Tribunal decisions

The decision

Case No: JR-2025-LON-004174
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
(IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER)
Field House,
Breams Buildings
London, EC4A 1WR

Before:

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SHERIDAN

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Between:

THE KING
on the application of
THANH QUAN DINH
Applicant
- and -

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

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Mr Fazli, Counsel
(instructed by Aspen Crown Solicitors), for the applicant

Mr Biggs, Counsel
(instructed by the Government Legal Department) for the respondent

Hearing date: 10 July 2026

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J U D G M E N T
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Judge Sheridan:

Introduction

1. The applicant, his wife and daughter (who are citizens of Vietnam) entered the UK in October 2024, following the applicant being granted leave as a skilled worker from 13 September 2024 to 14 August 2027.

2. The applicant was sponsored by a company called AA XPRESS LTD (“the sponsor”) to work full-time as an office manager on a salary of £39,000 a year. The conditions of his leave allowed him to undertake “permitted supplementary employment” as defined in the Immigration Rules (i.e. work listed on the skilled worker eligible occupation list), but not other work.

3. On 18 July 2025 the applicant was encountered by immigration officers at a nail salon called Angel Nails, during an enforcement visit. His wife was employed (lawfully) at Angel Nails. The immigration officers formed the view that the applicant was working at Angel Nails in the role of a nail technician, which was not permitted supplementary employment. He was interviewed and the officers’ view did not change.

4. It is a matter of dispute as to what the applicant was doing at Angel Nails on 18 July 2025 and what he told the immigration officers who encountered him.

5. On the same day as the encounter at Angel Nails, the respondent decided to cancel the applicant’s permission to stay in the UK with immediate effect. The respondent withdrew this decision and replaced it with a decision dated 28 August 2025 (“the challenged decision”), also cancelling his permission to stay with immediate effect.

6. The decision to cancel the applicant’s permission was made pursuant to para. 9.8.8 of the Immigration Rules1, which provides:

9.8.8. Permission (including permission extended under section 3C of the Immigration Act 1971) may be cancelled where the person has failed to comply with the conditions of their permission”

7. Cancelling permission under para. 9.8.8 is not automatic. If the respondent is satisfied (the burden being on her) that a person has failed to comply with the conditions of his permission, the respondent must then consider whether or not to cancel permission having regard to all relevant circumstances; i.e. she must exercise discretion. The respondent’s guidance on “Cancellation and curtailment of permission” states:

It is the Secretary of State’s responsibility to establish the reasons why an
individual’s entry clearance or permission is to be cancelled. You must establish the relevant facts and then carefully consider all an individual’s relevant circumstances and the proven facts of the case before you make a final decision.

8. The applicant argues that the challenged decision was (i) procedurally unfair and made without establishing and taking into account the relevant and correct facts; (ii) made without making adequate inquiries; and (iii) made without discretion being properly exercised.

9. For the reasons set out below, I am not persuaded by any of the grounds.

The challenged decision

10. The challenged decision states that, when encountered at Angel Nails, the applicant told immigration officers that he had been there since 9am to help his wife by doing one customer’s nails and that he said “I just did the tips, filed and coloured”. It is recorded in the challenged decision that he answered “yes” when asked if he knew that “nail technician” was not on the list of work he was permitted to undertake. It is also stated that when asked how often he had been at Angel Nails that week he responded “Every day. I come here after dropping [my] daughter off at school. I have been here all week between 9 and 3 as I have nothing to do at home”. The challenged decision states that when the officers entered Angel Nails the applicant stood up and removed his face mask.

11. The challenged decision notes that the applicant stated he was on annual leave from the sponsor. The respondent accepted that the applicant was working for the sponsor.

12. It is stated in the challenged decision that it was appropriate to cancel the applicant’s permission with immediate effect under para. 9.8.8 of the Immigration Rules.

13. The challenged decision also states that discretion was considered but not exercised in the applicant’s favour. The following is said regarding discretion:

I have considered whether to exercise discretion regarding the cancellation of your permission to stay, and whether there are any compassionate or exceptional circumstances. In light of your admission in relation to helping at Angel Nails and being aware that a nail technician is not a permitted additional paid job, along with your regular attendance to the premises, it is not considered appropriate to exercise discretion in your favour. Furthermore, as your family unit (wife and daughter who are your dependants) have been present in the UK for less than one year, it is not unreasonable to require you all to return to Vietnam.

