JR-2025-LON-002297

• Status of case: Unreported
• Hearing date: 19 Aug 2026
• Promulgation date: 26 Oct 2026
• Publication date: 02 Nov 2026
• Last updated on: 02 Nov 2026

The decision

JR-2025-LON-002297
In the Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber)
Judicial Review

In the matter of an application for Judicial Review

The King on the application of
CU
(Anonymity Order Made)
Applicant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

ORDER

UPON hearing counsel for the applicant, Mr Bandegani, and counsel for the respondent, Mr Biggs, at the hearing on 19 August 2026.
AND UPON considering written submissions filed by the applicant on 2 September 2026 and 29 September 2026, and the respondent’s written submissions dated 21 September 2026
AND UPON considering the respondent’s written submissions dated 19 October 2026 and brief emails from the applicant in respect of costs and permission to appeal, and there being no appearance at the hand-down of the judgment on 21 October 2026
AND UPON considering the applicant’s application for permission to appeal against the decision dismissing the judicial review application and the submission on behalf of the applicant that costs are left to the court’s discretion
IT IS ORDERED THAT: -
1. The application for judicial review is dismissed.
2. The applicant is to pay the respondent’s costs to be assessed on the standard basis if not agreed, save that there be no order as to costs in respect of the post-hearing application made by the applicant, and the post-hearing written submissions filed by the parties. 
3. Permission is appeal is refused.

REASONS
(1) The reasons for dismissing the judicial review application are contained in the judgment handed down on 21 October 2026. Permission to appeal is refused as there is no arguable error of law in the decision.

(2) I do not accept the applicant’s suggestion that costs should be reserved because she has indicated that she wishes to seek permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal. Permission to appeal has been refused and there must be a final determination on costs.

(3) The applicant did not make any further submissions on costs save that her solicitors indicated in an email dated 20 October 2026 that they were content to leave the matter to the court’s discretion. The general rule that the successful party is entitled to its costs applies here. However, this must be considered alongside the conclusion in the judgment (see [97-99]) that the respondent breached the duty of candour in failing to provide the visit report and the sponsor revocation decision (‘the relevant documents’). This led to further post-hearing written submissions. For the reasons outlined at [109-113] of the judgment, the relevant documents would have made no material difference to the outcome. In all the circumstances, the appropriate order for costs requires the applicant to pay the respondent’s costs to the date of the hearing, with no order as to costs thereafter.

Signed: DCP Plimmer

Deputy Chamber President Plimmer


Dated: 21 October 2026


The date on which this order was sent is given below


For completion by the Upper Tribunal Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Sent / Handed to the applicant, respondent and any interested party / the applicant's, respondent’s and any interested party’s solicitors on (date): 26/10/2026

Solicitors:
Ref No.
Home Office Ref:


Notification of appeal rights

A decision by the Upper Tribunal on an application for judicial review is a decision that disposes of proceedings.

A party may appeal against such a decision to the Court of Appeal on a point of law only. Any party who wishes to appeal should apply to the Upper Tribunal for permission at the hearing at which the decision is given. If no application is made, the Tribunal must nonetheless consider at the hearing whether to give or refuse permission to appeal (rule 44(4B) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008).

If the Tribunal refuses permission, either in response to an application or by virtue of rule 44(4B), then the party wishing to appeal can apply for permission from the Court of Appeal itself. This must be done by filing an appellant’s notice with the Civil Appeals Office of the Court of Appeal within 28 days of the date the Tribunal’s decision on permission to appeal was sent (Civil Procedure Rules Practice Direction 52D 3.3).



Case No: JR-2025-LON-002297
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
(IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER)
Field House,
Breams Buildings
London, EC4A 1WR
21 October 2026
Before:

DEPUTY CHAMBER PRESIDENT PLIMMER
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BLUM
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Between:

THE KING
on the application of
CU
(Anonymity Order Made)
Applicant
- and -

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Mr Bandegani, Counsel (instructed by MTC Solicitors), for the applicant
Mr Biggs, Counsel (instructed by the Government Legal Department) for the respondent

Hearing date: 19 August 2026
(followed by written submissions on behalf of the respondent dated 21 September 2026 and a reply on behalf of the applicant dated 29 September 2026)

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
J U D G M E N T
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the applicant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the applicant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the applicant without that individual’s express consent. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

Deputy Chamber President Plimmer:

1. The applicant has made an application for judicial review of the respondent’s decision dated 7 October 2024 to cancel her leave to remain as a skilled worker on the health and care worker route from 6 December 2024, and thereby providing her with a 60-day ‘grace period’ of further leave, under [9.27.1(a)] of the Immigration Rules (‘the decision’).

2. We have decided to make an anonymity order because this decision refers to the applicant’s psychiatric history, including her claim to be a victim of sexual assault. Given the importance of open justice, the general principle is that an anonymity order should only be made to the extent that the law requires it or it is found necessary to do so. The relevant Guidance Note 2022 No 2: Anonymity Orders and Hearings in Private notes that anonymity is required for an alleged victim of a sexual offence listed in s.2 of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992. Whilst that does not extend to Sri Lanka where the alleged assault took place, we consider in all the circumstances it is appropriate to anonymise the applicant’s name. Mr Biggs did not have instructions but was content to be neutral on the issue.

Background facts

3. The factual background is set out in two witness statements signed by the applicant, dated 20 June 2025 and 1 April 2026. The respondent does not accept the entirety of the applicant’s account.

4. The applicant is a citizen of Sri Lanka and is 38 years old. She completed a Nursing Diploma and obtained a Bachelor of Science degree, which was taught in English, in Sri Lanka. She worked as an emergency nurse at a hospital in Sri Lanka for about ten years.

5. On 2 March 2023, the applicant applied for entry clearance to the United Kingdom (‘UK’) as a student visitor for short term study, which was granted on 9 March 2023. The applicant provided a Gmail email address using variants her name (‘the Gmail address’) as her contact email address. Whilst in the UK, the applicant began an English course and claims that she was introduced to individuals named Dilshan and Vasuki. Dilshan said that he could assist the applicant to obtain a work permit at a cost of £21,000. The applicant’s uncle initially paid Dilshan £1,000. Arrangements were made to meet at Vasuki’s address. In July 2023 Vasuki was paid £10,000 in cash, whilst in the applicant’s uncle’s vehicle, as Vasuki did not permit the applicant to enter her property. Vasuki advised the applicant to return to Sri Lanka to obtain the relevant documents and introduced her to Tee Cee Global (‘the agency’), which would be responsible for making the application and arranging UK sponsorship and employment.

6. The applicant returned to Sri Lanka in July 2023, when a further £4,000 was transferred. In August 2023, the applicant contacted the agency directly and discovered that the agency fee was £16,000, indicating that £5,000 was to be kept by Dilshan and Vasuki. The applicant makes it clear at [9] of her supplementary witness statement that by this stage she realised that Vasuki and Dilshan had financially exploited her.

7. In September 2023, the applicant received a copy of her Certificate of Sponsorship (‘COS’) from Vasuki via WhatsApp. This sponsor was named as Greenstar Health Care Ltd (‘the sponsor’). The applicant paid the remaining £6,000, as instructed by Vasuki. The applicant claims that these payments were made with borrowed funds.

8. On 13 October 2023, the WhatsApp messages show that the agent was in close contact with the applicant in order to obtain relevant updated details to complete the application form. The applicant was provided with a copy of the application form and asked to check it before it was submitted. The applicant identified that the Hotmail email address entered on the application, which used variants of her name (‘the Hotmail address’) as incorrect. Her correct email address was the Gmail address. The agency responded that the “email address is ok” because it was the “company one”.

9. On 15 October 2023, the application for entry clearance as a skilled worker on the Health and Care Worker route in order to work at the sponsor (‘the application’), was sent on behalf of the applicant. The application was granted on 23 October 2023, and the applicant was given permission to enter the UK valid from 25 October 2023 until 13 September 2026, as a skilled worker migrant. That notice attached notes on next steps which included the following:

“If your information or circumstances change
If your information or circumstances change you may need to tell us you can find out what changes you should tell us about and how to do so at
https://www.gov.uk/change-circumstances-visa-brp.”

10. The link makes it clear that a biometric residence permit (‘BRP’) holder must report any changes in circumstances and must inform UKVI of changes to contact details.

11. The applicant was provided with a sponsorship letter dated 21 September 2023 on 6 November 2023. The letter of employment stated that she was to work as a domiciliary care worker. The applicant noted with concern that she did not hold a valid driving licence, which was a requirement for the position. The agency and Vasuki assured her that everything would be fine once she arrived in the UK.

12. The applicant arrived in the UK on 2 December 2023 and collected her BRP shortly after this. From December 2023 onwards, the applicant repeatedly attempted to contact the sponsor and the agency seeking information about training, induction and the commencement of work. This is corroborated within contemporaneous emails and WhatsApp messages. This includes the applicant using the Gmail address from December 2023 to make it clear to the sponsor that she is in the UK and would like to know next steps. In January 2024, having received no meaningful information, the applicant travelled from London to Leeds in an attempt to attend the sponsor’s premises and obtain answers in person, but was not permitted entry or given an explanation. Further chasing emails were sent by the applicant up to May 2024 with no meaningful response.

13. In March 2024, the applicant was asked to pay £500 per month personally to an individual associated with the sponsor, purportedly for ‘tax’. When she was unable to make those payments, meaningful communication ceased. The applicant maintains that she was in a very vulnerable situation, isolated, afraid and not knowing who to trust. She was also grieving her uncle who had passed away in December 2023, and claims to have been under increasing psychological distress.

