JR-2025-LON-002346
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JR-2025-LON-002346
In the Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber)
Judicial Review
In the matter of an application for Judicial Review
The King on the application of
IMON AHMED
Applicant
And
ENTRY CLEARANCE OFFICER
Respondent
ORDER
BEFORE Upper Tribunal Judge FRANCES
HAVING considered all documents lodged and having heard Mr Biggs of counsel, instructed by Zyba Law, for the applicant and Mr Holborn of counsel, instructed by GLD, for the respondent at a hearing on 10 August 2026
AND UPON the applicant’s application for permission to appeal by way of email dated 19 August 2026
IT IS ORDERED THAT:
(1) The application for judicial review is dismissed for the reasons given in the attached judgment.
(2) The applicant to pay the respondent’s reasonable costs to be assessed if not agreed.
(3) Permission to appeal is refused because there is no arguable case that I have erred in law.
Signed: J Frances
Upper Tribunal Judge Frances
Dated: 21 August 2026
The date on which this order was sent is given below
For completion by the Upper Tribunal Immigration and Asylum Chamber
Sent / Handed to the applicant, respondent and any interested party / the applicant's, respondent’s and any interested party’s solicitors on (date): 21/08/2026
Solicitors:
Ref No.
Home Office Ref:
Notification of appeal rights
A decision by the Upper Tribunal on an application for judicial review is a decision that disposes of proceedings.
A party may appeal against such a decision to the Court of Appeal on a point of law only. Any party who wishes to appeal should apply to the Upper Tribunal for permission, at the hearing at which the decision is given. If no application is made, the Tribunal must nonetheless consider at the hearing whether to give or refuse permission to appeal (rule 44(4B) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008).
If the Tribunal refuses permission, either in response to an application or by virtue of rule 44(4B), then the party wishing to appeal can apply for permission from the Court of Appeal itself. This must be done by filing an appellant’s notice with the Civil Appeals Office of the Court of Appeal within 28 days of the date the Tribunal’s decision on permission to appeal was sent (Civil Procedure Rules Practice Direction 52D 3.3).
Case No: JR-2025-LON-002346
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
(IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER)
Field House,
Breams Buildings
London, EC4A 1WR
10th August 2026
Before:
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE FRANCES
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Between:
THE KING
on the application of
IMON AHMED
Applicant
- and -
ENTRY CLEARANCE OFFICER
Respondent
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Mr M Biggs
(instructed by Zyba Law) for the applicant
Mr J Holborn
(instructed by the Government Legal Department) for the respondent
Hearing date: 10 August 2026
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
J U D G M E N T
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Judge FRANCES:
1. The applicant challenges the respondent’s decision of 7 November 2024 refusing entry clearance as a short-term student and the administrative review decision of 3 June 2025 maintaining the refusal of entry clearance.
2. Permission was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Norton-Taylor on 17 February 2026 on the sole ground that:
“It is arguable that the respondent should have, but did not, provide the applicant with a fair opportunity to respond to the allegation that he lacked credibility and was not in fact a genuine short-term student before the refusal decision was made. In this regard, a lack of genuineness might be said to equate to untruthfulness/misconduct requiring procedural fairness to step in certain pre-decision obligations on the respondent.”
3. The applicant was given permission to reformulate the narrow basis of the grant of permission. The applicant submits that:
“Where the Respondent considers that an applicant is being dishonest in any way or acting in bad faith, he or she ought to be given an opportunity to respond directly to the accusation of bad faith or dishonesty before the final decision is made.”
Respondent’s application for a stay
4. The respondent applied for a stay behind the outcome of appeal proceedings in R (Sanci) v SSHD (JR-2025-LON-002518) promulgated on 30 July 2026 and published on 3 August 2026. The respondent submitted that Sanci is directly relevant to the applicant's ground of challenge in these proceedings. Mr Holborn submitted that the wording in the refusal decision appeared to be the same and this case was on ‘all fours’ with Sanci. He stated that the Secretary of State for the Home Department (SSHD) intends to seek permission to appeal from the Court of Appeal and is preparing the requisite application. The respondent seeks a stay until permission to appeal has been refused or, if permission is granted, until the appeal is determined. It is submitted that this would be consistent with the overriding objective and enable the Tribunal to deal with cases justly and at proportionate cost.
5. The applicant opposed the application for the reasons given in his submissions of 7 August 2026. I did not require Mr Biggs to address me on the application. In summary, it is the applicant’s case that the application for a stay did not meet the test in AB (Sudan) v SSHD [2013] EWCA Civ 921 because the impending appellate decision was unlikely to have a critical impact of the current litigation.
6. I refused the application for a stay for the following reasons. Sanci is not binding and is not determinative in this case. Applying AB (Sudan) the appeal in Sanci is not likely to have a critical impact on this application because the assessment of procedural fairness is fact-sensitive: R v SSHD ex parte Doody [1994] 1 AC 531 at 560 D to G. The requirements of procedural fairness depend upon the facts and the context in which a decision is taken including the nature of the legal and administrative system within which the decision is taken: R (Topadar) v SSHD [2020] EWCA Civ 1525 at [52]. No notice of appeal has yet been filed and, having considered the overriding objective, it is not in the interests of justice to delay the hearing of the applicant’s judicial review.
Decision under challenge
7. It is not in dispute that the salient decision is the decision of 7 November 2024 (the Decision) which states:
“I have refused your application for a short-term student visa because I am not satisfied that you meet the requirements of paragraph(s) STS 5.2 and 8.1 of Appendix Short Term Student (English Language) because:
Paragraph STS 8.1 of the Immigration Rules Appendix Short-Term Student (English Language) states:
STS 8.1. If the decision maker is satisfied that all the suitability and eligibility requirements for a Short-term Student are met the application will be granted, otherwise the application will be refused.
Paragraph STS 5.2 of the Immigration Rules Appendix Short-Term Student (English Language) states:
STS 5.2 The applicant must intend to leave the UK within 30 days of the end of their English language course, or at the end of 11 months, whichever is sooner.