Preliminary issue at the hearing: oral evidence from the applicant

14. At the start of the hearing, Mr Fazli applied for permission for the applicant to give oral evidence. Mr Biggs resisted the application.

15. Mr Biggs argued that I should refuse to allow the application as it was made late and in an improper manner. He maintained that the respondent would be prejudiced by permission being given as he had not had time to prepare a cross-examination or to take instructions on whether to call the immigration officer who had made a witness statement.

16. Mr Fazli’s response to this submission was that the issue of the applicant giving oral evidence had been raised, both in the grounds and in the skeleton argument.

17. The issue of oral evidence was, as Mr Fazli correctly observed, raised prior to the hearing. In the grounds, under the subheading “conclusion and relief sought”, it is stated “The applicant seeks permission to be able to give evidence given the factual disputes in this claim”. In the applicant’s skeleton, it is stated in the section headed “conclusion” that “the applicant will attend the Tribunal and he is prepared to give evidence if the tribunal will be assisted given the factual dispute”.

18. However, the question of whether there will be oral evidence was not considered in the grant of permission and the grant does not include any directions in respect of oral evidence. In these circumstances, in order for the Upper Tribunal to consider whether to permit oral evidence, the applicant needed, in accordance with the Case Management directions, to make an application within 14 days of the service of the detailed grounds. No such application was made. The consequence of no application being made following the grant of permission is that prior to the hearing there had been no judicial consideration of – and no directions concerning - oral evidence by the applicant or anyone else. In the absence of a decision and directions regarding oral evidence it was entirely understandable that Mr Biggs had proceeded – and prepared for the hearing – on the basis that there would not be oral evidence. This is particularly the case because adducing oral evidence in judicial review proceedings is only suitable in “the most exceptional cases”: see para. 24 of Bubb v London Borough of Wandsworth [2011] EWCA Civ 1285. I agree with Mr Biggs that raising the matter at the hearing did not give the respondent sufficient time to prepare or take instructions, thereby prejudicing the respondent. I also note what is said in in para. 50(b) of R (F) v Surrey County Council [2023] EWHC 980 about not permitting oral evidence where “no application to cross-examine has been made before the start of the substantive hearing”.

19. Mr Biggs made a further argument as to why oral evidence should not be permitted, which is that it would be wrong in principle.

20. I understand from the grounds (and from the way Mr Fazli framed his argument) that the applicant has, broadly, two reasons for wishing to give oral evidence. The first is to refute the respondent’s claim about what he was doing, and what he said, when the immigration officers encountered him at Angel Nails. The second is to establish that he was not treated fairly when encountered by the immigration officers.

21. I agree that it would be wrong in principle to allow oral evidence in order for me to make findings of fact or to decide for myself, having regard to that evidence, what occurred on 18 July 2025. As explained in para. 24 of Bubb:

“As its name suggests, judicial review involves a judge reviewing a decision, not making it; if the judge receives evidence so as to make fresh findings of fact for himself, he is likely to make his own decision rather than to review the original decision.”

22. A similar point is made in para. 50 of F, where it is emphasised that the supervisory function in judicial review does not require the Court/Tribunal to step into the shoes of the decision maker and resolve factual issues itself. For these reasons, I agree with Mr Biggs that it would be wrong in principle to permit oral evidence so that the applicant can try and refute the respondent’s account of what occurred.

23. However, it is well established that fresh evidence can be admitted in judicial review proceedings where it is required to determine if there has been a procedural error: R v. Secretary of State for the Environment ex parte Powis [1981]. I therefore do not consider it wrong in principle for oral evidence to be given to the extent that it relates to the applicant’s procedural unfairness challenge. However, oral evidence in judicial review proceedings is exceptional (see para. 24 of Bubb) and courts will normally resolve factual disputes on written evidence (see para 50(b) of F). Mr Fazli did not advance any argument to demonstrate that, exceptionally, this is a case where oral evidence is necessary. In the absence of any explanation as to why this was an exceptional case, and given that no application was made following the grant of permission until the commencement of the hearing, I am not persuaded that oral evidence should be permitted.

The respondent’s account of events on 18 July 2025

24. The respondent’s contemporaneous record shows four interviews with the applicant took place on 18 July 2025 over a brief period. All were in English without an interpreter.

