JR-2025-LON-002307 & JR-2025-LON-002505

• Status of case: Unreported
• Hearing date: 09 Jan 2026
• Promulgation date: 29 Apr 2026
• Publication date: 08 May 2026
• Last updated on: 08 May 2026

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL JR-2025-LON-002307
(IMMIGRATION AND ASYLM CHAMBER)

JUDICIAL REVIEW

BETWEEN:
THE KING on the application of


NAN
Applicant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

and

HERTFORDSHIRE COUNTY COUNCIL
Interested Party



FINAL ORDER


UPON the Administrative Court granting the Applicant permission to apply for judicial review and transferring the proceedings to the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) for a fact-finding hearing on age to be conducted;
UPON the Respondent, by an application notice dated 24 November 2025, making concurrent applications in these proceedings and two others: (NXP v SSHD JR-2025-LON-002505) and (RBK v SSHD JR-2025-LON-001585) seeking substitution of the Respondent from the Secretary of State for the Home Department (“SSHD”) to the National Age Assessment Board (“NAAB”);
UPON hearing counsel for the Applicant, counsel for NXP and counsel for the Respondent at a case management hearing on 9 January 2026 listed to determine:
Issue 1: The appropriate venue for lodging judicial review applications against
decisions by a “designated person” pursuant to sections 50 and 51 NABA 2022 in light of the Lord Chief Justice’s Consolidated Direction on the Jurisdiction of the Upper Tribunal and Mandatory Transfer of Judicial Review applications to the Upper Tribunal under s.31A(2) of the Senior Courts Act 1981, dated 21 August 2013, as amended (“Transfer Direction”); and
Issue 2: the appropriate respondent where a challenge is to decisions made by a “designated person” pursuant to sections 50 and 51 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 (“NABA 2022”).

IT IS DECLARED that
Issue 1
1. A challenge to an age assessment decision taken by a “designated person” pursuant to sections 50 and 51 NABA 2022 falls within paragraph 1(i) of the Transfer Direction and must be brought in the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber).

Issue 2
2. Where an age assessment decision is made pursuant to sections 50 or 51 NABA 2022, the appropriate respondent to a judicial review challenge, whether lodged in the Administrative Court or the Upper Tribunal, is the SSHD.

IT IS ORDERED that
3. The respondent’s applications for the substitution of the SSHD for NAAB or any alternative nomenclature are refused.

PERMISSION TO APPEAL
4. There is no application for permission by the Respondent to appeal to the Court of Appeal. In any event, we refuse permission in relation to Issue 2

COSTS
5. No order as to costs in respect of Issue 1.
6. The Respondent shall pay 50% of the Applicant’s reasonable costs incurred for this preliminary hearing representing the costs caused and occasioned by Issue 2.
7. Costs shall be the subject of detailed assessment on the standard basis if not agreed.
8. There shall be detailed assessment of the Applicant’s publicly funded costs which are payable by the Lord Chancellor under Part I of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012.



IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL JR-2025-LON-002505
(IMMIGRATION AND ASYLM CHAMBER)

JUDICIAL REVIEW

BETWEEN:
THE KING on the application of

NXP
Applicant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent



FINAL ORDER


UPON the Administrative Court granting the Applicant permission to apply for judicial review and transferring the proceedings to the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) for a fact-finding hearing on age to be conducted;
UPON the Respondent, by an application notice dated 24 November 2025, making concurrent applications in these proceedings and two others: (NAN v SSHD JR-2025-LON-002307) and (RBK v SSHD JR-2025-LON-001585) seeking substitution of the Respondent from the Secretary of State for the Home Department (“SSHD”) to the National Age Assessment Board (“NAAB”);
UPON hearing counsel for the Applicant, counsel for NAN and counsel for the Respondent at a case management hearing on 9 January 2026 listed to determine:
Issue 1: The appropriate venue for lodging judicial review applications against decisions by a “designated person” pursuant to sections 50 and 51 NABA 2022 in light of the Lord Chief Justice’s Consolidated Direction on the Jurisdiction of the Upper Tribunal and Mandatory Transfer of Judicial Review applications to the Upper Tribunal under s.31A(2) of the Senior Courts Act 1981, dated 21 August 2013, as amended (“Transfer Direction”); and
Issue 2: the appropriate respondent where a challenge is to decisions made by a “designated person” pursuant to sections 50 and 51 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 (“NABA 2022”).

IT IS DECLARED that:
Issue 1
1. A challenge to an age assessment decision taken by a “designated person” pursuant to sections 50 and 51 NABA 2022 falls within paragraph 1(i) of the Transfer Direction and must be brought in the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber).
2. Where an age assessment decision is made pursuant to sections 50 or 51 NABA 2022, the appropriate respondent to a judicial review challenge, whether lodged in the Administrative Court or the Upper Tribunal, is the SSHD.

IT IS ORDERED that
3. The respondent’s application for the substitution of the SSHD for NAAB or any alternative nomenclature are refused.

PERMISSION TO APPEAL
4. There has been no application by the Respondent for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal in any event, permission to appeal is refused in relation to Issue 2.

COSTS
5. No order as to costs in relation to Issue 1.
6. The Respondent shall pay 50% of the Applicant’s reasonable costs incurred for this preliminary hearing representing the costs caused and occasioned by Issue 2.
7. Costs shall be the subject of detailed assessment on the standard basis if not agreed.
8. There shall be detailed assessment of the Applicant’s publicly funded costs which are payable by the Lord Chancellor under Part I of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012.



