therefore submitted that the claim was academic. The Respondent also agreed to pay the Applicant’s reasonable costs to 26 June 2025, the date of the acknowledgment of service.
15. In an order issued on 4 July 2025, Upper Tribunal Judge Norton-Taylor granted the Applicant permission only in respect of the scoped challenge identified by the Upper Tribunal Judge Blundell. Permission was refused in respect of the grounds as originally pleaded by the Applicant. In granting permission Upper Tribunal Judge Norton-Taylor was not persuaded that the entirety of the application for judicial review had become academic stating:
“6….’The scoped challenge, as identified by Judge Blundell at [3] of his decision, includes the seeking of declaratory relief as to the applicant’s true status from 2019 onwards, and damages in respect of claimed losses/harm caused by the incorrect designation as an illegal entrant. These matters are deserving of more detailed consideration by the Tribunal.
7. In respect of the conditions imposed by the respondent’s notice of 26 June 2025, section 71 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 entitles the respondent to impose certain conditions on individuals in the applicant’s position, notwithstanding that they are not on immigration bail. At this stage, I see no arguable unlawfulness in respect of the conditions which have now been imposed.”
16. Upper Tribunal Judge Norton-Taylor cautioned that the Applicant “should now carefully consider his position” and “should think carefully before expending additional costs on judicial review proceedings and should also bear in mind the fact that the respondent has agreed to pay the reasonable costs of the current proceedings thus far.” Upper Tribunal Judge Norton-Taylor noted that the Applicant had a pending appeal in the First tier Tribunal where he could put forward arguments about the Respondent’s conduct.
17. On 21 July 2025, the Respondent made an application for clarification on the scope of the grant of permission. On 18 August 2025, Upper Tribunal Judge Norton-Taylor refused the application because it was not required and the grant of permission “speaks for itself”. Upper Tribunal Judge Norton-Taylor granted the Respondent’s application for an extension of time to file and serve her detailed grounds of defence and again noted that the Applicant “should give careful consideration to the merits of his case.”
18. On 11 September 2025, the Respondent filed and served her detailed grounds of defence outlining her position that the Respondent had complied with the order of Upper Tribunal Judge Blundell by cancelling the Applicant’s bail conditions and treating him as a person who continues to enjoy statutorily extended leave. The Respondent submitted that there was no cause of action arising from her actions in 2019, because permission had been refused and no renewal had been sought. Accordingly, no remedies could follow.
19. In a decision dated 6 October 2025, the Applicant’s appeal against the refusal of his protection claim was allowed by the First-tier Tribunal.
The Parties’ Positions
20. I have considered all the pleadings relied on by the parties, including their skeleton arguments.
21. Having heard from the parties, I am satisfied that the issue I am required to determine is a narrow factual issue. As a result I am not required to refer to the caselaw relied on by the parties.
22. The Applicant confirmed that he does not seek to challenge the original decision designating him as an illegal entrant under section 26(1)(c) and the consequent refusal to recognise that he was entitled to statutorily extended leave by virtue of section 3C Immigration Act 1971. In any event, the Respondent has accepted that the decision was made in error.
23. The Applicant confirmed that he does not seek to challenge the notice that substituted his bail papers i.e. the Notice of Restriction to a Person who has Made an In-Country Claim for Asylum (IS.248).
24. The Applicant confirmed that he is not seeking damages.
25. It is the Applicant’s case that there are “three dimensions of unfairness” (1) the original wrong, which the Respondent has admitted; (2) the Respondent’s promise to fix the wrong (in her letter to the Applicant’s MP dated 16 May 2025) and (3) the Respondent’s failure to honour her promise to fix the error.
26. The Applicant does not accept that the Respondent has fixed her earlier error and is not satisfied that this was done by virtue of the Respondent's letter dated 26 June 2025. He therefore does not accept that the claim is academic.
