JR-2025-LON-003578

• Status of case: Unreported
• Hearing date: 09 Jul 2026
• Promulgation date: 29 Sep 2026
• Publication date: 05 Oct 2026
• Last updated on: 05 Oct 2026

The decision

JR-2025-LON-003578
In the Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber)
Judicial Review

In the matter of an application for Judicial Review

The King on the application of
Rushita Maheshbhai Korat
Applicant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

ORDER


BEFORE Upper Tribunal Judge Khan

HAVING considered all documents lodged and having heard Ms S Naik KC and Mr A Rehman of counsel, instructed by Lawfare Solicitors, for the Applicant and Mr J Yetman of counsel, instructed by GLD, for the Respondent at a hearing held on 09 July 2026.

UPON the Applicant lodging this application for judicial review seeking to challenge the Respondent’s decision dated 12 July 2025 refusing her visit visa on grounds of deception,

AND UPON the Tribunal handing down judgment on the Applicant’s judicial review application on 28 September 2026,

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

(1) The application for judicial review is dismissed for the reasons in the attached judgment.

(2) The Applicant shall pay the Respondent’s reasonable costs of the judicial review claim, to be assessed on the standard basis if not agreed.

(3) The Applicant is to file and serve written submissions in respect of any application for permission to appeal by 4pm on 23 September 2026.

(4) The Respondent to file any submissions in response to any application to appeal by 4pm on 25 September 2026.

(5) Pursuant to CPR rule 52.12(2)(a) it is directed that the time by which the Applicant must file any appellant’s notice in the Court of Appeal is extended to 21 days after service of the Tribunal’s written decision in respect of permission to appeal. However, if no application for permission to appeal is made, the period in CPR rule 52.12(2)(b) applies.

(6) Permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal is refused because the Tribunal is satisfied that the Applicant’s grounds of appeal dated 23 September 2026 amount to no more than a mere disagreement with the Tribunal’s judgment and would not have a realistic prospect of success. This case does not raise any important point of principle capable of wider application. Rather, the decision is fact-sensitive and simply represents the application of well-established public law principles of fairness to the specific factual matrix of the case. Contrary to the grounds there are no arguable errors of law. This is for the following reasons:

(a) Ground 1 is misconceived and seeks to open a ground which was not before the Tribunal. The applicant’s counsel specifically stated at the hearing that the applicant was not challenging the respondent’s policy but only the application of the policy to the applicant’s case [26(g)] & [69]. The Tribunal’s analysis is consistent with the respondent’s Guidance and the lawful manner of its application to the applicant’s case. As to the issue of ‘significant detriment’ the Tribunal carefully considered the applicant’s factual circumstances and properly contrasted it with the situation in Kaur [65] & [78].

(b) Ground 2 is not arguable. The decision in Kaur was properly distinguished on its facts at [73] - [83]. Furthermore, it is evident from the language of the decision that the Tribunal proceeded on the basis that the Applicant was made subject to the imposition of a ban up to ten years [61]. The Tribunal was not required to set out every submission made before it by counsel as suggested by the applicant at [16] of the grounds of appeal. The task of the Tribunal was to resolve the material issues before it, which are adequately addressed and reasoned throughout the decision.

(c) Ground 3 is not arguable. This applicant simply seeks to reargue her case rather than identifying any arguable and material errors of law.


Signed: K.A.Khan

Upper Tribunal Judge Khan

Dated: 28 September 2026


The date on which this order was sent is given below


For completion by the Upper Tribunal Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Sent / Handed to the applicant, respondent and any interested party / the applicant's, respondent’s and any interested party’s solicitors on (date): 29/09/2026

Solicitors:
Ref No.
Home Office Ref:


Notification of appeal rights

A decision by the Upper Tribunal on an application for judicial review is a decision that disposes of proceedings.

A party may appeal against such a decision to the Court of Appeal on a point of law only. Any party who wishes to appeal should apply to the Upper Tribunal for permission at the hearing at which the decision is given. If no application is made, the Tribunal must nonetheless consider at the hearing whether to give or refuse permission to appeal (rule 44(4B) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008).

If the Tribunal refuses permission, either in response to an application or by virtue of rule 44(4B), then the party wishing to appeal can apply for permission from the Court of Appeal itself. This must be done by filing an appellant’s notice with the Civil Appeals Office of the Court of Appeal within 28 days of the date the Tribunal’s decision on permission to appeal was sent (Civil Procedure Rules Practice Direction 52D 3.3).



Case No: JR-2025-LON-003578
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
(IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER)
Field House,
Breams Buildings
London, EC4A 1WR

28 September 2026

Before:

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KHAN

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Between:

THE KING
on the application of
Rushita Maheshbhai Korat
Applicant
- and -

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

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Ms Sonali Naik KC and Mr Arif Rehman
(instructed by Lawfare Solicitors), for the applicant

Mr Joshua Yetman
(instructed by the Government Legal Department) for the respondent