Case No: JR-2025-LON-002505
JR-2025-LON-002307
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
(IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER)
Field House,
Breams Buildings
London, EC4A 1WR

24 April 2026

Before:

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MANDALIA
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE NORTON-TAYLOR

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Between:

THE KING
on the application of
NXP
and
NAN
(anonymity orders made)
Applicants
- and -

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent


HERTFORDSHIRE COUNTY COUNCIL
Interested Party in JR-2025-LON-002307


- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


Ms A Benfield
(instructed by the Anti-Trafficking & Labour Exploitation Unit), for the applicant
NXP

Ms E Doerr
(instructed by Hodge Jones Allen at the hearing, but now by Wilsons Solicitors),
for the applicant NAN

Mr S Tawiah
(instructed by the Government Legal Department), for the respondent


Hearing date: 9 January 2026

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

J U D G M E N T

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Glossary

The Administrative Court “the Court”
The Upper Tribunal “the Tribunal”
The Secretary of State for the Home Department “the SSHD”
The National Age Assessment Board “NAAB”
The Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 “TCEA 2007”
The Nationality and Borders Act 2022 “NABA 2022”
The Senior Courts Act 1981, as amended “SCA 1981”
The Children Act 1989 “CA 1989”
The Lord Chief Justice’s Consolidated Direction on the Jurisdiction of the Upper Tribunal and Mandatory Transfer of Judicial Review applications to the Upper Tribunal under s.31A(2) of the Senior Courts Act 1981, dated 21 August 2013, as amended “the Transfer Direction”
The National Referral Mechanism “the NRM”

Judges Mandalia and Norton-Taylor:

Introduction
1. These two cases concern foreign nationals who claim to be under the age of 18 and therefore entitled to support and accommodation under the CA 1989. Their ages are disputed by the respondent. The applicants’ applications for judicial review challenging the age assessment decisions were lodged in the Court before being transferred to the Tribunal. The Tribunal then undertook its case management of the cases and both were set down for fact-finding hearings in order to determine the applicants’ respective dates of birth and age. The fact-finding hearings remain in place and it is common ground between the parties that these will remain unaffected by what we say in this judgment.
2. These two cases were identified as appropriate vehicles for the Tribunal to address two matters of general importance in age dispute challenges. These are:
(1) What is the appropriate venue for lodging judicial review applications against decisions by a “designated person” pursuant to sections 50 and 51 NABA 2022 and in light of the Transfer Direction?
(2) In challenges to decisions made by a “designated person” pursuant to sections 50 and 51 of NABA 2022, is the appropriate respondent the SSHD or NAAB or some other nomenclature?
3. On the first issue, the applicants submit that the appropriate venue is the Court, whilst the respondent submits that it is the Tribunal. On the second issue, the applicants submit that the SSHD is the appropriate respondent, whilst the respondent submits that it should be NAAB or some other nomenclature.
4. At the outset we wish to express our gratitude to Counsel and their instructing solicitors on both sides. The lucidity of the respective written and oral submissions has been of great assistance.

Factual background in summary
5. For the purposes of this decision, it is sufficient for us to simply summarise the relevant background as far as it is relevant to the issues we are considering at this stage.

NXP
6. NXP is a citizen of Vietnam. She arrived in the United Kingdom on 28 January 2024. She claims she was born on 5 June 2007 and had been trafficked to this country for the purposes of forced labour and sexual exploitation. If her account of her date of birth is correct, she was 16 years old on arrival in the UK. Following a brief period in adult Asylum support accommodation, she claims she was taken by her traffickers and once again exploited. Having then been found by the police and National Crime Agency, she was referred to the NRM and taken into the care of Rotherham Metropolitan Borough Council. She was provided with support and accommodation under the CA 1989. She continues to be supported and accommodated by the local authority.
7. By a conclusive grounds decision dated 13 February 2025, the Single Competent Authority determined that NXP was a victim of modern slavery for the purposes of forced labour and sexual exploitation in the United Kingdom.
8. Following a referral by the local authority to NAAB, in January 2025 an age assessment was completed. By a decision dated 24 February 2025 (provided on 4 March 2025) the applicant was informed her claimed age and date of birth were not accepted. She was assigned a date of birth 24 February 2004. If that is correct, she was 20 years old when she arrived in the UK.
9. On 30 May 2025 NXP lodged her application for judicial review in the Court. By an order sealed on 11 July 2025, Ms Kate Grange, KC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge granted permission on all grounds and transferred the proceedings to the Tribunal.

NAN
10. NAN is a citizen of Afghanistan. He claims to have been born on 29 February 2008. He arrived in the United Kingdom on 3 March 2024 when, on his case, he was 16 years old. He was taken into the care of Hertfordshire County Council and provided with support and accommodation pursuant to CA 1989. Those arrangements continue to date.
11. Following a referral to NAAB, between August and October 2024, an age assessment was completed. By a decision dated 7 October 2024, it was determined that NAN was an adult and he was assigned a date of birth of 1 January 2004. If that is correct NAN was 20 years old on arrival in the UK.
12. NAN lodged his application for judicial review in the Court on 24 December 2024. By an order sealed on 25 June 2025, Upper Tribunal Judge Church, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge granted permission on all grounds and transferred the proceedings to the Tribunal.
13. In each case the “designated person” under the auspices of NAAB undertook the age assessment (conducted by two social workers), pursuant to section 50 NABA 2022.
14. Before we address the two matters that we are considering in this decision, it is helpful for us to set out the relevant legal framework.

The Legal Framework
The SCA 1981
15. As far as relevant section 31A SCA 1981 provides for the circumstances in which an application for judicial review must or may be transferred to the Tribunal:
“31A Transfer of judicial review applications to Upper Tribunal
(1) This section applies where an application is made to the High Court–
(a) for judicial review, or
(b) for permission to apply for judicial review.
(2) If Conditions 1, 2 and 3 are met, the High Court must by order transfer the application to the Upper Tribunal.
(3) If Conditions 1 and 2 are met, but Condition 3 is not, the High Court may by order transfer the application to the Upper Tribunal if it appears to the High Court to be just and convenient to do so.
(4) Condition 1 is that the application does not seek anything other than–
(a) relief under section 31(1)(a) and (b);
(b) permission to apply for relief under section 31(1)(a) and (b);
(c) an award under section 31(4);
(d) interest;
(e) costs.
(5) Condition 2 is that the application does not call into question anything done by the Crown Court.
(6) Condition 3 is that the application falls within a class specified under section 18(6) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007.

