Tribunal decisions

The decision

JR-2025-LON-002505
In the Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber)
Judicial Review

In the matter of an application for Judicial Review

The King on the application of
NXP (Anonymity Order Made)
Applicant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

ORDER

BEFORE the Honourable Mr. Justice Lavender, President and Upper Tribunal Judge Khan

HAVING considered all documents lodged and having heard Ms. A. Benfield of counsel, instructed by the Anti-Trafficking and Labour Exploitation Unit (ATLEU), for the applicant and Mr. S. Tawiah of counsel, instructed by the Government Legal Department, for the respondent at a hearing on 13 July 2026

IT IS DECLARED THAT:

The Applicant was born on 24 February 2004.

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

(1) The application for judicial review is dismissed for the reasons given in the attached judgment.

(2) The Applicant shall pay the respondent’s reasonable costs, subject to her ability to pay such costs pursuant to section 26 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 and with any sum payable to be determined in accordance with Regulation 16 of the Civil Legal Aid (Costs) Regulations 2013.

(3) There shall be a detailed assessment of the Applicant’s publicly funded costs.

(4) The order for anonymity made by the Administrative Court remains in force.

(5) Permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal is refused, no application for such permission having been made, on the basis that there is no arguable material error of law in the judgment.

Signed: K. A. Khan

Upper Tribunal Judge Khan

Dated: 15 October 2026

The date on which this order was sent is given below

For completion by the Upper Tribunal Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Sent / Handed to the applicant, respondent and any interested party / the applicant's, respondent’s and any interested party’s solicitors on (date): 16/10/2026

Solicitors:
Ref No.
Home Office Ref:

Notification of appeal rights

A decision by the Upper Tribunal on an application for judicial review is a decision that disposes of proceedings.

A party may appeal against such a decision to the Court of Appeal on a point of law only. Any party who wishes to appeal should apply to the Upper Tribunal for permission at the hearing at which the decision is given. If no application is made, the Tribunal must nonetheless consider at the hearing whether to give or refuse permission to appeal (rule 44(4B) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008).

If the Tribunal refuses permission, either in response to an application or by virtue of rule 44(4B), then the party wishing to appeal can apply for permission from the Court of Appeal itself. This must be done by filing an appellant’s notice with the Civil Appeals Office of the Court of Appeal within 28 days of the date the Tribunal’s decision on permission to appeal was sent (Civil Procedure Rules Practice Direction 52D 3.3).

Case No: JR-2025-LON-002505
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
(IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER)
Field House,
Breams Buildings
London, EC4A 1WR

15 October 2026

Before:

THE HON. MR JUSTICE LAVENDER, PRESIDENT
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KHAN

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Between:

THE KING
on the application of

‘NXP’
(Anonymity direction continued)
Applicant
- and –

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Ms A Benfield
(instructed by the Anti-Trafficking and Labour Exploitation Unit (‘ATLEU’), for the applicant)

Mr S Tawiah
(instructed by the Government Legal Department) for the respondent)

Heard at Field House on 13 July 2026

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Anonymity direction - Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the applicant is granted anonymity, to the extent set out in this direction. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the applicant, likely to lead members of the public to identify her. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court. For the avoidance of doubt, both parties are permitted to disclose the applicant’s identity to, and to share a copy of this judgment and order with, the Secretary of State for the Home Department, the applicant’s immigration solicitors and any other relevant body for the purposes of updating the applicant’s Home Office records. The reason for granting anonymity is that the applicant is an age-disputed vulnerable young person with a pending asylum claim.