25. The first interview was at 14.57. The following is recorded:

what time did you arrive here today at the shop? Bout 9am
what have you been doing here while you have been here? Helping my wife. I did one customers nails
what did you do to the customers nails I just did the tips, filed and coloured
how many customers nails have you done today? 1 or 2, i cant really remember. I was just helping out
the customers whose nails you did, did they pay the shop money? Yes they did
are you aware of the conditions of your skilled worker visa? Yes. I can do part time work but not more than 20 hours per week. But it has to be on the list
nail technicians is not on that list Yes i know.

26. The second interview was at 15:18. The following is recorded:

How long have you been working at this business? I am not working here. My wife works here. I just come here every now and then I do another part time job in marketing to help nail salons promote their business. My friend isnt very good at english so I help him
have you ever been paid to help out here doing peoples nails? No i dont get paid. I just help
What is your job role/ what are your duties? I have no role because i am not working for them
Who gave you this job (name and role in business)? Just be sure i am not working here. Just come for a chat.
When officers first arrived you stopped what you were doing and removed your mask. It is my belief that you know youre not allowed to work here I didnt want to confuse you and let you think i worked here

27. Under the heading “observations” the following is stated:

When Immigration officers arrived at front of shop Mr DINH was working on a customers nails. He was wearing a face mask. He stood up when he saw officers and removed his face mask

28. The third interview was at 15:34. The following is recorded:

how often do you come here to this business? Very often. I pick my friends daughter up from school too
and when you come here do you often help? Some of the time. Friends help friends
how many time have you been here this week? Every day. I come here after dropping daughter off at school. I have been here all week between 9 and 3 as I have nothing to do at home

29. The fourth interview is at 15:38. This has a heading “mitigating circumstance”. It records the applicant being asked if he has any medical conditions and responding that he has irritable bowel syndrome for which he receives traditional Vietnamese medicines.

30. The respondent has submitted a witness statement from Mr Houston, one of the officers who encountered the applicant at Angel Nails. He recounts entering the premises at 14:30 and observing applicant sat behind a nail technician desk wearing a face mask and painting a customer’s nails. He states that the applicant stood up, took off his face mask, and moved away from the nail technician desk. It is recorded that the applicant spoke clear English and conversed with ease in English. It is also stated that the applicant confirmed he had worked on 2-3 customer’s nails.

The applicant’s account of events on 18 July 2025

31. The applicant’s account is set out in his witness statement dated 25 November 2025. In the statement he states that his wife worked part-time at Angel Nails and, at the same time, operated a small marketing business providing marketing pictures for nail salons. He states that he was never employed by Angel Nails and was helping his wife with her marketing business when the encounter with Immigration Officers occurred. He also explains that he regularly visited the salon to drop off and pick up his wife and daughter.

32. He states that on 18 July 2025 the following occurred:

a. He collected his daughter and the salon owner’s daughter from school and brought them to the salon at around 3 PM.

b. His wife asked him to (i) assist briefly by taking photographs and short video clips of a customer’s nail designs for her marketing work; and (ii) help a customer choose new colours and prepare the area for filming. The applicant states that he was doing the latter when the immigration officers arrived.

c. He was wearing a face mask due to the dust and chemical smell. He removed the mask to assist the salon owner with interpretation as the owner’s English is limited.

d. He was interviewed at the back of the salon. Following this, his arm was pulled firmly and he was escorted into a dark cold van outside where further questioning took place.

33. The applicant states that he has a medical history of anxiety disorder and irritable bowel syndrome and the intimidating situation triggered severe symptoms including rapid heartbeat, shortness of breath, and abdominal pain.

34. He states that he explained that he was assisting his wife with marketing work and not performing nail services for payment. He also states that some of his responses were mis-recorded, and gives as an example that he did not say he did “the tips, filed and coloured the nails” but rather said he “helped get colours for one or two customers and helped clean the table for them”.

35. He also states that due to his limited English and the officer’s accent he misunderstood several questions and confused “helping” and “working”. He states that if he had known he could request an interpreter he would have done so.

The grounds

36. The first ground covers two distinct areas: (i) procedural unfairness; and (ii) failure to establish and take into account all relevant and correct facts.

37. The second ground argues that the respondent failed to make adequate enquiries and breached the Tameside duty.

38. The third ground argues that the respondent failed to properly exercise her discretion in full consideration of the relevant facts and circumstances.