The relevant provisions of TCEA 2007
16. Sections 15 to 21 TCEA 2007 set out a statutory regime which enables the Upper Tribunal to exercise judicial review powers in appropriate cases. Section 15 TCEA 2007 confers power on the Upper Tribunal to grant certain forms of relief in the same way as the High Court on an application for judicial review:
“15 Upper Tribunal's “judicial review” jurisdiction
(1) The Upper Tribunal has power, in cases arising under the law of England and Wales or under the law of Northern Ireland, to grant the following kinds of relief–
(a) a mandatory order;
(b) a prohibiting order;
(c) a quashing order;
(d) a declaration;
(e) an injunction.
(2) The power under subsection (1) may be exercised by the Upper Tribunal if–
(a) certain conditions are met (see section 18), or
(b) the tribunal is authorised to proceed even though not all of those conditions are met (see section 19(3) and (4)).
(3) Relief under subsection (1) granted by the Upper Tribunal–
(a) has the same effect as the corresponding relief granted by the High Court on an application for judicial review, and
(b) is enforceable as if it were relief granted by the High Court on an application for judicial review.
(4) In deciding whether to grant relief under subsection (1)(a), (b) or (c), the Upper Tribunal must apply the principles that the High Court would apply in deciding whether to grant that relief on an application for judicial review.
…
17. Section 15 must be read alongside sections 16 and 18, which set out the circumstances in which the Upper Tribunal has jurisdiction. Section 16 deals with applications for relief under section 15(1). Section 18 sets out the limits of the jurisdiction:
“18 Limits of jurisdiction under section 15(1)
(1) This section applies where an application made to the Upper Tribunal seeks (whether or not alone)–
(a) relief under section 15(1), or
(b) permission (or, in a case arising under the law of Northern Ireland, leave) to apply for relief under section 15(1).
(2) If Conditions 1 to 4 are met, the tribunal has the function of deciding the application.
(3) If the tribunal does not have the function of deciding the application, it must by order transfer the application to the High Court.
(4) Condition 1 is that the application does not seek anything other than–
(a) relief under section 15(1);
(b) permission (or, in a case arising under the law of Northern Ireland, leave) to apply for relief under section 15(1);
(c) an award under section 16(6);
(d) interest;
(e) costs.
(5) Condition 2 is that the application does not call into question anything done by the Crown Court.
(6) Condition 3 is that the application falls within a class specified for the purposes of this subsection in a direction given in accordance with Part 1 of Schedule 2 to the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (c. 4).
(7) The power to give directions under subsection (6) includes–
(a) power to vary or revoke directions made in exercise of the power, and
(b) power to make different provision for different purposes.
(8) Condition 4 is that the judge presiding at the hearing of the application is either–
(a) a judge of the High Court or the Court of Appeal in England and Wales or Northern Ireland, or a judge of the Court of Session, or
(b) such other persons as may be agreed from time to time between the Lord Chief Justice, the Lord President, or the Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland, as the case may be, and the Senior President of Tribunals.
…

The Transfer Direction
18. On 21 August 2013 (as amended on 17 October 2014), the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, with the agreement of the Lord Chancellor, issued a consolidated Direction in accordance with Part 1 of Schedule 2 to the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 and section 18 TCEA 2007. The Direction sets out the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and mandatory transfer of judicial review applications to the Tribunal under section 31A(2) of SCA 1981. As far as relevant the Direction states:
“1. Subject to paragraphs 2 and 3 below, the Lord Chief Justice hereby specifies the following classes of case for the purposes of section 18(6) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007:
any application for permission to apply for judicial review and any application for judicial review (including any application for ancillary relief and costs in such applications) that calls into question:
i. a decision made under the Immigration Acts (as defined in Schedule 1 to the Interpretation Act 1978) or any instrument having effect (whether wholly or partly) under an enactment within the Immigration Acts, or otherwise relating to leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom outside the immigration rules; or
…
…
3. Paragraph 1 above does not apply to any application which comprises or includes:
i. a challenge to the validity of primary or subordinate legislation (or of immigration rules);
ii. a challenge to the lawfulness of detention (but an application does not do so by reason only of the fact that it challenges a decision in relation to bail);
iii. a challenge to a decision concerning inclusion on the register of licensed Sponsors maintained by the United Kingdom Border Agency, or any authorisation of such Sponsors;
iv. a challenge to a decision as to citizenship under the British Nationality Act 1981 or any other provision of the law for the time being in force which determines British citizenship, the status of a British national (Overseas), British Overseas citizenship or the status of a British subject.
v. a challenge to a decision made under or by virtue of section 4 (accommodation centres) or Part VI (support for asylum seekers) of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999;
vi. a challenge to a decision made under or by virtue of Part II (accommodation centres) or Part III (other support and assistance) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002;
vii. a challenge to a decision of the Upper Tribunal;
viii. a challenge to a decision of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission;
ix. an application for a declaration of incompatibility under section 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998;
x. a challenge to a decision which is certified (or otherwise stated in writing) to have been taken by the Secretary of State wholly or partly in the interests of national security; or
xi. a challenge to a decision which is certified (or otherwise stated in writing) to have been taken by the Secretary of State wholly or partly in reliance on information which it is considered should not be made public in the interests of national security.
4. In paragraphs 1 and 3 above, references to a decision include references to any omission or failure to make a decision.
5. Any application to which paragraph 1 above applies, and any proceedings relating thereto, are hereby designated as an immigration matter.
…”

