JR-2025-LON-004181
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The decision
Case No: JR-2025-LON-004181
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
(IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER)
Field House,
Breams Buildings
London, EC4A 1WR
6 November 2026
Before:
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HIRST
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Between:
THE KING
on the application of
Mila Melnik
Applicant
- and -
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
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Professor Niaz A Shah
(instructed by Advocate), for the Applicant
Mr Joshua Yetman
(instructed by the Government Legal Department) for the Respondent
Hearing date: 19 August 2026
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J U D G M E N T
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Judge Hirst:
1. The Applicant challenges the Respondent's decision dated 10 October 2025 refusing to grant indefinite leave to remain (‘ILR’) and varying her application to one for limited leave to remain.
2. The Applicant is a Russian citizen. Her immigration history, so far as relevant to this claim, is as follows. The Applicant entered the UK on 8 April 2015 with leave on a Tier 5 Creative and Sporting visa valid to 4 April 2016.
3. On 29 March 2017 the Applicant applied for leave outside the rules on the basis of her human rights (Articles 3 and 8 ECHR). That application was refused on 11 May 2018. The Applicant’s appeal against the refusal was allowed by the First-tier Tribunal on 10 January 2019 on the basis of exceptional and compelling circumstances relating to the Applicant’s health, and on 27 February 2019 the Applicant was granted leave outside the Immigration Rules valid to 27 August 2021. On 18 October 2021 the Applicant applied for leave to remain on family and private life grounds. On 31 October 2022 she was granted leave to remain valid to 30 April 2025. By 8 April 2025 the Applicant had therefore accumulated 10 years’ continuous lawful residence in the UK.
4. On 14 April 2025 the Applicant applied for ILR using the Settlement Private Life form. It is common ground that that was the wrong form. The Applicant could not meet the requirements of Appendix Private Life at the time of her application, because her first grant of leave under the Private Life route began only on 27 February 2019 and she had therefore not accumulated the requisite 10-year period of continuous residence under the Private Life route.
5. On 10 October 2025 the Respondent sent the Applicant the decision under challenge. The relevant parts of the decision stated:
“On 14 April 2025, you made an application for settlement in the United Kingdom (UK).
A decision has not yet been made on your application, however, based on the information you have provided, you would not meet the requirements to be granted settlement.
…
However, based on the information provided, I am satisfied that you appear to meet the requirements to be granted permission to stay on the 10-year Private Life route for 30 months on the basis of paragraph PL9.1 with reference to PL5.1(b) of Appendix Private Life of the Immigration Rules to allow you more time to meet the requirements for settlement.
I will therefore vary your application and consider your application for settlement as an application for permission to stay…
Once you have paid the immigration health surcharge, your application will be treated as a valid application for limited leave to remain and you will be granted 30 months’ limited leave to remain in the UK
...”
6. The Applicant paid the immigration health surcharge. On 23 October 2025 she sent a pre-action letter challenging the decision.
7. The Applicant filed this claim for judicial review on 26 November 2025. Permission was granted by the Upper Tribunal on 7 April 2026.
8. At the hearing before me the Applicant was represented pro bono by Professor Shah. I am grateful to both counsel for their assistance.
Legal framework
9. Paragraph PL14.2 of Appendix Private Life to the Immigration Rules sets out the qualifying period required for settlement, and provides:
“PL 14.2 An applicant who is aged 18 or over at the date of application and does not meet the requirement in PL 14.1 must either:
(a) have lived in the UK for a continuous qualifying period of 10 years with permission set out in PL 14.3 or 14.4.; or
(b) have, or last had, permission on the basis of their family or private life (under Appendix FM or leave outside the Immigration Rules before 20 June 2022), before 20 June 2022.”
10. Paragraph PL 14.3 provides:
“PL 14.3. Permission on the following routes (or any combination of those routes) counts towards the qualifying period in PL 14.1, PL 14.2 or PL 14.2A:
(a) entry clearance or permission granted as a partner or parent under Appendix FM (except for permission as a fiancé(e) or proposed civil partner); or
(b) permission described in the Home Office grant letter as “family permission as a parent” or “family permission as a partner”; or
(c) permission on the private life route under paragraph 276ADE or 276BE(2) before 20 June 2022 or Appendix Private Life; or
(d) entry clearance or permission as a child of a person with limited leave as a partner or parent under Appendix FM; or
(e) permission granted outside the rules as a partner, a parent or child or because of private life on the basis of Article 8 of the Human Rights Convention.”