When asked on your application form what you will do when you have completed your course, you stated:
"I plan to return to my country because my family, culture and expand my business. My aim to build a big farm like Kazi Farms Group or Paragon Group. English is essential for managing international buyers, suppliers which will help grow my business globally. Also contracts and agreements in international trade are often conducted in English. My goal is to create a successful business that contributes to Bangladesh's agricultural industry, generates job opportunities, and boosts the local economy."
We requested verifiable evidence of the initial steps taken to improve your English language abilities in your country of residence and what you intend to do with the course after completion.
To demonstrate your initial steps taken to improve your English language abilities in your country of residence, you have provided a certificate from Amin's IELT.LifeSkills.Spoken showing you have completed a Spoken English Language Course on 5/12/2023. Whist (sic) I acknowledge your efforts, the certificate does not demonstrate any specified level of progression of standard English qualification which can be independently verified. In addition, when an open-source checks was (sic)conducted on Amin's IELT.LifeSkills.Spoken it showed only a Facebook page and does not relate to any website. The certificate does not also demonstrate any contact details such as an email that can be independently verified. Whilst this is not a prerequisite, it is unclear why an educational institution teaching international languages wouldn't have a website. Therefore, the authenticity of the certificate cannot be independently verified. This raises concerns about the overall credibility of your application and whether English is essential. I am not satisfied of your intentions of travelling to the UK currently.
Further, in consideration of your personal ties to your country of residence, I note you have declared on your application form that you currently live within your family home and do not have any dependents in your country of residence. Whilst your supporting document indicate your self-employed commitments, from the information you have provided in support of your application on this occasion, I am not satisfied that you have sufficiently demonstrated ties to your country of residence that would satisfy an assessment of your intention to depart the United Kingdom at the end of your study.
Whilst I acknowledge you state you will be returning to Bangladesh to expand your business, when requested to provide further rationale as to how your proposed course of study will benefit you in the future, you did not provide any official or verifiable documentation to demonstrate your plans. Rather, you have provided a personal statement in which you have listed various reasons to study in the UK and how the course will equip you with the necessary skills to excel in your business. However, a personal statement or statement of purpose without supporting evidence is considered as a self-declaration. I am therefore unable to consider a self-declaration without supporting evidence. On the available information before me, I am not satisfied with the rationale for undertaking your proposed course of study in the UK and doubt you will leave the UK upon completion of your English language course.
I accept that where you prefer to study is a matter of personal choice. However, as you have demonstrated, I am aware there are study centres in your country of origin and online resources where you could pursue a similar English course. Whilst this is not a prerequisite, I must consider your choices as part of the overall credibility of your application, given the significant additional costs of overseas studies. I also note your documentation you have
submitted in support of your application does not outline a reason for why you are required to learn English specifically within the United Kingdom.
The points noted above undermine the credibility of your application and I am not satisfied of your rational (sic) for attending this course, which leads me to question the purpose and reasoning for wanting to travel to the UK.
Therefore, I am not satisfied that you are genuinely intending to visit the United Kingdom to study as a Short-Term Student or the intentions of your visit and therefore, that you intend to leave the United Kingdom at the end of the visit.
I have therefore, refused your application because I am not satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that you meet all the requirements of STS 5.2 and STS 8.1 of Appendix Short Term Student of the Immigration Rules.”
Applicant’s submissions
8. Mr Biggs relied on his skeleton argument dated 29 July 2026 and submitted the issue in this case was whether the respondent’s suspicion of dishonesty or reprehensible conduct is the event which ‘triggers’ the duty to act procedurally fairly. He submitted the duty to act procedurally fairly falls to be determined at the point at which the event ‘triggering’ the procedural fairness duty occurs.
9. In summary, Mr Biggs submitted that it was clear from the Decision that the respondent had serious doubts about the applicant’s intentions and suspected he had lied in his application. This amounted to an allegation of deception as in R (Karagul) v SSHD [2019] EWHC 3208 (Admin) and Sanci. The authorities made it clear that a decision maker was required to set out in clear terms the basis of the allegation and to give the applicant an opportunity to respond to it. The administrative review (AR) process, as a general rule, was not the appropriate place to respond to an allegation of dishonesty or reprehensible conduct because the applicant was not able to put forward fresh representations or evidence. An opportunity to respond after the decision was taken did not cure the unfairness in the procedure.
10. Mr Biggs went through the wording of the decision and acknowledged the request for further information. He submitted that a suspicion of dishonesty was raised when the respondent rejected the English Language certificate because it could not be verified. He submitted that on any view, the respondent was alleging that the certificate was not genuine and it undermined the applicant’s credibility. The reasoning in the refusal decision indicated the respondent did not believe the applicant and the rejection of his personal statement and English Language certificate amounted to an allegation that he was lying about his intention to return to Bangladesh.
11. Mr Biggs submitted that the requests for further information did not amount to an opportunity to respond because they did not put the suspicion of lying to the applicant. The respondent did not state that the applicant had lied about his intentions prior to the decision being made. The AR added little to the process. No new documents were submitted because the applicant could not rely on new evidence. The AR decision stated that the respondent was not satisfied the applicant was a genuine student.
12. Mr Biggs drew my attention to the salient paragraphs of relevant authorities and submitted that, before a decision is taken that affects a person’s position in respect of immigration control, there is a general requirement to:
i) Inform that person in clear terms that the respondent suspects dishonesty or reprehensible conduct, and the reasons for the suspicion; and
ii) Give the person an adequate opportunity to set out their response, which must then fairly be considered before such a decision is made.
13. Mr Biggs submitted there were serious consequences flowing from the refusal of entry clearance but, in any event, the impact of the refusal was not relevant to whether the applicant should be given an opportunity to respond. In the applicant’s case, the lack of an opportunity to make representations on whether he was a genuine student had substantially prejudiced his application. The applicant was never put on notice of the concerns about whether he was a genuine student. In substance there was an allegation of dishonesty. There did not need to be an express allegation to ‘trigger’ the ‘minded to’ process in Balajigari v SSHD [2019] EWCA Civ 673.