Age Assessments: NABA 2022
19. Part 4 NABA 2022 sets out the statutory framework for an official of the Secretary of State to conduct full age assessments on age-disputed persons. Section 49 NABA 2022 is the interpretation provision relating to Part 4:
“49 Interpretation of Part etc
(1) In this Part, "age-disputed person" means a person—
(a) who requires leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom (whether or not such leave has been given), and
(b) in relation to whom—
(i) a local authority,
(ii) a public authority specified in regulations under section 50(1)(b), or
(iii) the Secretary of State, has insufficient evidence to be sure of their age.
(2) In this Part—
"decision-maker" means a person who conducts an age assessment under section 50 or 51;
"designated person" means an official of the Secretary of State who is designated by the Secretary of State to conduct age assessments under section 50 or 51;
"immigration functions" means functions exercisable by virtue of the Immigration Acts;
"immigration officer" means a person appointed by the Secretary of State as an immigration officer under paragraph 1 of Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act 1971;
"local authority" —
(a) in relation to England and Wales, means a local authority within the meaning of the Children Act 1989 (see section 105(1) of that Act),
(b) in relation to Scotland, means a council constituted under section 2 of the Local Government etc (Scotland) Act 1994, and
(c) in relation to Northern Ireland, means a Health and Social Care trust established under Article 10 of the Health and Personal Social Services (Northern Ireland) Order 1991 (S.I. 1991/194 (N.I. 1));
"public authority" means a public authority within the meaning of section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998, other than a court or tribunal;
…
(3) In this Part, "relevant children's legislation" means—
(a) in relation to a local authority in England, any provision of or made under Part 3, 4 or 5 of the Children Act 1989 (support for children and families; care and supervision; protection of children);
(b) in relation to a local authority in Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland, any statutory provision (including a provision passed or made after the coming into force of this Part) that confers a corresponding function on such an authority.
…
(4) In subsection (3)—
…
"statutory provision" means a provision made by or under—
(a) an Act,
(b) an Act of the Scottish Parliament,
(c) an Act or Measure of Senedd Cymru, or
(d) Northern Ireland legislation.
(5) In section 94 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 (support for asylum- seekers: interpretation), for subsection (7) substitute—
"(7) For further provision as to the conduct of age assessments, which applies for the purposes of this Part, see Part 4 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022."
20. Section 50 NABA 2022 confers a power on the Secretary of State to conduct full age assessments upon referral from a local authority:
“50 Persons subject to immigration control: referral or assessment by local authority etc
(1) The following authorities may refer an age-disputed person to a designated person for an age assessment under this section—
(a) a local authority;
(b) a public authority specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State.
(2) Subsections (3) and (4) apply where—
(a) a local authority needs to know the age of an age-disputed person for the purposes of deciding whether or how to exercise any of its functions under relevant children's legislation in relation to the person, or
(b) the Secretary of State notifies a local authority in writing that the Secretary of State doubts that an age-disputed person in relation to whom the local authority has exercised or may exercise functions under relevant children's legislation is the age that they claim (or are claimed) to be.
(3) The local authority must—
(a) refer the age-disputed person to a designated person for an age assessment under this section,
(b) conduct an age assessment on the age-disputed person itself and inform the Secretary of State in writing of the result of its assessment, or
(c) inform the Secretary of State in writing that it is satisfied that the person is the age they claim (or are claimed) to be, without the need for an age assessment.
(4) Where a local authority—
(a) conducts an age assessment itself, or
(b) informs the Secretary of State that it is satisfied that an age-disputed person is the age they claim (or are claimed) to be,
it must, on request from the Secretary of State, provide the Secretary of State with such evidence as the Secretary of State reasonably requires for the Secretary of State to consider the local authority's decision under subsection (3)(b) or (c).
(5) Where a local authority refers an age-disputed person to a designated person for an age assessment under subsection (1) or (3)(a), the local authority must provide any assistance that the designated person reasonably requires from the authority for the purposes of conducting that assessment.
(6) The standard of proof for an age assessment under this section is the balance of probabilities.
(7) An age assessment of an age-disputed person conducted by a designated person following a referral from a local authority under subsection (1) or (3)(a) is binding—
(a) on the Secretary of State and immigration officers when exercising immigration functions, and
(b) on a local authority that—
(i) has exercised or may exercise functions under relevant children's legislation in relation to the age-disputed person, and
(ii) is aware of the age assessment conducted by the designated person.
But this is subject to section 54(5) (decision of Tribunal to be binding on Secretary of State and local authorities) and section 56 (new information following age assessment or appeal).
…”
21. Section 51 NABA 2022 provides for age assessments for immigration purposes:
“51 Persons subject to immigration control: assessment for immigration purposes
(1) A designated person may conduct an age assessment on an age-disputed person for the purposes of deciding whether or how the Secretary of State or an immigration officer should exercise any immigration functions in relation to the person.
(2) An assessment under subsection (1) may be conducted—
(a) in a case where subsections (3) and (4) of section 50 do not apply, or
(b) in a case where those subsections do apply—
(i) at any time before a local authority has referred the age-disputed person to a designated person under section 50(3)(a) or has informed the Secretary of State as mentioned in subsection (3)(b) or (c) of that section, or
(ii) if the Secretary of State has reason to doubt a local authority's decision under subsection (3)(b) or (c) of that section.
(3) An age assessment under this section is binding on the Secretary of State and immigration officers when exercising immigration functions. But this is subject to section 54(5) (decision of Tribunal to be binding on Secretary of State and local authorities) and section 56 (new information following age assessment or appeal).
(4) The standard of proof for an age assessment under this section is the balance of probabilities.
22. The only policy guidance to which we have been referred is entitled “National Age Assessment Board: The operation of the National Age Assessment Board and sections 50 and 51 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022”, version 3.0, published on 30 June 2025. There is nothing to be gained from us setting out that guidance in this decision.
23. Having set out the relevant legal framework, we turn to the two issues that we must determine. We take each in turn.

