Tribunal decisions

The decision

Case No: JR-2025-LON-002648
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
(IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER)
Field House,
Breams Buildings
London, EC4A 1WR

22 January 2026
Before:

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE McWILLIAM
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE NORTON-TAYLOR

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Between:

THE KING
on the application of
Hemanshi Hitendrakumar Panchal

Applicant
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SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
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Mr A Badar
(instructed by Saj Legal), for the applicant

Ms H Burton
(instructed by the Government Legal Department) for the respondent

Hearing date: 22 January 2026

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J U D G M E N T

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Judge McWilliam:

Introduction
1. The Applicant seeks to challenge by way of judicial review the decision of the Respondent dated 26 November 2024 (“the decision”) to refuse her application for leave to remain (LTR) as a student which was upheld on Administrative Review (AR) dated 9 June 2025. Upper Tribunal Judge Lodato granted permission on 22 October 2025.
2. The Respondent refused the application because in her application form the Applicant answered “no” to whether she had ever been refused a visa. The parties agreed that the answer given by the Applicant was incorrect because on 20 February 2024 she applied for LTR as a Skilled Worker. The application was refused on 21 February 2024 under Part 9 of the Immigration Rules (“the rules”) because the Applicant submitted a false Certificate of Sponsorship (CoS) which attracts an automatic refusal period of up to 10 years starting from the date of the refusal. The Applicant was given the opportunity to apply for AR and did not do so. On 13 March 2024 she made another application for LTR as a Skilled Worker. The application was refused on 14 March 2024 on the basis that the Applicant, again, submitted a false CoS. Again, she was given the opportunity to apply for AR and did not do so.
Background
3. In these proceedings the Applicant says that she did not know about the previous refusals of 21 February 2024 or 14 March 2024. She relies on a witness statement of 7 August 2025. The Applicant says that she relied on a “recruiter” called Deep Gopalbhai Patel to make the applications on her behalf. She believed that both applications had been withdrawn. She first became aware of the allegations of deception when she received the decision of 26 November 2024.
4. As regards the first application, Mr Patel told the Applicant that there was an employer in the UK wanting to recruit a receptionist. On this basis she decided to switch from a student visa to a skilled worker visa. The Applicant returned to India to make the application. Mr Patel “handled everything” on her behalf. The Applicant gave Mr Patel her email login details after which time she no longer had access to her email address. On 26 February 2024 the Applicant lost access to her Google account. Mr Patel told her that the application was being processed. He misinformed the Applicant that he had withdrawn the application because she had not submitted a police character certificate.
5. Mr Patel made a second application on the Applicant’s behalf using his own email address. The Applicant told Mr Patel to withdraw her application. Unbeknown to the Applicant he did not follow her instructions. The Applicant still had extant student leave. She returned to the UK.
6. Mr Patel has made a statement dated 5 August 2025 for the purpose of these proceedings in which he admits that he “withheld and deleted important correspondence from the Home Office and misled [the Applicant] about the outcome of her application”.
Grounds of Judicial Review
7. The sole ground of review is that the decision and the AR are procedurally unfair because the Applicant was denied a fair and proper opportunity (“a minded to opportunity”) to explain to the Respondent before the decision was made why she answered “no” when asked if she had previously been refused a visa. The AR procedure did not provide her with this opportunity.
The Immigration Rules (“the rules”)
Immigration Rules Part 9: Grounds for Refusal
8. Grounds for refusal:
“9.7.1. An application for entry clearance, permission to enter or permission to stay may be refused where, in relation to the application, or in order to obtain documents from the Secretary of State or a third party provided in support of the application:
(a) false representations are made, or false documents or false information submitted (whether or not relevant to the application, and whether or not to the applicant’s knowledge); or
(b) relevant facts are not disclosed.
9.7.2. An application for entry clearance, permission to enter or permission to stay must be refused where the decision maker can prove that it is more likely than not the applicant used deception in the application.
Previous breach of immigration laws grounds
9.8.1. An application for entry clearance or permission to enter must be refused if:
(a) the applicant has previously breached immigration laws; and
(b) the application is for entry clearance or permission to enter and it was made within the relevant time period in paragraph 9.8.7.
9.8.2. An application for entry clearance or permission to enter may be refused where:
(a) the applicant has previously breached immigration laws; and
(b) the application was made outside the relevant time period in paragraph 9.8.7; and