Hearing date: 09 July 2026

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J U D G M E N T

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JUDGE KHAN:
1. This judgment concerns the content and extent of the duty of fairness required to be shown by an Entry Clearance Officer (“ECO”) in circumstances where an allegation of deception is made against an entry clearance applicant who would likely become subject to mandatory refusal of future applications as a result of a finding of deception.
Background
2. By way of an application filed on 11 October 2025, the applicant seeks to challenge the respondent’s decision dated 12 July 2025 (“the decision”) to refuse the applicant’s application for entry clearance as a visitor under paragraph 9.7.2. of Part 9 of the Immigration Rules.
3. The background to this challenge can be summarised briefly in the following manner. The applicant is a national of India. On 23 June 2025, the applicant submitted an application to visit the United Kingdom between 10-20 July 2025 to attend her husband’s graduation ceremony. This was scheduled for 14 July 2025. The applicant was not self-funding, and the expectation was that her UK visit would be funded by her husband.
4. The applicant engaged a third-party agent, Golden Eagle Visa Consultancy, to assist her with making the visa application.
5. The applicant’s visa application form (“VAF”) was submitted without any indication of the involvement or assistance from a third party agent and contained a declaration stating that to the best of her knowledge and belief the information relating to the application and the supporting evidence was correct, and, that the applicant understood that if false information was given, that the application could be refused and that she may be prosecuted and banned from the UK.
6. By a decision letter dated 12 July 2025, the respondent refused the visa application on the basis of using deception pursuant to the mandatory grounds of paragraph 9.7.2. of Part 9 of the Immigration Rules. Within that decision it was mentioned that the applicant had submitted financial material with her application described as certificates issued by “Saharayn Universal Multipurpose Society Limited” (account numbers ending 0541, 0540, 0539) which sought to demonstrate the applicant’s financial position. The account information was subsequently deemed non-genuine because the certificate numbers were found to be duplicates matching another application. The decision letter further stated that the ECO was satisfied, on balance that the document had been submitted with an intention to deceive because the document referenced was in the applicant’s name and directly referred to her own personal finances and circumstances.
7. On 21 July 2025, the applicant sent a pre-action letter to the respondent pursuant to the Judicial Review Pre-Action Protocol process (“PAP”). The applicant’s position was that she was the victim of her visa agent’s negligence, whose staff had mistakenly uploaded the false document which was in fact a “training template”.
8. On 04 August 2025, the respondent responded defending the decision on the basis that the ECO was satisfied that the applicant had used deception in her application.
9. The applicant subsequently produced a letter dated 8 October 2025 from the Golden Eagle Visa Consultancy which confirmed that the applicant had not provided, reviewed, or approved the uploading of the false document. The applicant also provided a copy of a police complaint that she lodged on 25 September 2025 against the visa agent for fraud and forgery.
10. On 11 October 2025, the applicant sought judicial review of the decision of 12 July 2025. Three grounds of review were pleaded. In summary, the first ground submits that the decision was procedurally unfair for failing to seek clarification prior to refusing the applicant; second, the decision was unlawful for failing to act in line with policy guidance and, thirdly, the respondent acted irrationally and unreasonably in refusing the application under paragraph 9.7.2. of the Immigration Rules.
11. Permission was granted on all three grounds by Upper Tribunal Judge Hirst on 10 February 2026.
12. The judge granting permission made the following remarks:
3. The grounds are arguable. It is arguable in particular that the submission of a false document did not automatically establish an intention to deceive on the part of the Applicant and that given the severity of the consequences of refusal, fairness required further investigation prior to a decision on the application.
Application to Rely on Additional Evidence
13. UTJ Hirst issued standard directions when she granted permission. This provided that the respondent was to file and serve detailed grounds within 35 days of the Order being sent. The applicant was then to file and serve any reply and any application to rely on further evidence within 14 days of service of the detailed grounds.
14. The respondent’s detailed grounds of defence were filed on 07 April 2026. At [35]-[39] the respondent set out her written submissions on the ‘Materiality of the Self-Serving Evidence’ and clearly referenced her reliance on section 31(2A) Senior Courts Act 1981.
15. Pursuant to the standard directions, the applicant was therefore required to file any reply and additional evidence by 21 April 2026. No reply to the detailed grounds nor any application to file additional evidence was made on or before that date.
16. The applicant sought and was granted a short extension to file the hearing bundle and skeleton argument by 01 July 2026. The applicant explained the delay arose because the applicant’s skeleton argument was not finalised until 30 June 2026 due to unforeseen difficulties concerning the availability of instructed counsel and difficulties concerning funds which delayed instructions.
17. At the hearing, Ms Naik, indicated that an application to admit further documentary evidence would be filed imminently, comprising a further witness statement from the applicant and copies of the original bank statements provided by the applicant to the visa agent. She argued that the ‘materiality’ point under section 31(2A) Senior Courts Act 1981 had not been properly pleaded earlier in the respondent’s detailed grounds and therefore the applicant had not been afforded a fair opportunity to put in a reply.
18. In response at the hearing, and later in his written submissions dated 27 July 2026, Mr Yetman on behalf of the respondent submitted that the application should be refused as it was simply made too late, and that the applicant’s detailed submissions post-hearing should have been made as part of a Reply to the Respondent’s detailed Grounds and, in any event within the applicant’s skeleton argument. In short, he submitted the applicant was now trying to build and advance their case on section 31(2A) Senior Courts Act 1981 impermissibly post-facto.
19. No decision was made at the hearing. I indicated to the parties that I would make my decision on the applicant’s application in the course of my judgement.
20. I have carefully considered the applicant’s application issued on 09 July 2026 to admit further documentary evidence. In considering this matter, I have noted from Ms Naik’s written submissions dated 22 July 2026 (submitted pursuant to paragraph 2 of my Directions promulgated on 10 July 2026) that she states at [3]: “As it now stands the application [she] filed on the 09 July 2026 to admit her witness statement of the same date exhibiting those documents is no longer required (despite the Respondent’s objection to it in the letter dated 16 July 2026 enclosing some of those very same documents).”
21. Despite Ms Naik’s submissions that the application filed is no longer required, the application has not been withdrawn and remains extant and therefore requires the Tribunal’s determination. I also note that the bank statements which the application sought to admit were already provided with applicant’s VAF which disclosure was made by the respondent pursuant to my Directions of 10 July 2026.
22. Having considered the parties’ respective submissions, I refuse the application for the following reasons. Firstly, the respondent’s detailed grounds of defence unarguably put the applicant on notice of the respondent’s position on section 31(2A) Senior Courts Act 1981 before the hearing. Accordingly, any Reply or request to admit additional evidence should have been made on or before 21 April 2026. This was not done.
23. The application has been made late, and no extension of time has been formally sought on the face of the application: see Denton v TH White [2014] EWCA Civ 906. In any event, the explanation advanced by Ms Naik is that the detailed grounds of defence inadequately pleaded the section 31(2A) Senior Courts Act 1981 matter. As I have already stated, I do not accept that explanation. No other adequate explanation has been advanced for the lack of timeliness.
24. Secondly, it is indeed a very strange turn of events whereby the applicant seeks to adduce documentary evidence which she says should have been disclosed by the respondent in accordance with the duty of candour, when those very same documents were attached to the applicant’s VAF, and, presumably amounts to material that remains in her possession.
25. Thirdly, there is a need for procedural rigour in judicial review proceedings. The applicant has been legally represented throughout these proceedings. No adequate explanation has been provided for the delay in making the application to admit additional documentary evidence. The Administrative Court Guide 2025 emphasises at section [2] the importance of procedural rigour and adherence to court directions, noting in particular, that applications are to be made at the earliest stage possible and not left to the last minute as has happened in this case: See R (Spahiu) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] EWCA 2604.
Submissions
26. In her oral submissions, Ms Naik argued, in summary, the following points drawing on the filed skeleton argument which I acknowledge was authored by respective counsel, Mr Jefferji and Mr Rehman.
(a) The respondent’s core position is if a false document is submitted as part of the VAF, there is no obligation to bring it to the attention of the applicant. This issue was at the core of the applicant’s case and the respondent’s position was wrong.

(b) The question for the Tribunal to determine was what does “fairness” require in the applicant’s circumstances. In this regard, the authorities of R v SSHD ex parte Doody [1994] 1 AC 531, Bank Mellat v HM Treasury [2013] UKSC 39; [2014] 1 AC 700, Balajigari v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 673, R (Karagul) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWHC 3208 (Admin) and R (Kaur) v Entry Clearance Officer (New Delhi) [2026] UKUT 80 (IAC) all establish a clear duty to act fairly.

(c) The consequences flowing from a finding of deception were serious and therefore the respondent was required to follow a fair process. Kaur at [68]-[70] supports the applicant’s assertion that there is no proper distinction to be struck between entry clearance and indefinite leave to remain (“ILR”) cases in respect of the respondent’s duty of fairness. Whether the applicant is in-country or not does not matter. The decision in Kaur should be followed by the Tribunal.

(d) If a fair process had been adopted by the respondent, the applicant would not have had to bring her claim. It was because a “minded to refuse process” had been followed in Kaur that the applicant’s case failed. None was followed in the instance case.