Issue 1: The Appropriate Venue for Issuing a Claim for Judicial Review
24. The respondent’s primary position on this first issue is what Mr Tawiah described as “the straightforward approach.” In short, he submits that it is common ground that the decisions being challenged here are age assessments completed by the National Age Assessment Board. He submits that all such decisions taken under sections 50 and 51 of NABA 2022 are made “under the Immigration Acts”. That is because:
a. Schedule 1 to the Interpretation Act 1978 provides that “The Immigration Acts” has the meaning given by section 61 of the UK Borders Act 2007.
b. Section 61 of the UK Borders Act 2007 provides that a reference to “the Immigration Acts” is to …(m) the Nationality and Borders Act 2022
25. A decision under sections 50 and 51 is therefore a decision made under the Immigration Acts. The decisions therefore fall within the class of cases specified in paragraph 1(i) of the Transfer Direction, made pursuant to section 18(6) TCEA 2007 conferring jurisdiction on the Tribunal.
26. Where a claim is issued in the Court, the Court is required (“must”) to transfer all such cases to the Tribunal by operation of section 31A SCA 1981. The three conditions set out in section 31A(4), (5) and (6) are met. The applicants do not seek anything other than the forms of relief under s31(a) and (b) SCA 1981. The applications do not call into question anything done by the Crown Court, and the applications fall within a class specified in paragraph 1(i) of the Transfer Direction, made pursuant to section 18(6) TCEA 2007.
27. Therefore where a claim is issued in the Court, the Court must transfer the application to the Tribunal. It follows, Mr Tawiah submits, that the appropriate venue for filing a claim for judicial review against a decision made by a designated person is the Tribunal.
28. Although there is an obvious attraction to that “straightforward” approach, it is in our judgement too simplistic. The applicants refer to the decision of Dove J, as he then was, in ABW v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] 1 W.L.R. 1685. He decided, as a preliminary issue, that in a judicial review claim brought by a trafficked victim challenging a decision of the SSHD to issue a Public Order Disqualification (“POD”) pursuant to the section 63 of NABA 2022, the transfer of the claim to the Tribunal was not mandatory. Dove J referred to the Transfer Direction and the list of statutes that fall within the term “The Immigration Acts”. He said:
“10. …it might be thought that on the basis of a superficial literal reading of the Direction it is a case subject to the requirement of mandatory transfer to the Upper Tribunal.
11. In my view, this superficial reading does not properly reflect the intention and purpose behind the creation of the Direction Furthermore, it does not reflect the extensive evolution of the statutory framework and the broad range of content now encompassed by the lengthy list of Immigration Acts which are the subject of the Direction…”
29. Dove J referred to the breadth of the statutory landscape created by an examination of the contents of the Immigration Acts and considered it necessary for a more nuanced approach to be adopted rather than simply adopting a literal approach. He said:
“13. … It is essentially uncontroversial that the starting point is that an objective assessment of the meaning of the words used is required (see R v Secretary of State for Environment, Transport and the Regions, ex p Spath Holme Ltd [2001] AC 349 and the speech of Lord Nicholls at 396 E to 397A). It is agreed that a purposive approach to the Direction should be taken, that is to say that it should be read as a whole bearing in mind its obvious function and purpose that those matters which require consideration by the highly specialised and expert judges of the Upper Tribunal in its Immigration and Asylum Chamber should be required to be transferred to that jurisdiction. Such an approach requires that paragraph 1(i) of the Direction is read as a whole, with the phrase "or otherwise relating to leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom outside the immigration rules" providing a contextual guide to the identification of the decisions made under the Immigration Acts or related instruments which are captured by the Direction and thereby earmarked for mandatory transfer. This approach obviously requires a careful examination of the nature and subject matter of the decision under consideration so as to enable the correct application of the Direction, and ensure that the matters identified for mandatory transfer are those which properly demand the specialist skills of the Upper Tribunal.”
30. The POD under section 63 of NABA 2022 allows (not requires) the Home Office to deny modern slavery support, protection, and leave to remain to victims deemed a threat to public order or those who have claimed to be a victim of slavery or human trafficking in bad faith. Dove J accepted the decision under challenge was undoubtedly reached deploying a power contained within an Immigration Act. That however was not determinative. He said:
“19. … The question is whether a decision to make a POD in the circumstances of this case is one which falls within the definition provided by paragraph 1(i) of the Directive.
20. In the light of the principles of construction which have been set out above, paragraph 1(i) of the Direction has to be read as a whole, and bearing in mind the purpose of ensuring that those cases which require the specialist immigration jurisdiction provided by the Upper Tribunal are sent there for determination. Given the breadth of the coverage of the Immigration Acts not all decisions reached using powers contained within that legislation will be within the scope of paragraph 1(i). The inclusion of decisions "otherwise relating to leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom outside the immigration rules" illustrates, consistently with the purpose of the Direction, that it is immigration decisions, or decisions arising in the context of provisions related to questions of immigration status that must be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Upper Tribunal. The use of the language "relating to" is sufficiently open textured to incorporate decisions that do not directly lead to a decision granting leave to enter or remain, but includes those in relation to preparatory stages in the process of obtaining status. For instance, questions in respect of the accessibility of opportunities to provide biometric data to enable completion of the procedures leading to a decision to grant leave to enter are properly caught by the provisions of paragraph 1(i).
31. Dove J referred to the relevant characteristics of a POD decision, the immigration implications and the direct consequences which arise when a POD decision is made. He said:
“21. … In my view the immigration dimension to these provisions cannot be regarded as determinative nor can they give rise to the conclusion that it is essential in all cases that they be considered and determined by the specialist judges of the Upper Tribunal.
22. One of the points which carries significant weight in making this determination is the fact that these provisions do not apply only to those who are the subject of immigration control. These provisions also apply to United Kingdom citizens who have been the subject of referral and who have received a reasonable grounds decision. This factor points firmly and clearly in the direction that questions in relation to POD decisions do not fall within the scope of paragraph 1(i). Thus, having taken account of the nature and effect of a decision under section 63 of the 2022 Act to make a POD, I am satisfied that it is not a decision which, pursuant to the Direction, is required to be mandatorily transferred to the Upper Tribunal.”
32. Dove J went on to consider whether the claim should be transferred to the Tribunal as an exercise of case management discretion. He considered that to be a finely balanced decision and that decisions under section 63 NABA 2022 are well within the institutional competence of the Tribunal. He concluded that the specific circumstances of the case before him justified its continued progress in the High Court. Relevant factors included the advanced preparation of the case, delay, and importantly, a challenge to the Modern Slavery Act Statutory Guidance which governs the exercise of the power under section 63.
33. We accept, as the applicants submit, that in light of ABW, a literal approach to the Transfer Direction is inappropriate and instead a purposive and more nuanced assessment is required. To that end, the applicants submit that the Tribunal is a specialist tribunal in matters relating to immigration and asylum, but that the subject matter of an age assessment decision is a person’s age and date of birth and not their immigration status in the United Kingdom.
34. The difficulty with that submission is twofold. First, section 51 of NABA 2022 expressly concerns persons subject to immigration control, and by operation of section 51(1), the age assessment of an age-disputed person is conducted for the purposes of deciding whether or how the Secretary of State or an immigration officer should exercise any immigration functions in relation to the person. Second, as a matter of practice, the Court routinely transfers the determination of age to the Tribunal, whether the decision-maker is a local authority or a designated person operating under the auspices of NAAB. In R. (on the application of Z) v Croydon LBC [2011] EWCA Civ 59, Sir Anthony May (President of the Queen's Bench Division) referred to the test for the grant of permission and having granted permission, said:
“31. The Administrative Court does not habitually decide questions of fact on contested evidence and is not generally equipped to do so. Oral evidence is not normally a feature of judicial review proceedings or statutory appeals. We would therefore draw attention to the power which there now is to transfer age assessment cases where permission is given for the factual determination of the claimant's age to the Upper Tribunal….Transfer to the Upper Tribunal is appropriate because the judges there have experience of assessing the ages of children from abroad in the context of disputed asylum claims. If an age assessment judicial review claim is started in the Administrative Court, the Administrative Court will normally decide whether permission should be granted before considering whether to transfer the claim to the Upper Tribunal. The matter could be transferred for permission also to be considered, but the Administrative Court should not give directions for the future conduct of the case after transfer, and in particular should not direct a rolled-up hearing in the Upper Tribunal.”