11. Paragraph PL 14.4 provides:
“Permission on any other route that includes rules allowing an applicant to qualify for settlement also counts towards the qualifying period in PL 14.1 or PL 14.2, if the applicant:
(a) did not enter the UK illegally (unless they have permission to stay on the private life route as a child or young adult); and
(b) has had permission either under paragraph 276ADE or 276BE(2) before 20 June 2022 or Appendix Private Life for at least one year at the date of application.”
12. Paragraph PL 18.2 provides for an application for settlement to be varied to one for limited leave by the Secretary of State in certain circumstances:
“If the requirements for settlement are not met, but the decision maker believes the applicant is likely to meet all the suitability and eligibility requirements for permission to stay on the private life route the application will be varied by the Secretary of State to an application for permission to stay on the private life route. Where this happens:
(a) no additional application fee for permission to stay will be required and the settlement application fee will not be refunded; and
(b) the Secretary of State will write to the applicant informing them of this variation and if required will request the applicant pay any immigration health charge.”
13. So far as relevant to this claim, Appendix Long Residence provides at paragraph LR3.1 under the heading “Qualifying period requirement for permission to stay on the Long Residence route”:
“LR3.1 The applicant must have spent a qualifying period of 10 years lawfully in the UK, for the entirety of which one or more of the following applied:
(a) The applicant had permission, except permission under Appendix Ukraine Scheme, or permission as a Visitor, Short-term Student (English language) or Seasonal Worker (or under any of their predecessor routes);
…”
The Respondent's guidance on Long Residence is to the same effect.
The variation policy
14. The Respondent has published policy guidance (‘Validation, variation, voiding and withdrawal of applications’) (‘the variation policy’). The version in the authorities bundle was hyperlinked to version 10.0 of the online policy, which was updated on 8 April 2026 and post-dates the decision in this claim. However, neither party suggested that the version of the policy which was in force at the time of the decision was materially different.
15. The variation policy begins by defining a valid application:
“An application under the Immigration Rules is valid when it meets all of the validity requirements set out in the Immigration Rules for that route, or when discretion is applied to treat an application as valid even when it does not meet all of the validity requirements for the route.”
16. The policy states that the burden of proof is on the applicant to show that they meet the validity requirements. It provides that caseworkers should have regard to all relevant information when considering the application and should request more information or clarification if needed.
17. The policy then draws a distinction between validity requirements that an applicant cannot take action to meet (such as an age requirement or a requirement that the applicant must last have been granted leave in a specific route or category), and those which an applicant can take action to meet. The two sections of the policy most relevant to this claim provide as follows:
“Contacting an applicant where they have used the correct application form but may have selected the wrong route or category
Where an application has been made, but it seems from the information you have, that the applicant has selected the wrong route or category on the form, you should contact them using the ‘Checking whether intended application been made’ template which gives them the opportunity to confirm whether or not they have made a mistake and want their application to be amended and considered under a different route or category.
If the applicant does not respond within 14 days, the application they have made on the route or category selected must be considered.
It is not possible to correct a route or category in this way when the wrong application form has been used. In those case [sic] see:
Contacting an applicant where they may have used the wrong form for their application
Where an application has been made, but it seems based on information you have, that they may have intended to make a different application, you should contact them using the ‘Checking whether intended application been made’ template, inviting them to seek independent immigration advice and, if they wish to make a different application, to submit that within 14 days of the date of the notice. Any application submitted before the original application is decided will be a variation of their current application […]
If the applicant does not submit a further application or withdraw their current application within 14 days, their current application must be considered.”
The Applicant’s claim
18. The Applicant’s claim as originally pleaded set out eight grounds of challenge. Before me, Professor Shah confirmed that only the first two grounds were actively pursued, namely:
a. Ground 1: The Respondent misapplied the Immigration Rules. The Applicant had at the time of the decision accumulated 10 years’ continuous lawful residence in the UK and was therefore eligible for ILR under Appendix Long Residence;
b. Ground 2: The Respondent failed to follow her own guidance (‘Validation, variation, voiding and withdrawal of applications’) (‘the guidance’) by failing to give the Applicant the opportunity to correct her application.