DECISION AND REASONS

(1) Introduction
1. This is the judgment of the Tribunal, to which both of its members have contributed.
2. The applicant has been granted permission to apply for judicial review of the respondent’s decision dated 4 March 2025. That decision was the outcome of an age assessment by which the National Age Assessment Board (“the NAAB”) assessed the applicant to be aged twenty-one (at the time) and determined the applicant’s date of birth to be 24 February 2004. That date of birth was the same as that which was provided by the applicant upon entry to the UK on 28 January 2024 via small boat crossing from France.
3. The issue for resolution in these proceedings is the applicant’s age, which is in dispute between the parties. The applicant, a national of Vietnam, claims that she was born on 5 June 2007 and was thus aged seventeen at the time of the age assessment. The applicant has no documentation which corroborates her claimed age or identity.
4. The factual background to this case is set out in the Agreed Statement of Facts, which is too lengthy to be reproduced here. However, relevant extracts from that document, which set out the applicant’s personal, immigration and age assessment history, are set out below:
(1) The applicant claims to have been born in Nghia Tan, in the Cau Giay district of Hanoi, Vietnam, growing up with her grandmother.
(2) The applicant claims that her grandmother passed away on 12 April 2015, leaving her without parents or family support.
(3) On 28 January 2024, the applicant entered the United Kingdom. On the same date she attended an asylum screening interview with the Home Office, at which she stated her name and said that her date of birth was 24 February 2004. She also provided details relating to her personal history. The applicant’s case is that she accepts that the details provided to the Home Office at this time were false.
(4) The applicant was housed in adult asylum support accommodation at a hotel in Hounslow. Shortly thereafter, however, she went missing from that accommodation.
(5) The Single Competent Authority (“the SCA”) has accepted that the applicant was recruited and transported from Vietnam to the UK for the purpose of forced labour and sexual exploitation and that, during a period from approximately February 2024 to June 2024, she was the victim of modern slavery in the UK for the specific purpose of forced labour and sexual exploitation.
(6) On 4 June 2024 the applicant, along with another young female, was found in a property in Rotherham by the Police and the National Crime Agency in the execution of a warrant to search the property. The property was connected to a male known to the authorities as a sex offender and linked to crime groups who traffic women into the UK for forced labour and exploitation.
(7) The applicant was then interviewed by the Police, and she informed them that she was a child of 16 years old, born on 5 June 2007. She also gave what she claims is here true name.
(8) On 13 June 2024, the SCA determined there were reasonable grounds to believe that the applicant was a victim of modern slavery.
(9) On 3 September 2024 Rotherham Metropolitan Borough Council referred the applicant to the NAAB, requesting an age assessment to be completed under section 50 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022.
(10) On 7 January 2025 social workers from the NAAB commenced the age assessment, with further sessions being held on 9, 14 and 21 January 2025. On 23 January 2025, a “minded-to” meeting was held. Placement staff from the applicant’s accommodation attended the age assessment sessions as appropriate adults. An interpreter was present for all meetings and the applicant confirmed at all of the meetings that she understood the interpreter.
(11) The NAAB age assessors finalised a version of the age assessment report on 5 February 2025, but it was then amended to include an additional information section addressing a letter from Catherine Baker of the Snowdrop Project. This version was concluded on 24 February 2025 and served on 5 March 2025.
(13) On 13 February 2025, the SCA made a conclusive grounds decision that the applicant was a victim of modern slavery.
(14) On 4 March 2025, the applicant was informed that her age had been disputed and that she was deemed to have been born on 24 February 2004.
(15) In an email dated 26 March 2025 from the applicant’s solicitor, Ms Cundall, to Rotherham Metropolitan Borough Council, Ms Cundall indicated that, in the course of providing instructions, the applicant had disclosed to her that she had been forced to have sex with men in Russia and that she had felt unable to disclose this previously, as she had been specifically threatened not to.
(16) On 11 April 2025, the applicant was assessed by Dr Juliet Cohen. In a report dated 28 April 2025, Dr Cohen assessed the applicant as suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) and depression, with physical evidence which was highly consistent with the applicant’s account of her traumatic experiences. Dr Cohen considered the applicant to be extremely vulnerable and in need of a high level of support and not fit to give evidence or attend an interview with the Home Office at that time.
(17) In a letter before claim dated 2 May 2025 the respondent was provided with Dr Cohen’s report and invited to withdraw the age assessment and to accept the applicant’s claimed age.
(18) On 21 May 2025, the respondent responded to the letter before claim, repudiating the grounds of challenge and declining the relief sought.
(19) On 29 May 2025, the claim was issued in the Administrative Court.
(20) On 11 September 2025, the respondent provided a new information decision in response to information which the applicant’s solicitor had provided on 6 May 2025. The age assessment was maintained.
(21) On 16 October 2025, the applicant attended a further interview with Dr Cohen. Dr Cohen confirmed that the applicant continued to meet the diagnostic criteria for PTSD and depression and that she was unfit for interview and unfit to give evidence at an Upper Tribunal fact-finding hearing.
5. As a post-date development to the Agreed Statement of Facts, on 10 February 2026 the applicant was granted temporary leave to remain as a victim of human trafficking or slavery (“VTS leave”) until 10 August 2028.
6. The reasons provided in the age assessment report dated 4 March 2025 for the outcome were, in summary, that: (i) the applicant had provided no documentation to corroborate her claimed date of birth or identity; (ii) there were significant doubts relating to the credibility of the information which the applicant had shared about her life; and (iii) the applicant had provided inconsistent accounts regarding her circumstances prior to leaving, and her reasons for leaving, her country of origin, including her educational background.
7. Overall, the age assessors concluded that, based also on the applicant’s physicality, interaction and demeanour, the evidence was more consistent with an adult in their 20s rather than someone aged 17.
(2) Procedural Matters
8. As we have said, on 29 May 2025 the applicant commenced judicial review proceedings in the Administrative Court of the High Court seeking permission to challenge the age assessment. The applicant sought relief in the form of: a declaration that she was her claimed age and born on 5 June 2007; an order quashing the respondent’s age assessment; a declaration that the assessment was unlawful and/or wrong in fact; and an order that she be provided with age-appropriate support in line with the leaving care provisions of the Children Act 1989.
9. On 2 June 2025, an order for expedition and anonymity was made by David Pievsky KC sitting as a judge of the High Court.
10. On 11 July 2025 permission to apply for judicial review was granted by Kate Grange KC sitting as a judge of the High Court and the matter was transferred for determination to the Upper Tribunal pursuant to section 31A of the Senior Courts Act 1981.
11. Following a Case Management Hearing held on 25 November 2025, the Upper Tribunal issued several directions, which included listing the substantive hearing for 8-9 April 2026. Permission was granted for Ms Anam Khan to give her evidence remotely and for the respondent to provide written questions to the applicant to answer in writing, as she was unfit to give evidence at the hearing.
12. On 7 April 2026, the Upper Tribunal adjourned the fact-finding hearing, owing to the late unavailability of the respondent’s counsel. The hearing was relisted for 13-14 July 2026.
13. On 8 July 2026 the Upper Tribunal granted permission to admit into the proceedings an amended Additional Trial Bundle, filed on 30 June 2026, containing further documents comprising: (a) substantive asylum interview record dated 30 March 2026; and (b) representations sent by the Anti-Trafficking and Labour Exploitation Unit after the asylum interview on 21 May 2026.
(3) The Hearing
14. On 13 July 2026 Ms Anam Khan gave evidence remotely and Ms Catherine Baker gave her evidence in person, both on the applicant’s behalf. In line with Dr Cohen’s expert opinion, the applicant did not give oral evidence, but had the assistance of an interpreter to help her understand the evidence being presented. Thereafter, both counsel provided detailed submissions, relying on their respective skeleton arguments. Additionally, both counsel provided the Tribunal with written speaking notes of their closing submissions.
(4) Evidence Summary
15. In reaching our decision, we have had the benefit of the totality of the evidence on which the parties seek to rely, including the witness statement of the applicant and her written answers to questions. We have also had the benefit of the oral evidence of Ms Khan and Ms Baker, the information disclosed by the Home Office and the social care records maintained by Rotherham Metropolitan Borough Council.
16. Before turning to our detailed analysis of the evidence, we take into account the unchallenged report of Dr Cohen, whose expert opinion was that the applicant was suffering from PTSD and depression, with physical evidence which was highly consistent with the applicant’s account of her traumatic experiences. We also take into account the conclusive grounds decision.