35. The applicants submit that challenges to age assessment decisions often involve orthodox public law grounds in addition to the precedent fact of a person’s age. It is submitted that in R. (on the application of Z), the Court of Appeal recognised that transfer to the Tribunal is appropriate because the judges there have experience of assessing the ages of children from abroad in the context of disputed asylum claims. The relevance of orthodox public law grounds in this context is in our judgment limited. The Court of Appeal recognised; “the Administrative Court will normally decide whether permission should be granted”, but importantly in the passage we have cited Sir Anthony May did not discount the possibility that the question of permission too, can be considered by the Tribunal. The weight to be attached to the age assessment completed will be a matter for the Tribunal. The orthodox public law grounds (for example, procedural fairness in respect of the age assessment and/or the rationality of an age assessment decision) are part and parcel of the Tribunal’s judicial review work in a wide variety of cases. In any event, it is now well established that the Tribunal is not confined to choosing between the positions of the parties; R (W) v London Borough of Croydon [2012] EWHC 1130.
36. In AWB, Dove J took account of two considerations which in his judgment pointed away from a conclusion that a challenge to a decision made under section 63 fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal. First, section 63 applied equally to British citizens as much as foreign citizens: [18] and [22]. Secondly, a foreign citizen subject to a POD decision will be disentitled to assistance and support during the recovery period, a consequence which was directly connected to matters other than immigration status: [18] and [21].
37. We reject the submission made on behalf of the applicants that the primary purpose or consequence of determining a person’s age is to establish whether they are owed duties under the CA 1989 by a local authority. Every local authority has a statutory duty as set out in section 17 CA 1989 to safeguard and promote the welfare of children within their area who are in need. A child is defined in section 105(1) CA 1989 as a person under the age of 18. Section 50 of NABA 2022 makes provision for a referral of an age-disputed person to a designated person for an age assessment where a local authority needs to know the age of an age-disputed person for the purposes of deciding whether or how to exercise any of its functions under relevant children's legislation in relation to the person. That is one purpose, but not the primary purpose of the age assessment. Equally important in this context is section 51, which concerns ‘Persons subject to immigration control’, and provides that a designated person may conduct an age assessment for the purposes of deciding whether or how the Secretary of State or an immigration officer should exercise any immigration functions in relation to the person.
38. It is true that as a general proposition, an age assessment decision can be made in respect of a British citizen. However, section 49(1)(a) NABA 2022 confirms that for the purposes of sections 50 and 51, an “age-disputed person” means a person “who requires leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom (whether or not such leave has been given)” and sections 50 and 51 only apply to persons “subject to immigration control”. Thus, British citizens cannot be subject to an age assessment and a consequent decision under those provisions. This is the reverse of the consideration to which Dove J attributed “significant weight” at [22] of ABW. Thus, here the fact that British citizens cannot be subject to an age assessment decision under sections 50 and 51 NABA 2022 carries points the other way and in favour of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. Section 49(1)(a) also addresses the applicants’ submission as to the position of those who already have refugee status (and leave as such) prior to an age assessment being conducted. Such persons will still fall under the ambit of sections 50 and 51 and so the pre-existing status does not point against the Tribunal’s exclusive jurisdiction.
39. As highlighted by Mr Tawiah, the important point here is the wording of sections 50 and 51 NABA 2022. Section 50 sets out which authorities may refer an age-disputed person to a designated person for age assessment, the circumstances in which such a referral can be made, what the local authority must do when those circumstances arise, and the binding nature of an age assessment conducted by a designated person following a referral. Once a referral has been made, section 51(1) confirms that the consequent age assessment is undertaken “for the purposes of deciding whether or how the Secretary of State or an immigration officer should exercise any immigration functions in relation to the person”. Although the age assessment does not of itself lead to a decision to grant permission to stay or enter, in our judgment the statutory framework provides a clear nexus between an age assessment (and its resulting decision) and the exercising of “immigration functions”.
40. That is distinct from the obligations of a local authority under the CA 1989 and inescapably places an age assessment decision firmly in the territory of the Tribunal’s expertise and supervisory jurisdiction in respect of immigration matters. It constitutes a significant consideration in our assessment of whether such decisions fall within paragraph 1(i) of the Transfer Direction.
41. The applicants’ reliance on the historical fact that age assessments were exclusively conducted by local authorities adds little. Now, as in the past, any challenge to an age assessment decision made by local authority must be brought in the Court because (a) the age assessment decision was made under the local authority’s obligations pursuant to the CA 1989, not the Immigration Acts and (b) it appears to be well-established that such a decision is not captured by the “or relating to” alternative in paragraph 1(i) of the Transfer Direction. Our attention has not been drawn to any authority in which that phrase has been the subject of judicial consideration in a case concerning a local authority decision.
42. Here, we are not concerned with a decision made by a local authority. The decisions under challenge are decisions made by a designated person in the context of the statutory framework set out in NABA 2022. The landscape has changed. We acknowledge that a challenge to a decision by a local authority would still have to be issued in the Court, but the administrative convenience of ensuring all challenges to age assessments are issued in one forum cannot on its own deflect us from determining the correct meaning of the Transfer Direction in the context of the statutory provisions.
43. The applicants also submit that there will be cases in which the challenge is not simply against the age assessment decision itself, but also, for example, a refusal by the decision-maker to refer a person to the NRM as a potential victim of trafficking. That aspect of a challenge would not fall within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction under paragraph 1 of the Transfer Direction. The applicants submit that there is a risk of confusion and an administrative burden if a challenge is brought in the Tribunal only for it to have to be transferred to the Court because the former has no jurisdiction to consider a particular element of it, and then for the Court to transfer the matter back to the Tribunal on a discretionary basis for a fact-finding hearing to determine age, thereby causing delay. We recognise the force of that submission and accept that it is in the interests of justice for judicial review challenges to proceed efficiently and effectively. This is particularly so where the applicant is a putative child. However it is not unusual for claims issued in the Court or in the Tribunal to raise issues that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction over. Claims are often issued in the Tribunal, for example, that include a challenge to a ‘trafficking decision’ by the Competent Authority or challenging the lawfulness of immigration detention. The Court and the Tribunal are well versed with transfer between the two jurisdictions and the Court is quite capable of properly determining those claims in which it has a discretion to transfer to the Tribunal. The case management powers of the Tribunal are sufficiently flexible to ensure that any delay is minimised.
44. We add that in issuing a claim for permission to claim judicial review it is not unreasonable to expect the applicant to have given careful consideration to the scope of a challenge prior to deciding the forum in which the claim is to be brought. The applicant and their representatives will obviously be aware and will consider whether any element of the challenge involves a refusal to make a referral to the NRM or some other factor over which the Tribunal may have no jurisdiction before making a decision on the appropriate forum in which the claim is issued.
45. For the sake of completeness, it has not been suggested that the Tribunal is unable to consider applications for interim relief in the form of a mandatory order requiring a local authority to provide support and accommodation to a person pending final determination of the judicial review proceedings. Nor is it suggested that the inclusion of such an application as part of a challenge to an age assessment decision taken pursuant to section 50 and 51 NABA 2022 means that the appropriate venue must be the Court. We simply add that where an application for interim relief is made, it is important that the party to whom any order is directed (usually the local authority) is named as an interested party and is served with the claim and application, and has an opportunity to respond, where possible, before a decision is made on the application.
46. In conclusion, our decision upon the first issue is that a challenge to an age assessment decision taken by a “designated person” pursuant to sections 50 and 51 NABA 2022 falls within paragraph 1(i) of the Transfer Direction and must be brought in the Tribunal.

