Tribunal decisions

The decision

Case No: JR-2025-LON-002329
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
(IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER)
Field House,
Breams Buildings
London, EC4A 1WR

3rd June 2026

Before:

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HOFFMAN

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Between:

THE KING
on the application of
SADAQAT ALI
Applicant
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SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

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Ms L Simak
(instructed by Maxwell Solicitors), for the applicant

Mr T Cockroft
(instructed by the Government Legal Department) for the respondent

Hearing date: 8th May 2026

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J U D G M E N T

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Judge Hoffman:

1. The applicant seeks judicial review of the respondent’s decision dated 10 July 2025 cancelling his student visa with immediate effect.

2. For the reasons set out below, the application for judicial review is dismissed.

Background

3. The applicant is a national of Pakistan. On 18 January 2024, he was granted leave to enter the United Kingdom as a student on a visa valid until 1 October 2025. He entered the country on 2 February 2024 and, on 24 June 2025, he successfully completed his master’s degree in pharmaceutical chemistry. Outside of term time, the applicant’s visa conditions permitted him to work full-time on an employed basis. He exercised that permission by working at a Shell petrol station.

4. However, on 10 July 2025, the applicant was encountered by immigration officers in Bristol with a motorbike. The officers interviewed the applicant and decided that he was working as a self-employed food delivery courier in breach of the terms of his visa. As a consequence, it was decided to cancel his visa with immediate effect. Removal directions were subsequently set for 26 July 2025.

The application for judicial review

5. On 21 July 2025, the applicant applied for urgent interim relief suspending his removal to Pakistan as well as permission to apply for judicial review of the respondent’s decision to cancel his student visa.

6. The applicant raised two grounds of claim:

(1) The respondent’s decision is unlawful because it was based on the false assumption that the applicant was working as a delivery driver.

(2) The decision to cancel the applicant’s visa is disproportionate and one that no reasonable or rational decision-maker could come to.

7. The applicant was granted interim relief by Upper Tribunal Judge Hirst on 21 July 2025.

8. By an order sealed on 30 October 2025, Upper Tribunal Judge Ruddick granted permission to apply for judicial review. Although Judge Ruddick indicated that the applicant might wish to reconsider his first ground of challenge in light of the disclosure provided by the respondent with her Acknowledgement of Service, she was satisfied that the second ground was arguable. The grant of permission was not restricted.

Legal framework

The statutory framework

9. Section 3 of the Immigration Act 1971 confers on the respondent general powers for the regulation and control of immigration. Section 3(1)(a) provides that a person shall not enter the United Kingdom unless given leave to do so under the Act. Section 3(1)(b) permits the respondent to grant leave to enter or remain for either a limited or an indefinite period.

10. Section 3(1)(c) empowers the respondent to attach conditions to a person’s leave to enter or remain, including, at sub‑paragraph (i), “a condition restricting his work or occupation in the United Kingdom”.

11. Under s.3(2), the respondent may lay before Parliament statements of the rules, or of any changes to them, governing the practice to be followed in the administration of the Act, namely the Immigration Rules.

The Immigration Rules

12. At the date of the decision1, the provision relevant to the cancellation of a person’s leave to enter or remain could be found in Part 9 of the Immigration Rules, at paragraph 9.8.8:

“Permission (including permission extended under section 3C of the Immigration Act 1971) may be cancelled where the person has failed to comply with the conditions of their permission.”

As is made clear by the use of the word “may”, the power is a discretionary one.

The respondent’s guidance

13. Guidance on the application of paragraph 9.8.8 is set out in the respondent’s policy document Cancellation and Curtailment of Permission (“the Guidance”). The version in force on the date of decision was version 7.0, published on 8 October 2024.

14. On pages 56-57, under the heading “Use of discretion when considering cancellation”, it says:

“In cases where the reasons for cancellation are discretionary, you must not automatically cancel an individual’s entry clearance or permission if there are reasons that suggest it may not be appropriate to do so.

It is the Secretary of State’s responsibility to establish the reasons why an individual’s entry clearance or permission is to be cancelled. You must establish the relevant facts and then carefully consider all an individual’s relevant circumstances and the proven facts of the case before you make a final decision.

You must consider any other facts or evidence about the individual’s circumstances, such as those recorded on Atlas, provided with an application or stored on a case file that is relevant to your decision.