17. As a preliminary matter, we confirm that, applying the Joint Presidential Guidance Note No.2 of 2010: Child, Vulnerable, Adult and Sensitive Applicants, it is apparent that the applicant is a vulnerable person and the guidance has been considered and applied at all stages, including when considering the applicant’s account and evidence. Additionally, the applicant was afforded regular breaks in the course of the hearing.
(5) The Applicant’s Case
18. In her witness statement dated 29 May 2025, at paragraphs 11 to 14 and 17, 20, 21, 29, and 31, the applicant provided an explanation for how she knows her age. It should be noted that the numbering format in the applicant’s witness statement duplicates in error paragraphs 11 and 12.
At paragraph 11: “I remember there was a book in my classroom with all our names and dates of birth on it. I think I have known my date of birth since that time”.
At paragraph 12: “I remember I started school in 2013 when I was 6 years old. My gran became unwell when I was 6 years old”.
At paragraph 13: “We had a party for my 7th birthday”.
At paragraph 14: “…my gran died on 12 April 2015 in hospital. I am able to remember that date clearly because when my gran died, my neighbours helped me to put something nice on the wall with my gran’s name, her photo, and the date that she died”.
At paragraph 17: “I stopped going to school after my gran passed away. I know I was 6 years old when I started school (grade 1) in 2013. In Vietnam we start school in September. When I had my age assessment it is recorded that I said that my gran died in the middle of grade 3 and that I was 8. I understand that it would actually have been grade 2 and I would have been 7, but almost 8 when my gran died. I must have misremembered this because I was very young”.
At paragraph 20: “…I knew that my birthday was on 5 June and that I only had a birthday party once when I was seven”.
At paragraph 21: “I know that my lunar animal is a pig and that my birthday in the lunar calendar is 20 April 2007. My gran told me this”.
At paragraph 29: “I think I went to China in 2016….In the restaurant there was a calendar on the wall and that is why I think it was 2016”.
At paragraph 31: “I think it was 2019 when I left the restaurant, I remember I saw the date on the calendar on the wall”.
(6) The Respondent’s Case
19. The respondent relied upon the outcome of the NAAB age assessment, the new information decision and the witness statements of Rochelle Salman and Yvonne Shearwood in support of her contention that the applicant’s age was assessed in a procedurally fair, structured and holistic manner and that the conclusion reached was reasoned, balanced and reliable. No witnesses were called to provide oral evidence on the respondent’s behalf. We have taken into consideration all the material relied upon by the respondent.
(7) The Legal Framework
20. In terms of the law, the parties are in agreement. As a result, we do not set it out in full, but we do state a number of key principles. First, we have to decide the applicant’s age as a question of fact, specifically in terms of her date of birth. We should not choose between the alternatives put forward by the parties, but must decide the age for ourselves: N v Croydon LBC [2011] EWHC 862.
21. The nature of the Tribunal’s inquiry under the Children Act 1989 is inquisitorial: R (CJ) v Cardiff City Council [2011] EWCA Civ 1590; [2012] 2 All E.R. 836 at [21]. There is no burden of proof, but we must decide matters on the balance of probabilities. There is no margin of discretion to the respondent’s own view. Rather, the age assessment is evidence to be considered with all other evidence adduced.
22. Where the applicant does not produce any reliable corroborative documentary evidence of her date of birth or age, our starting point is the applicant’s own credibility and how the applicant knew her date of birth: R (AE) v Croydon LBC [2012] EWCA Civ 547 at [44].
23. In R (B) v Merton LBC [2003] EWHC 1689; 2003] 4 All E.R. 280, Stanley Burnton J articulated at [20], [27] & [37] several key principles in respect of age assessments:
“20. In such a case as the present, the applicant does not produce any reliable documentary evidence of his date of birth or age. In such circumstances, the determination of the age of the applicant will depend on the history he gives, on his physical appearance and on his behaviour.”
“27. Given the impossibility of any decision-maker being able to make an objectively verifiable determination of the age of an applicant who may be in the age range of, say 16-20, it is necessary to take a history from him or her to determine whether it is true. A history that is accepted as true and is consistent with an age below 18 will enable the decision-maker in such a case to decide that the applicant is a child. Conversely, however, an untrue history, while relevant, is not necessarily indicative of a lie as to the age of the applicant. Lies may be told for reasons unconnected with the applicant’s case as to his age, for example, to avoid his return to his country of origin. Furthermore, physical appearance and behaviour cannot be isolated from the question of the veracity of the applicant; appearance, behaviour and the credibility of his account are all matters that reflect on each other.”
“37. It is apparent from the foregoing that, except in clear cases, the decision-maker cannot determine age solely on the basis of the appearance of the applicant. In general, the decision-maker must seek to elicit the general background of the applicant, including his family circumstances and history, his educational background, and his activities during the previous few years. Ethnic and cultural information may also be important. If there is a reason to doubt the applicant’s statement as to his age, the decision-maker will have to make an assessment of his credibility, and he will have to ask questions designed to test his credibility.”
(8) Analysis of the Medical Evidence
24. As noted from the outset, when assessing the applicant’s credibility, we have been especially mindful of the expert report of Dr Juliet Cohen dated 28 April 2025 (“the first report”) and the subsequent updated medical report dated 27 October 2025 (“the supplementary report”). Both these reports confirm an ongoing diagnosis of PTSD and depression.
25. At [54] of the first report, Dr Cohen states that the applicant suffers from avoidance and numbing symptoms, with avoidance about talking about her experiences, avoidance of recalling her trauma experiences, detachment, restricted range of affect and no sense of future for herself.
26. At [58] Dr Cohen states that the likely cause for the PTSD is the cumulative impact of multiple experiences of a traumatic nature, with multiple experiences of physical and sexual violence over a prolonged period. At [60] Dr Cohen states that she ruled out any fabrication of the applicant’s psychological condition, as the applicant’s presentation was entirely in keeping with that expected from a child growing up in an environment of neglect and abuse without any adult caring for her since the age of 8.
27. At [94] and [96] of the first report, Dr Cohen records that delayed disclosure is very common in victims of trauma and especially where there are traumatic sexual experiences and that she found the applicant to be extremely vulnerable and in need of a high level of support.
28. At [100] of the first report, Dr Cohen observes that the applicant’s ability to recall and recount her experiences is significantly impacted as a result of clinical conditions affecting memory and recall and that her young age, whether it be 17 as claimed or 21, means that her ability to recall and recount experiences in her childhood is impacted by her young age at the time of the experiences and now. At [110] Dr Cohen states that she did not consider that the applicant was currently fit for a Home Office interview or to give evidence in Court, as she was too traumatised and re-traumatisation could cause further psychological harm, notwithstanding the best efforts at questioning her.
29. In the supplementary report, Dr Cohen confirms that the applicant was still suffering from PTSD and depression and notes that her depression was more evident. She states that the applicant’s response of “I don’t know” reflected her memory difficulties, young age and severity of depression.
30. As a result of the applicant’s ongoing psychological conditions, she did not give oral evidence at the hearing. The respondent fully acknowledged the medical evidence on this point and did not seek to draw any adverse inference from the applicant’s failure to give evidence.
31. Significantly, there was no challenge made on behalf of the respondent to Dr Cohen’s expertise or the content of either report. We have considered the medical evidence in the round. The opinion of Dr Cohen was reached following examination of the applicant and observation of the applicant’s presentation and not solely on reported history. We attach significant weight to the opinion of Dr Cohen and find that her reports provide a reliable account of the applicant’s mental health vulnerabilities from shortly after her arrival in the UK to date.
(9) The Applicant’s Factual Account
32. The applicant has provided one witness statement dated 29 May 2025. It covers the applicant’s arrival in the UK through to the outcome of the age assessment and includes her background and current accommodation. She also provided written responses to questions asked by the respondent.
33. As the applicant did not give oral evidence on medical grounds, it is fair to observe that the consequence is that her evidence has not been tested under cross-examination. Therefore, we agree with Mr Tawiah’s closing submission that in such circumstances the documentary evidence assumes an even greater importance when assessing the consistency of the applicant’s account and therefore her overall credibility.
34. The respondent argues that the applicant has been inconsistent across her accounts relating to her age, identity, and history. We now turn to review these matters.
(9)(a) Name and Date of Birth
35. In respect of the applicant’s name and date of birth the respondent highlights that at the initial screening interview on arrival in the UK the applicant stated her name and stated that her date of birth was 24 February 2004, making her an adult.
36. When the applicant was found by the police at a house in Rotherham on 4 June 2024, two of the names which she gave were the same as she had given in the initial screening interview, but one was different. She gave her date of birth as 5 June 2007.