(e) Where there is an allegation of dishonesty this heightens the need for a minded to process: see R (Wahid) v SSHD [2021] EWCA Civ 346 (Admin) at [31]-[32].

(f) In relation to the respondent’s policy under the section titled ‘Deception by a Third Party’ it identifies relevant factors that need to be considered to determine whether the applicant ought to have known the information was false. In order to answer those questions, it was necessary for the respondent to undertake a fair process which she refuses to consider.

(g) No challenge is made to the respondent’s policy per se, but only to the application of the policy. This is one of those “rare” entry clearance cases where the respondent should have applied a “minded to process” because the information was unknown to the applicant and she did not have access to the source material.

(h) Paragraph 9.7.2. of the Immigration Rules requires the decision maker to find “deception” on the balance of probabilities. The applicant accepts that the correct standard of review on judicial review is only for the Tribunal to ask whether it was “reasonably open” to the decision maker on the material before her to find that deception had been used, and not to decide the question of dishonesty for itself: see R v (on the application of Ashrafuzzaman) v Entry Clearance Officer (precedent fact: general grounds refusal) [2022] UKUT 00133 (IAC). However, in this instance the inference drawn was not open on the material before the ECO because the decision letter disclosed no engagement with the applicant’s state of mind and proceeded on the mere fact that because a document concerning her finance was false, that was enough to establish dishonesty. That was an application of the lower threshold which was found to be impermissible in AA (Nigeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] EWCA Civ 773 and Ahmed (general grounds of refusal- material non-disclosure) Pakistan [2011] UKUT 351 (IAC).

(i) Once deception was identified, the respondent should have adopted a fair process and applied a “higher bar” to establish deception. A finding of deception was different from a no-fault finding of falsity itself: see Chanda v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] EWCA Civ 244. In this instance the refusal decision did not reach the high bar required.

(j) In respect of section 31(2A) Senior Courts Act 1981, the test is ‘highly likely’ and no can say that the outcome would have been the same: see Bradbury v Brecon Beacons National Park Authority {2025] EWCA Civ 489 at [71].
27. On behalf of the respondent, Mr Yetman, argued, in summary the following points drawing on the detailed grounds of defence and his skeleton argument. In essence, the respondent submits that her decision was not vitiated by public law error or, in the alternative, that any such error was immaterial.
(a) The Tribunal can and should depart from the decision in Kaur at [70] which held that a minded-to process applied to entry clearance cases. Kaur was wrongly decided. There is a ‘tolerance’ in the instant case. To the extent that a duty arose in Kaur, it did not in this case.

(b) It was essential for the Tribunal to appreciate the architecture surrounding the refusal decision. Paragraph 9.7.2. of Part 9 of the Immigration Rules was a mandatory rule of refusal where deception was found on the balance of probabilities.

(c) Under the Immigration Act 1971 (“the 1971 Act”) the respondent has a broad discretion regarding entry clearance under which was also the source of her power to promulgate policy/guidance. Decisions should therefore be read in a manner consistent with the Act and related Immigration Rules. The respondent’s broad powers under the 1971 Act were not qualified by the terms of the Immigration Rules or published policies/guidance: see Alvi v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] UKSC 33 [2012] 1 WLR 2208 at [41]. In terms of hierarchy between Rules and policy/guidance made under the 1971 Act, the former took precedence where there was a conflict: see (RF) & Another v SSHD [2017] CSOH 130 at [41].

(d) Put simply, the mandatory nature of paragraph 9.7.2. meant that any policy/guidance ought not to be read as modifying or otherwise inserting any mandatory minded-to obligation in every case. The respondent should be afforded a ‘tolerance’ to not apply a minded-to process in every case especially where the respondent has been given power under the 1971 Act to make Rules which are mandatory.

(e) In respect of the principles of fairness set out in R v SSHD, ex parte Doody [1994] 1 AC 531 at [32], it was not unlawful for the respondent to say that those principles do not arise in certain circumstances by dint of the 1971 Act. However, even though the respondent submits that a duty to hold a minded-to process did not arise in this case, the process followed was nonetheless fair. The principles of fairness are not immutable but are context specific.

(f) The applicant’s reliance on Balajigari, R (Karagul) and Kaur was misplaced. The trigger for additional procedural protection in Balajigari was an allegation of dishonesty in relation to an ILR application which was reflective of the practical impact that can result from the refusal of ILR which are of a comparatively more serious nature than in the applicant’s case. Likewise, in R (Karagul) the matter concerned the cancellation of leave to remain and the court observed that a minded-to process will “generally“ be required which means that there is residual discretion not to apply it [103].

(g) The decision in Kaur was of no assistance to the applicant. The phrase “for reasons she could not reasonably have been expected to know about” at [70] was integral to the ratio of that decision and is the principled distinction between that case and the instant case. The applicant here could reasonably be expected to know about the duplicate documentation as there was no mention of any third-party agent being used at the material time within the applicant’s application. The applicant’s post facto evidence could not alter that. Further, the use of “generally” denotes a discretion aligned with R (Karagul). The decision of Wahid should not be followed as it relates to a permission application.

(h) The decision in Bank Mellat was also of no assistance to the applicant. The 10-year ban did not warrant a conclusion that the applicant had been “significantly detrimentally” affected by the decision. It may be undesirable for the applicant but that was insufficient. It was clear from paragraph 9.7.2. that it was meant to operate absent any additional procedural step. In any event, requiring a mandatory prior written minded-to process would render timely immigration control impractical and incompatible with border functions.

(i) In any event, it was possible to depart from Kaur on the following grounds: there had been a reconsideration [11] & [20]; the only common element with the instant case was the third party element but there was no mention of a third-party agent in the instant case; the applicant had a family nucleus in the UK and Germany unlike the instant case which goes to the significantly detrimental effect of the 10 year ban; Kaur accepts that Doody does not give rise to an immutable minded-to principle [55]; the conclusion in Kaur [70] is subject to two caveats, the respondent maintained her refusal notwithstanding the third party fraud and, the duty was a “general” one only.

(j) Turning to the application itself, it was for a graduation so reasonable to infer it was for that limited purpose only. There was no third-party declaration, all the information provided suggested it had been authored by the applicant herself, so it was reasonable for the respondent to rationally conclude that the applicant had completed and submitted it herself. It has never been suggested that the application was “missing” some information.

(k) To the extent that any general duties of procedural fairness applied to the instant case there was no breach, no material breach of the principles of procedural fairness or certainly none which would render the decision unlawful. The applicant had not suffered substantial prejudice as a result of any procedural failing: see Singaram v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 1375.

(l) There was no duty to conduct a minded-to process. In the instant case, there was no detriment to the applicant and the very fact of the Enrichment report showed there was a verifying process that led to a refusal. There was a clear process followed and this was not a situation where the respondent refused the application in the absence of any process. The analysis in the Enrichment report entitled the respondent to conclude that the applicant had used deception. The fact of a 10-year ban is not of itself significantly detrimental because there is no evidence of any impact as there was in Kaur. The respondent’s policy/guidance permitted reliance on a third-party document to meet the test of deception. A third-party document can impugn an applicant. At the material time, there was no indication of third-party agent involvement as the application purported to have been authored and submitted by the applicant and therefore it was rational to conclude there had been deception.