14. On 7 August 2024, the respondent received notification from the sponsor via the system for sponsor notifications, SMS message, that the applicant “is no longer employed by them” and “never showed up”. On 7 October 2024, the respondent cancelled the applicant’s leave. The reasons for the decision are recorded in these terms:

“…Your entry clearance has been cancelled under Part 9.27.1(a) of the Immigration Rules because you did not start working for Greenstar Health Care Ltd.
I have considered whether to exercise discretion regarding the cancellation of your entry clearance. It is not considered that the circumstances in your case are such that discretion should be exercised in your favour because your sponsor notified the Home Office on 7 August 2024 that they had withdrawn their sponsorship because you did not start working for them.
I have therefore decided to cancel your entry clearance.
Your entry clearance is cancelled from 6 December 2024.
…
If you think there are other reasons why you should be allowed to stay in the UK
If you think you have a reason to stay in the UK that you have not yet told us you must tell us now. If you do not tell us as soon as you can of any reasons why you should be allowed to stay and you apply later you may lose any right of appeal against a refusal of that application.
If you want to seek legal advice you must do so now.”

15. The respondent’s reasoning is based upon the sponsor’s assertion without any further enquiry. However, the applicant’s leave was not cancelled with immediate effect, but so that it would expire in 60 days, on 6 December 2024. This provided the opportunity to correct any error that had been made on the part of the respondent, as highlighted within the reasons for the decision.

16. The applicant claims that she did not receive the decision and she therefore did not know that her leave had been cancelled or that she was being provided with 60 days to correct any errors or make a new application. At the time of the decision, the applicant had not contacted the respondent regarding her employment difficulties or to update her email address. The applicant has adduced contemporaneous evidence that after arriving in the UK, she repeatedly sought information from the sponsor, with a view to commencing employment. The applicant considers herself to be the victim of prolonged and organised fraud and exploitation, including the following: she paid approximately £21,000 to secure what she believed to be genuine sponsorship and employment; the application was prepared and controlled by intermediaries presenting themselves as competent to arrange her visa; an email address which was not hers and to which she had no access was inserted into the application; she was denied the employment for which she had travelled to the UK; and she was subsequently asked to make monthly payments of £500 into the personal account of an individual connected with the sponsor.

17. The applicant was introduced to a job opportunity with Mary Gold Care but was told that they needed to confirm her employment hours with the sponsor. The applicant explains in her supplementary witness statement that the agent agreed to contact the sponsor, who provided a letter dated 4 September 2024. This states that the applicant “has been employed with us as a domiciliary care assistant” and that she “has shown herself to be a good care worker”. In October 2024, the applicant commenced 20 hours per week of supplementary employment with a different care provider, believing herself lawfully entitled to do so.

18. On 25 November 2024, the applicant created an e-visa account, giving the Gmail address for contact. The applicant made no attempt to alert the respondent that her contact details including the Hotmail address, provided in the application (dated 15 October 2023) had changed, beyond providing the Gmail address within the e-visa account, at this juncture. The applicant therefore did not ask the respondent to replace the Hotmail address with the Gmail address or explain that she had not been provided with work by the sponsor.

19. On 10 March 2025, the applicant obtained an offer of full-time employment from another care provider. It was only when she was unable to obtain a right-to-work share code on 28 March 2025 that she sought legal advice and discovered there was a problem with her immigration status. On 28 March 2025, the applicant made a request for disclosure of personal information held by the respondent, a ‘subject access request’. On 31 March 2025, the respondent received a letter before claim dated 28 March 2025 challenging the decision pursuant to the judicial review pre-action protocol. On 14 April 2025, the respondent replied to the 28 March 2025 letter, defending the decision. On 24 April 2025, the respondent’s sent the applicant her records pursuant to the ‘subject access request’.

20. On 20 June 2025, the applicant made a complaint to the police alleging that she was the victim of visa fraud. On behalf of the applicant it is said that her account is consistent with the evidence in the public domain outlining the fraud, unlawful recruitment fees, sham sponsorship and exploitation of migrant workers within the social care sector.

Procedural history

21. On 17 July 2025, the applicant lodged this application for judicial review, which was served on the respondent on 18 July 2025. Permission was initially refused on the papers but granted by UTJ Kebede at a hearing on 24 November 2025. The respondent sought and was granted an extension of time for filing her detailed grounds of defence to 15 January 2026.

22. The substantive hearing initially listed on 14 May 2026 was adjourned. In an Order dated 14 May 2026 the Tribunal noted that the applicant’s additional evidence was served late and without adequate explanation but was potentially relevant. The Tribunal accepted that in order to fairly determine the matter it was necessary to grant permission to the applicant to rely upon the late evidence and for the respondent to cross-examine the applicant, but no interpreter had been requested or booked. Directions were given to ensure the case was ready to proceed on 19 August 2026.

Adjourned hearing

23. At the adjourned hearing on 19 August 2026, the applicant sought permission to rely upon further evidence not available to the decision-maker or at the earlier hearing. This includes an independent psychiatric report by Dr Kamila Haider dated 17 June 2026. Dr Haider describes a longstanding history of psychological distress dating back to the applicant’s childhood. The applicant reported being the victim of sexual abuse at the age of four and during adulthood experienced further traumatic events including harassment while undertaking nurse training, an unfaithful partner, an unhappy arranged marriage and the difficulties associated with the sponsor in the UK. The applicant took an overdose of Bisoprolol in 2019 and was admitted to an intensive care unit in Sri Lanka. The applicant has reported worsening symptoms of anxiety, depression and trauma-related distress whilst in the UK.

24. Dr Haider diagnosed the applicant with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (with Complex Trauma Features), Major Depressive Disorder of moderate to severe intensity and Generalised Anxiety Disorder. Dr Haider identified longstanding difficulties with trust, heightened sensitivity to betrayal, emotional vulnerability, impaired decision-making and reduced resilience during periods of stress, and concluded that the applicant’s presentation is highly consistent with her history, which includes financial exploitation. On behalf of the applicant it is submitted that this provides further material support for her account and also explains her vulnerability throughout these events, including an expert explanation for conduct which might otherwise appear difficult to understand: why she remained dependent upon those controlling her sponsorship despite warning signs, why she continued to rely upon repeated assurances that matters would be resolved; why she did not immediately recognise that she had become the victim of organised fraud; and why she experienced difficulty seeking independent assistance. The expert evidence is said to have identified heightened threat perception, emotional vulnerability, reduced coping capacity, difficulties seeking support and increased vulnerability when faced with uncertainty and significant life challenges.

25. Mr Biggs accepted that the applicant should be treated as a vulnerable witness in the light of Dr Haider’s report. Arrangements were made to ensure there were straightforward questions on limited issues with requisite breaks. Mr Bandegani did not suggest any other adjustments. Whilst the applicant was clearly nervous, she provided clear and straightforward evidence with the assistance of a Tamil interpreter. She was only asked questions relating to the limited disputed issues.

26. At the hearing we agreed to consider the relevant new evidence de bene esse. This comprises Dr Haider’s report and WhatsApp communications between the applicant and others. Permission was not sought to rely upon this evidence in accordance with rule 33 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 (‘the Procedure Rules’). No formal application was made and there was no explanation for the failure to make the application – see [10.2.4.1] of the Administrative Court Judicial Review User Guide, September 2025. Whilst it is regrettable that the applicant’s solicitors have paid scant regard to the procedural requirements before submitting evidence, having considered that evidence to be relevant to the issues the respondent wished to cross-examine the applicant on, we give permission to the applicant to rely on this further evidence.

27. Having heard from the applicant for just under an hour, we heard submissions from Counsel for the remainder of the day. We summarise those submissions when outlining the grounds of challenge and when analysing the applicant’s case below. We reserved the decision.

Post-hearing application, evidence and written submissions

28. In an application dated 2 September 2026 the applicant relied upon documents provided to her by the respondent after the hearing including a visit report in relation to the sponsor, initially prepared on 9 September 2024 and finalised on 27 November 2024 (‘the visit report’), a letter from the respondent dated 21 February 2025 revoking the sponsor’s licence (‘the revocation letter’), submissions in respect of that material, and a claim that the respondent has breached the duty of candour. As a result, the panel issued directions for written submissions. In submissions dated 21 September 2026, the respondent addressed the application and at the request of the panel, the policy position regarding changes of contact details in respect of those granted leave to enter or remain. The respondent also attached a witness statement from Simon Fellgett, a technical lead responsible for reconsidering sponsor licence and visa decisions. This outlines the information available to the decision-maker responsible for the decision challenged in this case and provides information about the visit report. The visit report outlined a number of concerns regarding the sponsor’s employment practices and sponsor-compliance. On behalf of the applicant, Mr Bandegani submitted detailed written submissions dated 29 September 2026. Having considered the submissions from both parties, we grant the application to rely upon post-hearing evidence. We address the relevance of these documents later.

Grounds of challenge

29. On behalf of the applicant, Mr Bandegani described the central features of her case as straightforward: the respondent cancelled the applicant’s leave on the untested assertion of a sponsor operating within a sector which the respondent knew to be characterised by widespread exploitation and sponsor abuse, and (following the disclosure of the visit report) at a time when this particular sponsor was being investigated for concerning employment and sponsorship practices, yet made no enquiry of the applicant as to why her employment had not commenced; and then sent the decision to an email address which the contemporaneous evidence demonstrates was controlled by the very intermediaries alleged to have exploited her, thereby depriving her of any effective opportunity to challenge the decision or use the 60-day period to obtain alternative sponsorship.

30. In his written submissions Mr Bandegani outlined why the respondent failed to comply with her duty of candour in failing to disclose the visit report and invited the panel to draw adverse inferences against the respondent. Mr Bandegani also submitted that Mr Fellgett’s evidence did not adequately explain what was or should have been considered when making the decision under challenge. Mr Bandegani also made additional submissions on the impact of this additional evidence on grounds 2 and 4.

31. The applicant relies upon the following grounds:

Ground 1: The decision was not lawfully served because it was not sent to an email address validly provided for correspondence by the applicant or a lawfully authorised representative, as required within article 8ZA(2)(d) of the Immigration (Leave to Enter and Remain) Order 2000 (‘the 2000 Order’); and in any event, any presumption of receipt is rebutted by the evidence that the applicant neither created, controlled nor had access to the Hotmail address.