19. The Applicant’s case, in summary, is that although she was not eligible for ILR under Appendix Private Life at the time of her application, she was eligible for ILR under Appendix Long Residence. The Respondent has a discretionary power to vary an application. The Respondent also has a policy on variation of applications which requires caseworkers to invite an applicant to vary an application if it appears that the applicant has used the wrong route or application form. The Respondent should therefore have either (i) varied the application to an application for ILR under Appendix Long Residence, or (ii) applied her published policy and invited the Applicant to amend her application prior to any decision on it.
20. The Respondent’s case is that she was not obliged to consider the Applicant’s application under any other route than the Private Life route in which the Applicant applied. The Applicant did not qualify for ILR under the Private Life route and it was not an unlawful exercise of the Respondent’s discretion to grant a further period of limited leave to remain. On the information available to the decision-maker, it was not reasonably apparent that the Applicant had intended to apply under another route, and the variation policy did not require the Respondent to redirect the Applicant to a different route. In addition, the Respondent maintains that in any event the Applicant could not have qualified for ILR under Appendix Long Residence, because her previous grant of leave as a Temporary Creative Worker was not a route to settlement.
21. I address each ground in turn, because Ground 1 is relevant to the Respondent’s case under Ground 2. As will be seen from the below, this claim illustrates the labyrinthine complexity of the Immigration Rules and the considerable difficulty of navigating the Rules and relevant guidance.
Ground 1
22. The Applicant contends that at the time of her application she had accumulated 10 years’ continuous lawful residence in the UK and was therefore eligible for ILR under Appendix Long Residence.
23. The Applicant’s immigration history is not in dispute. She entered the UK on 8 April 2015 with leave as a Tier 5 Temporary Worker (Creative and Sporting) valid to 4 April 2016. That leave was extended by appeal proceedings before the First-tier Tribunal and she was subsequently on 27 February 2019 granted leave outside the Immigration Rules valid to 27 August 2021, extended to 30 April 2025. It is not therefore in dispute that the Applicant had, by 8 April 2025, accumulated 10 years’ continuous lawful residence in the UK.
24. Despite having accrued 10 years’ continuous lawful residence, however, it is common ground that the Applicant was not eligible for ILR under Appendix Private Life. That is because paragraphs PL 14.3 and 14.4 of the Rules require that permission to stay during the entire 10-year period must be either on one of the routes specified in PL 14.3 or on “any other route that includes rules allowing an applicant to qualify for settlement” under PL14.4.
25. The current version of Appendix Temporary Work: Creative Worker states clearly in the introductory section “The Creative Worker route is not a route to settlement”. However, Appendix Temporary Work: Creative Worker was introduced to the Immigration Rules only with effect from 11 October 2021 and was not in force during the period for which the Applicant had Temporary Worker leave. The Applicant’s previous grant of leave on 8 April 2015 appears to have been under the predecessor provisions in Tier 5 (Temporary Worker) Migrants (paragraphs 245ZM-245ZS of the Rules). Whilst those rules did not contain any clear statement that the route was not a route to settlement, an individual could only have been eligible for ILR under paragraph 245ZS as a private servant in a diplomatic household (which did not apply to the Applicant).
26. Whilst I did not hear argument on the point, it was common ground before me that the Applicant’s previous grant of leave under the Tier 5 (Temporary Worker) provisions prevented her from relying on that period of leave as part of her continuous qualifying period under paragraph PL 14.4. For the purposes of this claim, I do not need to resolve the issue of whether PL14.4 and Appendix Temporary Work: Creative Worker can be treated as having retrospective effect, and I proceed on the agreed basis that the Applicant was not eligible for ILR under Appendix Private Life because of her previous period of leave as a Tier 5 Creative Worker.
27. However, different criteria apply under Appendix Long Residence. Paragraph LR3.1 sets out the qualifying period requirement for settlement on the Long Residence route. It provides that:
“The applicant must have spent a qualifying period of 10 years lawfully in the UK, for the entirety of which one or more of the following applied:
(a) the applicant had permission, except permission under Appendix Ukraine Scheme, or permission as a Visitor, Short-term Student (English language) or Seasonal Worker (or under any of their predecessor routes); or
(b) the applicant was exempt from immigration control; or
(c) the applicant was in the UK as an EEA national […]; or
(d) a period as a British citizen, except where citizenship has subsequently been deprived.”
28. Unlike paragraph PL14.4, paragraph LR3.1 does not contain any catch-all provision excluding periods of residence on a route not intended to lead to settlement. Paragraph LR3.1(a) excludes only specific types of temporary permission (visitor, short-term student and seasonal worker, and the predecessor routes) and permission under the Ukraine scheme. The Applicant has not been granted leave in any of the excluded routes.