(m) There was no process or outcome irrationality in the refusal decision. The outcome for the applicant would not have been substantially different if the conduct complained of had not occurred because the applicant seeks to blame a third party, which was not disclosed at the time and amounts to an attempt at post-decision rationalisation. In any event, paragraph 9.7.2. permits conclusions as to deception even where a third party is involved.
28. I permitted Ms Naik to respond briefly. She stated that in accordance with the respondent’s duty of candour, confirmation was required from her to show there was no indication of third-party involvement in the preparation and uploading of the applicant’s visa application. As a result of this submission, I gave directions promulgated on 10 July 2026 requiring the respondent to disclose the applicant’s VAF and any supporting documentation. This was fully complied with by the respondent.
29. Ms Naik further submitted that even though the applicant may not have any family in the UK, a 10-year ban would nonetheless serve as a black mark on her profile in future applications to the UK and abroad. In this regard, the refusal letter was wrong to state that “any future entry clearance applications may also be refused under the Immigration Rules for a period of up to ten years (10) years depending on the type of application you make.” In this respect it was clear from reading the Immigration Rules that entry clearance applications to the UK ‘must’ be refused following the imposition of a 10-year ban.
30. The applicant was not saying that the duty of fairness articulated in Kaur at [70] arose in every single case, that was not the applicant’s position. The respondent’s argument that Kaur was distinguishable was not right because the applicant’s husband was still in the UK.
Legal Framework
31. It is common ground between the parties that the issue in this case does not turn on the construction or interpretation of any primary legislation but on paragraph 9.7.2. of Part 9 to the Immigration Rules. The relevant legal framework is therefore the Immigration Rules, any relevant policy or guidance and pertinent jurisprudence.
Immigration Rules
32. Paragraph 9.7.2 of the Immigration Rules Part 9: Grounds for Refusal, provides as follows:
An application for entry clearance, permission to enter or permission to stay must be refused where the decision maker can prove that it is more likely than not the applicant used deception in the application.
Home Office Guidance
33. The relevant Home Office Guidance (“the Guidance”) published for staff on 14 November 2023 titled “Suitability: False representations, deception, false documents, non-disclosure of relevant facts” provides several important paragraphs relevant to this case. These are set out below:
At page 9 of 23 of the Guidance

“An allegation of deception must not be made unless there is evidence to support the allegation ….”

At page 17 of 23 of the Guidance under the heading “Deception by Third Parties”

“…if an applicant was not aware that the information submitted was false, because there was deception by their partner or immigration adviser, and the false information was not relevant to the application, you may decide not to refuse on suitability grounds. Relevant factors to consider would include whether the applicant ought to have known the information was false, for example did they declare that the information was true to the best of their knowledge and belief? Was it reasonable of them to have done so without checking the accuracy of the information? What would be the effect of refusal on the applicant, and would that outcome be reasonable in all the circumstances of the case? “

At page 17 of 23 of the Guidance Under the heading “Mandatory Refusal- 9.7.2.”

Where paragraph 9.7.2. of Part 9 applies, you must refuse an application for entry clearance, permission to enter or permission to stay made on or after 1 December 2020 where you can prove that it is more likely than not the applicant used deception in the application.

Where you make a finding of deception you must make it clear that is your view. Stating that you have “doubts” or “concerns” is not sufficient. You must say that you believe there has been dishonesty or deception and explain why you have reached that view.

Where you have found that there has been deception you must refuse the application on suitability grounds unless an exception applies. It may be necessary to apply a minded to refuse process to gather the relevant information: see guidance on procedural fairness.

At page 18 of 23 of the Guidance under the heading “Procedural Fairness”

The Court of Appeal in the case of Balajigari v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 673 found that in certain cases where the Secretary of State is considering refusing an application, or cancelling permission, on the basis of false representations, etc. the applicant must be given an opportunity to address that allegation of deception before a decision is made. A finding that the applicant themselves used deception also means subsequent applications can be refused on the basis of the deception under paragraph 9.8.1. and 9.8.2. of Part 9.

If you are considering refusing or cancelling on the basis of false representations or deception, you must provide a ‘Minded to Refuse/Cancel notification’, which means simply that you must tell the applicant you are thinking of refusing the application and/or cancelling entry clearance or permission, based on false representations. You must set out exactly what the allegation is and make it clear you are alleging dishonesty/deception, including whether you allege the deception was that of the applicant or another. You must also give the applicant the chance to respond to the allegation before you make your decision.

When you must tell the applicant that you are alleging deception and give them an opportunity to respond

“You must do so when both of the following apply:

• the applicant may not necessarily know about the information you have considered, or its significance, for example, information obtained directly from another government department
• the implications for an applicant of a finding of deception are significant

Whether the applicant could reasonably be expected to have known about the issue in advance of your allegation will depend on the circumstances. For example, the applicant may have said they have never received public funds, but DWP may provide information demonstrating receipt of public funds.

“Before you make a finding of deception you should give the applicant the chance to explain the discrepancy…………”

The implications for an applicant of a finding of dishonesty are significant.

The seriousness of the consequences for the applicant is a fact-sensitive issue but, for example, if the applicant is lawfully in the UK and is seeking settlement or further leave to remain and will have to leave the UK if refused, that is a serious consequence.

If an applicant would qualify for settlement but for an allegation of deception, the fact that a decision to refuse or cancel will result in the applicant having no leave is a serious consequence.

A decision that exposes the applicant to the compliant environment will have serious implications, because it will mean that they can no longer open a bank account, rent accommodation and so on. The level of seriousness will depend on how deeply the applicant (and any family members) have established roots in the UK.