37. During the first information-gathering meeting in the age assessment, the applicant confirmed that her full name was as provided on 4 June 2024, stating that she had never been known by any other names in Vietnam or whilst in the UK. However, at the fourth information-gathering meeting, the applicant provided a different account, stating that, whilst in Vietnam, she had used the different name which she had provided in the screening interview and that this was also her nickname.
38. The respondent further highlights that in her social media accounts on Facebook and Instagram, which were created after her arrival in the UK, the applicant uses the name which she provided on 4 June 2024.
39. In her witness statement, at [36], the applicant explained that, before she travelled to the UK, she was given by her traffickers a mobile phone and a different date of birth, which served as the pin for the mobile phone. She was also given a story written down on a piece of paper to memorise in case she was asked any questions on arrival in the UK. That was the story which she gave on arrival, including the false date of birth.
40. At paragraphs [11]-[14], [17], [20], [21], [29] and [31] of the applicant’s witness statement, the applicant sets out how she knows her age and date of birth. We have already set out this evidence above and we do not repeat it here.
41. During the age assessment process, the applicant confirmed that her date of birth was 5 June 2007 and that she was at that time aged 17. She did not have any documents to prove her birth or identity, but she said that her date of birth was observed using the Gregorian calendar, which was usual in Vietnam, and that she was also aware of the Vietnamese lunar calendar. The age assessors found that the applicant could not demonstrate a deeper understanding of the lunar calendar and that, although she shared that her Vietnamese Zodiac animal was the pig, she could not recall any of the characteristics attributed to this animal.
42. The applicant also stated to the age assessors that she would observe birthdays and celebrate them with friends, but then clarified that she had only celebrated her birthday once, at the age of seven, which was organised by her grandmother.
43. The respondent highlights other alleged inconsistencies relating to the applicant’s claimed date of birth. On 4 June 2024 she was found by police. On 5 June 2024, the applicant was visited by a case worker on behalf of Rotherham Metropolitan Borough Council Children and Young People’s Services. Even though that day was her claimed birthday, the notes of the meeting, which record a fairly lengthy interaction between the applicant and the case worker, make no mention of her birthday.
44. At the ‘minded-to’ meeting held on 23 January 2025, the applicant was asked about this issue and stated that the staff bought her a cake on 5 June 2024 and that she mentioned it to the caseworker. However, as noted earlier, nothing was recorded by the case worker about a birthday or a cake.
(9)(b) Reason for Coming to the United Kingdon
45. In respect of the applicant’s stated reason for coming to the UK, the respondent submits that the applicant has been inconsistent. In this respect, at the screening interview she stated that the reason why she had come to the UK was to get a job to earn money and to pay her parents’ debt, as they had borrowed money for her mother’s medical treatment.
46. At the ‘minded-to’ meeting, the applicant clarified her account and stated that she had come to the UK because there was a job waiting for her in the UK and she denied that there was any debt.
47. In her written responses to the respondent’s questions numbered [6] and [11], the applicant said that what she had previously stated about coming to the UK to pay her parents’ debt was false and that she had been told to say this by the traffickers.
(9)(c) Parents
48. The respondent submits that the applicant has been inconsistent in her account about her parents. In this respect, at the screening interview the applicant said that she had come to the UK to get a job to pay back their debt. During an initial health assessment held on 30 July 2024, the applicant gave her parents’ names and stated that they lived in Vietnam and did not have any health problems.
49. By 29 November 2024, the applicant had changed her account. She told the Exploitation Social Worker that she had been separated from her parents ‘in a flood’ and that she was not in contact with them. She refused support to contact them.
50. During the first three days of the age assessment information-gathering sessions, the applicant refused to discuss her parents, but on day 4, she gave their first names, Quang (father) and Huang (mother), and stated that she did not know their surnames and refused to discuss them further.
51. At the “minded-to” meeting, the applicant stated that she did not know if her parents were alive and that she was not in contact with them. She did not know if they were present during her childhood years, had not met them in her life and did not want to mention them because she did not like them.
52. In her witness statement, at [3]-[6], the applicant explained that she only knew her parents’ names from her grandmother and that she did not know if they were alive or dead. She confirmed they had not died in a flood and said that she thought that there must have been a mix-up with the information relating to the other girl found with her on 4 June 2024.
53. The applicant further stated that, when she answered “No” on the health assessment in response to being asked if her parents had any medical conditions which might affect her, she did not mean it to be understood that she knew anything about her parents or had contact with them, as she had never been told if they had any medical problems.
54. In her written responses to the respondent’s questions [8], [9], [12], [15] and [17], the applicant said that she could not remember saying in the age assessment that she did not know her parents’ surnames. She claimed not to have said that her parents had died in a flood, and she asserted that she had been truthful about not knowing if her parents were dead or alive. She also clarified that, in the health assessment dated 30 July 2024 she had thought that the question was about whether her parents had any genetic health conditions which could be passed on to her and that that was the reason why she answered “No”, as she was not aware of any. She further confirmed that she has never known anything about her parents’ health, as she has no memories of them.
(9)(d) Grandmother
55. The respondent submits that the applicant has been inconsistent in her account about her grandmother. In this respect, there is no dispute between the parties that no mention is made within Home Office or social care records of the applicant’s grandmother, despite her claim that she was raised solely by her ‘gran’ until her grandmother’s death on 12 April 2015.
56. During the age assessment information-gathering sessions, the applicant stated that she had lived with her paternal grandmother, who was the source of the information about her date of birth, and that the only birthday that she celebrated was organised by her grandmother when she was 7 years old.
57. The applicant said that she shared a warm relationship with her grandmother, who earned money from selling plastic bottles and selling pak choi which she grew in the garden. She explained that her grandmother died on 12 April 2015 when she was 8 years old and that she knew this date because the neighbours helped her to put something nice on the wall with her grandmother’s name and photograph and the date of her passing.
58. The applicant said that she celebrated ‘Tet’ with her grandmother when she was alive, but not afterwards. It made her feel sad that she no longer celebrated it. She felt that she did not really understand what was being asked during the age assessment about ‘Tet’, but that she had provided more information to her solicitors since then. She also knew that the lunar animal for her date of birth was the pig, but when she was asked in the age assessment about the ‘characteristics’ of the animal, she did not understand what was meant by the word ‘characteristics’. Had the question been explained to her more fully, she would have been able to answer it.
(9)(e) Education
59. Lastly, the respondent submits that the applicant has been inconsistent about her educational background and highlights that in the screening interview the applicant stated that she had been educated to secondary school level.
60. Subsequently, during the age assessment information-gathering sessions, the applicant stated that she had attended ‘Meah Tan’ primary school in Vietnam, starting at aged six, and that she left in the middle of grade three due to the death of her grandmother. She claimed not to have received any further education until being enrolled at college in the UK in September 2024.
61. At the ‘minded-to’ meeting, the applicant was questioned about the conflicting accounts provided about her educational background. This included stating that she had attended school until grade three, when she was aged eight, even though in the health assessment dated 30 July 2024 she claimed to have received formal education only until grade two and that she had left school aged seven. In response, the applicant maintained that when she left school in 2015, she had completed primary school to the middle of grade three when she was around seven and half years old.
62. In the applicant’s witness statement, at [12] and [17], the applicant explained that she started school in 2013 when she was aged six years old. Her school was called Nghia Tan primary school. However, in the age assessment it was wrongly spelt ‘Meah Tan’, which she thought was the reason why the age assessors could not find it. She stopped going to school after her grandmother passed away.
63. The applicant explained that in the age assessment report it is recorded that her grandmother died when she was in the middle of grade three and aged eight, but she was actually in grade two and would have been seven years old, but almost eight when her grandmother died. She explained that she must have misremembered because she was very young.