Ground 1(i): Procedural unfairness

39. Mr Fazli argued, both in the grounds and in oral argument, that there was procedural unfairness in the following ways:

a. The applicant was not asked in the interviews why he was wearing a face mask thereby giving him an opportunity to explain that it was because of the dust and chemicals and not because he was working as a nail technician.

b. Adequate regard was not had to (and inadequate enquires were made in respect of) the applicant’s medical conditions and how this impacted (and caused confusion to) him when interviewed in stressful circumstances by the immigration officer.

c. The applicant was not offered an interpreter or asked if one might be needed; the interview was conducted without an interpreter; and the decision was made without regard to the applicant’s limited English.

d. The applicant was not asked about any vulnerabilities or if he was well enough to be interviewed.

40. Mr Biggs relied on R (Kanwal) [2022] EWHC 110 (Admin), which he characterised as factually very similar. Kanwal concerned a person (“K”) whose leave permitted her to work in her own business. K was encountered at a hotel where the immigration officers considered she was working illegally as a receptionist. One of the arguments advanced by K was that the decision was taken in procedurally unfair circumstances. The High Court rejected this argument. Reasons given where that (a) K knew the respondent was inquiring about illegal work at the hotel and she was asked questions relating to this; (b) when encountered K was given a fair opportunity to explain why she was at the hotel and explain her position; (c) there was nothing complex about the inquiry such that she needed time to prepare answers or time to obtain and submit documentary evidence; and (d) K was given a reasonable opportunity to address any possible exercise of discretion by the respondent.

41. Mr Biggs also relied on R (Singaram) v. SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 1375. In Singaram the person in question (“S”) was in the UK on a student visa that permitted him to work only 20 hours a week in term time. S was encountered working in an off-licence and, according to the respondent, admitted to working more than 20 hours a week. The Court of Appeal held that procedural fairness required that (i) it was made clear to S that the respondent suspected he was working outside the conditions permitted by his leave and he had an opportunity to respond to this; and (ii) S was given an opportunity to respond to matters relevant to the exercise of discretion.

42. The Court of Appeal was in no doubt that S was treated fairly in respect of having an opportunity to respond to the suspicion of working in breach of the conditions of his leave. First, S was told, and knew, that the issue was whether he had failed to comply with the conditions of his leave and he had an opportunity to give his version of events. Second, the context mattered. In this regard, it is stated in paras. 41-43:

41. The context needs to be borne in mind. The issue was a simple, straightforward one, namely whether the claimant had worked more than 20 hours a week in term time. The claimant knew, as he admitted to the immigration officers, that he was not permitted to work more than 20 hours a week. The immigration officer having entered the premises told him that she was there to ask questions of people working in the off licence about their working hours.

42. In the light of the answers the claimant gave, the immigration officer arrested the claimant and cautioned him. That caution says that the immigration officer was arresting him because “I suspect that you have breached a condition of your leave by working more hours than you are permitted”. The reason why the claimant was being arrested and being interviewed was clearly and straightforwardly identified.

43. The questions asked gave the claimant every opportunity to explain what he was doing, and when he began working both at Tesco and at Lucky’s. It gave him every opportunity to explain when he began working and what hours he worked at each. There was no procedural unfairness in relation to this aspect of the matter.

43. The Court of Appeal considered the position in respect of the exercise of discretion to be more nuanced. S had not expressly been told that he had an opportunity to comment on the exercise of discretion. However, he was given an opportunity, through the questions he was asked, to provide information relevant to the exercise of discretion. The consequence of this was that the immigration officer was in fact informed of all matters relevant to the exercise of discretion. In para. 51 it is explained:

As a result of the questions that were asked during the decision-making process, the claimant did, in fact, provide the information that he wanted the decision-maker to consider when deciding whether to cancel his leave immediately. In the circumstances, there was no, or no material, breach of the principles of procedural fairness and certainly none that vitiated the decision.

44. I discern from the authorities the following, which I do not understand is in dispute:

a. The immigration officers who encountered the applicant were required to act in a procedurally fair way when considering whether to cancel his permission under para. 9.8.8.

b. Whether the immigration officers acted in a procedurally unfair way is an objective question for the Upper Tribunal to decide for itself.

c. What fairness requires is dependent on the context, including the legislative framework, the nature of the decision-making process and the particular facts.

d. Procedural fairness required that, prior to the challenged decision being made (i) it was made clear to the applicant that the respondent suspected he was working in a role that was not permitted by the conditions of his leave; and (ii) the applicant was given an opportunity to respond to matters relevant to the exercise of discretion.