14. Mr Biggs submitted that in concluding the applicant was not a genuine student the respondent was stating that his reasons for coming to the UK were untrue. The respondent’s concerns were sufficient to ‘trigger’ the ‘minded to’ process. If the respondent alleges that the applicant is not a genuine student the decision making process is procedurally unfair unless the applicant is allowed to make representations in response to that allegation. In this case, the respondent suspected the applicant was lying about his intentions and he would not return to Bangladesh. This was sufficient to ‘trigger’ an obligation to act procedurally fairly and comply with the general requirement in [12] above.
15. In addressing the respondent’s skeleton argument, Mr Biggs submitted it was not relevant that there was no direct allegation of dishonesty or a refusal under Part 9 of the Immigration Rules because the respondent came to the conclusion that they were not satisfied the applicant was a genuine student on the basis that the applicant was lying. It was not appropriate to judge the process with hindsight and the authorities dealing with the points based system did not assist the respondent’s case. The respondent had failed to show that the result would have been the same had the applicant been given an opportunity to respond.
Respondent’s submissions
16. Mr Holborn submitted that procedural fairness was a fact sensitive exercise and in this case the respondent had made additional requests seeking verification of the applicant’s position. The applicant was on notice that there were gaps in his application. The applicant was asked what steps he had taken to improve his English language ability and he provided a certificate which could not be verified. There was no allegation of dishonesty. The document was rejected because it was not a verifiable document from a credible institution. It was not necessarily a false document. The respondent was not satisfied the applicant’s intentions were genuine. The reasoning in the Decision did not establish a finding of dishonesty underpinning that overall conclusion.
17. Mr Holborn submitted that this was not a case where the applicant had attempted to submit new evidence on AR and had been told he could not. There was no evidence of what the applicant would have said or done had he been given the opportunity to provide further evidence or representations. Mr Holborn submitted the authorities did not support the applicant’s submission that an implied allegation of dishonesty was sufficient to invoke the ‘minded to’ process in Balajigari absent serious consequences. There were no serious consequences in this case. The applicant can re-apply and he had been given the opportunity to provide further information. The burden was on the applicant to satisfy the requirements of the Immigration Rules.
18. Mr Holborn submitted that the question in this case was whether there is substantive procedural unfairness. This required the Tribunal to consider the context, the seriousness of the allegation and the consequences and nature of the unfairness. The authorities relied upon could be distinguished from the applicant’s case. The issue was whether, on the facts, the applicant was treated procedurally fairly. The respondent required more evidence of the applicant’s English language ability and how it would benefit his business in Bangladesh. The applicant had provided further information prior to the Decision and he did not seek to rely on any further evidence. The result would have been the same had the applicant been given an opportunity to respond to the finding that he was not a genuine student.
19. Mr Holborn submitted that the Decision, when read in the round, does not allege dishonesty or reprehensible conduct. He accepted that the authorities allowed for a finding of dishonesty in circumstances where Part 9 of the Immigration Rules (suitability provisions) was not invoked but they were dependent on serious consequences such as a 10 year ban or significant disruption. The Immigration Rules allow the respondent to find that they were not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the application was genuine without making a finding of dishonesty. The applicant provided further evidence on substantive areas of concern and this was not a case where the applicant has shown he would have provided more detailed and verifiable evidence if the respondent had made the allegation clear. Relief should be refused under section 31(2A) Senior Courts Act 1981 and s.15(5A) Tribunal, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007.
Analysis and Conclusions
20. The question of whether there has been procedural fairness is an objective question for the court to decide for itself, not whether the decision maker acted reasonably: Balajigari at [46]. It is apparent from Doody (at 560E/F) that “The principles of fairness are not to be applied by rote identically in every situation. What fairness demands is dependent on the context of the decision, and this is to be taken into account in all its aspects.”
21. It is apparent from Balajigari at [50] onwards that the context of the decision under challenge is relevant and a conclusion that the applicant has acted in a way which is dishonest is a particularly serious allegation going to a person’s character. The Court found that a refusal of indefinite leave to remain under paragraph 322(5) of the Immigration Rules is to the effect that a person’s very presence in the UK is undesirable. At [55] the Court held:
For all of those reasons, we have come to the conclusion that where the Secretary of State is minded to refuse ILR on the basis of paragraph 322(5) on the basis of the applicant’s dishonesty, or other reprehensible conduct, he is required as a matter of procedural fairness to indicate clearly to the applicant that he has that suspicion; to give the applicant an opportunity to respond, both as regards the conduct itself and as regards any other reasons relied on as regards “undesirability” and the exercise of the second-stage assessment; and then to take that response into account before drawing the conclusion that there has been such conduct.
22. I have considered the numerous authorities in the authorities bundle, in particular those referred to in submissions, from which I distil the following relevant points. An assessment of procedural fairness is fact specific and the opportunity to respond to an adverse allegation (by issuing a ‘minded to’ letter) does not arise in every case. However, in cases where there is a direct allegation of dishonesty, fairness demands that the applicant is given an opportunity to respond to that allegation. The entitlement to notice of an attack on character and the serious consequences of a refusal on suitability grounds are relevant considerations in deciding whether there has been a breach of the principles of procedural fairness.
23. The common theme in the authorities is that where there is an actual or imputed allegation of dishonesty or bad faith, with serious consequences for the applicant, the courts have concluded that the applicant is given prior notice and an opportunity to respond. Therefore, the questions to be addressed by the Tribunal in this case are:
(1) Is there an implied allegation of dishonesty?
(2) What are the consequences for the applicant?
(3) Did the applicant have notice of the allegation?
(4) Has the applicant been given an opportunity to respond?
(5) Was the refusal of entry clearance procedurally unfair in all the circumstances?