Ground 2: The respondent acted irrationally and in breach of the duty identified in Secretary of State for Education and Science v Tameside MBC [1977] AC 1014 (‘Tameside’) and the decision did not rationally consider whether to cancel the applicant’s leave as a matter of discretion. In particular, the respondent was not entitled to accept the sponsor’s assertion without taking reasonable steps to establish why the applicant failed to commence employment, in the light of the respondent’s own policy, institutional knowledge of widespread exploitation within the care-worker sponsorship route, and actual knowledge of specific concerns regarding the sponsor.

Ground 3: The respondent acted irrationally by failing to grant the applicant 60 days leave to remain or otherwise remedy the fact that the applicant was not notified of the decision.

Ground 4: The cumulative effect of the respondent’s failure to investigate, invalid service of the decision and deprivation of any effective opportunity to challenge cancellation or secure alternative sponsorship means the decision is undermined by procedural unfairness.

32. The respondent’s position in response is also described to be straightforward by Mr Biggs, and is summarised below.

Ground 1: The decision was validly notified to the applicant on 7 October 2024 because: (i) the evidence triggers the presumption that the applicant was given notice of the decision pursuant to article 8ZA(2)(d) and (3)(b) of the 2000 Order, as the Hotmail address was provided by the applicant or her representative as a contact email for the purposes of correspondence with the respondent; (ii) the presumption is not (indeed, cannot be) rebutted on the evidence, given that for the purposes of articles 8ZA-8ZB of the 2000 Order, receipt of an email at the email address falling within article 8ZA(2)(d) or (3)(b) is constituted by the arrival of the decision into the inbox of the relevant email address. The respondent has provided a delivery receipt confirming that the decision was sent to and received at the Hotmail address on 7 October 2024.

Grounds 2, 3 and 4: The decision to cancel the applicant’s leave to expire in 60 days was reasonable, rational and procedurally fair in all the circumstances, and the defendant was not under a Tameside duty.

Legal framework

Statutory framework

33. The sponsorship scheme has its roots in statute. By s. 3(2) of the Immigration Act 1971 (‘the 1971 Act’) the respondent is required to lay before Parliament rules as to the practice to be followed for regulating the entry into and stay in the UK of persons who require leave to enter. The Immigration Rules (HC 395) are made under that power. As Lord Sumption explained in R (New London College Ltd) v SSHD [2013] UKSC 51, and as the Court of Appeal recorded in R (Prestwick Care Ltd and Supporting Care Ltd) v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 184 at [4] to [5], the statutory power to administer the system of immigration control necessarily extends to a range of ancillary and incidental administrative powers.

34. The 1971 Act is the source of the respondent’s power to grant, refuse or vary (including by curtailing) leave to enter or remain - see R (Munir) v SSHD [2012] UKSC 32, [2012] 1 WLR 2192 at [33] and [44]. S. 3 of the 1971 Act provides that a person requires leave to enter and that leave may be varied or curtailed. S. 3B states that the respondent may by Order make further provision with respect to the giving, refusing or varying of leave to remain, and in particular, to provide for the form or manner in which leave may be varied.

35. S. 4(1) of the 1971 Act requires written notice of a decision varying leave to be given to the person affected. It provides that the power to curtain leave to remain:

“…shall be exercised by notice in writing given to the person affected…”

36. The importance of this wording was addressed by Sullivan LJ in SSHD v Ahmadi [2013] EWCA Civ 512, [2014] 1 WLR 401 at [22] where he said this:

“The notice in writing is not a subsequent step following the exercise of the power, it is the way in which the power is to be exercised.”

37. As Lord Steyn observed at R (Anufrijeva) v SSHD [2003] UKHL 36, [2004] 1 AC 604, at [26]:

“Notice of a decision is required before it can have the character of a determination with legal effect because the individual concerned must be in a position to challenge the decision in the courts if he or she wishes to do so. This is not a technical rule. It is simply an application of the right of access to justice.”

38. This is consistent with the wider principle that an administrative decision does not ordinarily take legal effect until it has been communicated to the person affected, as explained by Lord Steyn (with whom Lord Hoffman, Lord Millett and Lord Scott agreed) at [29] and [30], in which he highlighted the European law principle that “a measure adopted by public authorities shall not be applicable to those concerned before they have the opportunity to make themselves acquainted with it” (our emphasis) and the more general principles that surprise is regarded as the enemy of justice and fairness is the guiding principle of our public law. It is against that background that Lord Steyn observed that: “Elementary fairness therefore supports a principle that a decision takes effect only upon communication.”

39. In Syed (curtailment of leave — notice) [2013] UKUT 00144 (IAC) it was held at [28] that a curtailment decision did not take effect until it “was communicated to the person concerned”. UTJ Spencer pointed out that, whilst there were regulations which dealt with the giving of notice in writing of appealable ‘immigration decisions’, there were no corresponding regulations dealing with notice in writing of a decision to curtail leave to remain. The notice in writing curtailing Mr Syed’s leave had been twice sent by recorded delivery to his last known address and twice returned. In the absence of applicable regulations deeming service by post to be effective, effective notice had not been given to Mr Syed. The Tribunal also observed at [28] that “communication would be effective if made to a person authorised to receive it on that person’s behalf, see Hosier v Goddall [1962] 1 All ER 30, but the Secretary of State cannot rely upon deemed postal service”. The relevant statutory regime at the time was different. There was no statutory instrument under s. 4 of the 1971 Act dealing with the means of giving notice for the purposes of a non-appealable immigration decision.

40. The decision in Syed led to the amendment of the 2000 Order to insert articles 8ZA and 8ZB by article 4 of the Immigration (Leave to Enter and Remain) (Amendment) Order 2013/1749 (12 July 2013). Article 8ZA of the 2000 Order is headed “Grant, refusal or variation of leave by notice in writing”, and prescribes the methods by which notice may be given for the purposes of s. 4(1). It provides at article 8ZA(2) that the notice may be given by hand, sent by fax, sent by postal service, sent by document exchange, sent by courier or at article 8ZA(2)(d):

“sent electronically to an e-mail address provided for correspondence by the person or the person's representative”.

41. Article 8ZB is headed “Presumptions about receipt of notice” and provides for certain rebuttable presumptions of when notice has “been given”, when a notice is sent in accordance with Art 8ZA. It states at article 8ZB(1) (our emphasis):

“Where a notice is sent in accordance with article 8ZA, it shall be deemed to have been given to the person affected, unless the contrary is proved—…
(b) where the notice is sent by fax, e-mail, document exchange or courier, on the day it was sent.”

Case-law relevant to the 2000 Order as amended

42. In R (Khurram) v SSHD (effective service; 2000 Order) [2016] UKUT 281 (IAC) UTJ Grubb held at [34 and 38] that an address supplied by a third party falls within article 8ZA(2) where that third party acts as the authorised agent of the person. At [49] UTJ Grubb said that sending the notice electronically to the third party e-mail address clearly falls within article 8ZA(2)(d) as a proper method of sending notice. He observed that any sensible individual who wished to deal with the Home Office bona fides would inform the Home Office of any change in contact email address. It followed that the fact that the notice was directed to an apparently out of date address was a direct result of the person's failure to keep their contact address up to date.

43. These observations were made at a time when there was no obligation upon an individual subject to immigration control to notify the Home Office of a change of address whether postal or electronic. At [50] UTJ Grubb referred to this as an obvious gap in the system which could relatively easily be plugged without imposing an unreasonable burden on the individual and this might well benefit from further consideration by the SSHD. It is not disputed that by the time of the applicant’s application, the respondent’s practice was to tell individuals that they must inform the Home Office of any changes to contact details.

44. In R (Mahmood) v SSHD (effective service – 2000 Order) [2016] UKUT 57 (IAC) UTJ Grubb held that a notice of curtailment attached to an email is “given” for the purposes of s. 4(1) of the 1971 Act, when it is (i) “sent” in accordance with article 8ZA of the 2000 Order and (ii) delivered to the relevant email address. Delivery is therefore rebuttably presumed and there is no requirement that the individual has actual knowledge of the notice or its contents.

45. The Court of Appeal considered s. 4(1) of the 1971 Act and articles 8ZA-8ZB of the 2000 Order in R (Alam) and R (Rana) v. SSHD [2020] EWCA Civ 1527, [2021] INLR 74. After reviewing the statutory framework and authorities at [4]-[18] Floyd LJ (with whom Henderson and Phillips LJJ agreed) addressed the wording at article 8ZB(1) at [19] as follows:

“In those circumstances, whilst it is true that the drafting leaves much to be desired, I proceed on the basis that Article 8ZB (a) deems the use of the methods of sending in Article 8ZA to be the valid giving of notice and (b) deems that notice to have given on the specified day, but leaves the person affected (or for that matter the SSHD if the need arises) free to prove (a) that he was not in fact given notice and/or (b) that it was not given on that day.”

46. Floyd LJ made passing reference to Mahmood in the course of his judgment and identified at [20] the key issue in the appeals to be “what amounts to the giving of notice”. Detailed reference was made to [26-30] of Anufrijeva to the effect that notice of decision is required before it can have legal effect. Floyd LJ then explained the proper approach as follows: (our emphasis)

“[26] These passages [in Anufrijeva] do not support the notion that a communication will only be effective if the decision has been read and understood by the person affected. The European law approach described by Lord Steyn speaks in terms of the party affected being given the opportunity to make themselves acquainted with the decision. If Lord Steyn had been contemplating a requirement for the decision to have been read and understood by the person affected before it was communicated to the person affected, he could hardly have considered the broad thrust of the European law as being the same, when that law merely requires that persons affected should “have the opportunity to make themselves acquainted with” the decision.

[27] Lord Millett, at [43], thought that reasonable steps to communicate with the person affected could be enough:
“I do not subscribe to the view that the failure to notify the appellant of the decision invalidated it, but I have come to the conclusion that it could not properly be recorded so as to deprive her of her right to income support until it was communicated to her; or at least until reasonable steps were taken to do so.” (emphasis added).

