JR-2025-LON-004387
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The decision
JR-2025-LON-004387
In the Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber)
Judicial Review
In the matter of an application for Judicial Review
The King on the application of
F.R.U.
(Anonymity Order made)
Applicant
and
Trafford Council
Respondent
Direction Regarding Anonymity – Rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008
Unless and until a Tribunal or court directs otherwise, the applicant is granted anonymity. No report of these proceedings shall directly or indirectly identify him or any member of his family. This direction applies both to the applicant and to the respondent. Failure to comply with this direction could lead to contempt of court proceedings.
ORDER
BEFORE Upper Tribunal Judge Blum
HAVING considered all documents lodged and having heard Mr P Sharkey of counsel, instructed by Bhatia Best Solicitors, for the applicant and Ms E Wilsdon of counsel, instructed by Trafford Council, for the respondent at a hearing on 26 May 2026
IT IS ORDERED THAT:
(1) The application for judicial review is dismissed for the reasons in the attached judgment.
(2) The applicant shall pay the respondent’s reasonable costs, subject to detailed assessment if not agreed. The applicant having the benefit of public funding, such costs are not to be enforced without further order from the Senior Courts Cost Office under regulation 16 of the Civil Legal Aid (Costs) Regulations 2013.
(3) There shall be detailed assessment of the applicant’s publicly funded costs.
(4) No application for permission to appeal having been made, such permission is refused.
Signed: D. Blum
Upper Tribunal Judge Blum
Dated: 19 June 2026
The date on which this order was sent is given below
For completion by the Upper Tribunal Immigration and Asylum Chamber
Sent / Handed to the applicant, respondent and any interested party / the applicant's, respondent’s and any interested party’s solicitors on (date): 22/06/2026
Solicitors:
Ref No.
Home Office Ref:
Notification of appeal rights
A decision by the Upper Tribunal on an application for judicial review is a decision that disposes of proceedings.
A party may appeal against such a decision to the Court of Appeal on a point of law only. Any party who wishes to appeal should apply to the Upper Tribunal for permission, at the hearing at which the decision is given. If no application is made, the Tribunal must nonetheless consider at the hearing whether to give or refuse permission to appeal (rule 44(4B) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008).
If the Tribunal refuses permission, either in response to an application or by virtue of rule 44(4B), then the party wishing to appeal can apply for permission from the Court of Appeal itself. This must be done by filing an appellant’s notice with the Civil Appeals Office of the Court of Appeal within 28 days of the date the Tribunal’s decision on permission to appeal was sent (Civil Procedure Rules Practice Direction 52D 3.3).
Case No: JR-2025-LON-004387
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
(IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER)
Field House,
Breams Buildings
London, EC4A 1WR
23 June 2026
Before:
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BLUM
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Between:
THE KING
on the application of
FRU
(Anonymity Order Made)
Applicant
- and -
Trafford Council
Respondent
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Mr P Sharkey
(instructed by Bhatia Best Solicitors), for the applicant
Ms E Wilsdon
(instructed by the Trafford Council) for the respondent
Hearing date: 26 May 2026
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J U D G M E N T
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Direction Regarding Anonymity – Rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008
Unless and until a Tribunal or court directs otherwise, the applicant is granted anonymity. No report of these proceedings shall directly or indirectly identify him or any member of his family. This direction applies both to the applicant and to the respondent. Failure to comply with this direction could lead to contempt of court proceedings.
Judge Blum:
1. The purpose of these proceedings is to determine the age of FRU (the applicant). He maintains that his date of birth is 26 January 2008, which would now make him 18 years old. The respondent undertook a ‘Brief Enquiry’ age assessment and formed the view that he was older than his claimed age. The two social workers who undertook the Brief Enquiry assessment attributed to the applicant a date of birth of 26 January 2003, making him 23 years old.
Relevant background
2. I summarise the applicant’s own account of his personal and immigration history and the chronology of events relevant to this assessment of his age.
3. The applicant asserts that he is a national of Eritrea, born in Assab. He lived with his parents until he was around 2 years old, when his mother took him to Ethiopia because of political problems his father was having with the Eritrean authorities (his father was imprisoned). Neither the applicant nor his mother had legal residence in Ethiopia. To the applicant’s knowledge no ID documents were issued to him or his mother. They lived in Metema, which borders Sudan. The applicant never attended school or a government owned health centre. He was taught to read and write in Amharic by friends and neighbours. The applicant believes his mother is in her 30s and sold vegetables. Around a year before the applicant left Ethiopia he started selling water.