24. There is a difference between a situation where evidence is rejected on the basis that it is knowingly untrue, false or dishonest and where there are gaps, insufficiencies of detail or inconsistencies such that the burden of proof is not reached. The Immigration Rules make specific provision for refusals on suitability grounds in Part Suitability. At the time of the decision in this case those provisions were in Part 9 of the Immigration Rules. Following Balajigari, a refusal under Part 9 would require the respondent to give the applicant an opportunity to respond in the form of a ‘minded to’ letter or interview before that decision was made. This is a direct allegation that the applicant is lying. That is not the case here.
25. There is a difference between an allegation of dishonesty and a conclusion that the decision maker is not satisfied the applicant is a genuine student. There is a difference between deliberate wrong-doing (bad faith) and a failure to provide evidence (insufficient evidence) or a rejection of the veracity of the applicant’s account and the inadequacy of evidence produced.
26. A conclusion in a refusal decision that, taking into account all the evidence, ‘I do not believe you’ is different to a conclusion that ‘You have not produced sufficient evidence upon which I can be satisfied that your account is true’. Neither of these conclusions amount to a direct allegation of dishonesty. The first could be interpreted as an implied allegation, depending on the circumstances of the case. The second is not an implied allegation of dishonesty. It is a conclusion that there is insufficient evidence to satisfy the standard of proof because there is insufficient evidence to find in the applicant’s favour. That is the conclusion in the Decision under challenge.
27. In this case, the respondent was not satisfied that the applicant is a genuine student who intends to return to Bangladesh because his personal statement setting out his rationale for undertaking an English language course in the UK was not supported by verifiable information. The applicant failed to provide sufficient evidence to show that an English language course in the UK will benefit him and his business on return to Bangladesh. Therefore, the respondent was not satisfied of the purpose and reasons for why the applicant wanted to travel to the UK. The applicant failed to submit sufficient evidence to satisfy the requirements of the Immigration Rules.
28. The Decision does not state that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the applicant has been dishonest in his application. The English Language certificate was rejected because it could not be verified. It was not rejected because it was false and the applicant knew that to be the case. The decision does not imply that the applicant’s presence in the UK is undesirable. The application was refused because there was insufficient evidence to support the applicant’s reasons for coming to the UK. There was no direct or implied allegation of dishonesty or other reprehensible conduct on a fair reading of the Decision.
29. The respondent was not satisfied as to the applicant’s reasons for coming to the UK and stated that the documentation did not demonstrate a reason for why the applicant was required to learn English specifically in the UK. This does not amount to an allegation that the account is untrue. It is a conclusion that, notwithstanding the specific request to provide such evidence, the applicant had failed to submit sufficient evidence to demonstrate why he needed to study English in the UK. The Decision addresses the lack of evidence rather than an allegation of undesirable conduct. The factual situation in Sanci was entirely different because the only reason for coming to the UK was to visit family members. In the present case, there was no suspicion of dishonesty or reprehensible conduct to ‘trigger’ the requirement of a ‘minded to’ process.
30. There are no serious consequences resulting from the refusal of entry clearance as a short-term student. The applicant will have to pay another fee to make a new application and he is likely to be required to disclose the refusal in a subsequent application.
31. Alternatively, if the allegation in the applicant’s case is analogous to Karagul and a finding that the applicant’s account lacks credibility amounts to an attack on his integrity and character, I find that there was no unfairness because in this case the applicant was given an opportunity to respond. The failure to specifically put to the applicant that he was not a genuine student in the requests for further information was not material because in this case the applicant had nothing further to say. There was nothing before me to show that if the respondent had served a ‘minded to’ letter on the applicant he would have produced evidence upon which the respondent could have found that he was a genuine student.
32. In this case, the applicant was given an opportunity to provide further information before the decision was made. He was aware, from the requests for further information, that his application lacked verifiable evidence to show that he would benefit from an English language course in the UK and lacked information about the steps he had taken to improve his English language ability. It was apparent that the respondent did not accept his reasons given in his personal statement without supporting evidence. The applicant responded to those requests for further information and submitted further evidence. He had an opportunity to respond to the respondent’s concerns about his reasons for coming to the UK.
33. On the facts of this case, there was no requirement to serve a ‘minded to’ letter and the applicant had been given an opportunity to address the reasons why the application was refused before the decision was made in November 2024.
34. The administrative review in Balajigari was found to be inadequate on the facts of that case because the applicant had no notice of the Secretary of State’s concerns. That is not the case here. The respondent requested further information from the applicant on more than one occasion before the decision was made in November 2024 and the applicant made further representations before the AR decision was made. At no stage did the applicant assert that he had further evidence which he had been prevented from submitting. The applicant does not identify further information he could have provided in response to a ‘minded to’ letter. The applicant has not suffered substantial prejudice and there was no breach of the principles of procedural fairness on the facts of this case.
35. The refusal of entry clearance was not procedurally unfair as alleged in the grounds. The application for judicial review is dismissed.
Permission to appeal
36. The applicant applied for permission to appeal on the grounds that an appeal had a realistic prospect of success given the respondent’s application for a stay behind Sanci. On a correct construction of the reasons for refusal in the Decision, the respondent rejected the applicant’s asserted intentions because they did not accept he was telling the truth thereby ‘triggering’ the minded to process in Balajigari.
37. I refuse permission to appeal because there is no arguable case that I have materially erred in law. The applicant does not have a realistic prospect of success on appeal because, on the facts of this case, there was no procedural unfairness. The applicant was given an opportunity to respond to the respondent’s concerns that they were not satisfied of his intentions and reasons for coming to the UK.
38. Further and alternatively, it was not the applicant’s case that he had further evidence or information that he could have submitted had he been interviewed or served with a ‘minded to’ letter.
39. There was no important point of principle or practice and no other compelling reason which requires consideration by the Court of Appeal.
Costs
40. The applicant to pay the respondent’s costs to be assessed if not agreed. The circumstances do not justify a departure from Bahta v SSHD [2011] EWCA 895 and M v Croydon BC [2012] EWCA Civ 595 that the unsuccessful party will pay the costs of the successful party. The respondent is entitled to her reasonable costs.