In cases where you must consider discretion, you must record your consideration and the reasons for your decision on whether to exercise discretion on the casework system. You must also explain your decision on whether you exercised discretion in the decision letter, so an individual can see that you considered the circumstances of their case.

See sample wording on exercise of discretion for inclusion in decision letters, where you have exercised your discretion and you have decided that cancellation action is justifiable and proportionate:

I have considered whether to exercise discretion regarding the cancellation of your entry clearance / permission. It is not considered that the circumstances in your case are such that discretion should be exercised in your favour because [insert reasons why you are not applying discretion, taking into consideration the full facts and circumstances of the case].

This will need to be tailored to the facts and circumstances of the case.

[…].”

15. At pages 61-62 of the Guidance can be found a non-exhaustive list of examples of when discretion should ordinarily be used to cancel a person’s leave with immediate effect:

“• an individual has been complicit in the reason for cancellation, such as cases where:
o a PBS [points-based system] individual was complicit in the actions that resulted in their sponsor losing their licence
o a PBS individual was complicit in the actions that resulted in their sponsor withdrawing their sponsorship, for example where the individual does not start, or ceases to work or study with their sponsor with no reasonable explanation and evidence - a reasonable explanation and evidence from the individual may include, but is not limited to, long-term sickness, or a family emergency, similar to the section on exceptional or compassionate circumstances - where such a reasonable explanation and evidence is provided, you may need to consider cancellation to 60 days, see: ‘cancellation: points-based system: 60 days permission remaining’
o there is evidence that an individual has fraudulently obtained their permission to enter or stay in the UK and this was material to the decision to grant their permission
o an individual has been involved in a sham marriage or civil partnership
• the level of non-compliance merits immediate cancellation, such as cases where:
o an individual sponsored on a PBS route who has been dismissed by their employer or excluded by their academic sponsor for gross misconduct which is serious enough to mean that they should not be granted 60 days permission to switch to another sponsor
o an individual sponsored on a PBS route whose sponsor ceased trading more than 60 days ago has not switched to another sponsor
• an individual poses a significant risk to a member or members of the public which means that immediate cancellation is appropriate, such as:
o breakdown of relationship cases where there is evidence that the settled spouse has been a victim of domestic violence

If, having considered all the relevant circumstances, you decide to cancel, you should normally cancel permission with immediate effect in such cases, unless there are circumstances which mean that permission should be cancelled so that an individual has a period of permission to stay in the UK remaining (normally 60 days, see Cancelling permission: points-based system: 60 days permission remaining).

[…].”

16. Page 64 of the guidance states:

“If, after having given full consideration to the facts and circumstances of the case, you decide that cancellation action is appropriate, you must include the following on a cancellation decision letter, or on a Notice of Liability to Remove (NOL) where you are cancelling permission with immediate effect:

• the ground for cancellation (for example: on the basis of ‘failing to comply with the conditions of permission’)
• the reason for cancellation in detail (that is, explain why you are taking cancellation action, including any facts, information and evidence to support your decision)
• exercise of discretion, where the cancellation ground is discretionary (that is, why you have decided it is appropriate to cancel the person’s permission)
• the date the permission expires as a result of the cancellation action

[…].”

The parties’ submissions

17. On behalf of the applicant, Ms Simak relied primarily on Ground 2, submitting that the respondent had acted unreasonably by failing to exercise, or alternatively to explain the exercise of, the discretion required by the Guidance. While it was accepted that the applicant had been working as a delivery driver and that this constituted a breach of his conditions, it was argued that the decision‑maker was required to undertake a second, distinct stage of reasoning as to whether leave should be cancelled at all and, if so, whether cancellation should take immediate effect. The Guidance, it was said, made this consideration of discretion mandatory and required explicit reasoning in the decision letter. The applicant had completed his master’s degree, had existing leave until October 2025, believed he was entitled to work after completing his course, and had explained that his work was intended to fund a further application and enable him to seek sponsorship. None of these matters was meaningfully addressed in the decision, which merely rejected his account as “unbelievable” without further enquiry. The absence of any reference to discretion or reasoning was said to demonstrate either a failure to appreciate that discretion existed or a failure to consider the applicant’s circumstances properly, contrary to the policy and the duty to make enquiries: see Secretary of State for Education and Science v Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council [1977] AC 1014. Ground 1 was advanced as overlapping with Ground 2, in that the respondent had failed to take material evidence and explanations into account, rendering the decision unlawful.