[28] In UKI (Kingsway) Ltd v Westminster City Council [2018] UKSC 67; [2019] PTSR 128, Lord Carnwarth cited with approval at [15] the observation of Lord Salmon in Sun Alliance and London assurance Group v Hayman (cited above):
“According to the ordinary and natural use of English words, giving a notice means causing a notice to be received. Therefore, any requirement in a statute or a contract for the giving of a notice can be complied with only by causing the notice to be actually received—unless the context or some statutory or contractual provision otherwise provides…”

[29] In my judgment, the giving of notice for the purposes of section 4(1) of the 1971 Act and the 2000 Order does not require that the intended recipient should have read and absorbed the contents of the notice in writing, merely that it be received. If it were not so, a failure to open an envelope containing the notice, for whatever reason, would mean that notice was not given. Similarly, I do not consider that the recipient must be made aware of the notice. Again, a recipient who allows mail to accumulate in a mailbox or on a hall table will not be aware of the notice. Proof of such facts should not enable the person to whom the mail is addressed to establish that the notice was not given, by being received.

[30] Receipt, and thus the giving of notice, can plainly be effected by placing the notice in the hands of the person affected. So much is recognised by Article 8ZA(2)(a). In my judgment, however, receipt in the case of an individual is not so limited. Receipt of an email, for example, will be effected by the arrival of the email in the Inbox of the person affected. Likewise, documents arriving by post will normally be received if they arrive, addressed to the person affected at the dwelling where he or she is living, at least in the absence of positive evidence that mail which so arrives is intercepted. A document received at an address provided to the SSHD for correspondence is received by the applicant, even if he does not bother to take steps to collect it.

[31] It follows that the burden of proving the negative, non-receipt, in the face of convincing evidence leading to the expectation of receipt, will not be lightly discharged. In particular it will not be discharged by evidence, far less by mere assertion, that the notice did not come to the attention of the person affected.”

47. At [44], Floyd LJ accepted that a dispute about whether articles 8ZA-8ZB meant that notice had been given on the facts of a given case was not a ‘Wednesbury’ question but was rather a matter for the Tribunal or court to decide itself, in the light of the evidence before it.

48. Sheldon J considered a claimant’s challenge that although the curtailment notice was sent to his email address, the presumption was rebutted because the email had been intercepted by a third party (his estranged wife) in Escobar v SSHD [2024] EWHC 1097 (Admin). Sheldon J decided that the 2000 Order permitted the rebuttal of the presumption that notice had been given by email delivery, if it could be established that there was third party intervention (see [27-30] and [30-31]) but on the facts of that case the claimant did not come close to demonstrating this.

49. In R (Dhandapani) v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 1244 the Court of Appeal considered an appeal against the Tribunal’s refusal of permission to bring a claim for judicial review. The Court found the Tribunal to be wrong to conclude that the applicant’s evidence to the effect that the email attaching the notice of curtailment was not received, was no more than assertion. Much turned on the facts of the case, including the absence of a delivery receipt on the respondent’s casework record. The Court of Appeal did not differ from the principled approach described in Alam, and at [55] emphasised that each case depends on its own facts. Upon remittal of this case in JR-2023-LON-001981, UTJ Hirst applied the reasoning in Alam at [29-31] and concluded at [27-28] that the applicant did not put forward a positive case to rebut the presumption of notice, given the availability of the respondent’s evidence (unavailable before the Court of Appeal as recorded at [47] and [53] of its judgment) that the relevant email attaching the cancellation decision was confirmed as delivered to the email address provided by the applicant.

50. The Administrative Court was invited to consider whether there had been valid service of a legal notice received into the recipient’s junk/spam folder in the recent decision of Berow v Maidstone Borough Council [2026] EWHC 635 (Admin). The Court considered relevant recent caselaw on this issue including Alam. For the reasons set out at [49-58] of the judgment, the Court rejected the argument that receipt of an email into a spam folder did not amount to effective email service. At [57] the court refers to any reasonable person having to keep an eye on both his email inbox and the spam box or folder.

Relevant Immigration Rules and guidance

51. [9.27.1] of the Immigration Rules is contained within Part 9 of the Immigration Rules, which at the time of the decision, provided (our emphasis):

“A person’s entry clearance or permission on the Skilled Worker, Intra-Company, Global Business Mobility, Representative of an Overseas Business, Scale-up Worker (subject to paragraph 9.33.1), T2 Minister of Religion, International Sportsperson or Temporary Worker routes, may be cancelled if:
(a) They do not start working for their sponsor; or
(b) They or their sponsor confirm that their employment, volunteering, training or job shadowing has ceased or will cease before the end date recorded on the Certificate of Sponsorship; or
(c) The start date for the job, as recorded on the Certificate of Sponsorship, is delayed by more than 28 days; or
(d) They cease to work for their sponsor.”

52. The respondent has provided guidance to its caseworkers regarding Rule [9.27.1]. This is entitled Cancellation and curtailment of permission Guidance, version 6, published on 15.8.24 (‘the cancellation guidance’). It is agreed that this version of the cancellation guidance governed the decision under challenge.

53. The cancellation guidance addresses issues relevant to the instant claim including: information gathering; exercise of discretion as to whether to cancel leave, and; discretionary assessment as to whether to cancel leave with immediate effect, or so that it expires 60 days or later.

54. The cancellation guidance details what must be considered before cancelling an individual’s permission to stay in the UK. Under the heading “When to consider asking for further information” (pg 53) the following is stated (our emphasis):

“You should make a cancellation decision on the basis of the available information, providing that is sufficient to inform your decision. In the majority of cases, you will be able to make a decision after reviewing the available information but in some circumstances, it may be appropriate for you to ask an individual to provide additional information before making a cancellation decision …”

55. It is also made clear that there are certain cases where the individual must be given an opportunity to address an allegation before a decision is made, when a minded to process or interview is conducted. These include allegations of deception and breach of conditions or where consideration is being given to cancelling leave with immediate effect. Pg 55 then explains (our emphasis):

“In cases where the reasons for cancellation are discretionary, you must not automatically cancel an individual’s entry clearance or permission if there are reasons that suggest it may not be appropriate to do so. It is the Secretary of State’s responsibility to establish the reasons why an individual’s entry clearance or permission is to be cancelled. You must establish the relevant facts and then carefully consider all an individual’s relevant circumstances and the proven facts of the case before you make a final decision. You must consider any other facts or evidence about the individual’s circumstances, such as those recorded on Atlas, provided with an application or stored on a case file that is relevant to your decision.”

56. The cancellation guidance goes on (pg 56) to explain that, where a person’s leave is liable to cancellation, there should be “compassionate or exceptional circumstances” before their leave will not be cancelled as a matter of discretion, but that even then, cancellation of leave may be justified. The document then provides specific guidance in this respect, addressing “Pregnancy, serious illness or serious medical conditions”. This includes by way of example where an individual is receiving treatment for a serious medical condition in the UK which prevents them from travelling or making a fresh application, and that treatment has a definitive end date in the next few months after which they could travel or make a fresh application.

57. The cancellation guidance then sets out how decision-makers should apply their discretion as to the length of leave that should be left, if it is decided that leave should be cancelled under “Deciding the date of expiry for cancelled permission” (pgs 59-63). This section of the cancellation guidance addresses whether to cancel leave so that it expires, immediately, in 60 days, or at some point after 60 days. This explains the types of cases where cancellation of permission should take place with immediate effect (inapplicable to the instant claim). The guidance goes on to state (pg 61) that where the reason why permission is being cancelled on a discretionary basis are outside the individuals control:

“It will normally be appropriate to leave an individual with 60 days permission to stay in the UK. This will allow them either to make an application for further permission to stay or make arrangements to leave the UK.”

58. Under the section “Service of a non-appealable cancellation decisions to an email address” (pg 88) the cancellation guidance states that where the respondent has a recorded email address, she must where possible serve the notice to an email address that the individual or their legal representative provided for the purposes of correspondence. The order of priority of email addresses to use to serve the cancellation notice are then recorded as follows:

“• an email address an individual provided for the purpose of correspondence
• an email address their legal representative provided for the purpose of correspondence
• the last known email address for the individual, including at the individual’s last known place of study or place of business
• the last known email address of the individual’s representative

You need to identify a suitable email address by looking through relevant systems and databases, including:
• CID / Atlas for in the UK application records and notes fields
• CRS for out of country application records
• SMS notifications received from sponsors

However, you must not use sponsor based email addresses, for example, migrant@sponsor.co.uk or migrant@sponsor.ac.uk if either:
• permission is cancelled following an SMS notification from the sponsor that they have withdrawn sponsorship from an individual who is no longer studying or working with them
• the sponsor has stopped trading…”

59. We were told that there is no specific policy document on notification of changes of contact details for a person with leave to enter or remain. However, it is the respondent’s practice to inform those granted entry clearance that they should notify the respondent if their information or circumstances changes. This is communicated in the written notice of decision granting entry clearance or permission, and was contained in the letter granting the applicant entry clearance dated 23 October 2023, as set out above. This refers to a hyperlinked webpage which states as follows: “You must report any changes in your circumstances if you’re in the UK and have a biometric residence permit (BRP), even if it has expired. How you do this depends on whether you have an eVisa or not.” The webpage goes on to explain that where a person has an eVisa they should sign in to their eVisa account “…to update any of these details online”. For those who do not have an eVisa, like this applicant until 25 November 2024, the webpage explains:

“You can still update your address if you do not have an eVisa yet, either:
• report a change of address online
• fill in the change of circumstances form and send it to the address on the form”

60. The text of these bullet points is hypertext-linked to the online mechanism for changing an address, and the form for making a change of address, respectively. The latter links to a webpage where the “Migrant change of circumstances” form (version 12/18) is available to download. The form (in effect since 2018) states on pg 2:

“What changes in circumstances does UK Visas and Immigration need to be informed of?
The applicant must inform UK Visas and Immigration of any changes to the following, for either themselves or their dependants:
• personal details
• criminal convictions
• contact details
• representative details
• dependants’ details
The applicant may also use this form to notify UK Visas and Immigration of any other information that they think we should know.”