64. In the applicant’s written answers to the respondent’s questions [18] to [22], the applicant stated that she did not remember saying to the age assessors that she was in grade three and aged eight when her grandmother died. In respect of changing her account in her witness statement to say that she was actually in grade two and aged seven when her grandmother died, the applicant was unable to explain why the account in her witness statement was more reliable than what she had previously said to the age assessors. Her answer was “I don’t understand”.
(9)(f) The Appellant’s Factual Account: Discussion
65. As we have already said, we accept that the starting point when assessing the applicant’s factual account in the round is that, regardless of the issue of age, the applicant is a highly vulnerable individual for the reasons set out in the expert medical reports of Dr Cohen.
66. We accept that the impact of vulnerability extends beyond oral evidence and that it affects the weight to be attached to inconsistencies, the ability to recall events and the manner in which evidence is given or statements are made.
67. We note in particular that Dr Cohen observes that the applicant shows a reluctance to give details about her past experiences and that it is not unusual for a person to disclose different symptoms at different times to different professionals, as disclosure is very context-specific and depends also on the degree of rapport and trust, as well as the phrasing of questions.
68. We note also from the expert medical reports that the applicant’s ability to recall and recount her experiences is significantly impacted by her age and her clinical conditions, which affect memory and recall. Further, Dr Cohen records that the applicant has poor concentration and has difficulty giving a chronological account and that she has avoidance and numbing symptoms, with avoidance about talking about her experiences, avoidance of recalling her trauma experiences, detachment, restricted range of affect and no sense of future for herself.
69. Nevertheless, Mr Tawiah submitted that, even when making necessary allowances for the applicant’s vulnerability, her narrative remains unreliable.
70. We agree with the respondent for the reasons which follow. Some of the core inconsistencies which undermine the applicant’s account relate to:
Identity: having stated during the age assessment that she was never known by any name other than that which she had provided on 4 June 2024, she then changed her account and said that she was also known by the name she had provided in her screening interview.
Birthday: she has given two different birthdates. There is no contemporaneous mention of her birthday by the visiting case worker on 5 June 2024, and no record of staff having bought her cake on 5 June 2024.
Grandmother: the applicant claims that she was raised solely by her grandmother, but there is no mention within Home Office or Social Care records of her grandmother. There are inconsistencies around how old she was when her grandmother died and what grade at school she had completed as of that date.
Parents: There are multiple inconsistencies in the applicant’s accounts relating to her parents.
Reasons for coming to the UK: There are multiple inconsistencies in the applicant’s account of the reasons why she came to the UK, ranging from paying her parents’ debt off to there being a job for her in the UK while denying a debt.
71. The inconsistencies in the applicant’s account across key areas of her life cannot be discounted as merely peripheral to the determination of the applicant’s age or explained away on the basis of her clinically diagnosed conditions. The inconsistencies are often of a basic nature and demonstrate an inability to provide the most basic personal information, such as her own name, her parents’ names, who raised her, how long she lived in Hanoi and the name of her school. These inconsistencies go to the core of the applicant’s account. There are also retrospective attempts by the applicant to correct, clarify or rationalise earlier accounts on the basis of misunderstanding or confusion, as can be seen in her responses to questions on her family background.
72. These basic inconsistences are material to the Tribunal’s determination of the reliability of, and weight to be attached to, the applicant’s account and therefore her overall credibility.
73. While we accept that the applicant may well have been forced by her traffickers to memorise a ‘story’ to tell immigration officials on arrival in the UK, it is difficult to ascertain which parts of her account are false and which parts are true, given the multiple inconsistencies in her subsequent accounts to different professionals.
74. The presence of so many basic inconsistencies in her account means that the Tribunal views her account as unreliable and attaches reduced weight to it because of the significant inconsistencies in her core account, internal contradictions and attempts to correct or rationalise earlier accounts.
(10) Other Observational Evidence
(10)(a) Ms Anam Khan
75. Ms Khan is the Director of Thrive Living, an organisation which provides supported accommodation for young people aged 16-25. She first met the applicant on 4 March 2025 when the applicant arrived at accommodation provided by Thrive Living at the request of Rotherham Metropolitan Brough Council Children’s Services. The applicant continues to be accommodated in housing provided by Thrive Living.
76. Ms Khan provided a witness statement dated 14 October 2025, which she adopted as her evidence in chief. She confirmed that she was not a qualified social worker and had no training as an age assessor. Prior to going on maternity leave, she saw the applicant at least three days per week in her accommodation.
77. In summary, her witness evidence states that when the applicant arrived at her property with her social worker, the applicant was crying and hysterical and screamed when she saw Ms Khan’s father and brother working in the property. The social worker later told Ms Khan that the applicant was fearful of males.
78. Ms Khan said she was told that the applicant had been assessed as being age 21, but that the applicant kept saying she was 17. For her part, Ms Khan thought the applicant looked younger than 21 and appeared vulnerable. As the placement progressed, Ms Khan observed the applicant was crying a lot, was withdrawn and scared to go out alone and so chaperones had to be organised when she wanted to go shopping.
79. Ms Khan said that she observed that, when shopping, the applicant did not seem to think about planning for sensible food, but picked out sweets, candy floss and drinks aimed at teenagers. In her experience of supporting young asylum seekers in their twenties, although they often needed support with local knowledge, they were able to demonstrate budgeting and planning skills and the ability to pick out essential foods which would last them longer. In contrast, she observed that the applicant did not have these skills and that her behaviour was quite immature and more normal for a 17-year-old.
80. Ms Khan stated that the applicant’s first few months in accommodation were very difficult for her, as she was the only resident. She appeared isolated and withdrawn and staff had to travel with her to college on several occasions before the applicant agreed to travel herself. She observed that the applicant struggled to trust people and to answer questions. However, in May 2025, two girls started living at the accommodation, which improved the applicant’s mood. Ms Khan said that the applicant now interacts more with other young people who have moved into the accommodation, and she has observed her slowly grow in confidence and independence.
81. Ms Khan stated that the applicant chose to dress in what she would describe as very “young” clothes and that her bedroom is very much a teenager’s room, which is very child-like. The applicant’s actions and behaviours are what she expected from a teenager. Overall, Ms Khan thought that the applicant was genuinely the age she claimed to be.
82. During cross-examination, several aspects of Ms Khan’s evidence were tested by Mr Tawiah. She acknowledged that she was unaware that on the day the applicant arrived at the accommodation looking distressed she had been informed of the age assessment decision. However, Ms Khan did not consider that the age assessment outcome itself would account for the high level of distress exhibited.
83. Ms Khan was taken to two documents from the applicant’s social workers which pre-dated her meeting with the applicant. It was put to her by Mr Tawiah that the contents of those documents demonstrated that, contrary to her evidence, the applicant was far from immature and had a strong, independent skill-set. Alternatively, it was suggested to Ms Khan that, if she was right in her observations, then her evidence showed a marked deterioration in the applicant’s previous skills.
84. The first document, the Age Assessment Observation Report of Sarah King, an Exploitation Social Worker from Rotherham Children’s Services, dated 29 November 2024, stated that the applicant “is very independent and does not require any support from staff at her placement. She and her peers make traditional Vietnamese dinners from scratch and very rarely eat any convenience food. Her budgeting is good.”
85. The second document, the Age Assessment Observation Report of Michelle Kaye, the applicant’s social worker, stated that the applicant “is always clean and well presented. [She] completes all her self-care without prompt. [She] is able to cook, clean and complete laundry tasks to a very high standard.”
86. Ms Khan’s response to the above observations of the applicant was that she may act differently when with other Vietnamese persons. That said, she accepted that her observations at paragraph 9 of her witness statement about the applicant’s immaturity could not be treated as relevant to the age assessment.
87. Ms Khan, however, did not accept that the applicant’s picking of sweets was explainable whether the applicant was a child or an adult, because in her view the applicant would choose candy floss, which tended to be for young children. Similarly, the applicant preferred to join in games and activities with younger people, whom she seemed more comfortable with, rather than with adult staff at her accommodation. While Ms Khan accepted that it was more natural for the applicant to interact with children than with adults, she observed that, when adults tried to engage with the applicant, she was not as natural with them.