18. On behalf of the respondent, Mr Cockroft submitted that the decision was lawful and rational. As to Ground 1, it was said that the finding that the applicant was working as a self-employed delivery driver was based on evidence and was no longer in dispute. As to Ground 2, three principal submissions were advanced. First, it was argued that the decision letter made clear that the applicant’s circumstances had been considered, from which it was a legitimate inference that discretion had in fact been exercised, the purpose of expressly referencing discretion as recommended by the Guidance merely being to demonstrate such consideration. Second, relying on Singaram v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 1375, it was submitted that no public law error arose because the applicant had failed to identify what further enquiries the respondent should have made, what additional information would have been provided, or how this could realistically have led to a different outcome. Third, even if there were an error in failing expressly to refer to discretion or to give fuller reasons, that error was immaterial under s.31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981. The reasons for cancellation were apparent from the interview and the decision‑maker’s concerns, including the applicant’s explanation for purchasing a motorbike rather than applying the funds towards the cost of a further visa, and any more detailed articulation of the discretion would not have altered the outcome.

Discussion

Ground 1

19. As pleaded in his statement of facts of grounds, the applicant asserted that when encountered by the immigration officers on 10 July 2025, he was merely

“standing in the street near to his bike and was over [sic] the phone with his family. He was not engaged in any form of delivery or paid work. He showed his bank account to the Home Office officers at the time of the investigation but they did not found [sic] any transaction or income whatsoever from any delivery services or unauthorized [sic] employment” (paragraph 10).

20. Further, at paragraph 17, it is stated:

“The immigration officer wrongly assumed the applicant was working as a delivery driver simply because he was standing near his bike and using his phone. There was no evidence of him working at the time. A [sic] decision is based on false assumptions.”

21. The documents subsequently disclosed by the respondent with her Acknowledgement of Service reveal that what is stated at paragraphs 10 and 17 of the statement of facts and grounds is, at best, misleading and, at worst, plainly false.

22. What the documents disclosed by the respondent show is that the applicant’s motorbike had a black box on its rear containing an insulated Just Eat bag. In addition, the applicant admitted to working as a food delivery driver using an account set up by, and in the name of, his former housemate, whom he paid £80 per week for the privilege. When the immigration officers examined the applicant’s phone, an app revealed a history of 1,788 deliveries covering 4,593 miles. Pictures taken by the immigration officers of the phone app used by the applicant showed payments to his account covering 16 June 2025 to 9 July 2025. None of this is now denied by the applicant.

23. It is not disputed by the applicant that the conditions attached to his student visa precluded self‑employment. In those circumstances, I am satisfied that the decision is not based on a false assumption, as the grounds of claim contend, and that the immigration officers were reasonably and rationally entitled to conclude that the applicant was working in breach of his visa.

Ground 2

24. In Singaram, at [34], the Court of Appeal (per Lewis LJ with whom Phillips and Zacaroli LJJ agreed) accepted

“that there are two essential aspects to the exercise of the power conferred by paragraph 9.8.8 of the Immigration Rules. First, the individual has to have failed to comply with a condition of his leave to enter or remain. Secondly, there is a discretion as to whether to cancel leave, whether immediately or at some later date.”

25. The applicant’s argument in the present case has three strands. First, it is said that the respondent failed to exercise her discretion at all when deciding to cancel his student leave. Second, if discretion was exercised, the respondent failed to give reasons in the decision letter for the conclusion she reached. Third, it is contended that the decision to cancel the applicant’s leave with immediate effect was, in any event, disproportionate. I asked Ms Simak to clarify the basis upon which the applicant sought to rely on proportionality, given that it is not a free‑standing public law ground in this context. She explained that, in substance, the applicant’s case was that the decision fell outside the range of rational responses in the Wednesbury sense: see [1948] 1 K.B. 223.

26. During the hearing, Ms Simak sought to advance an additional point, namely that the respondent acted unfairly by failing to ask further questions, make additional enquiries, or afford the applicant time to obtain supporting evidence. However, this point was not pleaded in the grounds of claim and the applicant did not therefore have permission to rely upon it at the hearing. In any event, Ms Simak was unable to articulate any persuasive examples of what further information the applicant would have provided, or what enquiries the immigration officers should have undertaken. By way of example, she suggested that the officers ought to have contacted the applicant’s employer at the Shell petrol station, but she was unable to explain what material information this would have yielded, given that the respondent does not contend that the applicant was in breach of his visa conditions in respect of that employment.