Fairness principles

61. The relevant authorities are well known and do not need to be rehearsed in detail. The convenient starting point is Lord Mustill's classic statement on how fairness applies in immigration cases in R v SSHD, Ex p Doody [1994] 1 AC 531 at p560, and the supplementary principles in R (Citizens UK) v SSHD [2018] EWCA Civ 1812, [2018] 4 WLR 123 at [68]-[71]. At p560 of Doody, Lord Mustill said that “fairness” will “very often require that a person who may be adversely affected by the decision will have an opportunity to make representations … either before the decision is taken …; or after it is taken, with a view to procuring its modification”.

62. In R (Wahid) v Entry Clearance Officer [2021] EWCA Civ 346 the Court of Appeal considered R (Balajigari) v SSHD [2019] EWCA Civ 673 and outlined the obligatory procedural safeguards when dishonesty is alleged. More recently, in R (Singaram) v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 1375 at [55], the Court of Appeal reaffirmed the Balajigari principles. The application of the above principles is heavily dependent on the statutory context and the gravity of the decision. The Court of Appeal in Wahid clarified that while these strict safeguards apply to decisions with severe consequences, such as the refusal of indefinite leave to remain, the same procedural safeguards will not apply for less consequential applications, such as short-term visitor visas where the applicant can simply make a second application.

63. In Pathan v SSHD [2020] UKSC 41; [2020] 1 WLR 4506 the Supreme Court held that the respondent breached her common law duty of procedural fairness by failing promptly to inform the applicant that his sponsor's licence had been revoked. However, the majority held that this procedural duty did not extend to a positive obligation to grant a specific period of grace to enable the applicant to make alternative immigration arrangements.

64. In EK (Ivory Coast) v SSHD [2014] EWCA Civ 1517 the Court of Appeal held (Floyd LJ dissenting)  that the SSHD had not breached her public law duty to act fairly in considering EK's application for leave to remain. The SSHD was not responsible for the general unfairness which EK had suffered. That was the result of actions and omissions by the college sponsor, which in error had withdrawn the requisite confirmation of acceptance of studies (‘CAS’).  Sales LJ referred to Alam at [26] and concluded that  there was no duty to adjourn any decision on the application to give EK notice of the problem with the CAS and an opportunity to rectify it. This is because the points-based system (‘PBS’) places the onus on the applicant to provide valid documentation and is designed to process high volumes of applications expeditiously against strict, objective criteria. Sales LJ held at [31] that while the general public law duty of fairness supplements the PBS regime, it:

“... ought not to be applied in such a manner as to undermine its intended mode of operation in a substantial way. Application of the duty of fairness should not result in the public benefits associated with having such a clear and predictable scheme operating according to objective criteria being placed in serious jeopardy.”

65. Briggs LJ agreed with Sales LJ observing at [54] that the necessary starting point is that a clear distinction must be made between the unfairness in outcome, viewed from the standpoint of the applicant and the separate question whether the SSHD's participation involved a breach of her common law duty to act fairly.

Disputed evidence / Findings of Fact

66. In order to address ground 1, it is agreed that we must determine whether notice of the decision was given in accordance with the 2000 Order, in the light of the relevant evidence before us - see [33(d)] and [44] of Alam, and [55] and [57] of Dhandapani.

67. We have carefully considered the appellant’s oral evidence in the light of Dr Haider’s report and our acceptance that she is a vulnerable witness. We have therefore applied the Joint Presidential Guidance Note No. 2 of 2010: Child, Vulnerable Adult and Sensitive Appellant. We have also considered this evidence alongside all of the detailed evidence before us, including the applicant’s witness statements and the contemporaneous WhatsApp messages. We are satisfied that the applicant provided honest evidence in many respects but some of her claims are not credible, even when we factor in the views of and diagnoses made by Dr Haider. We also disagree with many of the inferences that have been drawn from the evidence on the appellant’s behalf by Mr Bandegani. Having considered the evidence holistically, we reach the following relevant findings of fact.

68. First, the applicant authorised the agency to complete and send the application on her behalf. Indeed, the applicant clearly accepted this when it was put in a straightforward manner by Mr Biggs during cross-examination. Mr Bandegani noted this important answer but nonetheless submitted that the Hotmail address did not fall within the statutory description, because it was created, retained and controlled exclusively by the agency. Mr Bandegani also submitted that the agency “assumed effective control over the entire immigration application”. We note the applicant pointed out inaccuracies in the application to the agency, including questioning the use of the Hotmail address. However, she was persuaded by the agency’s explanation. At no point did she object to the application being submitted with the Hotmail address as her contact email. The chronology clearly demonstrates that the applicant was content to continue to use the services of the agency and content for the Hotmail address to be used as her contact email. We accept that the agency probably played a significant role in the application process, but the WhatsApp messages and the applicant’s own evidence demonstrate that she was closely involved in checking details within the application. It is therefore inaccurate to suggest that the agency maintained the type of exclusive control over the application that rendered the applicant’s role and instructions as meaningless. Whilst the applicant ultimately made a complaint to the police in June 2025, she effectively agreed to the application, was content to pursue it in the form recommended by the agency and participated in the next steps that secured her visa with the assistance of the agency.

69. Dr Haider’s report diagnoses the applicant in 2026 after a very unsettling, difficult and uncertain period in the UK. We do not know whether she had any diagnosable conditions when making relevant decisions in 2023 and 2025, in the light of her past difficulties. However, even assuming the applicant was vulnerable at the relevant time and her approach was to use Dr Haider’s phrase, “clinically plausible”, she was not coerced or controlled, and was capable of making her own decisions. When she made those decisions over the course of 2023 and 2024, the applicant’s vulnerability was mitigated by her educational background, her English language ability and her lengthy work experience. Mr Bandegani took us to WhatsApp messages, which he submitted demonstrated that the applicant was pressured into continuing the relationships with intermediaries and the agency. We do not accept that the applicant was pressured. There were many points at which she could have terminated the process or approached the respondent with updated contact details and information. The applicant’s desire to leave behind difficult circumstances in Sri Lanka and the conditions described in Dr Haider’s report may help explain her decision-making at the time, but she was able to and did make her own decisions. This included authorising the agency to submit the application unamended and then making use of the visa based upon the application.

70. Second, the applicant has not provided a credible explanation for failing to provide the respondent with an accurate contact email, when she obtained her BRP in 2023 or when her circumstances changed (in that she was not provided with work associated with her visa) in 2024. The application included a declaration that by sending it, the applicant was confirming the information contained within it to be correct and that if false information was given she could be prosecuted and banned from the UK. The applicant was told about her obligations to inform the respondent of changes to her information when provided with the visa on 23 October 2023. The applicant admitted that by March 2024 she was aware that she was not being provided with employment and her leave might be cancelled. The applicant’s explanation for not updating the respondent is implausible and incredible, even when Dr Haider’s report is taken into account. She explained to us that she thought the Home Office could have contacted her using the Gmail address. She was unable to explain how the respondent would be able to link her to any other email address when the application provided a different contact email, which remained unchanged up to and after the date of the decision. We note that when the applicant communicated directly with the sponsor between December 2023 and May 2024, she used the Gmail address, and provided the Gmail address to the respondent through the eVisa system when that mechanism became available in November 2024. There remains no credible explanation on the part of the applicant for her failure to notify the respondent of her genuine email address before November 2024.

71. We are satisfied that the applicant knew by around March 2024 that the sponsor was not going to provide her with work. The applicant was clearly in regular contact with the sponsor upon her arrival in December 2023 and even travelled to their premises in January 2024, when she was turned away. By March 2024 she was being asked to pay tax in relation to work she had not completed. Although the applicant was reluctant to accept that she realised this in March 2024 because the sponsor kept making promises, the evidence available to the applicant by March 2024 pointed in one obvious direction – the sponsor was not able or willing to provide her with any work. The applicant admitted in cross-examination that by 18 March 2024 the promised job was not available to her.

72. The applicant is intelligent and educated. It is clear that she considered the application carefully and was mindful about trying to ensure it was accurate and compliant. The wording within the grant letter was qualified but provided links to clear guidance that changes in circumstances must be reported and applicants must inform UKVI of changes to contact details. In his written submissions Mr Bandegani argued that these requirements could not impose any legal obligation as they were not contained in the grant letter or the Immigration Rules. Nonetheless these basic expectations were communicated to the applicant via links in the grant letter. In any event, we are satisfied that this applicant was fully aware that she was required to ensure the respondent could communicate with her. She knew that she did not have access to or control over the Hotmail address, yet she made no effort to update her contact details when she was provided with the information concerning the BRP or when her circumstances changed.

73. Third, it is of concern that the applicant was willing to engage in arrangements which repeatedly and regularly suggested that the intermediaries, the agency and the sponsor were at the very least unreliable and willing to be dishonest. Just a few examples illustrate the point. The applicant realised at a very early stage in August 2023 that she was probably being financially exploited yet continued to make arrangements with those individuals. The amount of money requested and payment methods clearly indicated very concerning financial arrangements. The sponsorship letter required the applicant to hold a valid driving licence, which she did not have. The applicant was willing to pay for a COS when requested and in cross-examination accepted that she did pay for the COS she received. The sponsor provided a reference letter in September 2024 that the applicant was a good and reliable worker, yet she had never worked for the sponsor. The applicant’s explanation that she thought they were referring to her work as a nurse in Sri Lanka is not credible and is inconsistent with the wording of the letter. The applicant then used that letter to apply for alternative jobs.

74. We note Dr Haider’s report seeks to explain why the applicant remained dependent upon those holding themselves out to be immigration specialists despite the early and continuing significant warning signs. As we set out above, Dr Haider’s report may help explain the applicant’s decision-making at the time, but she was able to and did make her own decisions. This included repeatedly engaging with individuals in arrangements which were clearly at the least, very concerning and were capable of being identified as such for a person with this applicant’s educational and work background, assuming in her favour that she has the diagnoses and vulnerabilities identified by Dr Haider.

75. With this background in mind, we now turn to address ground 1. The alleged breach of the duty of candour does not impact ground 1 in any way, which turns on the construction of the 2000 Order, and its application to the relevant factual matrix. We therefore deal with the duty of candour later.