88. We have carefully considered the evidence of Ms Khan. We are grateful for the time which she took to give her evidence remotely to the hearing. We found Ms Khan to be a sincere witness. However, her observations regarding the applicant’s lack of independent skills such as budgeting, planning, and cooking are not supported by the combined evidence from the social workers’ Age Assessment Observation Reports.
89. The applicant’s social worker, Michelle Kaye, saw the applicant every six weeks and took her to the initial health assessment and to her new accommodation. The exploitation social worker, Sarah King, met the applicant in July 2024 and met her thereafter almost on a weekly basis. By the date of her report, she had met the applicant almost 15 times. We therefore place significant weight on their respective observations of the applicant’s maturity and independent skill-set, which pre-dated the age assessment outcome and Ms Khan’s meeting with the applicant.
90. Further, Ms Khan’s lay impression of the applicant has been framed by the presentation of the applicant after she was informed of the decision of the age assessors. We consider that the applicant’s signs of distress, crying and withdrawal were an inevitable consequence of the impact of the decision which she received on 4 March 2025 about her age, which resulted in her having to move to new accommodation suddenly and abruptly on the very same day. Given her accepted vulnerabilities, the impact of the decision and the immediate consequences were undoubtedly upsetting and traumatic for the applicant.
91. We are fortified in our view by having considered the evidence of Ms Baker (see later) who stated in her witness statement, at [8], that “When the applicant received the decision from the National Age Assessment Board, she was completely overwhelmed by distress. Later that day, and on learning that the decision would also mean that she had to leave her accommodation, she started self-harming and cutting her hair and refused to get into the taxi that I organised for her. I believe this decision and the feeling of not being believed was experienced as a highly traumatic event for her.”
92. Given the foregoing reasons, we place modest weight on Ms Khan’s evidence.
(10)(b) Ms Catherine Baker
93. Ms Baker is the Child Trafficking Transition Lead for the Snowdrop Project, a charity which provides long-term support to survivors of trafficking, modern slavery, and exploitation. She confirmed that she was not a qualified social worker and had no training as an age assessor. The applicant was referred to the Snowdrop Project on 28 November 2024. Ms Baker confirmed that she continues to work with the applicant, meeting every six weeks and also staying in contact by text messaging. Ms Baker provided a witness statement dated 14 October 2025, which she adopted as her evidence in chief.
94. In summary, her witness evidence states that the applicant is one of the most vulnerable people she has worked with. In terms of presentation, Ms Baker referred to her letter dated 6 February 2025, which was sent to the age assessors. Here she stated that she believed that the applicant was her claimed age by reference to her physical appearance, demeanour, and body language.
95. Ms Baker stated that she also worked with another girl aged 17, referred to as ”X”, who was a close friend of the applicant. They were both found by police at the house in Rotherham. Ms Baker stated that ”X” was found to be the age she claimed.
96. Ms Baker observed that the applicant was quiet, highly fearful, and deferential to adults, although over time the applicant had been able to relax a little more in her presence. During the age assessment process, she said that the applicant was completely overwhelmed and, since the decision, the applicant’s mental health had significantly deteriorated. The age dispute continued to weigh on her heavily and she was terrified of being left alone and was not sleeping or eating much.
97. Ms Baker noted a gradual opening up by the applicant, citing her disclosure to her solicitor in March 2025 of being trafficked for sexual exploitation in Russia. She considered that such significant trauma would undoubtedly have shaped the applicant’s development and presentation.
98. Ms Baker said that the applicant had joined an English conversation club for a short time at the Snowdrop Project. This proved a positive experience for her, as she was able to mix with other young Vietnamese people of similar age. Ms Baker had not introduced the applicant to some of her older clients, aged 21 or 22, because, in her view, they were much older than the applicant and it would have been inappropriate.
99. Finally, Ms Baker stated in her witness evidence that she disagreed with the age assessment outcome. She considered that the overall picture presented was of an extremely traumatised young person who was clearly abused and controlled from a young age and told to give a different story, including her date of birth, to professionals. Any small inconsistencies in the applicant’s account were in her view unremarkable and understandable. She did not think it was possible to separate trauma from age.
100. During cross-examination, several aspects of Ms Baker’s evidence were tested by Mr Tawiah.
101. Ms Baker accepted that, when she wrote the letter dated 6 February 2025 to the age assessors, she had only met the applicant twice and that between 9 June 2025 and the date of her witness statement her meetings with the applicant had been via WhatsApp with the assistance of an interpreter. She accepted that meetings had been short, but across different settings.
102. Ms Baker accepted that general physical appearance would not on its own tell very much about the applicant’s age, but, in her view, there was nothing to suggest that the applicant was older than her claimed age. She agreed that the age assessment outcome would definitely have had an impact on the applicant, because she had to leave her friends and she also felt distressed because she had not been believed and she perceived the outcome to be siding with the people who trafficked her.
103. It was put to Ms Baker that, as she had not introduced the applicant to her older, 21- or 22-year-old clients, she could not say how the applicant would have interacted. Ms Baker responded that the applicant had a natural tendency to interact with a younger age group.
104. It was also suggested to Ms Baker that the trauma experienced by the applicant would have presented in the same way whether the applicant was 17 or 21 years old. Ms Baker replied that several factors can impact that age group and that the applicant’s demonstrated cooking skills, for example, were only because she had done that for a long time.
105. Finally, Ms Baker was asked whether there were any observations she had raised that were not taken into account by the age assessors. She responded that they did not have her insight over multiple situations and did not fully embed the applicant’s trafficking issue into their decision.
106. We have carefully considered the evidence of Ms Baker. We are grateful for the time which she took to attend in person and to give her evidence at the hearing. We also found Ms Baker to be a sincere witness. However, we do not consider that her observations regarding the applicant assist us greatly one way or another in our fact-finding exercise.
107. She accepted that she was not trained in age assessments and that her interaction with the applicant was primarily through the lens of supporting her as a victim of trafficking and not as a social worker.
108. Ms Baker’s response that the applicant naturally interacts with a younger age group is, in our view, no answer to the fact that she did not offer the applicant the opportunity to interact in a safe space with older young people and therefore did not have the opportunity to observe her in that context.
109. At the core of her evidence lies one complaint, namely that the age assessors did not fully embed the applicant’s trafficking issue in their decision-making. For the reasons which we have set out at in this decision, we do not accept that criticism.
110. Given the reasons we have stated, we place only modest weight on Ms Baker’s evidence.
(10)(c) Other Professional Observation
111. In addition to the oral evidence of Anam Khan and Catherine Baker, the applicant also relied on the written evidence of Lynsey Laing, Support Worker at Future 19, Sarah King, Exploitation social worker from Evolve, Michelle Kaye, the applicant’s allocated social worker and an observation from an Intelligence Officer of the Home Office, Intelligence Division who noted that the applicant and girl ”X”, with whom she was found, “gave their ages as 17 but looked younger”.
112. Ms Benfield submits that there is no single professional who has worked with the applicant who has provided an opinion or expressed a view that she is older than the age she claims to be. In short, Ms Benfield submits that over a two-year period, where the applicant has had extensive interaction and professional support, it is simply not possible that, if the applicant was at all material times an adult, no professional would have raised this within the local authority or within the applicant’s placement, in the course of healthcare or in education.
113. Ms Laing, in her Age Assessment Observation Report dated 16 November 2024, stated that she had known the applicant for four months, working with her between 3 and 5 days per week. She observed that the applicant was “a shy young person” and “appears child-like including her body language” and “acts age appropriate in the community”. Ms Laing considered the applicant to be aged between 16 and 18 years old.
114. Sarah King, in her Age Assessment Observation Report dated 29 November 2024, stated that she had known the applicant since July 2024 and had seen her almost weekly and, in total, 15 times since 9 July 2024. She stated that the applicant dresses in “age-appropriate clothing for a 17-year-old” and that “there are no facial lines present”. Ms King also observed that the applicant appears “more reserved in the community and more dependent on her peer [another young Vietnamese girl] than when they are at placement”. Ms King considered the applicant to be aged between 16 and 18 years old.