~~~~0~~~~
In the Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber)
Judicial Review
In the matter of an application for Judicial Review
The King on the application of
IMON AHMED
Applicant
And
ENTRY CLEARANCE OFFICER
Respondent
ORDER
BEFORE Upper Tribunal Judge FRANCES
HAVING considered all documents lodged and having heard Mr Biggs of counsel, instructed by Zyba Law, for the applicant and Mr Holborn of counsel, instructed by GLD, for the respondent at a hearing on 10 August 2026
AND UPON the applicant’s application for permission to appeal by way of email dated 19 August 2026
IT IS ORDERED THAT:
(1) The application for judicial review is dismissed for the reasons given in the attached judgment.
(2) The applicant to pay the respondent’s reasonable costs to be assessed if not agreed.
(3) Permission to appeal is refused because there is no arguable case that I have erred in law.
Signed: J Frances
Upper Tribunal Judge Frances
Dated: 21 August 2026
The date on which this order was sent is given below
For completion by the Upper Tribunal Immigration and Asylum Chamber
Sent / Handed to the applicant, respondent and any interested party / the applicant's, respondent’s and any interested party’s solicitors on (date): 21/08/2026
Solicitors:
Ref No.
Home Office Ref:
Notification of appeal rights
A decision by the Upper Tribunal on an application for judicial review is a decision that disposes of proceedings.
A party may appeal against such a decision to the Court of Appeal on a point of law only. Any party who wishes to appeal should apply to the Upper Tribunal for permission, at the hearing at which the decision is given. If no application is made, the Tribunal must nonetheless consider at the hearing whether to give or refuse permission to appeal (rule 44(4B) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008).
If the Tribunal refuses permission, either in response to an application or by virtue of rule 44(4B), then the party wishing to appeal can apply for permission from the Court of Appeal itself. This must be done by filing an appellant’s notice with the Civil Appeals Office of the Court of Appeal within 28 days of the date the Tribunal’s decision on permission to appeal was sent (Civil Procedure Rules Practice Direction 52D 3.3).
Case No: JR-2025-LON-002346
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
(IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER)
Field House,
Breams Buildings
London, EC4A 1WR
10th August 2026
Before:
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE FRANCES
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Between:
THE KING
on the application of
IMON AHMED
Applicant
- and -
ENTRY CLEARANCE OFFICER
Respondent
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Mr M Biggs
(instructed by Zyba Law) for the applicant
Mr J Holborn
(instructed by the Government Legal Department) for the respondent
Hearing date: 10 August 2026
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
J U D G M E N T
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Judge FRANCES:
1. The applicant challenges the respondent’s decision of 7 November 2024 refusing entry clearance as a short-term student and the administrative review decision of 3 June 2025 maintaining the refusal of entry clearance.
2. Permission was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Norton-Taylor on 17 February 2026 on the sole ground that:
“It is arguable that the respondent should have, but did not, provide the applicant with a fair opportunity to respond to the allegation that he lacked credibility and was not in fact a genuine short-term student before the refusal decision was made. In this regard, a lack of genuineness might be said to equate to untruthfulness/misconduct requiring procedural fairness to step in certain pre-decision obligations on the respondent.”
3. The applicant was given permission to reformulate the narrow basis of the grant of permission. The applicant submits that:
“Where the Respondent considers that an applicant is being dishonest in any way or acting in bad faith, he or she ought to be given an opportunity to respond directly to the accusation of bad faith or dishonesty before the final decision is made.”
Respondent’s application for a stay
4. The respondent applied for a stay behind the outcome of appeal proceedings in R (Sanci) v SSHD (JR-2025-LON-002518) promulgated on 30 July 2026 and published on 3 August 2026. The respondent submitted that Sanci is directly relevant to the applicant's ground of challenge in these proceedings. Mr Holborn submitted that the wording in the refusal decision appeared to be the same and this case was on ‘all fours’ with Sanci. He stated that the Secretary of State for the Home Department (SSHD) intends to seek permission to appeal from the Court of Appeal and is preparing the requisite application. The respondent seeks a stay until permission to appeal has been refused or, if permission is granted, until the appeal is determined. It is submitted that this would be consistent with the overriding objective and enable the Tribunal to deal with cases justly and at proportionate cost.
5. The applicant opposed the application for the reasons given in his submissions of 7 August 2026. I did not require Mr Biggs to address me on the application. In summary, it is the applicant’s case that the application for a stay did not meet the test in AB (Sudan) v SSHD [2013] EWCA Civ 921 because the impending appellate decision was unlikely to have a critical impact of the current litigation.
6. I refused the application for a stay for the following reasons. Sanci is not binding and is not determinative in this case. Applying AB (Sudan) the appeal in Sanci is not likely to have a critical impact on this application because the assessment of procedural fairness is fact-sensitive: R v SSHD ex parte Doody [1994] 1 AC 531 at 560 D to G. The requirements of procedural fairness depend upon the facts and the context in which a decision is taken including the nature of the legal and administrative system within which the decision is taken: R (Topadar) v SSHD [2020] EWCA Civ 1525 at [52]. No notice of appeal has yet been filed and, having considered the overriding objective, it is not in the interests of justice to delay the hearing of the applicant’s judicial review.
Decision under challenge
7. It is not in dispute that the salient decision is the decision of 7 November 2024 (the Decision) which states:
“I have refused your application for a short-term student visa because I am not satisfied that you meet the requirements of paragraph(s) STS 5.2 and 8.1 of Appendix Short Term Student (English Language) because:
Paragraph STS 8.1 of the Immigration Rules Appendix Short-Term Student (English Language) states:
STS 8.1. If the decision maker is satisfied that all the suitability and eligibility requirements for a Short-term Student are met the application will be granted, otherwise the application will be refused.
Paragraph STS 5.2 of the Immigration Rules Appendix Short-Term Student (English Language) states:
STS 5.2 The applicant must intend to leave the UK within 30 days of the end of their English language course, or at the end of 11 months, whichever is sooner.