4. The applicant was aware of his age as his mother informed him each year on his birthday. His mother would invite neighbours for tea and coffee to celebrate. This stopped when the applicant was around 10 as a result of tensions in Ethiopia between Eritreans and Ethiopians. The applicant’s mother still told him when it was his birthday and his age.
5. Fearful of the rising tensions in Ethiopia the applicant asked friends whom he overheard discussing leaving Ethiopia whether he could accompany them. The applicant did not have to pay a Sudanese agent who agreed that the applicant could travel with them. They entered Sudan and remained there for more than a week before entering Libya. There are differences in the applicant’s account of his stay in Libya which I will consider later. I focus on the account given in his most recent statement dated 2 March 2026. He was detained by the agents in a warehouse who required a ransom to be paid for his release. He was unable to contact his mother and was beaten by the agents. He remained in the warehouse for 2 months until rescued by the police who kept him in a detention centre in Aljabiya for 5 months where he was treated for his injuries and nursed back to health. He was then taken to another detention centre in Tripoli and was released after about a week after being asked to pay 5,000 to 6,000 dinars to be released (he was unable to pay).
6. The applicant went to a region of Triploi called Kareemia where the Habesha people lived who were of Eritrean/Ethiopian descent and spoke Amharic. The applicant worked as shepherd for 2 months but was not paid and left the farm. He then worked in a restaurant for approximately 3 months. He heard people discussing leaving Libya and had saved some money but was unable to afford the agent’s fee of 150,000 dinars. The applicant’s boss at the restaurant agreed to pay the remainder of the money so long as other people travelling agreed to look after the applicant, and the people he travelled with also contributed to the agent’s fee. The applicant spent approximately a year in Libya.
7. The applicant claimed he travelled by boat to Lampedusa, Italy, in April 2025 where he was fingerprinted and transported to Sicily, but left a refugee camp and travelled with other people to Rome and then took a train to France. He spent between 5 and 7 days in Italy. The applicant believes the people he travelled to France with paid for his tickets. He travelled through France by train, stayed in Paris for approximately 1 week, and then to Dunkirk where he was provided with tents by the Red Cross. He remained in France for approximately 2 months. The applicant travelled to the UK by small boat. He had no money for the crossing and begged the agent to allow him to travel for free. The agent agreed as long as the people the applicant was travelling with all agreed to travel in the agent’s boat and pay him. The applicant arrived in the UK on 2 July 2025.
8. In a decision dated 16 July 2025 the respondent concluded, based on a visual assessment of the applicant’s appearance, demeanour and a brief enquiry undertaken by two social workers with the assistance of an interpreter, that the applicant was significantly over 18 years of age. The respondent did not proceed to undertake a full age assessment.
9. A judicial review challenging the lawfulness of the decision of 16 July 2025 was lodged on 14 October 2025. In a decision sealed on 8 December 2025 Mr C M G Ockelton, sitting as a judge of the High Court, granted permission to the applicant to apply for judicial review to the extent necessary to establish the applicant’s age. The case was transferred to the Upper Tribunal to undertake the fact-finding exercise to determine the applicant’s age.
The fact-finding hearing
10. The Upper Tribunal fact-finding hearing took place on 26 May 2026. The trial bundle included, inter alia, the judicial review grounds, the Summary Grounds of Defence, two statements (accompanied by certified translations) made by the applicant for the purpose of his age assessment proceedings, and the Brief Enquiry age assessment.
11. Also included in the trial bundles were relevant Court and Tribunal orders and related correspondence, a witness statement from the applicant prepared for the purpose of his claim to be a victim of trafficking dated 22 October 2025, a completed Home Office ‘Initial age decision (Strongly over 18) questionnaire’ dated 2 July 2025 and accompanying assessing officer’s report, the applicant’s Initial Contact And Asylum Registration Questionnaire (hereafter ‘screening interview’) dated 3 July 2025, documents created by the respondent including contact records, case notes, documents and correspondence relating to the applicant’s referral to the National Referral Mechanism (NRM), the Single Competent Authority’s Conclusive Grounds decision dated 22 January 2026, correspondence between the applicant’s legal representatives instructed for the purpose of his protection claim and the Home Office, details of the creation date, settings and registration information for the applicant’s WhatsApp account, and details relating to the applicant’s social media accounts held with Facebook, Instagram and TikTok. Prior to the hearing I received skeleton arguments from the representatives.