Issue 2: Is the appropriate respondent the SSHD or NAAB or some other nomenclature
47. Combining the written submissions from Lord Murray of Blidworth and the oral submissions of Mr Tawiah, the central points made by the respondent on the question of substitution are as follows:
(a) Part 4 of NABA 2022, and in particular sections 49-51, created a new statutory regime for age assessments;
(b) This new regime provides for “designated” persons, and only such persons, to conduct age assessments;
(c) “Designated” persons conduct age assessments under the auspices of NAAB, which is a distinct body from the SSHD;
(d) Significantly, age assessment decisions taken by “designated” persons are binding on the SSHD, thereby strongly indicating that they (as individual decision-makers or in the form of NAAB) operate outside of and distinct from the SSHD. If this were not the case, there would have been no reason to include a “binding” provision in sections 50(7) and 51(3) NABA 2022;
(e) The respondent’s position does not infringe on the Carltona principle because NAAB and/or “designated” persons have a distinct legal identity and are not the alter ego of the SSHD;
(f) If NAAB is not the appropriate respondent, alternatives could for example be the “designated decision-maker for age assessments”, or the “designated age assessment decision-maker”.
48. The Carltona principle arises from the decision in Carltona Ltd. v Commissioner of Works [1943] 2 All ER 560. Lord Greene M.R. said, (563):
“In the administration of government in this country the functions which are given to ministers (and constitutionally given to ministers because they are constitutionally responsible) are functions so multifarious that no minister could ever personally attend to them…The duties imposed upon ministers and the powers given to ministers are normally exercised under the authority of the ministers by responsible officials of the department. Public business could not be carried on if that were not the case."
49. The decision is a pragmatic one, and what was said by the Master of the Rolls must apply with equal if not more force now despite the passage of time where a minister of the Crown such as the SSHD is generally the recipient of such a quantity of functions that it cannot have been expected that it would exercise all of them personally. Most statutory functions are therefore exercised through some kind of agency or delegation.
50. In the context of the present cases, we have been assisted by what was said in three authorities relied on by the applicants: R v SSHD ex parte Oladehinde [1991] 1 AC 254, R (SSSS) ex parte Sherwin [1995] 2 WLUK 301, and Director of Public Prosecutions v Haw [2007] EWHC 1931 (Admin); [2008] 1 WLR 379. In Oladehinde, the House of Lords rejected the submissions that (a) immigration officers were the holders of a statutory office which meant they were independent of the executive arm of government, thereby falling outside of the Carltona principle and (b) if immigration officers were civil servants, the relevant statutory regime clearly implied that the SSHD’s powers in relation to deportation could not be exercised by those officers. Lord Griffiths found that immigration officers are civil servants in the Home Office to whom are assigned specific statutory duties under the Immigration Act 1971. That Act makes no provision for the management of the immigration service for that is the function of the Home Office of which the service is a part. He went on to conclude at 303E-F that:
“The immigration service is comprised of Home Office civil servants for whom the Secretary of State is responsible and I can for myself see no reason why he should not authorise members of that service to take decisions under the Carltona principle providing they do not conflict with or embarrass them in the discharge of their specific statutory duties under the Act and that the decisions are suitable to their grading and experience.”
51. In Sherwin, the Divisional Court was concerned with whether a decision of the Benefits Agency was properly to be regarded as being one made by the relevant Secretary of State. At [9], Kennedy LJ concluded that:
“In my judgment, in the context of this case, the creation of the Benefits Agency has had no effect whatsoever on the operation of the Carltona principle. In addition to the cases to which I have referred Mr Drabble referred us to a number of academic writings which I have read with interest, but at the end of the day I come back to what was said by Lord Griffiths in Oladehinde. The decision in question was taken by a person of suitable seniority in the Agency (which was itself within the DSS), and it was taken by a person for whom the Secretary of State accepts responsibility therefore the Carltona principle applied.”
52. Finally, in Haw, the Divisional Court considered whether statutory powers given to the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police could be delegated. At [33], the Lord Chief Justice observed:
“As Lord Donaldson pointed out, the Carltona principle can apply to the exercise of prerogative powers that are not conferred by statute. Where powers are conferred on a Minister by statute, the Carltona principle will apply to those powers unless the statute, expressly or by implication, provides to the contrary. Where a statutory power is conferred on an officer who is himself the creature of statute, whether that officer has the power to delegate must depend upon the interpretation of the relevant statute or statutes. Where the responsibilities of the office created by statute are such that delegation is inevitable, there will be an implied power to delegate. In such circumstances there will be a presumption, where additional statutory powers and duties are conferred, that there is a power to delegate unless the statute conferring them, expressly or by implication, provides to the contrary. Such a situation is, in practice, indistinguishable from one in which the Carltona principle applies.”
53. Having regard to these authorities and all of the materials before us, we conclude that age assessment decisions made under Part 4 of NABA 2022 are in effect taken by the SSHD, and that the Carltona principle applies to such decisions. We reach that conclusion for eight reasons in particular.
54. First, we have considered the wording of the relevant statutory provisions, namely sections 49-51 NABA 2022. The power to conduct an age assessment and make a decision thereon is clearly confined to a “designated person”. A “designated person” is defined under section 49 as being “an official of the Secretary of State who is designated by the Secretary of State to conduct age assessments under section 50 or 51”. It is true that Parliament has chosen to invest the power to conduct age assessment on a specified class of persons, but it has also stipulated that such persons are “officials” of the SSHD. Applying the natural and ordinary meaning of the words used in the statute, there is to our mind an inescapable link between the persons empowered to conduct age assessments and the SSHD. The function is delegated to a defined official of the SSHD.
55. We reject the submission made on behalf of the respondent that the fact that a designated person is an official of the Secretary of State does not alter the fact that it is the designated person who is empowered to conduct age assessments. The two are not necessarily exclusive of each other and the definition under section 49 is a powerful indication of the intended position.