(c) the applicant has previously contrived in a significant way to frustrate the intention of the rules, or there are other aggravating circumstances (in addition to the immigration breach), such as a failure to cooperate with the redocumentation process, such as using a false identity, or a failure to comply with enforcement processes, such as failing to report, or absconding.
9.8.3. An application for permission to stay may be refused where a person has previously failed to comply with the conditions of their permission, unless permission has been granted in the knowledge of the previous breach.
9.8.3A. Unless 9.8.1. applies, an application for entry clearance, permission to enter or permission to stay may be refused where a person used deception in relation to a previous application (whether or not successfully).
9.8.4. In paragraphs 9.8.1, 9.8.2, 9.8.3, and 9.8.3A, a person will only be treated as having previously breached immigration laws if, when they were aged 18 or older, they:
(a) overstayed their permission and neither paragraph 9.8.5. nor paragraph 9.8.6. apply; or
(b) breached a condition attached to their permission and entry clearance or further permission was not subsequently granted in the knowledge of the breach; or
(c) were (or still are) an illegal entrant; or
(d) used deception in relation to an application (whether or not successfully).”
Administrative Review
9. The rules concerning administrative review at the material time read as follows:
“AR 3.3. Where evidence which was not before the original decision maker is submitted with the application for administrative review, the reviewer will only consider that evidence where the eligible decision was:
(a) a decision under Part 9 on or before 10 November 2025 or Part Suitability of these rules to refuse an application on the grounds of false representations or deception; or
(b) a decision under Part 9 on or before 10 November 2025 or Part Suitability of these rules, to cancel entry clearance, permission to enter or permission to stay on the grounds of false representations or deception; or
(c) a decision to refuse an application for entry clearance under Part 9 on or before 10 November or Part Suitability of these rules on the grounds of a previous breach of immigration laws; or
(d) a decision not to request specified documents under paragraph 245AA of these rules; or
(e) a failure to follow the evidential flexibility policy published on gov.uk.
AR 3.4. Where evidence would be admissible under AR 3.3, the reviewer may contact the applicant to request further information and specify a reasonable timeframe for receipt of that information.
AR 3.5. Where the requested information is not provided within the timeframe specified, the reviewer may consider the administrative review on the available information”.
The Law
10. Section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 (“s.31 (2A)”) reads as follows:
“The High Court—
(a) must refuse to grant relief on an application for judicial review, and
(b) may not make an award under subsection (4) on such an application,
if it appears to the court to be highly likely that the outcome for the applicant would not have been substantially different if the conduct complained of had not occurred”.
11. The parties relied on a joint authorities bundle. The relevant authorities upon which the parties rely are as follows: R (Balajigari) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 673; R (Wahid) v Entry Clearance Officer [2021] EWCA Civ 346; R (on the application of Tazeem) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWHC 1828; R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Ex parte Doody [1994] 1 AC 531; R (on the application of Karagul) v Secretary of State [2020] EWHC 3208; R (Naidu) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] EWCA Civ 156; EK (Ivory Coast) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] EWCA Civ 1517; Mansur (immigration adviser’s failings: Article 8) Bangladesh [2018] UKUT 274.
Submissions
12. We summarise the parties’ submissions. It was agreed by the parties that decisions made under paras 9.7.1(b) and 9.8.3A of the rules do not require a finding of dishonesty. They are strict suitability requirements. The parties agreed that a minded to opportunity was not required under these paragraphs. As regards a decision under para 9.7.2, which requires a finding of dishonesty, both parties agreed that whether a minded to opportunity is required before a decision is made is fact specific.
13. Mr Badar contended that the decision in this case was made under para 9.7.2 and that the Applicant should have been given a minded to opportunity. Mr Badar’s submissions evolved during the hearing. He conceded that in addition to para 9.7.2, the application was refused under paras 9.7.1(b) and 9.8.3A. Notwithstanding this, he contended that we should consider the substance of the decision. He contended that the grounds are inextricably linked, and the procedural error in failing to give the Applicant a minded to opportunity in relation to para 9.7.2 infects the entire decision. Mr Badar contended that in a case of multiple grounds of refusal, under Part 9, where there is public law error, because one ground should attract a minded to opportunity when it is not followed, the whole decision fails. Mr Badar cautioned us against applying s.31(2A), reminding us of the high threshold.
14. Ms Burton accepted that one of the grounds for the refusal was under para 9.7.2. She said that in the circumstances fairness did not demand that the Applicant should have been given a minded to opportunity. She said that the application was additionally refused under paras 9.7.1(b) and 9.8.3A which do not require an applicant to be given a minded to opportunity. She said that, in any event, if there was procedural unfairness s.31(2A) applied. Moreover the evidence on which the Applicant now relies to explain her position is deficient.
The decision of 26 November 2024
15. The salient parts read as follows:
“Our records show you previously applied for Permission to Enter the UK on 20 Feb 2024 and 14 Mar 2024, however, both applications were refused for providing false documentation with the intention to deceive in obtaining documents from the Secretary of State.
Furthermore, you failed to disclose the previous refusals on this application, therefore it has been determined that further deception has been used with the intent to deceive due to answering ‘No’ to the following questions, which was [sic] asked on your application form.
For either the UK or any other country, have you ever been:
• refused a visa.
…
Have you ever:
…
• given false information when applying for a visa, leave to enter, or leave to remain
• breached UK immigration law in any other way
Furthermore, you attracted a mandatory refusal period of 10 years, which started from the date of the original refusal, 21 Feb 2024. Therefore, your application does not meet the suitability requirements, and the mandatory refusal period is still in effect.
Your application has been refused under paragraph ST 2.1 of the Immigration Rules, Appendix Student, 9.7.1.(b), 9.7.2., 9.8.3.A and 9.8.4.(d) of the Immigration Rules, Part 9: Grounds for Refusal …”
The AR decision of 9 June 2025
16. The salient parts of the AR decision read as follows: -
“Consideration has been given to the points that you have raised, it is noted that you state that in your previous application for entry clearance were refused under part 9.7.2 you have raised that you should have been issued with a minded to refuse notice. However, it should be noted that the purpose of an administrative review is limited to an assessment of the original decision, which was a refusal of your application for permission to stay on the Student route. It is not within the administrative review process to review your previous applications and therefore the case that you cite is not applicable to your case.
Having reviewed the circumstances of your case I am satisfied that within your application for permission to stay on the student route, you answered ‘no’ when asked if you had ever been refused a visa etc. Furthermore, your previous entry clearance applications were refused under part 9.7.2.
Therefore, I am satisfied that the original decision maker was correct to refuse your application under Paragraph ST 2.1 of the Immigration Rules, Appendix Student, 9.7.1. (b), 9.7.2., 9.8.3.A and 9.8.4. (d) of the Immigration Rules, Part 9: Grounds for Refusal.”
Conclusions
17. Having considered the decision, we are in no doubt that the application was refused on three grounds. Mr Badar conceded this. In the paragraph commencing with “Our records show...” (p209 of the JR bundle) we identify the first ground under para 9.7.1(b) of the rules; namely, that the Applicant did not disclose relevant facts, in this case the two previous refusals. The following paragraph on the same page which starts with the word “Furthermore” discloses the second ground of refusal under para 9.7.2. It is a refusal on the ground that the Applicant used deception by answering “No” to questions untruthfully.
18. On the following page of the decision (p210 of the JR bundle) the paragraph reading “Furthermore you attracted a mandatory refusal period of 10 years….” is the third ground of refusal, under paras 9.8.3A and 9.8.4, which is that the applicant does not meet the suitability requirements and that the mandatory refusal period which started from the date of the original refusal on 21 February 2024 is still in effect.
19. We turn to whether procedural fairness in this case demanded that the Respondent should have given the Applicant a minded to opportunity before refusing the application under para 9.7.2. The Applicant was given the opportunity to apply for AR, which she did. The Applicant relies on various authorities to support that she should have been given a minded to opportunity.
20. In general, following where an allegation of dishonesty is relied on, procedural fairness demands that the allegation should be put in clear terms to the affected person in advance of the decision. In Balajigari the Court of Appeal found, on the facts of the case, that the AR procedure did not satisfy the requirements of procedural fairness. The case concerned challenges to decisions of the Respondent to refuse applications pursuant to para 322(5) of the rules before giving applicants an opportunity to respond to allegations of deception. The Court said as follows;
“58. Ms Anderson also submitted that a ‘minded to’ procedure was unnecessary in the present context (unlike in naturalisation cases following Ex p Fayed) because under paragraphs 34L—34Y and Appendix AR of the Immigration Rules there is now available a procedure for administrative review following an initial refusal of ILR. We do not accept that the availability of that procedure satisfies the requirements of procedural fairness, for the following reasons.
59. In the first place, although sometimes the duty to act fairly may not require a fair process to be followed before a decision is reached (as was made clear by Lord Mustill in the passage in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex p Doody [1994] 1 AC 531 which we have quoted earlier: see para 45), fairness will usually require that to be done where that is feasible for practical and other reasons. In Bank Mellat v HM Treasury (No 2) [2014] AC 700, Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury PSC (after having cited at para 178 the above passage from Ex p Doody) said, at para 179:
‘In my view, the rule is that, before a statutory power is exercised, any person who foreseeably would be significantly detrimentally affected by the exercise should be given the opportunity to make representations in advance, unless (i) the statutory provisions concerned expressly or impliedly provide otherwise or (ii) the circumstances in which the power is to be exercised would render it impossible, impractical or pointless to afford such an opportunity. I would add that any argument advanced in support of impossibility, impracticality or pointlessness should be very closely examined, as a court will be slow to hold that there is no obligation to give the opportunity, when such an obligation is not dispensed with in the relevant statute’.
60. This leads to the proposition that, unless the circumstances of a particular case make this impracticable, the ability to make representations only after a decision has been taken will usually be insufficient to satisfy the demands of common law procedural fairness. The rationale for this proposition lies in the underlying reasons for having procedural fairness in the first place. It is conducive to better decision-making because it ensures that the decision-maker is fully informed at a point when a decision is still at a formative stage. It also shows respect for the individual whose interests are affected, who will know that they have had the opportunity to influence a decision before it is made. Another rationale is no doubt that, if a decision has already been made, human nature being what it is, the decision-maker may unconsciously and in good faith tend to be defensive over the decision to which he or she has previously come. In the related context of the right to be consulted, in Sinfield v London Transport Executive [1970] Ch 550, 558, Sachs LJ made reference to the need to avoid the decision-maker’s mind becoming ‘unduly fixed’ before representations are made. He said:
‘any right to be consulted is something that is indeed valuable and should be implemented by giving those who have the right an opportunity to be heard at the formative stage of proposals before the mind of the executive becomes unduly fixed’.
61. More fundamentally, it is a central feature of the administrative review procedure, stated at paragraph AR2.4 of Appendix AR, that the reviewer will not consider any evidence that was not before the original decision-maker except in certain specified cases (broadly described as the correction of case-working errors). That means that the applicant would normally only be able to assert that he or she had not been dishonest but would not be permitted to adduce evidence in support of that assertion. That limited type of legal review is clearly inadequate here. It is precisely because the applicant had no notice of the Secretary of State’s concerns that he or she had no opportunity to put evidence before the original decision-maker”.
21. In Karagul the decisions under challenge were made in relation to the rights to apply for LTR under the Agreement establishing an Association between the European Community and Turkey (“the Ankara Agreement”). The SSHD refused the claimants’ applications because she was not satisfied that they wished to genuinely establish in business. The decisions were maintained on AR. The court analysed the AR procedure. In the claimants’ circumstances AR did not allow for them to put new evidence before the decision maker. Saini J said at para 102 and 103 as follows:
“102. In my judgment, the Balajigari judgment is an application of well-established general principles and is not to be regarded (as the Secretary of State submits) as a decision simply about unfairness in a specific set of circumstances. Based on that decision, and also the decision of Martin Spencer J in R (Shahbaz Khan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] UKUT 384 (IAC) (which I respectfully record I have found to be of considerable assistance) there is in my judgment a general public law principle in operation in the cases.
103. I summarise that general principle as follows but with the caveat that its application will of necessity be modified depending on the terms of the statutory regime:
(1) Where a public authority exercising an administrative power to grant or refuse an application proposes to make a decision that the applicant for some right, benefit or status may have been dishonest in their application or has otherwise acted in bad faith (or disreputably) in relation to the application, common law fairness will generally require at least the following safeguards to be observed. Either the applicant is given a chance in a form of interview to address the claimed wrongdoing, or a form of written minded to process, should be followed which allows representations on the specific matter to be made prior to a final decision.”
22. In Wahid the applicant submitted an application for a visitor visa in order to attend his wife’s graduation ceremony in London. He was asked, amongst other things, whether he had ever had in the UK a criminal conviction or a penalty for a driving offence or “a caution, warning, reprimand or other penalty”. In answer, he declared a driving conviction but made no reference to having been cautioned for possessing a dangerous article. His application was refused on the basis that he had made a false representation. Mr Wahid said that he was wholly unaware of any caution in respect of the butterfly knife which was said to be a dangerous article. He did not have a right of AR. Carr LJ stated at [32] as follows:
“I am persuaded, broadly for the reasons identified by Mr Gajjar, that it is arguable that, where an ECO harbours suspicions of dishonesty, procedural fairness requires the applicant to have the opportunity to respond. The Judge was wrong to conclude otherwise. This is an important point which does not appear to have been considered directly in any of the authorities to date”.