12. I heard face-to-face oral evidence from the applicant with the assistance of an Amharic interpreter. The applicant indicated that he could understand the Tribunal interpreter, and the Tribunal interpreter indicated that he understood the applicant. I informed an Amharic interpreter instructed by the applicant’s solicitors to inform the applicant’s counsel if he considered there was any material misinterpretation or misunderstanding in the interpretation undertaken by the Tribunal interpreter. In the event the solicitor’s interpreter did not raise any issue in respect of the interpretation of the applicant’s oral evidence.
13. As the applicant was now an adult even on his own claimed age, and in the absence of any medico-legal report identifying any vulnerability, it was not necessary to apply the specific provisions of the Joint Presidential Guidance Note No 2 of 2010, relating to children and vulnerable adults, to the evidence given by the applicant at the hearing. In assessing the totality of the applicant’s evidence relating to his claimed age, including the evidence presented prior to the date he claimed to have turned 18, I have nevertheless applied the approach detailed in the Joint Presidential Guidance Note.
14. I recorded and considered the oral submissions from both Mr Sharkey and Ms Wilsdon. I have read and considered with care all the documents before me even if they are not specifically identified later in this decision. Both parties are aware of the evidence, both written and oral, that was before me. This evidence is, in any event, a matter of record. I shall refer to this evidence only in so far as it is necessary for me to lawfully determine the applicant’s age.
15. It is not my role to determine factual issues that may be relevant to the applicant’s asylum application, or to proffer a view on that application. An asylum claim is, in any event, to be assessed on a different standard of proof (the ‘real risk’ test) and in a context where the burden of proof rests on the asylum applicant.
Legal principles
16. In undertaking my assessment, I have considered the following legal principles. In R (A) v Croydon LBC [2009] UKSC 8 the Supreme Court decided that "there is a right or wrong answer" to the question whether an individual is or is not a child and that it was for the Court to determine it. A person’s age is a fact precedent to a local authority exercising any of its powers under the Children Act 1989. I must therefore determine, in my inquisitorial role and on the balance of probabilities, whether the applicant was a child when he came under the care of the Local Authority. Neither party is required to prove the precedent fact and neither party bears the burden of proof (R (CJ) v Cardiff City Council [2011] EWCA Civ 1590). It is open to me, having carried out a holistic assessment of all material evidence, to reach a conclusion that is different from both the claimed age and the assessed age.
17. The judgment in R (B) v Merton London Borough Council [2003] EWHC 1689 (Admin), [2003] 4 All ER 280 laid down guidance in judicial review proceedings on appropriate processes to be adopted when a local authority is assessing a young person's age in borderline cases. Assessments which comply with those guidelines are said to be ‘Merton compliant.’ VS v The Home Office [2014] EWHC 2483 (QB) contains the following helpful summary of the Merton guidelines, as modified by subsequent decisions. Although there has been no full age assessment in this JR challenge, the factors identified below are nevertheless of some relevance when assessing the applicant’s age.
(1) The purpose of an age assessment is to establish the chronological age of a young person.
(2) The decision makers cannot determine age solely on the basis of the appearance of the applicant, except in clear cases: Merton per Stanley Burnton at [37].
(3) Demeanour can be notoriously unreliable and by itself constitutes only "somewhat fragile material": NA v LB of Croydon [2009] EWHC 2357 (Admin) per Blake J at [28]. Demeanour will generally need to be viewed together with other things.
(4) There should be "no predisposition, divorced from the information and evidence available to the local authority, to assume that an applicant is an adult, or conversely that he is a child": see Merton per Stanley Burnton J at [37-38]. The decision, therefore, needs to be based on particular facts concerning the particular person.
(5) There is no burden of proof imposed on the applicant to have to prove his or her age in the course of the assessment: see Merton per Stanley Burnton J at [38], confirmed by R(CJ) v Cardiff CC [2011] EWCA Civ 1590.
(6) In similar vein, benefit of any doubt is always given to the unaccompanied asylum-seeking child since it is recognized that age assessment is not a scientific process: A and WK v London Borough of Croydon & Others ([2009] EWHC 939 (Admin) per Collins J at [40]; see also [21] of R(AB) v Kent County Council [2020] EWHC 109 (Admin).
(7) The two social workers who carry out the age assessment should be properly trained and experienced: A and WK per Collins J at [38].
(8) The applicant should have an appropriate adult, and should be informed of the right to have one, with the purpose of having an appropriate adult also being explained to him or her.
(9) The applicant should be told the purpose of the assessment.
(10) The decision "must be based on firm grounds and reasons …[and] must be fully set out and explained to the applicant": A and WK per Collins J at [12].