45. It is clear from the interview record that the applicant was made aware – and understood - that the immigration officers were investigating illegal working at Angel Nails. It is also clear that the applicant was aware that he was suspected of working as a nail technician in breach of the conditions of his visa. The applicant was interviewed and open questions were put to him giving him an opportunity to respond to the allegation of working as a nail technician. In my view, the process was procedurally fair because:

a. the applicant was informed that he was suspected of working in breach of the conditions of his permission;

b. it was made clear to him why this suspicion arose;

c. he was given an opportunity, during the interviews, to put forward an explanation to refute the suspicion; and

d. in the circumstances of this case a brief interview immediately following the encounter was adequate because the issue was very straightforward – was the applicant engaging in the work of a nail technician? To address this allegation, there was no need to provide the applicant with an opportunity to obtain documents or other evidence before responding to the allegation; he simply needed to give a credible account of his circumstances that explained why he was in Angel Nails positioned in a way that gave the impression that he was working as a nail technician.

46. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the respondent acted in a procedurally fair way in respect of making it clear that the applicant was suspected of working in a role that was not permitted by the conditions of his leave.

47. Procedural fairness in respect of the exercise of discretion is less clear because it was not put to the applicant by the immigration officers, in any of the interviews that took place on 18 July 2025, that the respondent has a discretion and that this would be the applicant’s only opportunity, prior to a decision on his permission being made, to make arguments as to why discretion should be exercised in his favour. I can see some merit to the contention that it was procedurally unfair to (i) not make clear to the applicant that the interview was the only opportunity he would have to make arguments as to why discretion should be exercised in his favour; (ii) not ask him specific questions that would enable him to put forward information relevant to the exercise of discretion; and (iii) if necessary, depending on answers given, give him additional time to obtain and provide evidence relevant to the exercise of discretion. Accordingly, I accept that there was procedural unfairness in relation to the opportunity afforded to the applicant to make representations concerning the exercise of discretion. However, for the reasons set out below, I would not grant relief pursuant to section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981.

48. Section 31(2A), which applies to decisions in the Upper Tribunal by operation of section 15(5A) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, states:

The High Court—

(a) must refuse to grant relief on an application for judicial review, and
(b) may not make an award under subsection (4) on such an application,
if it appears to the court to be highly likely that the outcome for the applicant would not have been substantially different if the conduct complained of had not occurred.

49. In order to decide if section 31(2A) applies, I need to consider what information the applicant might have provided to the respondent prior to the challenged decision had he had a full opportunity to make submissions and provide evidence relevant to the exercise of discretion. Based on Mr Fazli’s submissions, the grounds and the applicant’s witness statement, it is apparent that the applicant’s case as to why discretion ought to have been exercised in his favour is that: (i) he did not breach the conditions of his visa; (ii) he was working legitimately for the sponsor; and (iii) his family are settled and integrated in the UK, are suffering because of his inability to work, and his employer cannot keep his position open for him indefinitely.

50. The difficulty for the applicant is that, in substance, everything raised post-challenged decision was in fact considered by the respondent when exercising discretion. In the challenged decision the respondent took into account her view on whether the applicant had breached the conditions of his permission (deciding he had); took into account her view on whether he was working legitimately for the sponsor (deciding he was); and took into account the impact on his family (deciding that they had only been in the UK for less than a year and could return to Vietnam as a family unit). There is nothing materially new in the post-decision evidence relevant to the exercise of discretion and, having considered this evidence carefully, I cannot discern a basis for the respondent reaching a different conclusion on the exercise of discretion. The only conceivable basis for exercising discretion differently might be the impact on the applicant’s family but all the applicant has said regarding his family is that they are well settled in the UK and suffering due to his inability to work. I cannot discern how this could conceivably have led to discretion being exercised differently. Put another way, even if the respondent had given the applicant ample opportunity to make representations about the exercise of discretion and the applicant had provided his witness statement and other post-decision evidence prior to the challenged decision being made, it is highly likely that the respondent would have exercised discretion in the same way. Accordingly, section 31(2A) applies.