Ground 1 – invalid service and rebuttal of presumption of receipt

76. Where the respondent relies upon a presumption of notice pursuant to article 8ZB, she has the burden of proving that a method of giving notice provided for by article 8ZA, thereby triggering the article 8ZB presumption has been used. It is therefore for the respondent to establish that the decision was “sent electronically to the e-mail address provided for correspondence by the person or the persons representative” pursuant to article 8ZA(2)(d). The respondent relied upon a delivery receipt confirmation confirming that the decision was delivered to the email address provided for correspondence within the application, certified to be correct by the applicant, i.e. the Hotmail address, on 7 October 2024.

77. Mr Bandegani accepted that the respondent has shown that the decision was sent and successfully delivered to the Hotmail account. In these circumstances, Mr Bandegani submitted that the sole issue to be resolved under article 8ZA is whether the Hotmail address was validly provided with the applicant’s authority. Mr Bandegani contended that it follows that there are therefore two remaining relevant questions to be asked for the purposes of determining whether the decision was validly served in accordance with articles 8ZA-8ZB of the 2000 Order. First, was the Hotmail address validly “provided for correspondence” by the applicant for the purposes of article 8ZA(2)(d)? Second, if the Hotmail address was validly provided, has the applicant displaced the presumption of service, pursuant to article 8ZB?

Article 8ZA

78. Mr Bandegani’s oral submissions differed from the pleaded grounds of challenge, relevant to the validity of service for the purposes of article 8ZA. Mr Bandegani focussed his oral submissions on the alleged fraud on the part of the intermediaries in this case, applying the principle in Takhar v Gracefield Developments Ltd [2019] UKSC 13, that “fraud unravels everything” and people are not expected to arrange their affairs on the basis that others may commit fraud – see [43-44] and [52-53]. Mr Bandegani relied upon the principles outlined in Takhar to support his proposition that the Hotmail address could not be an email address provided for the purposes of the 2000 Order because it was predicated upon a fraud. Mr Bandegani submitted that the causal connection was present – but for the fraud on the part of the intermediary, the Hotmail address would not exist. It therefore followed that the respondent was unable to convert the successful operation of fraudulent arrangements into proof of lawful service. We reject these submissions for a variety of inter-related reasons.

79. As Mr Biggs pointed out, the submission based upon fraud has not been pleaded and permission has not been granted to rely on it. Mr Biggs pointed out that his limited cross-examination and the evidence adduced on behalf of the respondent may well have been different if it had been made clear within the grounds that fraud was being relied upon to support the submission that there was no valid service. The argument was raised very late (it was raised faintly in the applicant’s replacement skeleton argument but only developed orally after the applicant’s evidence concluded) and no explanation was provided for not raising it at the earlier stages of these proceedings including the oral renewed permission hearing and the adjourned earlier substantive hearing. There was no application to amend the grounds and no explanation for the delay in raising the issue. Once the statement of grounds has been served, amendment requires the permission of the Tribunal in accordance with rule 32 of the Procedure Rules. As set out at [10.2.2] of the Administrative Court Judicial Review User Guide, September 2025 the application to amend must be made promptly and should include draft amended grounds and be supported by evidence explaining the need for the proposed amendment and any delay in making the application. In all the circumstances we refuse permission to rely on the amended ground that fraud on the part of the agent rendered the email address provided invalid.

80. In any event, had we granted permission, the submission predicated upon fraud fails on the facts and by reference to the applicable principles. Mr Bandegani relied upon the definition of fraud at [56] of Takhar without making any meaningful attempt to set the fraud alleged here in context. Takhar set out the principles which govern applications to set aside judgments for fraud and does not directly assist in determining whether there was fraud on the facts of this case, by whom it was perpetrated and upon whom, at what time and its impact upon the issues that arise here. Mr Bandegani appears to have assumed there to be fraud on the part of the agent in providing the Hotmail address, when fraud by the agent has not been established on the facts. We are not in a position to make a finding that the agent acted fraudulently in providing the Hotmail address. As outlined above, we have found that the applicant authorised the agent to complete and then send the form with the Hotmail address as her contact address. The agent appears to have taken diligent steps to ensure much of the application was accurate after liaising with the applicant. The Hotmail address must have been utilised by the agent at certain points otherwise the applicant would not have been granted the visa to enter the UK. It is unclear when or why this address stopped being used. Indeed, it is entirely uncertain which individual or organisation was involved in fraud and to what extent – the individual intermediaries, the agent or the sponsor? In addition, the applicant’s leave was cancelled because the sponsor claimed she did not turn up for work and not because of any fraud on the part of the sponsor or anyone else.

81. Mr Bandegani’s submissions also entirely overlook the applicant’s role in the arrangements and her complicity in the exercise to obtain a visa, as we explain above. As Lady Arden pointed out at [92] of Takhar, there are exceptions to the principle that “fraud unravels all”, including cases where both parties have colluded to deceive. Further, Mr Bandegani was unable to explain why on his premise that the agent’s fraud unravelled all, the grant of the visa itself, and the very basis of the applicant’s grant of leave, was not undermined.

82. We do not accept that any alleged fraud in providing the Hotmail address on the part of the agent vitiated the service of the decision to that address on the facts of this case. For the reasons outlined above, whilst we accept that the applicant did not have access to the Hotmail address, she authorised the agent to provide it, and did not make any meaningful attempt to update the respondent with her correct email contact details for a lengthy period of time, including when it had become clear that circumstances had changed. Had the applicant updated the respondent with the correct email address when it was appropriate to do so, service to the Gmail address could have easily followed.

83. The applicant does not challenge the respondent’s evidence that the decision was sent to and was received at the Hotmail address, which we have found to be an email address authorised by her. We do not accept that the agent exceeded its authority or acted fraudulently in providing the Hotmail address. The respondent has established that the requirements of article 8ZA(2)(d) are met.

Article 8ZB

84. In order to rebut the presumption that a notice sent in accordance with article 8ZA is deemed to have been given to the person affected, the applicant has the burden of proving on the balance of probabilities that the decision was not received, pursuant to article 8ZB. Receipt for these purposes does not require that the applicant should have read or become aware of the contents of the decision: Alam at [29-30]. Rather, receipt for these purposes means the conclusion of the method of giving notice permitted by article 8ZA. In other words, notice depends on the receipt of the communication, not on the recipient becoming aware of the communication. For example, in the case of physical mail, by a notice received upon delivery: Alam at [30], [46] and [48]. Hence the reasoning that receipt of an email will be effected by the arrival of the email in the inbox of the person affected. This is of course subject to the question whether Sheldon J’s observations in Escobar about interception of emails were correct in law. However, as in Dhandapani (see [56]), this issue does not arise in this case. There is no suggestion in the present case of any interference with the Hotmail address. The contention here is different – the applicant did not have access to the Hotmail address as this was the address provided by the agent.

85. Importantly, the requirement in article 8ZB that notice be “given”, must be seen in the context in which Parliament provided that the permitted notice is received, communicated or given in the 2000 Order. The 2000 Order clearly contemplates notice being given when it is sent electronically to an email address provided for correspondence by the person, in accordance with article 8ZA(2)(d). As observed by UTJ Grubb in Mahmood, the natural consequence of this is that notice will be given when the relevant method results in the notice being delivered i.e. when the relevant email is delivered in the sense of held in the email system, usually in the inbox. This chimes with the Court of Appeal’s judgment in Alam at [30].

86. Given the nature of receipt for the purposes of articles 8ZA-8ZB, the burden of rebutting the presumption of notice arising under article 8ZB is onerous and will not be lightly discharged, especially where the facts triggering the presumption lead to an expectation of receipt – Alam at [31].

87. Mr Bandegani acknowledged that for the purposes of article 8ZB we are entitled to assume that contrary to the applicant’s primary case, the Hotmail address was validly provided. He accepted that it was not necessary for the applicant to have read the email. Rather, he submitted that the applicant’s inability to access the email at all is key. He described the applicant as having been completely ‘locked out’ of the Hotmail address by the agent, and invited us to note that none of the authorities dealt with this particular factual matrix. At the beginning of the hearing, we drew the parties attention to Mahmood, which did not appear in the authorities bundle. The applicant in Mahmood claimed that although he had included an e-mail address in his visa application, this was provided by the agent and he never had the password and could not access it. It was upon this basis that it was argued on his behalf that he had rebutted the presumption applying article 8ZB. Like the applicant in Mahmood, this applicant’s position is that she had no way of accessing the email address containing the notice of curtailment in the decision. UTJ Grubb held that it was sufficient if the notice had been delivered to the relevant email inbox and provided comprehensive reasoning for this at [55-68] of Mahmood. We agree with these reasons. The Court of Appeal reached the same conclusion in Alam.

88. In Mahmood, UTJ Grubb grappled with the potentially harsh results that might result from this construction of the notice provisions in the 2000 Order, at a time when there was no obligation upon an individual subject to immigration control to notify the respondent of a change of address, whether postal or electronic. At [50] UTJ Grubb referred to this as an obvious gap but he nevertheless considered that any sensible individual would inform the respondent of any change, adding “in that sense, any harshness would, at least in part be of an individual's own making”.

89. It is perhaps more instructive to consider whether the construction of the 2000 Order we accept would lead to any breach of the broader Anufrijeva principles. As explained by UTJ Grubb at [59-61] of Mahmood and by Floyd LJ at [24-30] of Alam, that construction is consistent with the principled approach in Anufrijeva. It is important to note that Anufrijeva was not concerned with the situation where notification was provided but the individual had for whatever reason not read it, as in the instant case. Rather Anufrijeva was a case in which there had been no notification at all of an administrative decision affecting the individual concerned. As Lord Steyn put it at [25f]: “The practice of not notifying asylum seekers of the fact of withdrawal of income support was consistently and deliberately adopted. There simply is no rational explanation for such a policy”. Anufrijeva does not establish that a person unaware of a decision because they were given it, but did not read it, should have no effect. Indeed, such an approach would be inconsistent with the reasoning in Alam, which carefully considered Anufrijeva.