(11) The approach of the assessors must involve trying "to establish a rapport with the applicant and any questioning, while recognising the possibility of coaching, should be by means of open-ended and not leading questions". It is "equally important for the assessors to be aware of the customs and practices and any particular difficulties faced by the applicant in his home society": A and WK per Collins J at [13].
(12) It is "axiomatic that an applicant should be given a fair and proper opportunity, at a stage when a possible adverse decision is no more than provisional, to deal with important points adverse to his age case which may weigh against him": R (FZ) v Croydon LBC [2011] EWCA Civ 59, at [21]. It is not sufficient that the interviewing social workers withdraw to consider their decision, and then return to present the applicant "with their conclusions without first giving him the opportunity to deal with the adverse points".
(13) Assessments devoid of details and/or reasons for the conclusion are not compliant with the Merton guidelines; and the conclusions must be "expressed with sufficient detail to explain all the main adverse points which the fuller document showed had influenced the decision" (FZ, at [22]).
18. In R(AM) v Solihull Metropolitan Borough Council [2012] UKUT 000118 (IAC) the Vice-President of the Upper Tribunal stated, at [15],
In the present case the evidence is wide ranging. It may therefore be appropriate to make some general observations about the impact of evidence of various sorts and from various sources in this type of case. First, we think that almost all evidence of physical characteristics is likely to be of very limited value. That is because, as pointed out by Kenneth Parker J in R (R) v Croydon [2011] EWHC 1473 (Admin) there is no clear relationship between chronological age and physical maturity in respect of most measurable aspects of such maturity.
19. The observations in R(AM) were endorsed by the Administrative Court in GE (Eritrea), R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department & Anor [2015] EWHC 1406 (Admin) (at [74]). I note that in the earlier decision of NA v LB of Croydon [2009] EWHC 2357 (Admin) Blake J indicated, at [27], that physical appearance alone was a notoriously unreliable basis for assessment of chronological age. This was endorsed in VS (at [78]).
20. In R (AM) Mr Ockelton additionally indicated that “…there may be value to be obtained from observations of demeanour and interaction with others made over a long period of time by those who have opportunity to observe an individual going about his ordinary life.” The Tribunal however found “… it difficult to see that any useful observations of demeanour or social interaction or maturity can be made in the course of a short interview between an individual and a strange adult.” This could occur because of cultural and “ordinary social difficulties”. The asserted expertise of a social worker conducting an interview was not, in the Tribunal’s judgement, sufficient to counteract those difficulties. The view of a person who could point to consistent attitudes, and a number of supporting instances over a considerable period of time, was likely to carry weight that observations made in the artificial surroundings of an interview could not carry. The Tribunal additionally noted that evidence of interaction between an age disputed individual and other young people may well assist in making an age assessment.
21. The approach in R(AM) was endorsed in R(GE) v SSHD and Bedford Borough Council [2015] EWHC 1406 (Admin) where the Administrative Court noted that people can behave in a formal interview in a way that is very different from their normal behaviour as a result of nervousness, fear, feeling of intimidation, or because they simply want the experience to end.
22. In MVN v LB Greenwich [2015] EWHC 1942 the Administrative Court observed that the primary focus will be on the credibility of the person’s evidence concerning their age, but it is permissible to have regard to credibility more generally, as long as the primary focus is not forgotten. Any assessment of credibility must be made ‘in the round’ and in light of all relevant evidence, including background country evidence and expert reports (Mibanga v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 367, Karanakaran v SSHD [2000] EWCA Civ 11), and allowance should be given to the fact that asylum-seekers may have problems giving coherent accounts of their history (R(N) v SSHD [2008] EWHC 1952 (Admin)). When assessing the plausibility of the applicant’s account I additionally remind myself that reliance on inherent improbability may be dangerous or inappropriate where the conduct in question has taken place in a society whose culture and customs are very different from those in the United Kingdom (HK v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 1037, at [29]; Araghi v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 973, at [7]). In approaching the applicant’s evidence, I take into account the content of the Joint Presidential Guidance Note No 2 of 2010 and the authority of AM (Afghanistan) v SSHD [2017] EWCA Civ 1123, and note, inter alia, that a minor may encounter greater difficulty understanding questions, and that I must make proper allowance for that possibility. I have additionally taken into account the ADCS Age Assessment Guidance, October 2015 and in particular an extract from Appendix C of the Guidance indicating that “… the very fact” that a young person is being assessed to determine their age “means that by definition they have undergone extraordinary, difficult and distressing experiences.”
My analysis
23. My assessment has been undertaken on a holistic approach, and my conclusions have been reached after a cumulative assessment of the various factors considered below, applying the principles identified above.