27. There can therefore be no suggestion that the respondent acted unfairly by failing to alert the applicant to the potential consequences of his breach, or by denying him an opportunity to make representations. It is clear from the interview record that the immigration officer did ask the applicant whether there were any reasons why his visa should not be cancelled. The applicant responded:

“I’m just trying to get money for my PSW [post-study work visa]. I have done a pharmaceutical course here and I have applied for jobs here which they have declined because of my visa. They said I can apply after my PSW visa arrives and this is a golden opportunity for me”.

28. Even if the immigration officers failed to draw a clear distinction between immediate and deferred cancellation, in my judgment, the applicant nonetheless had a fair opportunity to say all that he wished to say: see Singaram at [46]–[49] and [53].

Whether the respondent took into account her discretion

29. Turning to the applicant’s main argument, that the respondent failed to take into account her discretion at all, the respondent’s decision says the following:

“I have carefully considered the circumstances of your case and have decided it is appropriate to cancel your permission because you have breached your visa conditions by working as a self-employed delivery driver. Your permission to stay in the UK is cancelled from today 10/07/2025. Your leave is to be cancelled under Paragraph: Part 9.8.8 as you have failed to comply with your visa conditions.”

30. Although this passage does not expressly use the term “discretion”, on a plain reading I accept Mr Cockroft’s submission that the wording “considered the circumstances” and “decided that it is appropriate” indicates that the respondent was purporting to exercise discretion. It would, of course, be preferable for the respondent expressly to refer to the exercise of discretion, as recommended by the sample wording at page 57 of the Guidance. However, what matters is the substance of the decision rather than the particular terminology employed.

31. I am also satisfied, from reading the witness statement made by Dean Munday, His Majesty’s Inspector of the Home Office, dated 3 December 2025, that consideration was given at the time of the decision to whether the applicant’s leave should be cancelled on the facts of the case. HMI Munday recounts his discussion with Immigration Officer Oliver Iles, who encountered the applicant. The key passages of HMI Munday’s statement are as follows:

“6. [Immigration Officer] ILES explained that the Applicant was found to be working illegally using another individual’s account, for which he pays £80 per week to use. Although he claimed to have only worked as a delivery driver for one week, the account in question showed a history of 1,788 deliveries covering 4,593 miles. ILES explained that he asked the Applicant if he knew that he was not allowed to work as a delivery driver and he replied “No. After completion of my course I was told I was allowed to work”.

7. ILES explained that the Applicant stated his intention was to apply for further leave to remain under the Post-Study Work Visa route. However, he claimed that due to the cost of the application (approximately £3,000), he needed to work to raise the necessary funds. He further stated that he had recently purchased the motorcycle he was found riding for £2,500, in addition to covering insurance costs. When asked why he chose to invest in a motorcycle rather than use the funds to submit his visa application, his explanation lacked credibility and raised concerns regarding his true intentions.

8. ILES explained that the Applicant was given the opportunity to present any grounds as to why his visa should not be cancelled. He stated that he was attempting to earn money to fund a new visa application. However, the Applicant had access to funds prior to purchasing the motorcycle and had permission to undertake lawful employment. He also confirmed that he had been working long shifts (16-18 hours) at a Shell garage, which could have legitimately supported his application costs.

9. Taking all of this information into account, this did not constitute sufficient grounds for discretion to be exercised in his favour.”

32. Ms Simak did not refer to HMI Munday’s witness statement in her main submissions and mentioned it only briefly in reply, submitting that, as post‑decision evidence, it could not cure the failure of the decision letter to give reasons for the manner in which discretion was exercised. However, no direct challenge was made to the accuracy or reliability of the statement, nor was any application made to cross‑examine HMI Munday. In those circumstances, I attach weight to the witness statement as evidence that active consideration was given by both HMI Munday and Immigration Officer Iles to whether discretion should be exercised in the applicant’s favour before the decision was taken to cancel his leave.