29. The Respondent’s long residence guidance is in the same terms. The guidance provides, at p122, that leave granted under predecessor provisions is similarly excluded. In relation to the previous Tier 5 (Temporary Worker) rules, time spent with entry clearance or permission as a seasonal worker granted under paragraphs 245ZM to 245ZP is excluded. However, the Applicant was not a seasonal worker and those paragraphs did not apply to her previous period of leave.
30. Mr Yetman contended that the statement in Appendix Temporary Work: Creative Worker that “the Creative Worker route is not a route to settlement” was definitive, whether the Applicant’s ILR application was considered under Appendix Private Life or Appendix Long Residence. He acknowledged that paragraph LR3.1 did not expressly exclude leave as a Creative Worker from qualifying residence, but maintained that exclusion of all temporary worker routes was implicit in the scheme of the Immigration Rules. He submitted that to hold that lawful leave for the purposes of long residence included a period as a temporary creative worker would undercut the purpose of the temporary worker rules.
31. I do not accept that submission. The Immigration Rules are statements of executive policy as to how the Secretary of State will exercise the broad powers of immigration control conferred on her by the Immigration Act 1971. The starting point for interpreting the Rules is the natural and ordinary meaning of the words used: Wang v SSHD [2023] UKSC 21, [2023] 1 WLR 2125 at §29-30. The Private Life rules, and paragraph PLL 14.4 in particular, expressly exclude leave granted under routes not intended as routes to settlement. If the Secretary of State intended that the same exclusion should apply for the purposes of ILR under Appendix Long Residence, then LR3.1 would be in similar terms to PL14.4. It is not. The wording of LR3.1 is clear and unambiguous: it does not exclude any categories of leave other than those referred to at LR 3.1(a). There is no need to adopt the kind of purposive interpretation for which Mr Yetman contends; nor is that consistent with the plain wording used in LR 3.1(a).
32. The Applicant has never had leave in any of the categories identified in LR 3.1(a) or excluded under the guidance, and so she was not precluded from relying on her previous grant of leave as a Tier 5 Temporary Worker (Creative and Sporting) Migrant as part of her 10-year qualifying period.
33. I therefore conclude that the Applicant met the qualifying period eligibility requirement under LR 3.1 at the time of her application. It has not been suggested by the Respondent that she would not otherwise meet the requirements for ILR under Appendix Long Residence.
34. However, Ground 1 is not by itself sufficient for the Applicant’s claim to succeed. I therefore turn to consider under Ground 2 whether the Respondent was required, in the particular circumstances of the Applicant’s case, to either vary the application to one made under Appendix Long Residence or to give the Applicant an opportunity to vary it herself.
Ground 2
35. The Applicant contends that the Respondent has the power either to vary an application for leave, or (under the terms of her variation policy) to invite an applicant to do so, where it appears that the applicant may have made an error in the application.
36. The Applicant submits that the variation policy required the Respondent, faced with the Applicant’s ILR application, to contact the Applicant and invite her to amend her application from one made under Appendix Private Life to one made under Appendix Long Residence. The Respondent did not apply the variation policy to the Applicant’s application, and thereby fettered her discretion.
37. The Respondent contends that it was not obvious that the variation policy applied, since on the basis of the application made it was not obvious that the Applicant had used the wrong form, applied for the wrong route or had intended to make a different ILR application. It was therefore not irrational or otherwise unlawful for the Respondent not to invite the Applicant to amend her application.
38. The Respondent contends in the alternative that redirecting the Applicant from the Private Life route to the Long Residence route would be tantamount to impermissibly correcting her application. That would require an intensity of review or inquiry on the part of the decision-maker which goes beyond the variation policy and which would give rise to an unduly onerous administrative burden if applied to all such cases.
39. I have not found Ground 2 easy to determine. The Respondent’s variation policy clearly requires caseworkers to contact applicants where it appears from the application made, and on the basis of the information which the caseworker has, that the applicant “may have selected the wrong route or category” or “may have used the wrong form for their application”. The wording used in the policy is not mandatory, but is stronger than that which would imply a bare or permissive discretion: the policy instructs caseworkers that they “should contact” the applicant, not that they “may” do so.