90. In any event, this applicant’s position must be considered within a different context. It is not disputed that by the time of this applicant’s application, individuals were being clearly told to inform the respondent of any changes, and this is clear from the next steps document attached to the decision granting the applicant the visa. There is a clear public policy interest in individuals subject to immigration control ensuring their contact details are up to date so that correspondence from the respondent reaches them. Against this background, we ask whether the applicant had the opportunity to “make herself acquainted” with the decision in the sense intended in Anufrijeva? And in addition, were reasonable steps taken by the respondent to communicate the decision to her? The respondent was provided with the Hotmail address, listed as the contact email and under personal information as the applicant’s email address, in the application. There was no reason to consider this was not the correct email for correspondence when that is precisely what was indicated through submission of the application. The application included a declaration that by sending it, the applicant was confirming the information contained within it to be correct and that if false information was given she could be prosecuted and banned from the UK. The applicant was told about the expectation that she should inform the respondent of changes to her contact details when provided with the visa. In these circumstances, the respondent was entitled, in accordance with the cancellation guidance, to serve the decision on the Hotmail address. The Hotmail address did not relate in any way to the sponsor and had clear links to the applicant’s name. In all the circumstances, the respondent took reasonable steps to communicate the decision to the applicant.

91. It follows that notice of the decision is presumed to have been given to the applicant when it was sent to and confirmed as delivered to the Hotmail address. The applicant is entitled to rebut the presumption under article 8ZB that it was delivered on that day or at all but is unable to do so. In a similar manner to the facts in Mahmood, the applicant’s claim that she could not access the Hotmail address because it was set up by the agent does not rebut the presumption. The Hotmail address provided was the only address at which she could have expected the respondent to correspond with her.

92. Against that background and in all the circumstances, there was no unfairness and any harshness could have been obviated by the applicant. She made no effort to provide the respondent with an email address to which she did have access. The applicant could have provided herself with the “opportunity to make herself acquainted” with the decision if she had taken the simple step of ensuring her contact details were correct and up to date in the lengthy period between the application in October 2023 and the decision in October 2024.

93. It is simply irrelevant for the purposes of the statutory scheme that as submitted by Mr Bandegani in the skeleton argument, that the applicant “neither created, owned nor controlled the hotmail account and had no access to it because it remained throughout under the exclusive control of those who facilitated her immigration application”, or that there is some evidence indicating abuse within the health and care worker sponsorship route, or that the sponsor inconsistently said in a letter that the applicant was a good worker but then said that she failed to commence employment. On any view of the relevant evidence, the applicant has not rebutted the presumption that the decision was given to her by sending it to and it being confirmed as received by the Hotmail address.

94. It follows that where an applicant submits a skilled worker visa application containing a contact email address to the respondent, she is confirming that she authorises the use of that email address for correspondence. When such an application is successful and the applicant is provided with leave, she is told that if her information or circumstances change, she must inform the respondent. Such an applicant is expected to ensure her contact details remain accurate and up to date.

95. Where an applicant was assisted by a third party to complete the application, and that third party uses an email to which the applicant does not have access, she remains under a continuing obligation to ensure that she has prompt access to that email address via the third party, and if not, to ensure that she provides the respondent with an email address she does have access to.

96. For the purposes of articles 8ZA(2)(d) and 8ZB of the 2000 Order, where a notice is sent electronically to an email address provided for correspondence by or on behalf of the applicant and there is a confirmed delivery receipt, notice has been sent and is deemed to be given to the person affected, unless the contrary is proved. In order to rebut the presumption, it is insufficient for the applicant to state she did not in fact receive or read the email because she did not have access to it. This does not without more breach the principle that adverse decisions must be communicated in Anufrijeva, in circumstances where the applicant was told of the expectation to ensure her contact email address was accurate. In such circumstances, the applicant had the requisite opportunity to be acquainted with the decision reasonably sent by the respondent to the email address provided as the contact email address.

Remaining grounds – duty of candour

97. Before turning to the remaining grounds, it is necessary to deal with Mr Bandegani’s submission that there has been a breach of the duty of candour. The duty of candour requires the respondent to disclose all material facts known to it and to assist the Tribunal with a full and accurate explanation of the facts relevant to the issues being determined: Citizens UK at [106–108]. It extends to material which may assist the applicant or undermine the respondent’s case: R (Bancoult (No 2)) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2016] UKSC 35, at [183–187]. This duty of candour is an obligation of explanation – see [22] of SSHD v IAB [2024] EWCA Civ 66, [2024] 1 WLR 1916; but for reasons explained at [20-21] the duty of candour goes beyond that – it comprises a very high duty on public authorities to assist the Court or Tribunal with full and accurate explanations of all the facts relevant to the issue the Court must decide.

98. We note that it has been accepted on behalf of the respondent that the fact that the sponsor’s licence was suspended and revoked was omitted from the chronology and the SSHD’s skeleton argument as a result of an oversight. We are satisfied that the visit report and revocation letter are relevant to grounds 2 and 4. In short, the SSHD’s evidence to the effect that it had sufficient concerns about the sponsor that it was being investigated before the decision was made and its licence was revoked thereafter, is potentially relevant to determining the extent of the duty of enquiry and the relevant circumstances framing the consideration of procedural fairness. The respondent appears to dispute the materiality of the visit report and suggests that it does not provide a sound basis to challenge the decision. However, the applicant relied upon general evidence of abuse in the health and care sector in order to support her case. In those circumstances, specific allegations of abuse on the part of the sponsor are clearly relevant to the issues the Tribunal is required to determine, even if the respondent does not deem them to be a sound basis to challenge the decision. Indeed, the respondent accepts that the sponsor’s licence suspension and revocation was sufficiently relevant to support inclusion in the chronology and skeleton argument. The visit report was closely linked to the suspension and revocation decisions.

99. We note that the applicant would have been able to belatedly identify that the sponsor had its licence revoked from publicly available information, and there is no clear explanation why disclosure was not sought until 24 August 2026, after judgment had been reserved. This is regrettable but it does not obviate the respondent’s own duty of candour. We have no reason to believe this was a deliberate breach. For reasons outlined below, the late disclosure of the relevant material did not lead to any material public law error, albeit this may be relevant to costs.

Ground 2 - Tameside duty / Unlawful exercise of discretion

100. At the hearing Mr Bandegani briefly submitted that should we be satisfied there was valid service of the decision, the respondent was under a duty to make further enquiries of the applicant, and her failure to do so was irrational or breached the principles established in Balajigari. This was expanded upon in more detail in written submissions, following the disclosure of the visit report and revocation letter.

101. We are satisfied that as at the date of decision, 7 October 2024, it was reasonable for the respondent to decide to cancel the applicant’s leave to remain with effect on 6 December 2024 (thereby providing 60 days of leave), without making further enquiries. It is important to note right from the beginning that the decision-maker exercised their discretion not to cancel the applicant’s leave with immediate effect, and instead afforded her a period of 60 days before any cancellation took effect. Having considered the reasons relied upon by Mr Bandegani as triggering the Tameside duty of enquiry, we reject the overarching submission that there was an obligation on the respondent to make further enquiries of this applicant in all the circumstances.

102. We begin by considering the relevant context. It is common ground that the word “may” in rule 9.27.1 is permissive; the respondent was not required to cancel leave in every instance where the individual does not start work. However, it does not follow from the permissive use of “may”, that the rule imposes a duty of enquiry or a procedural obligation to conduct an all-circumstances assessment of the migrant's private life or particular vulnerability before deciding to exercise that power. The cancellation guidance serves to explain the use of discretion, but it does not convert the power into a duty of further enquiry. The existence of a discretion to refrain from cancelling is distinct from a requirement to invite representations regarding every potential hardship or mitigation factor. The respondent was entitled to approach the sponsor’s evidence in accordance with the cancellation guidance: in the majority of cases the respondent could make the decision based upon the information provided by the sponsor that the individual did not start working for the sponsor.

103. The respondent was entitled to accept the brief reasons provided by the sponsor, given the nature of the skilled worker sponsorship system, which depends on the respondent investing sponsors with a high degree of trust and the facilitation of straightforward decisions based on objective criteria- see R (Prestwick Care) v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 184 at [4] and [21]. We also note, as Mr Bandegani pointed out, that at [4] Baker LJ recorded that the social-care sponsorship system was heavily dependent on trust and presented a plain potential for abuse. At [128] the court described the sponsor-compliance provisions as essential both to preventing abuse of the system and migrants.

104. When making and issuing the decision, the respondent was not required to consider whether the applicant might have been a victim of an unscrupulous sponsor or have regard to the wide-ranging evidence in the public domain regarding abuses in the health and care sector. As made clear in EK (Ivory Coast) the regulatory framework governing the sponsorship scheme is built upon objective, predictable criteria. Rule 9.27.1 is a tool of administrative enforcement. To read a mandatory, preliminary rounded assessment requirement into the word “may” would be to impose a requirement that finds no basis in the text of the rule or the purpose of the scheme. Such an interpretation adopts a balanced approach to the public interest in maintaining an effective, reliable sponsorship system and individual interests. Individual migrants are able to make relevant representations in those cases which do not require an interview, in the 60 day period provided, before cancellation actually takes effect.

105. It is significant that the applicant’s leave was not cancelled with immediate effect and therefore did not necessitate an urgent opportunity for the applicant to respond to specific evidence the respondent regarded as justifying immediate termination. Rather, the respondent made the decision that leave should expire in 60 days, effectively giving the applicant ample opportunity to provide the very information it is alleged the respondent failed to enquire about. It has been claimed on behalf of the applicant that she was not provided with an opportunity to address relevant matters: the reasons she had not started work; whether the promised employment genuinely existed and remained available; whether the applicant bore responsibility for her plight. Even assuming these matters to be relevant, they could have all been addressed by the applicant during the 60 day period, and before cancellation of leave took effect.

106. The provision of 60 days leave prior to cancellation taking effect reflects the cancellation guidance, which as outlined above, addresses the date of expiry for cancelled permission decisions. Where, as here, the cancellation is discretionary and not mandatory, cancellation may be given with immediate effect or with 60 days remaining. The cancellation guidance draws a distinction between a breach of conditions and a failure to maintain the requirements of a particular route. The immediate cancellation option and the interview process is reserved for breach of conditions cases and deception cases, not for the category of case in which sponsorship ceases.