23. In Tazeem the claimant was given leave to enter and remain in the UK for a course of study which was conditional on the claimant demonstrating a sufficient command of English. The claimant provided the university with documents certifying that he had passed various tests for proficiency in English. He was interviewed by immigration officers on arrival in the UK. They took the view that his command of English was poor and referred him for further interviews. Following a second interview a decision was taken to cancel his leave on the basis that his English language was not what he had represented it to be and following this the Respondent concluded that the documents provided by the applicant to certify his proficiency in English were not genuine. The applicant in judicial review proceedings contended that he had not been provided with a notice of the concern about the authenticity of the documents provided and that the Respondent in that case had adopted an unfair procedure. Deputy High Court Judge, Tim Smith, found that the allegation had not clearly been put to the claimant during the interview. With reference to Karagul, he said as follows:
“55. Mr Justice Saini concluded at [126]:
‘126. The rejection of the applications on this basis was reached without affording the Claimants a fair process at common law in that: (a) the original decision of the Secretary of State was made without giving the Claimants the opportunity to address such a serious allegation; and (b) as was common ground before me, the system of AR expressly prevented the Claimants from submitting any additional evidence to the reviewer in answering this allegation.
127. As to relief, the Secretary of State invited me to consider the issue of materiality. I have considered whether one might contend the above unfairness had no material effect on the outcome of the applications and I have paid particular regard to the helpful summary of the principles at [131]-[136] of Balajigari.
128. It seems to me that two points might be made by the Secretary of State. First, that the applications would have been refused on the merits even if the comments about intention were not made; and second, that a process of interview or ‘minded to’ decision would not have made any difference to the Secretary of State’s conclusion on the substance of the applications.
129. I reject both of these arguments. In my judgment, it is not possible with confidence to say that the Secretary of State’s conclusion as to the true intentions of the applicants would have had no impact upon their rejection on the merits. Equally, I also cannot say with confidence that allowing the Claimants to make submissions (and to submit additional evidence) would have made no difference to the outcome. The errors were material”.
24. In both Wahid and Tazeem the applicants were not given an opportunity to ask for AR. The Court of Appeal was critical of the AR procedure in Karagul and Balajigari. A significant reason given by the court in both cases was that the AR procedure did not afford the applicant with an opportunity to rely on further evidence to be considered on AR.
25. The facts in the cases on which the Applicant relies can be distinguished from those in her case. The premise of her case is that she was not given the opportunity to put forward evidence in the AR procedure. However, this misunderstands the rules applicable at the time. They afforded her the opportunity to submit further evidence (see AR 3.3 (a)). While the hyperlinks in the decision do not directly reference the applicable rules, these are accessible to an applicant. It is reasonable to assume that this Applicant would familiarise herself with them and that her professional representatives would be aware of them.
26. The thrust of the Applicant’s AR grounds is that she should have been given a minded to opportunity. The Applicant relied on Wahid. An absence of an opportunity to respond to the excessive 10-year ban is also raised. The same points are made by the Applicant’s representatives in a separate document entitled “Grounds for Administrative Review”. The PAP letter makes the same points.
27. The first time that the Applicant mentioned that she used an agent to make previous entry clearance applications and was unaware of the previous refusals was when she issued these judicial review proceeding. This was not mentioned in the AR grounds or PAP letter. With the application for judicial review, she relied on her witness statement and that of Mr Patel. No reason has been forthcoming to explain why the Applicant did not raise these matters earlier. On her own evidence she became aware of the refusal decision on 26 November 2024.
28. We do not accept on the specific facts of this case that fairness demanded that the Applicant be given a minded to opportunity. Unlike the applicants in the cases on which the Applicant relies, the AR procedure gave her the opportunity to submit further evidence.
29. We take on board that in Balajigari the Court of Appeal gave other reasons to explain the shortcomings of the AR procedure; 1) a minded to opportunity is conducive to better decision making: 2) the court warned against defensive decision making and “unduly fixed” mindsets and 3) a minded to opportunity shows respect to the Applicant. It is our view that the opportunity given to this Applicant to submit further documents/evidence goes a long way to address the general concerns about the procedure. In respect of any criticism of the AR decision in this case, this must be considered in context. In the AR grounds her explanation on which she now relies was not forthcoming. She simply relied on a general fairness ground based on shortcomings in the AR procedure.
30. Reliance by the Applicant on Naidu is misconceived. There was nothing relied on by the Applicant with the application or AR review which could potentially undermine the earlier decisions. The Applicant did not proffer an innocent explanation supported by evidence which could potentially undermine the earlier decisions.