When asked on your application form what you will do when you have completed your course, you stated:
"I plan to return to my country because my family, culture and expand my business. My aim to build a big farm like Kazi Farms Group or Paragon Group. English is essential for managing international buyers, suppliers which will help grow my business globally. Also contracts and agreements in international trade are often conducted in English. My goal is to create a successful business that contributes to Bangladesh's agricultural industry, generates job opportunities, and boosts the local economy."
We requested verifiable evidence of the initial steps taken to improve your English language abilities in your country of residence and what you intend to do with the course after completion.
To demonstrate your initial steps taken to improve your English language abilities in your country of residence, you have provided a certificate from Amin's IELT.LifeSkills.Spoken showing you have completed a Spoken English Language Course on 5/12/2023. Whist (sic) I acknowledge your efforts, the certificate does not demonstrate any specified level of progression of standard English qualification which can be independently verified. In addition, when an open-source checks was (sic)conducted on Amin's IELT.LifeSkills.Spoken it showed only a Facebook page and does not relate to any website. The certificate does not also demonstrate any contact details such as an email that can be independently verified. Whilst this is not a prerequisite, it is unclear why an educational institution teaching international languages wouldn't have a website. Therefore, the authenticity of the certificate cannot be independently verified. This raises concerns about the overall credibility of your application and whether English is essential. I am not satisfied of your intentions of travelling to the UK currently.
Further, in consideration of your personal ties to your country of residence, I note you have declared on your application form that you currently live within your family home and do not have any dependents in your country of residence. Whilst your supporting document indicate your self-employed commitments, from the information you have provided in support of your application on this occasion, I am not satisfied that you have sufficiently demonstrated ties to your country of residence that would satisfy an assessment of your intention to depart the United Kingdom at the end of your study.
Whilst I acknowledge you state you will be returning to Bangladesh to expand your business, when requested to provide further rationale as to how your proposed course of study will benefit you in the future, you did not provide any official or verifiable documentation to demonstrate your plans. Rather, you have provided a personal statement in which you have listed various reasons to study in the UK and how the course will equip you with the necessary skills to excel in your business. However, a personal statement or statement of purpose without supporting evidence is considered as a self-declaration. I am therefore unable to consider a self-declaration without supporting evidence. On the available information before me, I am not satisfied with the rationale for undertaking your proposed course of study in the UK and doubt you will leave the UK upon completion of your English language course.
I accept that where you prefer to study is a matter of personal choice. However, as you have demonstrated, I am aware there are study centres in your country of origin and online resources where you could pursue a similar English course. Whilst this is not a prerequisite, I must consider your choices as part of the overall credibility of your application, given the significant additional costs of overseas studies. I also note your documentation you have
submitted in support of your application does not outline a reason for why you are required to learn English specifically within the United Kingdom.
The points noted above undermine the credibility of your application and I am not satisfied of your rational (sic) for attending this course, which leads me to question the purpose and reasoning for wanting to travel to the UK.
Therefore, I am not satisfied that you are genuinely intending to visit the United Kingdom to study as a Short-Term Student or the intentions of your visit and therefore, that you intend to leave the United Kingdom at the end of the visit.
I have therefore, refused your application because I am not satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that you meet all the requirements of STS 5.2 and STS 8.1 of Appendix Short Term Student of the Immigration Rules.”
Applicant’s submissions
8. Mr Biggs relied on his skeleton argument dated 29 July 2026 and submitted the issue in this case was whether the respondent’s suspicion of dishonesty or reprehensible conduct is the event which ‘triggers’ the duty to act procedurally fairly. He submitted the duty to act procedurally fairly falls to be determined at the point at which the event ‘triggering’ the procedural fairness duty occurs.
9. In summary, Mr Biggs submitted that it was clear from the Decision that the respondent had serious doubts about the applicant’s intentions and suspected he had lied in his application. This amounted to an allegation of deception as in R (Karagul) v SSHD [2019] EWHC 3208 (Admin) and Sanci. The authorities made it clear that a decision maker was required to set out in clear terms the basis of the allegation and to give the applicant an opportunity to respond to it. The administrative review (AR) process, as a general rule, was not the appropriate place to respond to an allegation of dishonesty or reprehensible conduct because the applicant was not able to put forward fresh representations or evidence. An opportunity to respond after the decision was taken did not cure the unfairness in the procedure.
10. Mr Biggs went through the wording of the decision and acknowledged the request for further information. He submitted that a suspicion of dishonesty was raised when the respondent rejected the English Language certificate because it could not be verified. He submitted that on any view, the respondent was alleging that the certificate was not genuine and it undermined the applicant’s credibility. The reasoning in the refusal decision indicated the respondent did not believe the applicant and the rejection of his personal statement and English Language certificate amounted to an allegation that he was lying about his intention to return to Bangladesh.
11. Mr Biggs submitted that the requests for further information did not amount to an opportunity to respond because they did not put the suspicion of lying to the applicant. The respondent did not state that the applicant had lied about his intentions prior to the decision being made. The AR added little to the process. No new documents were submitted because the applicant could not rely on new evidence. The AR decision stated that the respondent was not satisfied the applicant was a genuine student.
12. Mr Biggs drew my attention to the salient paragraphs of relevant authorities and submitted that, before a decision is taken that affects a person’s position in respect of immigration control, there is a general requirement to:
i) Inform that person in clear terms that the respondent suspects dishonesty or reprehensible conduct, and the reasons for the suspicion; and
ii) Give the person an adequate opportunity to set out their response, which must then fairly be considered before such a decision is made.
13. Mr Biggs submitted there were serious consequences flowing from the refusal of entry clearance but, in any event, the impact of the refusal was not relevant to whether the applicant should be given an opportunity to respond. In the applicant’s case, the lack of an opportunity to make representations on whether he was a genuine student had substantially prejudiced his application. The applicant was never put on notice of the concerns about whether he was a genuine student. In substance there was an allegation of dishonesty. There did not need to be an express allegation to ‘trigger’ the ‘minded to’ process in Balajigari v SSHD [2019] EWCA Civ 673.