Whether the respondent provided reasons for refusing to exercise discretion in the applicant’s favour

33. The applicant is on firmer ground in his submission that the passage of the decision letter addressing discretion does not expressly engage with the reasons he advanced as to why his leave should not be cancelled, namely that he had completed his course of study and wished to make an in‑country application for a post‑study work visa. Nor does it address his claim that he was unaware that he was not permitted to work on a self‑employed basis. Instead, the sole reason given in that passage in relation to the exercise of discretion is that the applicant was “working as a self‑employed delivery driver”. That does no more than restate the basis for the cancellation decision itself, rather than demonstrating that relevant competing considerations were weighed.

34. The decision letter therefore does not comply with the requirement set out at page 57 of the Guidance that the decision‑maker “must also explain your decision on whether you exercised discretion in the decision letter, so an individual can see that you considered the circumstances of their case”. However, HMI Munday’s witness statement makes clear that account was taken of the applicant’s assertion that he had been working as a delivery driver for only a short period; his stated intention to apply for a post‑study work visa; and his explanation that he was working in order to save funds to support that application.

35. Although not addressed in either the decision letter or HMI Munday’s statement, the applicant’s claim that he was unaware he was prohibited from working on a self‑employed basis does not amount to a compelling reason why the respondent erred in declining to exercise discretion in his favour. Mr Cockroft submits in the respondent’s skeleton argument that the immigration officer was entitled to infer that the applicant used his former roommate’s Just Eat account because he knew he was not permitted to engage in self‑employment and would therefore have been unable to set up an account in his own name. There is some force in that submission; however, it was not a reason expressly relied upon in the encounter records, HMI Munday’s witness statement or the decision letter. In any event, this was not a point raised by the applicant in response to the invitation to provide reasons why his visa should not be cancelled. Moreover, it was incumbent upon him to be aware of the conditions attached to his leave.

36. Accordingly, even if the respondent (a) failed to give adequate reasons in the decision letter for the manner in which discretion was exercised, as required by the Guidance, and/or (b) failed expressly to consider the applicant’s claimed lack of awareness that self‑employment was prohibited, I am satisfied that relief should nonetheless be refused. That is because, having regard to the contents of HMI Munday’s witness statement, it is clear that the outcome for the applicant would not have been substantially different had those omissions not occurred: see s.31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981.

The reasonableness of the respondent’s decision

37. Ms Simak submitted that the decision was unreasonable because the respondent ought to have taken into account that the applicant was a genuine and successful student who had completed his master’s degree. However, by the time the applicant was encountered by immigration officers, he had already completed his course. In those circumstances, there was no interference with his ability to pursue his studies, as he no longer required leave for that purpose. In reality, the applicant’s complaint is that, by cancelling his leave with immediate effect, he lost the opportunity to make an in‑country application for a post‑study work visa.

38. However, the Guidance states at page 61 that immediate cancellation will normally be appropriate where “the individual has been complicit in the reason for cancellation”. The applicant’s case plainly falls within that category, given that he was solely responsible for breaching the condition of his visa prohibiting self‑employment. In that context, I am satisfied that the reasons given in HMI Munday’s statement for declining to exercise discretion in the applicant’s favour were within the range of rational responses open to a decision-maker in light of that breach. In particular, it was reasonable to conclude that the applicant’s claim that he took up additional work as a delivery driver in order to save £3,000 for a post‑study work visa application fee was undermined by the fact that he had spent £2,500, together with additional insurance costs, on purchasing the motorbike required for that work. As already explained, I am not satisfied that the applicant’s asserted lack of awareness that self‑employment was prohibited constituted a compelling factor which, if expressly considered, would have led to a different outcome.

Conclusion

39. The applicant is entitled to a measure of sympathy. There is no dispute that he was a genuine student. Further, as demonstrated by the long hours he worked at the Shell petrol station, together with his wish to supplement that employment by undertaking delivery work, he is plainly a hard‑working individual. Although the respondent’s policy of prohibiting students from engaging in self‑employment is one that was rationally open to her, it might be said that there is, in substance, a distinction between a student establishing and running their own business and, as in the present case, an applicant who was, for all practical purposes, working in a manner analogous to an employee for an app-based technology company on a zero‑hours basis. Nonetheless, applying the Immigration Rules and policies as they currently stand, the applicant’s claim cannot succeed.

40. For the reasons given above, the application for judicial review is dismissed.

41. The parties are invited to seek to agree an order disposing of this matter, including provision in respect of costs and any application for permission to appeal.

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