115. Michelle Kaye, in her Age Assessment Observation Report, stated that she has known the applicant since 27 June 2024 and has visited her every six weeks since that date. She stated that the applicant was highly dependent on girl “X” and that they seek reassurance from each other when speaking to professionals. She also observed that the applicant undertakes “age-appropriate interests” and that she presents “physically as quite young”. Ms Kaye considered the applicant to be aged up to 18 years old.
116. We have carefully considered the evidence of the professionals mentioned. We accept that the value of professional observation from those who have worked with a young person outside the formality of the age assessment process is well established. This is reflected in both the best practice guidance on Age Assessment published by the Association of Directors of Children’s Services (“the ADCS”) and the NAAB Guidance, which indicate that the observations of others who have had close contact with children or young asylum seekers can make a useful contribution to the assessment. That view was also expressed by Mr Ockelton, the former Vice-President of the Upper Tribunal, in R (AM) v Solihull MBC [2012] UKUT 118 (IAC) at [19].
117. That said, we consider that the professionals involved were not engaged in conducting an age assessment in accordance with the Merton principles. It is clear from the opinions expressed that they were based on the applicant’s demeanour, clothing and interaction with peers, which are all unreliable indicators of age in the absence of conducting a more structured and holistic assessment.
118. Given the foregoing reasons, we place modest weight on the evidence received of professional observation before the Tribunal.
(11) Consideration of the Age Assessment
119. We now undertake an examination of the age assessment undertaken by social workers Rochelle Salman and Gemma Sullivan on behalf of the NAAB. Their respective professional experience as trained assessors to conduct age assessments is stated in the report and has not been challenged by the applicant.
120. The age assessment report states that it was conducted in compliance with the Merton principles¸ the NAAB guidance on Assessing Age and ADCS guidance.
121. The Assessment schedule records that no pre-meeting with the applicant was able to be arranged prior to the assessment beginning and that the information-gathering sessions were held over four days (7, 9, 15 and 21 January 2025) with a clarifying and “minded-to” meeting held on 23 January 2025 and a final decision meeting held on 4 March 2025.
122. The age assessment report states that all the evidence available which could inform the assessment of the applicant’s age was considered and the professional opinion of the assessors was that the applicant’s physicality, interaction and demeanour were more consistent with an adult in their 20s than someone aged 17 years and that, on the balance of probabilities, it was more likely that the applicant’s accurate date of birth is the one which she provided on entry to the UK of 24 February 2004. As a result, the applicant would have been 19 years old upon her entry to the UK on 28 January 2024 and 20 years old upon the commencement of the age assessment on 7 January 2025.
123. Ms Benfield raises several concerns about the conduct of the age assessment. These can be grouped into the following areas: (i) procedural shortcomings; (ii) reasons relied upon in the age assessment; and (iii) the new information decision. We address these matters in turn below.
(11)(a) Procedural shortcomings
124. Ms Benfield submits that the age assessment was not conducted in accordance with best practice because the age assessors; failed to take into account the conclusive grounds decision; failed to ensure that the appropriate adult provided was independent, rather than being staff on the applicant’s placement; failed to ensure the continuity of the appropriate adult or the interpreter; and failed to hold a pre-meeting with the applicant.
125. First, turning to the issue of failing to take into account the conclusive grounds decision letter (“the CG decision”) dated 15 February 2025, the applicant argues that the NAAB guidance was not followed. In this regard, the applicant relies on the provisions of the NAAB guidance which require that age assessors “remain vigilant” to the availability of additional information until the age assessment has been concluded, including that which “could require steps to be taken to obtain additional information.”
126. The applicant further submits that the age assessors, who had written their report prior to receiving the CG decision, should have revisited their assessment in a more substantive manner in the light of the CG decision in order to consider how it bore on the facts of the applicant’s case, rather than “merely” adding a concluding paragraph to their report deeming that it did not affect their decision. This approach, says the applicant, was especially important because the NAAB guidance records as mandatory that trafficking must be taken into account.
127. We have carefully considered this matter. It is clear from reading the section headed ‘Additional Information’ in the age assessment report that the age assessors received a copy of the CG decision from the National Referral Mechanism (“NRM”) on 24 February 2025. They then reviewed the CG decision and concluded that it did not contain further information which could impact the outcome of the assessment, as it was based on the information contained within the original referral, which the age assessors had already considered within the decision-making process.
128. We consider that the age assessors’ approach was entirely rational and in accordance with the NAAB guidance. They were aware of the context and the basis of the original referral and had already taken that into account in their decision-making. They then reviewed the age assessment in the light of the CG decision and concluded that no change was warranted. That course was unarguably open to them on the information. It is clear to us that the applicant’s submissions on this issue amount to little more than a disagreement with the age assessors’ decision.
129. One further issue arises from the CG decision which we wish to address here. In closing submissions, Ms Benfield submitted that the respondent’s position in disputing the applicant’s claimed date of birth was inconsistent with the respondent’s position adopted in the CG decision. In the CG decision, the respondent had accepted the applicant’s claimed date of birth of 5 June 2007, but the respondent was now defending a different date of birth in the age assessment.
130. Mr Tawiah submitted that no substantive contradiction existed between the respondent’s respective positions. The CG decision was concerned with the overarching question of whether the applicant had been trafficked and was not focused on ascertaining the applicant’s age, which the decision-maker simply accepted from the applicant without any specific inquiry.
131. We have reviewed the CG decision and accept that there was no questioning or inquiry made into the applicant’s claimed age from the face of the decision. Further, the decision-maker’s focus was on whether the applicant was a victim of modern slavery and not on the applicant’s age. We therefore find that the respondent’s acceptance of the applicant’s claimed date of birth in the CG decision does not undermine the age assessment outcome or indeed the Tribunal’s fact-finding task.
132. We next turn to address the other procedural shortcomings raised by the applicant. We have carefully considered the circumstances around the absence of a pre-meeting with the applicant, the lack of an independent appropriate adult, failure to ensure continuity of the appropriate adult and the failure to ensure continuity of the interpreter.
133. The age assessment records that no pre-meeting was able to be arranged prior to the assessment beginning. Ms Benfield submitted that given the difficulty the applicant had with building rapport and trusting people this could have assisted in the process. We note that the practice of undertaking a pre-meeting is regarded as best practice in the ADCS guidance and is not an absolute requirement. In this respect, the applicant has not pointed to any identifiable prejudice or unfairness resulting from the absence of a pre-meeting. In fact, it is recorded in the age assessment report that through the deployment of activities such as drawing and writing, the applicant became more animated, comfortable, and communicative with the age assessors after an initial reluctance to engage in the process.
134. We note that, contrary to the ADCS guidance, no notes were taken by the appropriate adults and that it is best practice to ensure continuity of the appropriate adult. These are best practice and not mandatory requirements. That said, the question for us is whether any of these omissions resulted in unfairness to the applicant. We do not consider there was any material prejudice or unfairness caused to the applicant by these departures from best practice.
135. The applicant had the same appropriate adult and interpreter for all four information-gathering sessions. The one time change of the interpreter, and the appropriate adult came about at the minded-to meeting and the decision meeting. The applicant has not suggested that she was materially prejudiced by these departures from best practice and there is nothing to suggest that she was not given the opportunity to participate fully in the sessions.
136. In fact, it is clear from the age assessment report that the assessors were very alive to the applicant’s reluctance to engage in conversations and so adapted their approach, while maintaining a trauma-informed and child centred approach to the information gathering exercise.
137. As to the independence of the appropriate adults, we note that this is a best practice requirement in accordance with the ACDS guidance. However, the Local Authority specifically requested the use of placement staff as appropriate adults because the applicant had agreed that placement staff with whom she was familiar would be well placed to support her. The Local Authority did not directly employ the placement staff, who were independent and had the relevant skills and training to undertake their role in accordance with the ACDS guidance.