By contrast, it will rarely be the case that an application for entry clearance or permission to enter reaches the required level of seriousness, because in most such cases a refusal will not change the applicant’s circumstances.
The Legal Authorities
34. The parties have placed before me several authorities. However, the key legal authorities relied upon touching on the issue of procedural fairness are principally R v SSHD ex parte Doody [1994] 1 AC 531, Bank Mellat v HM Treasury [2013] UKSC 39; [2014] 1 AC 700, Balajigari v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 673, R (Karagul) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWHC 3208 (Admin) and R (Kaur) v Entry Clearance Officer (New Delhi) [2026] UKUT 80 (IAC). I have not added Wahid v ECO [2021] EWCA Civ 346 to this list because it is impermissible under the terms of the Practice Direction on the Citation of Authorities [2001] 1 WLR 1011 because it concerned an application for permission to appeal and does not purport to establish any new principle or to extend the current law.
35. There is a dispute between the parties on the application of the decision in Kaur to the present case which I will address later. In the meantime, I set out below the legal principles arising from the principal authorities.
36. In R v SSHD ex parte Doody [1994] 1 AC 531, Lord Mustill addressed the requirements of fairness. He stated the following at page [106] D-H:
(1) Where an Act of Parliament confers an administrative power there is a presumption that it will be exercised in manner which is fair in all the circumstances.
(2) The standards of fairness are not immutable. They may change with the passage of time but in the general and in their application to decisions of a particular type.
(3) The principles of fairness are not to be applied by rote identically in every situation. What fairness demands is dependent on the context of the decision, and this is to be taken into account in all its aspects.
(4) An essential feature of the context is the statute which creates the discretion, as regards both its language and the shape of the legal and administrative system within which the decision is taken.
(5) Fairness will very often require that a person who may be adversely affected by the decision will have an opportunity to make representations on his own behalf either before a decision is taken with a view to producing a favourable result, or after it is taken, with a view to procuring modification, or both.
(6) Since the person affected usually cannot make worthwhile representations without knowing what factors may weigh against his interest’s fairness will very often require that he is informed of the gist of the case which he has to answer.
37. In Bank Mellat v HM Treasury [2013] UKSC 39; [2014] 1 AC 700, Lord Neuberger stated at [179]:
179. In my view, the rule is that, before a statutory power is exercised, any person who foreseeably would be significantly detrimentally affected by the exercise should be given the opportunity to make representations in advance, unless (i) the statutory provisions concerned expressly or impliedly provide otherwise or (ii) the circumstances in which the power is to be exercised would render it impossible, impractical or pointless to afford such and opportunity.
38. In Balajigari v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 673, the Court of Appeal considered the requirements of procedural fairness at [45]-[61] in respect of four applicants who had been refused indefinite leave to remain (“ILR”). The court stated at [55]:
55. For all those reasons, we have come to the conclusion that where the Secretary of State is minded to refuse ILR on the basis of paragraph 322(5) on the basis of the applicant’s dishonesty, or other reprehensible conduct, he is required as a matter of procedural fairness to indicate clearly to the applicant that he has that suspicion; to give the applicant the opportunity to respond, both as regards the conduct itself and as regards any other reasons relied on as regards “undesirability” and the exercise of the second-stage assessment; and then to take that response into account before drawing the conclusion that there has been such conduct.
39. In R (Karagul) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWHC 3208 (Admin), the High Court considered the issue of procedural fairness in the context of refusals of leave to remain as business persons. At [95]-[103] Saini J (as he then was) stated:
95. Although there were a large number of authorities placed before me on the issue of procedural fairness…..one needs to go no further than the judgment of Singh LJ in R (Citizens UK) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] EWCA Civ 1812, [2018] 4 W.L.R. 113 for a comprehensive summary of the requirements of procedural fairness in modern public law.

96. Singh LJ collected and summarised the material principles as follows [68]-[71]:

“68. That the common law will ‘supply the omission of the legislature’ has not been in doubt since Cooper v Wandsworth Board of Works (1863) 4 CB (NS) 180 (Byles J); ……Accordingly, the duty to act fairly or the requirements of procedural fairness (what in the past were called the rules of natural justice) will readily be implied into a statutory framework even when the legislature is silent and does not expressly require any peculiar procedure to be followed.”

102. In my judgment, the Balajigari judgment is an application of well-established general principles and is not to be regarded (as the Secretary of State submits) as a decision simply about unfairness in a specific set of circumstances…….

103. I summarise the general principle as follows but with the caveat that its application will of necessity be modified depending on the terms of the statutory regime:

(1) Where a public authority exercising an administrative power to grant or refuse an application proposes to make decisions that the applicant for some right, benefit or status may have been dishonest in their application or has otherwise acted in bad faith (or disreputably) in relation to the application, common law fairness will generally require at least the following safeguards to be observed. Either the applicant is given a chance in a form of an interview to address the claimed wrongdoing, or a form of written “minded to” process should be followed which allows representations on the specific matter to be made prior to the final decision.

(2) Further, a process of internal administrative review of an original decision which bars the applicant from submitting new evidence to rebut the finding of wrongdoing is highly likely to be unfair.

(3) The need for these common law protections is particularly acute where there has been a decision by the legislature to remove an appeal on the merits to an independent and impartial tribunal.
40. In R (Kaur) v Entry Clearance Officer (New Delhi) [2026] UKUT 80 (IAC), the Upper Tribunal extensively considered the legal principles on procedural fairness in respect of an applicant whose application for entry clearance was refused pursuant to paragraph 9.7.2 of the Immigration Rules. This was on the basis that she had knowingly provided false documentation with an intention to deceive. The applicant challenged the decision as procedurally unfair as the respondent had not given the applicant notice of her concerns or an opportunity to address those concerns and had failed to exercise her discretion in light of all the facts, including the fact that the application had been prepared by a local consultant in India.
41. The respondent agreed to reconsider the decision under challenge within three months but before that reconsideration had taken place, the applicant made a ‘Refund request” and made another application for a visa. Both applications were refused. The reconsideration decision noted that no where in the applicant’s VAF had it mentioned that a third-party agent had helped the applicant complete and/or submit her application. Furthermore, the applicant had signed the application and by submitting it had agreed to the following declaration points: “That you confirm that to the best of your knowledge and belief the following is correct - The information relating to your application - The supporting evidence - I understand that if false information is given, the application can be refused and I may be prosecuted, and, if I am the applicant, I may be banned from the UK – I am the applicant aged 18 and over”.
42. The further visa application was refused on the basis that the respondent was satisfied that the applicant had used deception previously.
43. Following an extensive review of the authorities, including those mentioned above, Upper Tribunal Judge Blundell stated at [68]-[71]:
68. In many cases in which an Entry Clearance Officer reaches a finding of deception, the consequences for the individual applicant will be very serious indeed. They will often be the subject of a lengthy ban on being granted entry clearance of leave to remain. There might also be other consequences as a result of the ECO’s conclusions. Application forms for UK entry clearance and leave to remain frequently ask whether the individual has ever been refused entry or failed to comply with the immigration regime of a third country, and I am aware that other countries understandably ask similar questions.

69. A person who has been refused entry clearance to the United Kingdom on grounds of deception might therefore be banned from entering this country for many years and might also face additional difficulty in entering others. There might also be other contexts in which a person would be required to disclose such a refusal as it casts doubt on their character. Whilst a refusal of entry clearance does not “change the applicant’s circumstances” by subjecting them to the UK’s “compliant environment” (SSHD v RAMFEL [2025] EWCA Civ 1843 refers, at [26]-[27]), it is wrong to suggest that such a decision does not have serious and lasting consequences for the individual.

70. In my judgement, therefore, the duty to act fairly requires that an entry clearance applicant who is accused of deception for reasons she could not reasonably have been expected to know about, and who would face mandatory refusal of future applications on account of a finding of deception should generally be given notice of that allegation and an opportunity to respond to it before her application is decided.