56. Second, and following on from the above, the applicants rightly point out that NAAB is not referred to in NABA 2022. It is not a statutory body created by statute in order to perform functions as a distinct public authority. Parliament could have legislated for such a body, but chose not to. In our judgment, NAAB is properly to be described as an administrative mechanism through which designated persons operate in the discharge of their statutory functions, and nothing more. Even if it was considered to be an agency in some form, what is said in Oladehinde and Sherwin would lead us to conclude that the Carltona principle applies. The designated person is an official of the Secretary of State. That is, a person for whom the Secretary of State accepts responsibility.
57. Third, in so far as the respondent asserts that independence is integral to age assessments conducted under section 50 NABA 2022, we see nothing inconsistent in respect of, on the one hand, the need for robust decision-making by suitably trained social workers (the “designated person”) and, on the other, the application of the Carltona principle, as elucidated in the authorities. As we have already said, Parliament could have, but did not, create a distinct public authority which unambiguously provided for “independence” from the SSHD.
58. Fourth, the “binding” provisions in sections 50(7) and 51(3) of NABA 2022 do not in our judgment carry the weight attributed to them by the respondent. There is merit in the submission that such provisions would be unnecessary if NAAB and/or a “designated person” were simply an arm of the SSHD operating under the Carltona principle. On the face of it, it is suggestive of the former having a function/identity distinct from the latter. As put by Mr Tawiah, the provisions identify and ensure “statutory insulation” as between the two. However, in our judgment, when seen in context, the intention behind the “binding” effect of age assessment decisions on the SSHD is simply to reflect in primary legislation the reality of the position as it would otherwise be. We can two take examples from other areas in the general field of immigration and asylum to illustrate this. The power to grant or refuse permission to enter the United Kingdom is vested in immigration officers: section 4 of the Immigration Act 1971. In making a decision on whether to grant or refuse permission to enter, an immigration officer is acting as an official of the SSHD and that such a decision is binding on the SSHD. The same applies to a decision made by the Single Competent Authority following a referral to the NRM in respect of victims of trafficking.
59. Mr Tawiah submitted that sections 49-51 NABA 2022 provide a clear basis for distinguishing the two examples from the functions carried out by NAAB/designated persons. We disagree. In reality, an immigration officer is akin to a “designated person”, as is a trained specialist within the Home Office who makes decisions on behalf of the Single Competent Authority. We do not regard sections 49-51 NABA 2022 as constituting a sufficiently clear basis for finding that the “binding” provisions justify the substitution of the SSHD for NAAB or some other nomenclature.
60. Fifth, the respondent’s position in these claims does not appear to sit comfortably with her own guidance on NAAB. At the outset of the document and under the heading “About this guidance”, it is said:
“The NAAB is a decision-making function in the Home Office…”
We do not need to rely on the guidance as an aid to the meaning of the relevant statutory provisions, but it does shed some light on what has up until now been the respondent’s view of her decision-making structure.
61. In passing, we also note the Explanatory Notes to NABA 2022 prepared by the SSHD “in order to assist the reader of the Act and to help informed debate on it”, refers at paragraphs [499], [503]-[505], and [513] to sections 50 and 52 as conferring a power on the SSHD to conduct full age assessments on age-disputed persons (as defined in section 49).
62. Six, the examples relied on by the respondent of other government departments to show by way of analogy that the SSHD is not the correct respondent in age assessment challenges do not in fact assist her case. The Parole Board is an independent body established under the Criminal Justice Act 1967 which then became an independent non-departmental public body under the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. HMRC is a non-ministerial department created by the Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Act 2005. Under section 1 of the Environment Act 1995, the Environment Agency was created as a body corporate, distinct from ministerial or departmental functions. The Crown Prosecution Service was established as a distinct body under the Prosecution of Offenders Act 1985. Police forces are a product of the Police Act 1996. In short, all of these are creations of statute and were expressly given distinct identities as public authorities whose decisions could be the subject of public law challenge. As we have already noted, NAAB does not fall into the same category.
63. Seven, we have considerable concern over the respondent’s suggestion that, as an alternative to naming NAAB as the respondent, the specific designated person who has made a decision could instead be the target of a challenge. In effect, any official of the Secretary of State who is designated by the Secretary of State would be the target of the challenge. This would run the real risk of having two named individuals as the respondents because it is invariably the case that two social workers (“designated” persons) would carry out an age assessment and then make a decision. Quite apart from the obvious difficulty as to whether the social workers would be considered to be ‘a public body’ whose decision is susceptible to challenge by judicial review, the submission made fails to consider how those decision makers would be insulated from personal liability.
64. Eight, we have considered the evidence from Yvonne Shearwood, the Lead for NAAB also set out in her two witness statements and the exhibit thereto (what is described as the NAAB Designation Letter for persons designated to conduct age assessments under sections 50 and 51 NABA 2022). Ms Shearwood sets out in detail the role of NAAB, its importance in “safeguarding both migrant children and the indigenous care-experience population through the accurate and consistent assessment of age”, and the training and designation of members of staff. We are grateful for her evidence and have no reason to doubt its reliability. She refers to NAAB as being “in the Home Office.” She confirms that NAAB “operates within the UK Home Office” and the Designation Letter makes it is clear that “designated” persons are “employed” by the Home Office. Overall, we find that Ms Shearwood’s evidence tends to support our view that NAAB and/or “designated” persons are not distinct entities from the SSHD such that the Carltona principle does not apply at all, or is displaced by sufficiently clear contraindications.
65. It follows that the respondent’s applications in these two cases for the substitution of the SSHD for NAAB or any alternative nomenclature are refused.

Conclusion
66. For the reasons we have given we concluded:
a. A challenge to age assessment decision taken by a “designated person” pursuant to sections 50 and 51 NABA 2022 falls within paragraph 1(i) of the Transfer Direction and must be brought in the Tribunal.
b. Where an age assessment decision is made pursuant to sections 50 or 51 NABA 2022, the appropriate respondent to a judicial review challenge, whether lodged in the Court or the Tribunal, is the Secretary of State for the Home Department.

~~~~0~~~~