31. We will briefly engage with Mr Badar’s submission that had we found that the Respondent’s decision under paras 9.7.2 was procedurally unfair because she has not been given a minded to opportunity, the whole decision cannot stand. That submission cannot be right for the simple reason that the ground of refusal based on para 9.7.1(b) was distinct from that under para 9.7.2 and the former was not predicated on a finding of dishonesty, which in turn meant that no minded to opportunity was required. Even if we took the view that the submission had potential merit, it could only have been made good if the Applicant had submitted or would have submitted further evidence capable of undermining the previous decisions and findings of deception had she been given a minded to opportunity before the decision was made. In these circumstances the case of Naidu may have been of more relevance. We also recognise that para 9.7.1 is discretionary and para 9.8.3A is not always mandatory. However, for the reasons set out at [33] below, the Applicant’s post-decision evidence falls far short of establishing an evidential base capable of undermining the Respondent finding of deception.

32. Had we found that there was a procedural error of law infecting the whole decision, Ms Burton contended we should apply s.31(2A). We are cognisant of authorities including R (Hippolyte) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA 1493 and what is said about straying into “forbidden territory”. Mr Badar also relied on R (TJ Trading Express Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWHC Civ 1274 (permission has been granted by the Court of Appeal in this case).

33. We do not need to decide whether to apply s.31(2A). However, we note the problems with the Applicant’s account as highlighted by the Respondent in her skeleton argument at [21]-[25]. We would make the following observations about the evidence on which the Applicant relies to support that Mr Patel is responsible for any wrongdoing. Mansur (immigration adviser’s failings: Article 8) Bangladesh [2018] UKUT 00274 (IAC) concerns poor immigration advice in the context of Article 8 and the weight to attach to the public interest. In that case the Appellant produced evidence from OISC described by the Upper Tribunal as “highly material” that the advisers had failed to follow his blatant instructions. This Applicant’s case bears little if any resemblance to Mr Mansur’s. Mr Patel is not a legal adviser. The Applicant refers to him as a “recruiter”. He does not say in his statement in what capacity he assisted the Applicant. He is not an agent let alone an immigration adviser in whom it would be reasonable to place trust. There is no indication that he runs a business. There is nothing to support that he is anything other than a private individual who “helped” the Applicant. The Applicant cannot absolve responsibility for applications she has made through Mr Patel. She is an adult. We have not been told of any vulnerabilities so that she lacks capacity. She chose for Mr Patel to make two applications on her behalf. It is her responsibility to ensure that the information given to the Home Office is accurate and that documents submitted in support of the application are genuine. It is reasonable to expect her to have taken more care.
34. Judicial review is refused.

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