71. The applicant in this case was accused of falsifying a bank statement in connection with her application for a visit visa. The ECO’s finding that she had indeed falsified that document had serious consequences for her. She was made the subject of a ten year “ban” under paragraph 9.8.1 of the Immigration Rules. That will prevent her from visiting her family members in the United Kingdom. She also has family members in Germany and is understandably concerned that she might be required to disclose the refusal and the basis for it in her dealings with the German immigration authorities. These are serious consequences, founded upon an allegation of deception. In my judgment, the respondent was clearly required to put such an allegation to the applicant and to give her an opportunity to respond.
Analysis and Findings
Ground One – Procedural Fairness
Ground Two – Breach of Guidance/ Policy
44. As indicated in the parties’ respective skeleton arguments there is a narrow issue in dispute, that being, whether the respondent was required to give the applicant a fair opportunity to answer the allegation that she had submitted a false document and had used deception, applying Balajigari and Kaur, through a pre-decision opportunity to respond such as a minded-to refuse process.
45. The starting point must be to determine firstly, whether a duty arose to act fairly in the processing of the applicant’s application, and if so, secondly, to ascertain the requirements of that duty given the specific facts of the applicant’s case.
46. The respondent’s position is that fairness in this case did not give rise to a duty to conduct a minded-to process but the respondent in any event acted fairly throughout the process. Based on that submission, it is clear to me that the respondent accepts that she has a general duty to act fairly towards individuals like the applicant who apply for entry clearance, and likewise, to individuals applying for leave to remain following the decision in Balajigari.
47. The respondent’s position on the first point is in my judgment in line with the authorities, notably the decision in R (Citizens UK) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] EWCA Civ 1812, [2018] 4 W.L.R. In that case, Singh LJ (with whom Hickinbottom and Asplin LJJ agreed) stated at [68] that there was “no doubt” that the common law would “supply the omission of the legislature” and therefore the “duty to act fairly or the requirements of procedural fairness will readily be implied into a statutory framework even when the legislation is silent and does not require any particular procedure to be followed.” This latter point is especially pertinent in this case as neither statute, nor the Immigration Rules prescribe the procedure to be followed.
48. In light of the respondent’s acceptance that she was under a duty to act fairly towards the applicant in the processing of the entry clearance application, I now turn to the second question, namely, to ascertain whether the duty of fairness included a procedural requirement to conduct a minded-to refuse process given the facts of the applicant’s case.
49. There is ample legal authority establishing that the requirements of procedural fairness are not immutable but are fact-sensitive and context specific. In ex parte Doody, the second and third points set out in the opinion of Lord Mustill underscore this point.
50. Likewise, in Karagul, Saini J mentioned that the well-established general principles of procedural fairness at common law reflected in the Balijigari judgement, which he went on to summarise were subject to a caveat [103], namely “that its application will of necessity be modified depending on the terms of the statutory regime”. As an indication of such modification, Saini J at [101] observed that the Court of Appeal had held in Balajigari “that the duty to act fairly did not in every case require that an interview be conducted, and a written procedure might well suffice in most cases.”
51. Finally, in Kaur, Upper Tribunal Judge Blundell stated that an applicant who is accused of deception for reasons she could not reasonably have expected to know, and who faces mandatory refusal of future applications “should generally” be given notice of that allegation. In my judgment, it is clear that the use of the words “should generally” demonstrates a residual discretion and a lack of prescription reflecting the fact-sensitive and context specific nature of the requirements of procedural fairness.
52. The foregoing review of the authorities leads me to conclude that the requirements of procedural fairness at common law does not in every case where an allegation of deception is made, confer an automatic right on the applicant to demand the respondent follow some sort of a minded-to refuse process prior to making a decision on the application.
53. The absence of an automatic minded-to refuse process being triggered when an allegation of deception is made is also reflected in the respondent’s guidance titled “Suitability: False representations, deception, false documents, non-disclosure of relevant facts” (“Guidance”). In this regard, under the heading “Mandatory refusal: 9.7.2. it states “Where you have found that there has been deception you must refuse the application on suitability grounds unless an exception applies. It may be necessary to apply a minded to refuse process to gather the relevant information: see guidance on procedural fairness.
54. The Guidance sets out the specific circumstances when an applicant against whom deception is being alleged must be informed and given the opportunity to respond through a minded-to refuse process. The guidance provides that the applicant must be informed when both limbs stated below apply:
• the applicant may not necessarily know about the information you have considered, or its significance, for example, information obtained directly from another government department
• the implications for an applicant of a finding of deception are significant
55. The Guidance provides that before making a finding of deception the caseworker should give the applicant the chance to explain the discrepancy because the implications for an applicant of a finding of dishonesty are significant, and notes that the seriousness of the consequences for the applicant is a fact-sensitive issue. An example provided of when a deception finding may result in serious consequences is if the applicant is lawfully in the UK and is seeking settlement or further leave to remain and will have to leave the UK if refused, that is deemed a serious consequence.
56. By contrast, the Guidance states that it will “rarely” be the case that an application for entry clearance or permission to enter reaches the required level of seriousness, because in most such cases a refusal will not change the applicant’s circumstances. The Guidance also states that the level of seriousness will depend on how deeply the applicant (and any family members) have established roots in the UK.
57. Having considered the stated circumstances under the Guidance when a minded-to refuse process must be followed by the respondent, in my judgement the applicant’s circumstances do not satisfy both limbs of the Guidance and therefore a minded-to refuse process was not triggered for the reasons that follow.
58. Firstly, in respect of limb 1, I do not accept that the applicant would not know what information was considered given that the documents were submitted in her own name and in support of her own financial standing and there was no indication in the VAF of any involvement by a third-party agent. However, even if I am wrong on this and were to accept the applicant’s submission that the information considered by the respondent was unknown to her and she did not have access to the source material, the applicant would still not be able to satisfy limb 2. This is because the applicant has failed to demonstrate any serious consequences or impact flowing from the deception finding.
59. Secondly, it is important to recall that the purpose of the applicant’s visit to the UK was to attend her husband’s graduation, a limited purpose. In the VAF dated 23 June 2025, the applicant stated that her husband was her only family in the UK and that he had been in the UK for about one year studying for his master’s degree. This suggests that he only came to the UK as a student in mid 2024. The VAF also shows that her parents live in India.
60. Thirdly, in determining whether the consequences for the applicant are very serious by reason of a finding of deception, the Guidance specifically contrasts the situation of an applicant who is lawfully in the UK and is seeking settlement or further leave to remain and will have to leave the UK if refused, which is deemed a serious consequence, and the case of an individual applying for entry clearance or permission to enter which is said will “rarely” reach the required level of seriousness if refused, because in most such cases a refusal will not change the applicant’s circumstances. I consider that the applicant clearly falls into the latter category for the reasons that I have stated.
61. Fourthly, the applicant has provided no evidence of the consequences or impact, serious or otherwise that she might suffer as a result of the imposition of the 10-year ban following the finding of deception against her. The applicant’s witness statement dated 9 October 2025 simply states [10] “I respectfully request that the Tribunal quash the respondent’s decision and the associated 10-year ban, as it is based on a serious error of fact and a failure to follow procedure.” A second witness statement dated 09 July 2026 is silent on the consequences or the impact that a 10-year ban would have on the applicant which is clearly a missed opportunity to have set this out.