14. Mr Biggs submitted that in concluding the applicant was not a genuine student the respondent was stating that his reasons for coming to the UK were untrue. The respondent’s concerns were sufficient to ‘trigger’ the ‘minded to’ process. If the respondent alleges that the applicant is not a genuine student the decision making process is procedurally unfair unless the applicant is allowed to make representations in response to that allegation. In this case, the respondent suspected the applicant was lying about his intentions and he would not return to Bangladesh. This was sufficient to ‘trigger’ an obligation to act procedurally fairly and comply with the general requirement in [12] above.
15. In addressing the respondent’s skeleton argument, Mr Biggs submitted it was not relevant that there was no direct allegation of dishonesty or a refusal under Part 9 of the Immigration Rules because the respondent came to the conclusion that they were not satisfied the applicant was a genuine student on the basis that the applicant was lying. It was not appropriate to judge the process with hindsight and the authorities dealing with the points based system did not assist the respondent’s case. The respondent had failed to show that the result would have been the same had the applicant been given an opportunity to respond.
Respondent’s submissions
16. Mr Holborn submitted that procedural fairness was a fact sensitive exercise and in this case the respondent had made additional requests seeking verification of the applicant’s position. The applicant was on notice that there were gaps in his application. The applicant was asked what steps he had taken to improve his English language ability and he provided a certificate which could not be verified. There was no allegation of dishonesty. The document was rejected because it was not a verifiable document from a credible institution. It was not necessarily a false document. The respondent was not satisfied the applicant’s intentions were genuine. The reasoning in the Decision did not establish a finding of dishonesty underpinning that overall conclusion.
17. Mr Holborn submitted that this was not a case where the applicant had attempted to submit new evidence on AR and had been told he could not. There was no evidence of what the applicant would have said or done had he been given the opportunity to provide further evidence or representations. Mr Holborn submitted the authorities did not support the applicant’s submission that an implied allegation of dishonesty was sufficient to invoke the ‘minded to’ process in Balajigari absent serious consequences. There were no serious consequences in this case. The applicant can re-apply and he had been given the opportunity to provide further information. The burden was on the applicant to satisfy the requirements of the Immigration Rules.
18. Mr Holborn submitted that the question in this case was whether there is substantive procedural unfairness. This required the Tribunal to consider the context, the seriousness of the allegation and the consequences and nature of the unfairness. The authorities relied upon could be distinguished from the applicant’s case. The issue was whether, on the facts, the applicant was treated procedurally fairly. The respondent required more evidence of the applicant’s English language ability and how it would benefit his business in Bangladesh. The applicant had provided further information prior to the Decision and he did not seek to rely on any further evidence. The result would have been the same had the applicant been given an opportunity to respond to the finding that he was not a genuine student.
19. Mr Holborn submitted that the Decision, when read in the round, does not allege dishonesty or reprehensible conduct. He accepted that the authorities allowed for a finding of dishonesty in circumstances where Part 9 of the Immigration Rules (suitability provisions) was not invoked but they were dependent on serious consequences such as a 10 year ban or significant disruption. The Immigration Rules allow the respondent to find that they were not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the application was genuine without making a finding of dishonesty. The applicant provided further evidence on substantive areas of concern and this was not a case where the applicant has shown he would have provided more detailed and verifiable evidence if the respondent had made the allegation clear. Relief should be refused under section 31(2A) Senior Courts Act 1981 and s.15(5A) Tribunal, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007.
Analysis and Conclusions
20. The question of whether there has been procedural fairness is an objective question for the court to decide for itself, not whether the decision maker acted reasonably: Balajigari at [46]. It is apparent from Doody (at 560E/F) that “The principles of fairness are not to be applied by rote identically in every situation. What fairness demands is dependent on the context of the decision, and this is to be taken into account in all its aspects.”
21. It is apparent from Balajigari at [50] onwards that the context of the decision under challenge is relevant and a conclusion that the applicant has acted in a way which is dishonest is a particularly serious allegation going to a person’s character. The Court found that a refusal of indefinite leave to remain under paragraph 322(5) of the Immigration Rules is to the effect that a person’s very presence in the UK is undesirable. At [55] the Court held:
For all of those reasons, we have come to the conclusion that where the Secretary of State is minded to refuse ILR on the basis of paragraph 322(5) on the basis of the applicant’s dishonesty, or other reprehensible conduct, he is required as a matter of procedural fairness to indicate clearly to the applicant that he has that suspicion; to give the applicant an opportunity to respond, both as regards the conduct itself and as regards any other reasons relied on as regards “undesirability” and the exercise of the second-stage assessment; and then to take that response into account before drawing the conclusion that there has been such conduct.
22. I have considered the numerous authorities in the authorities bundle, in particular those referred to in submissions, from which I distil the following relevant points. An assessment of procedural fairness is fact specific and the opportunity to respond to an adverse allegation (by issuing a ‘minded to’ letter) does not arise in every case. However, in cases where there is a direct allegation of dishonesty, fairness demands that the applicant is given an opportunity to respond to that allegation. The entitlement to notice of an attack on character and the serious consequences of a refusal on suitability grounds are relevant considerations in deciding whether there has been a breach of the principles of procedural fairness.
23. The common theme in the authorities is that where there is an actual or imputed allegation of dishonesty or bad faith, with serious consequences for the applicant, the courts have concluded that the applicant is given prior notice and an opportunity to respond. Therefore, the questions to be addressed by the Tribunal in this case are:
(1) Is there an implied allegation of dishonesty?
(2) What are the consequences for the applicant?
(3) Did the applicant have notice of the allegation?
(4) Has the applicant been given an opportunity to respond?
(5) Was the refusal of entry clearance procedurally unfair in all the circumstances?