27. Accordingly, the only issue I am required to determine is whether the Respondent has, as a matter of fact, done what she undertook to do in her letter to the Applicant’s MP dated 16 May 2025.
28. The Applicant submits that the Respondent has not effectively corrected her records and that he has been (and will continue to be) erroneously treated as being an illegal entrant as a result.
29. The Applicant clarified that he has pursued this judicial review in order to seek a declaration as to the actual state of affairs and a mandatory order that the Respondent correct her “database”, delete all references to the Applicant having been an illegal entrant and provide evidence that this has been done.
30. The Applicant is concerned about being mistaken for having entered the UK illegally when in fact he entered lawfully.
31. The Applicant highlights that he has not been issued with an ARC to reflect his change in status.
32. The Applicant relies on two documents in support of his submission that the Respondent has not effectively corrected her records: (1) A GCID Case Record Sheet recording that 31 August 2020 is the Applicant’s Section 3C Expiry Date and (2) A notification of breach of bail condition dated 16 September 2025 (notification of breach of bail).
33. The GCID Case Record Sheet is an entry from the Respondent’s computer database. The entry relied on by the Applicant is dated 10 December 2020. Under the heading “Exit Checks Event History” it states
“10/MAR/2020 – CID Outcome “Asylum Refused – Non Certified” on “Asylum Claim” – AIU”
31/AUG/2020 – CID 3C Leave Expiry Date – on “Asylum Claim – AIU” (18-Jul-2019)”
34. It is the reference to 31 August 2020 being the Applicant’s “3C Leave Expiry Date” that the Applicant submits demonstrates that the Respondent has not effectively corrected her records.
35. The notification of breach of bail condition dated 16 September 2025 states:
“It has come to our attention that you have failed to comply with the following condition/s of your immigration bail:
REPORTING condition
You have been granted immigration bail subject to a condition that you report to an Immigration Official/Police Officer at 2 Ruskin Square on 12/09/25
You failed to report as required.
CONSEQUENCES FOR NON-COMPLIANCE
I am formally reminding you that failure to comply with any of the conditions set out in your grant of immigration bail notice have the following consequences:
[…]
WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW
If there is a reasonable excuse for this failure to comply with your immigration bail conditions then you must inform this office…’”
36. It is not in dispute that the Applicant is required to report, by virtue of the conditions imposed by the IS.248: Notice of Restriction to a Person who has Made an In-Country. The Applicant submits that the repeated references to him being on “immigration bail” demonstrate that the Respondent has not effectively corrected her records and that it is not accidental.
37. The Respondent accepts that the notification of breach of bail condition dated 16 September 2025 was sent to the Applicant in error and he had not failed to report. The Respondent relies on an email sent to the Applicant on 28 September 2025 which states:
“Home Office records indicate we have significant data which documents our department recording your reporting events as per your Bail 201 conditions since 13/10/2023…’
On this occasion we can confirm that there will be no negative ramifications for the recorded reporting breach of Immigration Bail 201 for 12/09/25...’
For matters pertaining to your current immigration status, we would suggest you direct such questions towards UK Visa and Immigration (UKVI) or the Asylum Intake Unit (AIU).”
38. The Applicant submits that he should not have been referred to UKVI or the AIU and that the letter should not be worded in that way.
39. The Respondent submits that the references to immigration bail is just the use of a generic term. It is the Respondent’s position that the Applicant does not understand the Respondent’s database and that there is no system to be corrected. It is not possible to amend previous entries. The Respondent submitted that her error finding that the Applicant had not reported was just that an error and it was not caused by any failure to effectively correct her records.
40. The Respondent accepts that an ARC would confirm the Applicant’s legal rights, but submits that this can be requested by the Applicant himself.
Analysis
41. I am satisfied that the Respondent has done what she undertook to do in her letter to the Applicant’s MP on 16 May 2025.