62. Ms Naik indicated at the hearing that the applicant’s student husband was still in the UK. I am not aware of his immigration status beyond a student and therefore I assume at some stage he will complete his studies and return to India. In the meantime, it is clearly open to the applicant’s husband to visit the applicant in India. This limited inconvenience does not in my view make the consequence of the 10-year ban very serious for the applicant.
63. Fifthly, I have considered the observations of Upper Tribunal Judge Blundell made in Kaur at [68]-[69] concerning the very serious consequences likely to result for an individual following a finding of deception. However, I do not feel bound to follow the observations made because they are of a generalised and speculative nature while the Guidance provides that the level of seriousness will depend on how deeply the applicant (and any family members) have established roots in the UK. In the applicant’s case there is no evidence of any family roots in the UK beyond the applicant’s husband who appears to have been studying in the UK only since mid 2024, which is a very short period to establish any significant roots.
64. The applicant’s case is therefore not on ‘all fours’ with the decision in Kaur where the applicant showed that the serious consequences resulting from the 10-year ban meant that she would be prevented from visiting her family in the UK and possibly also Germany where she feared having to disclose the refusal and the basis for it to the German immigration authorities.
65. I therefore conclude that there is no evidence of any tangible serious consequences or significant implications to the applicant resulting from a finding of deception and the imposition of a 10-year ban.
66. Finally, on this point, it is instructive to recall the decision in Bank Mellat v HM Treasury [2013] UKSC 39; [2014] 1 AC 700 where Lord Neuberger stated at [179], ”In my view, the rule is that, before a statutory power is exercised, any person who foreseeably would be significantly detrimentally affected by the exercise should be given the opportunity to make representations in advance, unless (i) the statutory provisions concerned expressly or impliedly provide otherwise or (ii) the circumstances in which the power is to be exercised would render it impossible, impractical or pointless to afford such and opportunity.
67. In relation to the requirement of the applicant being ‘significantly detrimentally’ affected, I adopt the same reasoning mentioned above in relation to limb 2 of the policy as to why the applicant would not be so affected by the exercise of the respondent’s statutory powers relating to entry clearance.
68. Further, I accept Mr Yetman’s submission that the imposition of an additional safeguard or step would render timely immigration control impractical and incompatible with border functions if the respondent were required to conduct a mandatory minded to refuse process in every case involving an allegation of deception.
69. At this point it is important to recall that Ms Naik stated that no challenge was being made to the respondent’s policy per se, but only to the application of the policy, and, that this case was one of those “rare” entry clearance cases where the respondent should have applied a “minded to refuse process” because the information was unknown to the applicant and she did not have access to the source material.
70. For the reasons I have stated, the respondent’s policy does not mandate the undertaking of a minded-to refuse process in every case where an allegation of deception is made. Such process is only mandated where the applicant may not necessarily know about the information considered by the respondent or its source and where the implications for an applicant of a finding of deception are significant.
71. As to whether the instant case was nonetheless one of those “rare” entry clearance cases where a minded-to refuse process should have been undertaken by the respondent, in my judgement it was not. This is because the applicant’s case does not satisfy both limbs of the Guidance to qualify for a minded-to refuse process.
72. Accordingly, while the respondent was under a duty to act fairly in the processing of the applicant’s entry clearance application, the requirements of procedural fairness did not mandate the respondent on the facts of the applicant’s case to undertake a minded to refuse process because of the finding of deception. It therefore follows that the respondent did not act in breach of procedural fairness nor in breach of her stated Guidance.
73. I turn now to the decision in Kaur. As previewed both parties accept the relevance of the decision to the applicant’s case but disagree on whether it should be followed or not by this Tribunal. For the applicant, the decision in Kaur at [70] applies directly to this case and should be followed. For the respondent, the decision was wrongly decided but in any event is distinguishable on its facts from the applicant’s case.
74. In respect of the respondent’s assertion that the decision in Kaur is wrong, this argument is no longer valid. At the hearing, Mr Yetman informed the Tribunal that the Court of Appeal on 09 July 2026 (the same day of the hearing) had refused the applicant permission to appeal the decision. In his refusal of permission, Dove LJ stated, “The decision does no more than apply well established public law principles of fairness to the specific facts of this case and there is no reason to grant permission to appeal in this case on the basis that it raises important points of legal principle with which the Court of Appeal should engage.”
75. I acknowledge the common law convention of judicial comity which exists between judges of the same chamber to ensure certainty of the common law.
76. I have carefully considered the decision in Kaur and the convention on judicial comity. However, for the reasons set out below, I consider that the decision in Kaur is distinguishable on its facts from the instant case and therefore I am not required to follow it.
77. I can identify only one significant common feature between Kaur and the instant case, namely, the existence of a third-party agent whose involvement is not mentioned in the VAF. On the other hand, there are some material facts in Kaur which allows it to be distinguished from the applicant’s case.
78. First and foremost, is the fact that the applicant in Kaur, unlike the applicant in the instant case, was able to demonstrate that the consequences to her from a finding of deception, namely the 10 year ban, was very serious indeed, as she would be prevented from visiting her family members in the UK and possibly also in Germany, and was concerned that she might be required to disclose the refusal and the basis for it in her dealings with the German authorities. In Kaur, unlike the instant case, there was a family nucleus in the UK and Germany that met the requirement in Bank Mellat of the applicant being ‘significantly detrimentally’ affected by the exercise of statutory power.
79. Secondly, in Kaur the Upper Tribunal was of the view that there had been a reconsidered decision [11] and this fact contributed to why the applicant’s judicial review failed. In the instant case, no reconsideration has taken place.
80. Thirdly, the facts of Kaur were clearly capable of giving rise to an obligation on the part of the respondent at common law and under the respondent’s Guidance to undertake a minded-to refuse process but that is not the factual matrix in the instant case.
81. Fourthly, I consider that the phrase used in Kaur [70] “for reasons she could not reasonably have been expected to know about” to be integral to the ratio of that decision and, as submitted by the respondent is the principled distinction between that case and the instant case.
82. In the instant case, the applicant could reasonably be expected to know about the duplicate documentation as there was no mention in the VAF of any third-party agent being used to prepare or submit the applicant’s application. The respondent’s view that the applicant had submitted the application herself was reinforced by the ‘Declaration’ stating that the submitted information relating to the application and the supporting evidence was correct to the best of the applicant’s knowledge and belief.
83. Fifthly, Kaur is not wrongly decided but as stated by Dove LJ, “The decision does no more than apply well established public law principles of fairness to the specific facts of [that] case “thereby underscoring the fact-sensitive and context specific nature of the duty of fairness.”
84. For the foregoing reasons, grounds one and two are not made out by the applicant.
Ground three – Irrationality
85. Pursuant to this ground, the applicant argues a number of points in her skeleton argument which submit that the respondent’s decision was irrational.
86. The applicant argues that the respondent’s decision does not engage with her “state of mind” at all to establish whether she had deliberately practised deception. Instead, the decision simply records that the document was false, that it was in the applicant’s name and that it concerned her finances and from these three matters alone the respondent inferred that the applicant would have been aware that the information provided was not accurate.
87. In short, the applicant submits that the decision letter moves directly from the falsity of the document to a conclusion of personal deception without the undertaking the necessary anxious scrutiny of her state of mind that paragraph 9.7.2 demands.