107. The respondent properly chose to provide 60 days remaining leave, and to the extent that the failure to attend for work was outside the applicant’s control or not her fault were relevant, representations could be made. The decision therefore provided the applicant with the time and the opportunity to correct any mistakes and to raise with the respondent by way of a further application for leave or otherwise, any matters indicating that she should be allowed further time in the UK. That approach complied with the respondent’s cancellation guidance and provided sufficient opportunity to the applicant to provide any relevant further information. The fact that the applicant was unable to take up this opportunity is explained by her own failure to keep her contact details accurate.

108. Mr Bandegani’s initial submission amounted to a requirement on the respondent to make further enquiries in every case concerning an applicant within the health and care sector. That approach would be contrary to the public interest in placing reliance upon the system based upon trust, both in relation to sponsors and the requirement that contact details should be kept up to date. The complicating factor in this case emerges from the visit report, particularising concerning practices on the part of the sponsor, which was in existence at the date of the decision. In his written submissions Mr Biggs made it clear at [7] that the decision-maker did not have access to the visit report, which was not available to them. Mr Fellgett explained that the decision under challenge was made on a case working platform known as ATLAS whilst the visit report was uploaded to a separate case working platform called Metastorm. The decision-maker who made the decision under challenge did not have access to Metastorm and no note would have been generated on ATLAS to link to the visit report on Metastorm.

109. In his revised submissions, Mr Bandegani argued that the visit report was clearly relevant and should have been made available to the decision-maker, because it undermined the assumption that the sponsor’s notification without further enquiry, was a sufficient and reliable basis for cancellation. Had it been available it is claimed on behalf of the applicant that it would have triggered a limited targeted enquiry before treating the sponsor’s notification as sufficient to justify cancellation. This gives rise to a dispute between the parties as to the extent of the Carltona principle, the correct application of R (National Association of Health Stores) v Secretary of State for Health [2005] EWCA Civ 154 and whether or not in the particular circumstances of this case it can be said that the relevant information should have been available to the decision-maker and in failing to consider it, there was public law unlawfulness. We have decided that it is unnecessary to resolve this dispute, and add to the length of this decision. This is because assuming the applicant is correct, and the decision-maker should have expressly considered the sponsor’s reliability by reference to the visit report either through a system linking the case management systems or otherwise, at best this would have triggered the respondent making further enquiries of the applicant. Even if the respondent made further enquiries or sought further information from the applicant, it is highly likely that the outcome of the decision would not have been substantially different for the purposes of s. 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981.

110. Mr Bandegani’s submission that the respondent may have decided not to pursue cancellation if the decision-maker was made aware of the sponsor’s own inadequacies in the visit report is devoid of practical reality. The visit report made no reference to the applicant. At best the respondent would have made further enquiries of the applicant to scrutinise the reliability of the sponsor’s indication that she did not start work. As recognised by Mr Bandegani in his written submissions any such enquiry would necessarily be limited and targeted. However, (i) any such enquiry would have elicited no response from the applicant, and separately (ii) the applicant would have been bound to admit that she did not start work (albeit she wanted to and it was not offered). We now turn to each of these in more detail.

111. Further enquiries would have made no difference as the applicant did not provide the sponsor with updated contact details. It follows that any notification on the part of the respondent seeking further information from the applicant would have met the same fate as the decision that was taken. It would have been sent to an email address the applicant continued to rely upon for contact, but which she did not access. Assuming it was appropriate to seek further information, it would have been entirely reasonable for the detailed reasons provided above for this to have been pursued via the email contact details provided by the applicant. In short, any further enquiry by the respondent at the relevant time to the provided email address, would have been met with no response from the applicant, and ultimately the same decision.

112. Even if contacted, the applicant would have been obliged to admit that she had not started working for the sponsor. The submission in the applicant’s skeleton argument that the respondent was obliged to consider why the applicant had allegedly fails to properly engage with the relevant context. 9.27.1 of the Immigration Rules provides that a person’s entry clearance or permission may be cancelled if they do not start working for their sponsor, without more. The applicant wished to commence work with the sponsor but the undisputed factual position is that she did not. If further enquiries were made of either the sponsor or the applicant, the respondent would have inevitably been told, taking the applicant’s case at its highest, that she did not start work because the sponsor did not have work for her to do (regardless of the reasons for this). That would have led to the same decision. The suggestion in the applicant’s skeleton argument that the sponsor’s assertion that the applicant failed to start work is inconsistent with its reference letter takes the matter no further. The applicant accepts that she did not commence work with the sponsor. The reference letter was provided to an alternative sponsor and was not before the respondent.

113. We have considered whether further enquiries or taking into account the visit report was capable of making a difference for the purposes of s. 31(2A). We appreciate the threshold is a high one and we are satisfied that it has been met.

Ground 3 – 60 days

114. Mr Bandegani did not make any additional oral submissions in relation to ground 3, and relied upon his skeleton argument. The applicant’s skeleton argument contends that the continuing refusal to grant an ‘effective’ 60 day period is unlawful. In our judgment it was reasonable in all the circumstances of this case, for the respondent to take the view that the applicant had been validly notified of the decision on 7 October 2024 (in the light of our factual findings and analysis under ground 1), and to take the position that it was the applicant’s responsibility to update the respondent in respect of her contact details, if she did not have access to the Hotmail address. The applicant therefore had the opportunity to make use of the 60 day period, but for her own omissions and actions.

Ground 4 – procedural unfairness

115. Fairness is not a rigid rule applied the same way in every case; it depends on the circumstances (Doody principle (3)). An essential feature of the context is the statutory scheme which creates the discretion (Doody principle (4)). The overarching principle that the duty of fairness must be interpreted in the light of the specific statutory and regulatory context in which a power is exercised is well established: EK (Ivory Coast) at [31] per Sales LJ. As set out above, the sponsorship scheme is built upon objective, predictable criteria. We prefer the submissions on behalf of the respondent on procedural fairness. These overlap to a significant degree with our analysis above. We therefore provide relatively concise reasons for our conclusion that there was no procedural unfairness in failing to provide the applicant with an opportunity to address the circumstances of non-commencement of employment prior to the decision under challenge.

116. First, the decision gave the applicant notice under the statutory scheme of the respondent’s position that the basis of the applicant’s leave had essentially fallen away because she had not (for whatever reason) commenced work. This was incontrovertible on any view. There is no dispute that the applicant did not commence work with the sponsor. Even on the applicant’s case, she was aware that the basis upon which she had been given leave to enter had fallen away because she did not commence work. This was therefore not a ‘breach of conditions’ case, which arises where the individual performs an act specifically prohibited by the conditions of their leave e.g., working more than the permitted hours, or working when prohibited from doing so. These often call for explanations. Not commencing work is different: it is a failure to maintain the basis upon which the leave that was granted. This must be viewed in the context of the sponsorship scheme, which is designed to process high volumes of applications based on objective, predictable criteria. Requiring the respondent to invite representations every time a sponsor reports that a worker has not shown up for work would impose an administrative burden that the scheme is not built to carry, particularly when the respondent provides the individual with 60 days to remedy any mistakes.

117. Second, for the reasons outlined above there was no duty to make further enquiries. Whether to seek further information is a matter of procedural discretion for the caseworker. The course adopted by the respondent was not irrational or otherwise unlawful. The notification was unambiguous, there was no allegation to put, and the cancellation guidance provides that where a sponsor notifies that a person has ceased work, the decision may be taken on the available information. The applicant appears to submit that as this was a discretionary decision, a different decision may have been taken as to whether to cancel or as to the expiry date. As EK (Ivory Coast) establishes, the absence of proactive enquiry is not unfair where the subject had fair warning and the scheme proceeds on the available information.

118. Third, the decision fairly gave the applicant 60 days to take steps to seek to regularise her immigration status, or to take other steps to protect her interests prior to cancellation taking effect. The decision expressly invited her to provide any reasons she had for being allowed to stay. This provided her with an opportunity to make representations after the decision was taken with a view to procuring its modification.

119. Fourth, the fact that the applicant was unaware of the decision could not be said to be attributable to the respondent in any way, and was influenced by her own actions and inactions for the reasons we have already explained above. Notwithstanding her vulnerabilities, the applicant had the information available to her that she needed to protect her interests. The applicant was well aware of the problems she faced with the sponsor not providing her with employment after an extended period. In the light of that information, the applicant was able to take steps, most obviously by contacting the respondent - see Tammina v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 24 distinguishing R (Pathan) v SSHD [2020] UKSC 41 from [36]. The duty in Pathan arose because the applicant did not know his sponsor’s licence had been revoked. That is not the position in this case. The applicant was fully aware that she had not started employment with the sponsor. She was not deprived of a chance to answer an allegation; rather, she was informed of the consequence of her own changed circumstances.

120. We now draw these reasons together. This is not a Balajigari-type case, where the respondent alleged dishonesty or reprehensible conduct and proposed an adverse decision based on that finding. Neither did the respondent contemplate cancellation with immediate effect, necessitating an urgent opportunity for the individual to respond to the specific evidence prompting that immediate termination. Here, there was no such evidence and no allegation of wrongdoing. That the claimant was no longer working for the sponsor was not a charge to be answered. It was a fact of which she had knowledge. The applicant was granted a 60-day grace period, which provided the opportunity to fairly provide additional explanations or explain why the respondent was mistaken. The fact that the applicant was not able to take up the opportunity to do so does not negate the fact that she was provided with that opportunity. The applicant’s overarching complaint is against the unfairness she suffered as a result of the conduct of the agent and the sponsor. That is to be distinguished from the respondent’s decision-making. The applicant was provided with clear, accurate information within the decision and also had a genuine opportunity to act. While we acknowledge the regrettable situation for the applicant, we conclude that in making the decision she did, the respondent did not act unfairly.

Conclusion

121. For these reasons, the applicant’s challenge to the decision is dismissed.