138. For the foregoing reasons, we do not accept that the applicant’s grounds relating to procedural unfairness, whether individually or cumulatively, are made out.
11(b) Reasons relied on in the Age Assessment
139. The applicant submits that the reasons relied upon by the age assessors for disputing her age are weak, do not stand up to scrutiny and are not cogent reasons, nor is the date of birth attributed to a reliable date.
140. In support of her arguments, the applicant highlights the following areas in the age assessment, which she says were wrongly assessed by the age assessors. These include the treatment of: the different names given; her failure to inform the police of her birthday; the Zodiac animal and the lunar calendar her refusal to discuss Vietnamese celebrations; inconsistences in the documents; family composition; where the applicant grew up; her journey to the UK; her fingerprinting; and her education.
141. We have carefully considered the areas raised. However, we are not persuaded by the applicant’s submissions. We have already identified several inconsistencies in the applicant’s core account, which significantly undermine her credibility. Our view aligns with the conclusion reached by the age assessors, who stated in the “Conclusion” section of the age assessment report that the applicant’s account was “riddled with discrepancy” and that the “assessors have significant doubts relating to the credibility of the information that the applicant has shared across all aspects of her life, including her name and date of birth.”
142. Ms Benfield has sought to isolate each of the reasons and argue why the assessors have reached the wrong conclusion in her written submissions. With respect, that is a flawed approach to the age assessment process, which requires a holistic assessment of all of the evidence to reach a decision on the balance of probabilities as to the applicant’s date of birth. That is the structured holistic exercise which was undertaken by the age assessors, and which is demonstrated in the detailed age assessment report.
143. For instance, in relation to the question whether the applicant gave the police her birthday, the discussion of this issue in the age assessment report concluded by applying the benefit of the doubt on this issue.
144. It is clear from the age assessment report that physical appearance and demeanour were treated as only part of the overall evidence and that the applicant’s trauma and vulnerability were always at the forefront of the assessment, with the assessors recognising that an adapted approach was necessary to engage the applicant so as to ensure that she had the opportunity to inform her age assessment. As a result, the age assessors maintained a trauma-informed and child-centred approach to information gathering and adapting their approach to accommodate the applicant’s communication needs. Additionally, at the “minded-to” meeting the assessors showed conspicuous fairness to the applicant by applying the “benefit of the doubt” principle to the applicant’s responses, where appropriate.
145. We have also considered the witness statement of Rochelle Salman dated 9 September 2025. She was one of the two age assessors. Although the applicant submits that Ms Salman’s written evidence does not take matters any further than the age assessment report itself, we consider Ms Salman’s evidence offers some valuable insights regarding the approach taken to conducting the age assessment and the reasoning which underpins the final report. That said, we place limited weight on her written evidence, recognising that it has not been tested under cross-examination.
146. Ms Salman’s evidence supports what can be seen from the age assessment report itself as to the professionalism and conspicuous fairness which was exercised by the age assessors in conducting this age assessment. In this context, we also note that the applicant has not challenged the professional experience or conduct of the age assessors.
147. We have also taken note of the witness statement of Yvonne Shearwood, dated 21 October 2025, who works as a lead for the NAAB employed by the Home Office. Her evidence has been helpful in understanding the structure of the NAAB, the training undertaken by assessors and the procedures in place for decision making. However, given the purely background nature of Ms Shearwood’s evidence, we treat it as neutral and attach no weight to it.
11(c) The New Information Decision
148. It is common ground that after the respondent was provided with new information, comprising the applicant’s summary pre-action correspondence and instructions and Dr Cohen’s report dated 28 April 2025, the age assessors considered the new material and issued a new information decision and pro forma dated 10 and 11 September 2025.
149. The new information decision informed the applicant that a further age assessment on an age disputed person could only be carried out where the new information submitted constituted ”significant new evidence” which meant that there was a realistic prospect that, if a further age assessment were to be conducted taking into account the new information, the applicant’s age would be assessed as different from the age determined in the first age assessment.
150. The new information decision concluded that the new information provided did not amount to significant new evidence and, as a consequence, a further age assessment was not warranted, and the first assessment would stand.
151. The applicant’s position is that, in light of the new information provided, the respondent should have withdrawn the first age assessment and accepted the applicant’s claimed age.
152. After reviewing the new information, the age assessors provided a detailed response setting out their reasons for concluding that the new information did not provide sufficient grounds to overturn the original age assessment report.
153. We have read the comprehensive response from the age assessors, and we consider that it provides a detailed and justifiable explanation for the age assessors’ conclusion in relation to the new evidence. It is also supported by the witness statement of Rochelle Salman.
154. We conclude that the decision not to conduct a second age assessment was unarguably rational and open to the respondent on the evidence. Dr Cohen’s report was not an age assessment, and its purpose was not to determine the applicant’s age. The assessors rightly considered its relevance in the context of the applicant’s memory, recall and vulnerability, but were also entitled to balance those considerations against the fact that they had conducted a comprehensive age assessment over an extended period of time which followed a child focused and trauma-informed approach.
(11)(d) The Age Assessment: Decision
155. We have considered the conduct of the age assessment with care in the light of the submissions of the parties. We consider that the age assessment is Merton compliant and we therefore attach significant weight to the report.
(12) Concluding Remarks
156. It is instructive to recall, following the decision in R (B) v Merton LBC [2003] EWHC 1689 at [20], that, in cases where the applicant does not produce any reliable documentary evidence of their date of birth or age, as in this case, then the determination of the age of the applicant will depend on the history they give, on their physical appearance and on their behaviour.
157. The decision in Merton also held that lies may be told for reasons unconnected with the applicant’s case as to their age, for example to avoid return to the country of origin; further, that physical appearance and behaviour cannot be isolated from the question of the veracity of the applicant; appearance, behaviour and the credibility of their account are all matters which reflect on each other.
158. Accordingly, it is axiomatic that the applicant’s credibility will be central to her claimed age in this case. In this context, we have set out above our reasons for not accepting the applicant’s factual account and why we consider that her credibility is significantly undermined.
159. Assessing the evidence holistically and accepting that physical appearance and demeanour/behaviour are unreliable indicators of age in themselves and not determining factors, and therefore of limited weight, we find that it is more likely than not that the applicant is an adult aged 22 years old with a date of birth of 24 February 2004.
160. Drawing all the evidence and submissions together, we reach the following conclusions:
(a) The applicant is suffering from PTSD and depression owing to multiple traumatic events.
(b) The applicant presents as a vulnerable person as a result of her trafficking and exploitation history.
(c) The applicant was born on 24 February 2004.
(d) Consequently, when the applicant arrived in the UK on 28 January 2024, she was aged 19 years and 11 months.
(12) SUMMARY OF DECISION
161. It is determined that the applicant’s date of birth is 24 February 2004 and that she is currently aged 22 years and 8 months.
(13) COSTS
162. The applicant has not been found to be the age she claims and has therefore lost this judicial review.
163. The applicant shall pay the respondent’s reasonable costs of the claim incurred with the sum payable to be determined in accordance with Regulation 16 of the Civil Legal Aid (Costs) Regulations 2013.

K. A. Khan

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

15 October 2026

Postscript to the Decision

Following circulation of the draft decision, the parties informed the Tribunal of the existence of a case note from Rotherham Metropolitan Borough Council dated 5 June 2024 which was not included in the hearing bundle. The case note records that the applicant and her friend were spoken to when in placement about looking for a GP and having a cake and cola. The parties consider that the case note bears on the applicant’s credibility, in respect of having been given a birthday cake on 5 June 2024, which is addressed, amongst other matters, in the judgment at paragraphs [43]-[74]. However, the parties are agreed there is no error of law in the judgement. The Tribunal is grateful to the parties for bringing this matter to its attention. Having considered the contents of the case note, we are of the view that it is immaterial to the judgment outcome.