88. The applicant additionally submits there was no consideration of the obvious alternative explanation for the inclusion of the false document readily available on the same facts, namely, that the false document had been generated and submitted by a third-party agent without the applicant’s knowledge. In this context, the applicant argues that the evidence now available (the third-party agent’s letter and the police report dated 25 September 2025) independently confirms that the inference drawn by the respondent was wrong.
89. I have carefully considered the parties’ detailed documents and their respective oral arguments. I have reached the conclusion that this ground lacks merit for the reasons that follow.
90. It is common ground that paragraph 9.7.2 of Part 9 of the Immigration Rules requires the mandatory refusal of an entry clearance application where the decision-maker can prove that it is more likely than not the applicant used deception in the application.
91. The respondent’s Guidance provides under the heading “Mandatory Refusal- 9.7.2.” that a decision-maker ( in this case the ECO) must refuse an application for entry clearance, permission to enter or permission to stay made on or after 1 December 2020 where they can prove that it is more likely than not the applicant used deception in the application.
92. The Guidance provides that where a finding of deception is made the decision-maker must make it clear that is their view and stating that they have “doubts” or “concerns” is not sufficient. The decision-maker must also state that they believe there has been dishonesty or deception and explain why they have reached that view. Where the decision-maker has found deception, they must refuse the application on suitability grounds unless an exception applies.
93. In the instant case, there is no dispute that a false document was included in the applicant’s uploaded VAF. It is clear from reading the text of the decision letter that the ECO knew that paragraph 9.7.2. required them to be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the applicant herself had “used deception” and that the formulation of the immigration rule required more than proof that a false document was submitted but required proof of a deliberate dishonest intention attributable to the applicant.
94. The decision letter clearly set out paragraph 9.7.2. and stated correctly that the legal standard was the “balance of probabilities”. The decision explained this meant that it is more likely than not that the applicant or a third party deliberately and dishonestly made false representations, submitted false documents or information, or failed to disclose material facts.
95. The decision letter next referred to the submitted Saharayn Universal Multipurpose Society Limited Certificate (account number ending 0541,0540, 0539) and stated that checks conducted found the document to be false, the details of which were held on an Enrichment Report. In applying the standard of proof, the ECO stated explicitly that the document was submitted with an intention to deceive because the documents referenced were in the applicant’s name and directly referred to her own personal finances and circumstances.
96. The decision letter stated that in line with the respondent’s Guidance the ECO went on to consider whether the applicant could have made an innocent mistake. In this respect, the ECO considered how the submission of a false document would benefit the applicant. After taking into account that the document sought to demonstrate that the applicant had sufficient funds for her visit and applying the balance of probabilities, the ECO concluded that the applicant would have been aware that the information provided by the document was not accurate given that it related to her own personal funds. On that basis, the ECO concluded that the applicant used deception in her application.
97. I have set out the above reasoning taken from the decision to demonstrate that the ECO did not make an irrational leap of judgment that because the falsity of the document had been established, that the applicant must have used deception, as has been asserted.
98. The ECO referenced the Enrichment report in the decision letter. The report set out the results of an independent third-party verifying process used to confirm the veracity of the financial information provided by the applicant. The conclusion reached by the ECO regarding the use of deception was not them simply relying on their own subjective judgment but rather on the objective evidence provided by the Enrichment report.
99. The Enrichment report specifically stated “Checks carried out by this office show that the certificate numbers on the supplied certificates match the certificate numbers seen in another application (GWF083421692). There is nothing that would indicate a credible reason for this duplication as certificate numbers within the same bank/cooperative society should be unique. This could indicate that the financial certificates are not genuine.“
100. It should be noted that the report explicitly stated that there “is nothing that would indicate a credible reason for this duplication”. The use of the word ‘could’ in the last sentence regarding the authenticity of the documents does not in my judgment undercut the weight to be attached by the ECO to the absence of any credible reason for the duplicates.
101. Pulling all the threads together, the ECO concluded that because the false document was submitted as part of the applicant’s own application, in her own name, dealing with her personal funds, coupled with an express declaration that the information and supporting evidence was correct to the best of her knowledge and belief that the applicant must have been aware that the information provided by the document was not accurate and therefore she had used deception in her application. As part of the ECO’s reasoning, they also properly considered whether there could have been an innocent mistake. They also took into account that the application was signed by the applicant with no indication in the VAF of any involvement by a third-party agent. The ECO concluded therefore that the only person responsible for the submission of the false document was the applicant, and that the submission of a false document was indicative of an intention to deceive. In my judgement, the ECO’s process of reasoning was evaluative and the conclusion reached was entirely adequate.
102. The applicant argues that an alternative explanation for the inclusion of the false document was readily available to the ECO on the same facts which found against the applicant, namely that the false document had been generated and submitted by a third-party agent without the applicant’s knowledge.
103. In my judgment that argument has no merit. The uploaded VAF and supporting documentation provided no indication to the ECO that the application had been submitted by the third-party agent on 23 June 2025. A fact we now know from the letter dated 8 October 2025 from the Golden Eagle Visa Consultancy.
104. In my judgment, the VAF clearly gave the impression that it was completed and submitted by the applicant herself. I reach this conclusion because of the use of the ‘first person’ in the responses to the questions asked in the VAF, and also because no where on the VAF does it mention that a third-party agent was involved in helping the applicant with the preparation or submission of the application.
105. Rather, the application was submitted with the applicant agreeing to the following declaration: That you confirm that to the best of your knowledge and belief the following is correct: - The information relating to your application – The supporting evidence – I understand that if false information is given , the application can be refused and I may be prosecuted, and , if I am the applicant I may be banned from the UK – I am the applicant aged 18 or over.”
106. In my judgment, the respondent was unarguably entitled to treat the VAF as prepared and submitted by the applicant herself. There was nothing ‘readily available’ on the same facts to indicate any third-party involvement as suggested by the applicant. Furthermore, the respondent was fully entitled to rely on the terms of the applicant’s ‘Declaration’ that accompanied the VAF submission. To reach any other conclusion on the facts of this case would render the “Declaration” null and meaningless.
107. The applicant further submits that the new evidence of the police report and the statement from the third-party agent shows that she lacked the intention to deceive. In my judgment, the provision of post-decision documents does not assist the applicant. In this respect, I agree with the respondent’s submission that as the materials were not before the ECO, they cannot show that the original inference of deception was irrational when it was made. The ECO’s conclusion was reasonably open on the evidence then available.
108. For the foregoing reasons, I find the inference of deception was rationally and lawfully open to the ECO to make. The reasoning in the decision letter demonstrates there was no “process irrationality” to mean that the decision discloses an ‘unexplained evidential gap or leap in reasoning which fails to justify the conclusion”: see R (Wells) v Parole Board [2019] EWHC 2710 (Admin) nor “outcome irrationality” to mean that the outcome is “so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it”: see Associated Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1KB 223.
109. For the foregoing reasons, ground three is not made out.
110. I acknowledge that submissions have been made on the issue of materiality before me. However, since I have concluded that there is no public law error as contended for by the applicant, there is no need for me to consider that matter.
111. The application for judicial review is therefore dismissed. I invite counsel to agree to the form of the order.
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