40. The part of the variation policy on which the Applicant relies is within the section on validity of applications and in my view applies only to applications which are on their face invalid. I accept that caseworkers are not required to carry out a full merits review in every such case nor to explore every potential alternative route by which an individual applicant might succeed; that would impose an unfair and unworkable administrative burden on the Respondent. In some cases, the caseworker will clearly be entitled to reject an application as invalid without any further or substantive consideration: Islam v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 458. The variation policy itself is silent as to the type of case in which a caseworker might be required to contact an applicant and provide an opportunity to amend the application, and it is not the role of the Upper Tribunal on review to provide guidance in that respect. It is however implicit in the wording of the variation policy that the caseworker will in some cases be required to look beyond the apparently invalid application which has been made and consider whether, on the basis of the information they have, the applicant in fact intended to make a different application or to select a different route.
41. The position is very different when paragraph PL18.2 of the Rules applies. Paragraph PL18.2 provides that where the application is one for settlement on the Private Life route, and where the requirements for settlement are not met but the suitability and eligibility requirements for further permission to stay are met, “the application will be varied by the Secretary of State” to an application for permission to stay (i.e. for further limited leave to remain). Unlike the Rules which apply to invalid applications (see, for example, paragraph 34B of the Immigration Rules) Paragraph PL18.2 does not include any process by which the applicant is invited to vary their application. PL18.2 sets out an automatic process which involves substantive consideration of the application followed by variation if the settlement requirements are not met.
42. Variation of the application under PL18.2 has adverse consequences for the applicant. First, although the applicant will have paid the higher fee for a settlement application, the difference will not be refunded: PL18.2(a). Second, the applicant may become subject to an additional requirement to pay an Immigration Health Charge for the duration of the limited leave: PL 18.2(b). Third, the applicant is not offered an opportunity to vary the application themselves to another settlement category in which they could succeed.
43. Considering both the variation policy and paragraph PL18.2, there is an obvious anomaly. Where an individual makes an invalid application for settlement under Appendix Private Life (for example, by using the Long Residence application form, or by applying when they are outside the UK), the variation policy requires caseworkers to consider whether the applicant may have intended to make a different application and to invite them to vary the application.
44. Where an individual makes a valid application for settlement under Appendix Private Life, but does not meet the eligibility requirement for settlement under the Private Life route, paragraph PL18.2 requires only that the Secretary of State consider whether the requirements for limited leave to remain are met, and if so, requires the Secretary of State to vary the application to one for limited leave. An individual who has accrued ten years’ lawful leave and who makes a valid but misguided application in the wrong settlement category will therefore be considerably financially worse off than one who makes an invalid application; they will also be deprived of the opportunity to vary their application to a different settlement category in which they might succeed.
45. That is precisely what happened in the Applicant’s case. Her application was made using the ‘Settlement Private Life’ online form and stated that she was applying for “Settlement Private Life”. It was a valid application, because it met all the validity requirements in paragraphs PL1.1 - PL1.3. Because the variation policy does not apply to valid applications, the Respondent was not required by the variation policy to contact the Applicant and invite her to vary her application. The Respondent was only required to consider the application under Appendix Private Life and, once she considered that the requirements for limited leave were met, was required by PL18.2 to vary the application to one for limited leave to remain.
46. I have reached that conclusion with some reluctance. The Applicant has throughout her stay in the UK had lawful leave and met the qualifying period requirement for settlement on the Long Residence route at the time of her application. There was nothing in the application form itself which would indicate to the Applicant that she could not meet the qualifying period requirement under the Private Life route. Nor did the form include any room for the Applicant to make supporting representations which might have prompted the decision-maker to consider varying the application to one for settlement on the Long Residence route or inviting the Applicant to do so.
47. Given the complexity of the relevant Rules (reflected in the Respondent’s own position in these proceedings about the Applicant’s eligibility for ILR under Appendix Long Residence) it is hardly surprising that the Applicant used the wrong form. Unfortunately, once she had done so, there was nothing on the face of the application which would make it reasonably apparent to the decision-maker that the Applicant intended to make a different application. On its face, the application which was made was a valid application on the Private Life route in which the Applicant did not meet the qualifying period eligibility requirement for settlement.
48. In the circumstances the Respondent was not required, either by the terms of the variation policy or by the Immigration Rules, to exercise her discretion to vary the Applicant’s application to the long residence route or to invite the Applicant to do so. Whilst I have considerable sympathy for the Applicant, the decision of 10 October 2025 to grant her a further period of limited leave to remain was one which was not irrational or otherwise unlawful.
49. I therefore dismiss the Applicant’s claim for judicial review.
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