24. There is a difference between a situation where evidence is rejected on the basis that it is knowingly untrue, false or dishonest and where there are gaps, insufficiencies of detail or inconsistencies such that the burden of proof is not reached. The Immigration Rules make specific provision for refusals on suitability grounds in Part Suitability. At the time of the decision in this case those provisions were in Part 9 of the Immigration Rules. Following Balajigari, a refusal under Part 9 would require the respondent to give the applicant an opportunity to respond in the form of a ‘minded to’ letter or interview before that decision was made. This is a direct allegation that the applicant is lying. That is not the case here.
25. There is a difference between an allegation of dishonesty and a conclusion that the decision maker is not satisfied the applicant is a genuine student. There is a difference between deliberate wrong-doing (bad faith) and a failure to provide evidence (insufficient evidence) or a rejection of the veracity of the applicant’s account and the inadequacy of evidence produced.
26. A conclusion in a refusal decision that, taking into account all the evidence, ‘I do not believe you’ is different to a conclusion that ‘You have not produced sufficient evidence upon which I can be satisfied that your account is true’. Neither of these conclusions amount to a direct allegation of dishonesty. The first could be interpreted as an implied allegation, depending on the circumstances of the case. The second is not an implied allegation of dishonesty. It is a conclusion that there is insufficient evidence to satisfy the standard of proof because there is insufficient evidence to find in the applicant’s favour. That is the conclusion in the Decision under challenge.
27. In this case, the respondent was not satisfied that the applicant is a genuine student who intends to return to Bangladesh because his personal statement setting out his rationale for undertaking an English language course in the UK was not supported by verifiable information. The applicant failed to provide sufficient evidence to show that an English language course in the UK will benefit him and his business on return to Bangladesh. Therefore, the respondent was not satisfied of the purpose and reasons for why the applicant wanted to travel to the UK. The applicant failed to submit sufficient evidence to satisfy the requirements of the Immigration Rules.
28. The Decision does not state that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the applicant has been dishonest in his application. The English Language certificate was rejected because it could not be verified. It was not rejected because it was false and the applicant knew that to be the case. The decision does not imply that the applicant’s presence in the UK is undesirable. The application was refused because there was insufficient evidence to support the applicant’s reasons for coming to the UK. There was no direct or implied allegation of dishonesty or other reprehensible conduct on a fair reading of the Decision.
29. The respondent was not satisfied as to the applicant’s reasons for coming to the UK and stated that the documentation did not demonstrate a reason for why the applicant was required to learn English specifically in the UK. This does not amount to an allegation that the account is untrue. It is a conclusion that, notwithstanding the specific request to provide such evidence, the applicant had failed to submit sufficient evidence to demonstrate why he needed to study English in the UK. The Decision addresses the lack of evidence rather than an allegation of undesirable conduct. The factual situation in Sanci was entirely different because the only reason for coming to the UK was to visit family members. In the present case, there was no suspicion of dishonesty or reprehensible conduct to ‘trigger’ the requirement of a ‘minded to’ process.
30. There are no serious consequences resulting from the refusal of entry clearance as a short-term student. The applicant will have to pay another fee to make a new application and he is likely to be required to disclose the refusal in a subsequent application.
31. Alternatively, if the allegation in the applicant’s case is analogous to Karagul and a finding that the applicant’s account lacks credibility amounts to an attack on his integrity and character, I find that there was no unfairness because in this case the applicant was given an opportunity to respond. The failure to specifically put to the applicant that he was not a genuine student in the requests for further information was not material because in this case the applicant had nothing further to say. There was nothing before me to show that if the respondent had served a ‘minded to’ letter on the applicant he would have produced evidence upon which the respondent could have found that he was a genuine student.
32. In this case, the applicant was given an opportunity to provide further information before the decision was made. He was aware, from the requests for further information, that his application lacked verifiable evidence to show that he would benefit from an English language course in the UK and lacked information about the steps he had taken to improve his English language ability. It was apparent that the respondent did not accept his reasons given in his personal statement without supporting evidence. The applicant responded to those requests for further information and submitted further evidence. He had an opportunity to respond to the respondent’s concerns about his reasons for coming to the UK.
33. On the facts of this case, there was no requirement to serve a ‘minded to’ letter and the applicant had been given an opportunity to address the reasons why the application was refused before the decision was made in November 2024.
34. The administrative review in Balajigari was found to be inadequate on the facts of that case because the applicant had no notice of the Secretary of State’s concerns. That is not the case here. The respondent requested further information from the applicant on more than one occasion before the decision was made in November 2024 and the applicant made further representations before the AR decision was made. At no stage did the applicant assert that he had further evidence which he had been prevented from submitting. The applicant does not identify further information he could have provided in response to a ‘minded to’ letter. The applicant has not suffered substantial prejudice and there was no breach of the principles of procedural fairness on the facts of this case.
35. The refusal of entry clearance was not procedurally unfair as alleged in the grounds. The application for judicial review is dismissed.
Permission to appeal
36. The applicant applied for permission to appeal on the grounds that an appeal had a realistic prospect of success given the respondent’s application for a stay behind Sanci. On a correct construction of the reasons for refusal in the Decision, the respondent rejected the applicant’s asserted intentions because they did not accept he was telling the truth thereby ‘triggering’ the minded to process in Balajigari.
37. I refuse permission to appeal because there is no arguable case that I have materially erred in law. The applicant does not have a realistic prospect of success on appeal because, on the facts of this case, there was no procedural unfairness. The applicant was given an opportunity to respond to the respondent’s concerns that they were not satisfied of his intentions and reasons for coming to the UK.
38. Further and alternatively, it was not the applicant’s case that he had further evidence or information that he could have submitted had he been interviewed or served with a ‘minded to’ letter.
39. There was no important point of principle or practice and no other compelling reason which requires consideration by the Court of Appeal.
Costs
40. The applicant to pay the respondent’s costs to be assessed if not agreed. The circumstances do not justify a departure from Bahta v SSHD [2011] EWCA 895 and M v Croydon BC [2012] EWCA Civ 595 that the unsuccessful party will pay the costs of the successful party. The respondent is entitled to her reasonable costs.
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