51. I will now address the specific points advanced by Mr Fazli in respect of procedural unfairness.

52. Mr Fazli argued that it was procedurally unfair to not put to the applicant that a concern arose because he was seen wearing a face mask. I am not persuaded by this submission for two reasons. First, the immigration officers did raise the issue of the face mask in the interview: see the interview at 15:18 where the applicant was asked “when officers first arrived you stopped what you were doing and removed your mask. It is my belief that you know you are not allowed to work here”. Second, and in any event, there was no need to specifically mention the face mask for the interview to be fair. Fairness required that the applicant was made aware that he was suspected of working as a nail technician and, in broad terms, why the suspicion arose. There was no need for the immigration officer to “put to” the applicant every detail of why the suspicion had arisen.

53. Mr Fazli argued that adequate regard was not had to (and inadequate enquires were made in respect of) the applicant’s medical conditions and how this impacted (and caused confusion to) him when interviewed in stressful circumstances by the immigration officer. In my view, this is plainly not the case given that in the fourth interview (at 15:38) the applicant was asked about medical conditions. The applicant’s answers did not indicate that he had a medical condition that could impact his ability to address the straightforward question of what he was doing at Angel Nails and therefore there was no need for the immigration officer to probe further in respect of the applicant’s health.

54. I am also not persuaded by Mr Fazli’s argument that the applicant ought to have been offered an interpreter. There is nothing in the interview record indicating that the applicant struggled with English or indicating that he would need an interpreter. Further, in the interview at 15:18 he said that he helped the owner of the salon with English, which is an indication that the applicant did not have difficulty with English. In my view, it was not procedurally unfair to proceed with the interviews in English when the applicant appeared to speak English, stated that he helps the salon owner with English, and did not state, at any time during four interviews, that he was having difficulty understanding the officer conducting the interview.

55. Mr Fazli submitted that the applicant should have been asked about vulnerabilities or if he was well enough to be interviewed. The applicant was asked about his health, which, in my view, gave him an adequate opportunity to raise any concerns about whether he was well enough to be interviewed or had a particular vulnerability. In any event, aside from health issues (which I have already addressed) no vulnerabilities have been identified by Mr Fazli. Accordingly, asking about vulnerabilities would not have made a difference. It follows section 31(2A) Senior Courts Act 1981 would apply.

Ground 1(ii): Failure to establish and take into account all relevant and correct facts

56. Relying on the content of the applicant’s witness statement, the grounds argue that some of the answers given in the interview were wrongly recorded or misunderstood. In particular, it is denied that the applicant ever said he “did the tips, filed and coloured nails”.

57. It is also argued that the respondent failed to properly and fairly consider the parts of the interview where the applicant denied working at Angel Nails and explained he had just come for a chat, or that he was there to help his wife with her marketing business. It is submitted that the post-decision evidence (including the evidence from the child’s school showing that the applicant regularly collects his and the salon owner’s daughter) and the fact that the applicant’s wife works at the salon, establishes that it is more likely than not that the applicant had a good reason for being at the salon.

58. Mr Fazli’s argument, in summary, is that the respondent reached the wrong conclusion as the facts, properly understood, demonstrate that the applicant is telling the truth and was not working as a nail technician.

59. There are several difficulties with this argument. First, as Mr Fazli accepted, conventional public law principles apply. It was not argued (and there is no ground submitting) that the respondent’s decision to cancel the applicant’s permission rested on a matter of precedent fact, such that the Upper Tribunal would need to make findings of fact and decide for itself whether or not the applicant was working at Angel Nails in breach of the conditions of his permission. Accordingly, as it is not for me to decide for myself whether or not the applicant is telling the truth and the public law question is whether the challenged decision is Wednesbury unreasonable (ie outside the range of reasonable decisions open to the decision maker), it is misconceived to argue that the challenged decision is unlawful because it is more likely than not the applicant was honest; or that the facts, properly understood, show that the applicant was honest.

60. Second, as argued forcefully by Mr Biggs, post-decision evidence is not relevant to whether the decision maker acted irrationally: the rationality of the decision making needs to be assessed on the basis of the evidence that was before the decision maker.

61. Third, based on (i) the immigration officer’s observation, on arrival at the salon, that the applicant was sitting at a nail technician’s work station wearing a mask and appeared to be working on a customer’s nails; (ii) the applicant saying in the first interview that he was helping out and had assisted with 1 or 2 customer’s nails; and (iii) the applicant saying he had been at the salon since 9am and that had been the case all week, it was well within the range of reasonable conclusions open to the respondent on the material evidence to decide that the applicant was working at the salon in the role of a nail technician even though the applicant also denied doing so and gave an alternative explanation for being at the salon.