42. The Respondent cancelled the Applicant’s bail and issued him with a IS.248. I note that the Applicant has not been provided with an ARC to reflect the change in his conditions, but the Respondent only undertook to request an ARC. In any event, the Applicant has the IS.248 which details the conditions imposed on him and importantly that they were imposed “under s.71 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (“NIAA 2002”), which applies to a person who makes a claim for asylum at a time when he has leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom.” Accordingly, the Applicant has evidence in writing should he require it.
43. I am not persuaded that the Respondent has not effectively corrected her records.
44. The GCID Case Record Sheet is an entry from 10 December 2020, before the error was corrected. Accordingly, it does not indicate that the Respondent has not corrected her records since she has acknowledged the error. I am not persuaded that the Respondent was required to (or that it would be possible for her to) delete any old references to the Applicant being an illegal entrant.
45. I am not persuaded that the Respondent’s repeated references to the Applicant being on “immigration bail” demonstrates that she has not effectively corrected her records or that she should not have referred the Applicant to the UKVI and AIU because that time, the Applicant had an outstanding appeal challenging the refusal of his asylum claim. I accept the Respondent’s submission that the references to “immigration bail” are just the use of a generic term.
46. I am concerned about the repeated references to “Bail 201”. The Respondent informed the Applicant that she had withdrawn his Bail 201 in her correspondence dated 26 June 2025. Accordingly, it is understandable that the Applicant would be concerned that the Respondent had not in fact withdrawn his Bail 201 if he received correspondence that repeatedly refers to it some three months later.
47. However, the Respondent did not undertake to correct her database or not to make any future errors as a result of the incorrect designation in her correspondence dated 16 May 2025. Therefore I am satisfied that the Respondent’s letter did not create a legitimate expectation of database correction.
48. I am satisfied that the Respondent’s letter dated 26 June 2025 resolved the issue and that the Applicant’s claim for judicial review was academic from that date.
49. The Applicant’s concern is understandable particularly in light of the Respondent’s references to “immigration bail” and “Bail 201”. Had the Respondent not made these errors and/or provided the Applicant with an ARC reflecting the change in his conditions this litigation may have been avoided.
Decision
50. The Applicant’s application for judicial review is accordingly refused.
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Postscript
Costs
51. After the judgment had been circulated in draft, the Respondent confirmed in writing that she was still willing to pay the Applicant’s costs to 26 June 2025, calculated on the basis that the Applicant is a litigant in person, but submitted that from 26 June 2025, she was entitled to her costs.
52. The Applicant submitted that there should be no order as to costs from 26 June 2025 because the judgment recognised that “the Respondent’s own correspondence, errors and omissions generated ambiguity as to the Applicant’s true bail status and justified his concerns,” the Applicant had acted reasonably throughout and the Applicant is a litigant in person and a recently recognised refugee who is in a position of financial vulnerability.
53. Rule 10(3)(a) of the Upper Tribunal’s Procedure Rules empowers the Tribunal to make an order for costs in judicial review proceedings without the jurisdictional threshold of unreasonable behaviour that applies in statutory appeals. Nor, save for the overriding objective, do those rules provide any other guidance on how the Tribunal’s discretion should be exercised. It is common for this Tribunal to apply the principles arising out of the Civil Procedure Rules that govern judicial review proceedings in the Administrative Court, notwithstanding that they do not formally apply – see, for example, R. (IX) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Judicial Review; costs) [2025] UKUT 154 (IAC).
54. The ‘general rule’ at CPR 44.2(2)(a) is that the unsuccessful party will be ordered to pay the costs of the successful party. In this case the Respondent is the successful party. However, as I noted in my judgment this litigation may have been avoided had the Respondent issued the Applicant with an ARC card reflecting the change in his conditions and/or not made errors in respect of the Applicant’s conditions.
55. Taking those circumstances into account, I consider that departure from the general rule is justified. Making no order for costs would, take insufficient account of the final result in the Respondent’s favour. However, I am satisfied that a reduction of the costs paid by 50% is justified by the matters discussed in the above paragraph.