62. Fourth, as argued by Mr Biggs (who relied on R (Andrews) v SSHD [2025] EWHC 64 (Admin)), and not contested by Mr Fazli, whether or not the applicant was paid was immaterial as unpaid work was not permitted.

63. I am therefore not persuaded by this ground.

Ground 2: Failure to make adequate enquiries and breach of the Tameside duty.

64. It is argued that the respondent failed to make further inquiries to ensure that a fully informed decision was made. It is submitted that inquires ought to have been made with the owner of Angel Nails and the applicant’s wife before a decision was made. It is also argued that further inquiries should have been made about the applicant’s health.

65. The Tameside duty is succinctly summarised in para. 70 of Balajigari v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 673:

The general principles on the Tameside duty were summarised by Haddon-Cave J in R (Plantagenet Alliance Ltd) v Secretary of State for Justice [2014] EWHC 1662 (Admin) at paras. 99-100. In that passage, having referred to the speech of Lord Diplock in Tameside, Haddon-Cave J summarised the relevant principles which are to be derived from authorities since Tameside itself as follows. First, the obligation on the decision-maker is only to take such steps to inform himself as are reasonable. Secondly, subject to a Wednesbury challenge, it is for the public body and not the court to decide upon the manner and intensity of enquiry to be undertaken: see R (Khatun) v Newham LBC [2004] EWCA Civ 55, [2005] QB 37, at para. 35 (Laws LJ). Thirdly, the court should not intervene merely because it considers that further enquiries would have been sensible or desirable. It should intervene only if no reasonable authority could have been satisfied on the basis of the enquiries made that it possessed the information necessary for its decision. Fourthly, the court should establish what material was before the authority and should only strike down a decision not to make further enquiries if no reasonable authority possessed of that material could suppose that the enquiries they had made were sufficient. Fifthly, the principle that the decision-maker must call his own attention to considerations relevant to his decision, a duty which in practice may require him to consult outside bodies with a particular knowledge or involvement in the case, does not spring from a duty of procedural fairness to the applicant but rather from the Secretary of State's duty so to inform himself as to arrive at a rational conclusion. Sixthly, the wider the discretion conferred on the Secretary of State, the more important it must be that he has all the relevant material to enable him properly to exercise it.

66. Applying these principles, it is clear that there was not a duty on the respondent to make further inquiries. First, the respondent was not required to obtain potentially corroborative evidence merely because such evidence existed. The question was whether it was reasonable to regard the information already available as sufficient. Second, this was a straightforward situation where the applicant was observed undertaking what appeared to be the work of a nail technician. Whilst it might have been sensible or desirable for the applicant’s wife and the business owner to be interviewed, I do not accept – given the context of this not being a complex inquiry - that it was irrational to take the view that it was sufficient to interview only the applicant. Third, the applicant was asked about his health and none of his answers indicated that there was a medical problem that would warrant further enquiry. I am therefore not persuaded that a Tameside duty arose in this case.

Ground 3: Failure to properly exercise discretion in full consideration of the relevant facts and circumstances.

67. Under this ground, it is submitted that that when exercising discretion, the respondent (i) did not take into account that the applicant made it clear that he was not working at the salon; (ii) took a one-sided approach to the interview; (iii) failed to ascertain the relevant facts; (iv) failed to give the applicant an opportunity to explain mitigating circumstances including his medical condition; (v) failed to consider the extent of the breach; and (vi) failed to investigate and ask for additional information.

68. Mr Fazli only made a brief reference to this ground in his oral submissions, which is unsurprising given that everything contained within it is a repetition of arguments made in the other grounds.

69. I am not persuaded by this ground for the following reasons. First, having lawfully decided that the applicant was in breach of the conditions of his permission, this was plainly a factor that could be given significant weight in the exercise discretion without re-examining the issue. Second, there was not a failure to take into account the applicant’s medical circumstances because the applicant was asked about these and he said nothing in his interview responses that could reasonably have led the respondent to treat this as relevant. Third, as explained in paras. 47-50 above, any failure to give the applicant a sufficient opportunity to make representations about the exercise of discretion did not make a difference to the outcome given the absence of anything in the post-decision evidence that could support a different conclusion on how to exercise discretion.

Conclusion

70. I am not persuaded by any of the grounds and therefore dismiss the application.

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