24. I begin my analysis by considering the applicant’s physical appearance. The Brief Enquiry age assessment observed that the applicant “…presented with numerous physical indictors consistent with someone significantly over the age of 18.” Reference was made to the applicant’s visible facial hair which included “a defined moustache”, and that he had “residual scarring indicative of previous acne”. The applicant was described as having “a pronounced jawline” and there were said to be lines on his forehead and “noticeable creases around the mouth, all suggestive of full physical maturity.” The applicant’s hairline was said to be visibly receding, and he was described as having “… a broad, well-developed physique, particularly around the shoulders, inconsistent with adolescent development.” The applicant’s voice was described as being “notably deep and the tone in which he spoke carried the maturity and cadence typically associated with adulthood.”
25. Having observed the applicant throughout the hearing I was unable to detect any significant receding hairline consistent with the loss of hair, although his hairline was slightly set back. I am not assisted by the evidence of the fact that his voice was broken or in respect of his build. These factors are not indicative of a person’s age beyond a relatively wide age range and varies considerably. The evidence that the applicant had a defined moustache is a neutral factor given that facial hair can start growing across a range of different ages. The fact that the applicant has a ‘pronounced jawline’ is also a neutral factor – it is perfectly possible for a child to have a pronounced jaw line and an adult to have a jawline that is not pronounced. I could not observe any pronounced lines on the applicant’s forehead or creases around his mouth. In any event, the existence of such lines and creases is ultimately a neutral factor given that the Brief Enquiry age assessment did not appear to consider the applicant’s background living in a hot and semi-arid part of Ethiopia, or the degree to which he had been exposed to the elements whilst living in Ethiopia and then Libya, or the impact that his journey to the UK may have had on his physical appearance. I remind myself that physical appearance alone is a notoriously unreliable basis for assessment of chronological age. Ultimately, having considered the evidence relating to the applicant’s physical appearance, I find that he could fall anywhere in the range from 18 years old to 23 years old.
26. I now consider the evidence relating to the applicant’s demeanour, his presentation, and his behaviour. The Brief Enquiry age assessment stated that throughout the assessment the applicant appeared relaxed to the point of disengagement. “He was said to have continuously rocked back and forth in his chair, which the assessors perceived as “deliberate and habitual rather than nervous.” The applicant’s body language and manner suggested a high level of self-confidence, bordering on defiance at times. Although the applicant “maintained strong eye contact” he “… intermittently but frequently looked around the room, giving the impression of boredom or disinterest.” When asked to put his phone away so the interview could proceed the applicant continued to use it until he had completed his task. The assessors believed this “… conveyed a sense of assertiveness and control over the interaction.” The assessors stated that the applicant’s “… verbal responses were articulate, coherent and delivered without hesitation”, and that he “… demonstrated a high level of cognitive maturity” and expressed himself clearly and confidently throughout the assessment.
27. The age assessors made much of the fact that the applicant was confident and maintained good direct eye contact. When assessing the applicant’s interaction with the age assessors I remind myself of what was considered in R(AM), at [19] & [20], and in GE (Eritrea), at [73]. The applicant’s presentation to the age assessors as someone who was generally calm and confident are ultimately neutral factors. A child aged 17 years old could present as confidently as someone over the age of 18, although confidence may generally increase with age.
28. I regard the observation concerning the applicant’s body language and manner (which was otherwise unparticularised), and the description of his reaction when he was asked to put his phone away, as neutral points when assessing his age. Whilst some adults may feel sufficiently confident to continue using their phones when asked to stop, others may comply immediately. Equally, whilst there are considerable numbers of mid to late teenagers who do abide by rules, conditions and requests, the teenage years are generally characterised by rebellious behaviour and assertions of independence. Coupled with the difficult journey the applicant had to the UK (regardless of his age) and his experiences, I do not consider his confidence and perceived ‘defiance’ as being anything other than neutral factors.
29. The primary focus in an age assessment will be on the credibility of the person’s evidence concerning their age (MVN v LB Greenwich [2015] EWHC 1942). I will now consider the applicant’s evidence concerning his knowledge of his age. In assessing the applicant’s evidence relating to his knowledge of his age, and in respect of his general credibility, I proceed on the basis that the applicant did undertake an arduous journey to the UK during which he may well have been significantly mistreated, although I note the absence of any independent evidence such as a medico-legal report relating to the applicant’s mental health.
30. The applicant has not produced any documentary evidence supportive of his claimed age. He was not pressed in the Brief Enquiry age assessment or at the hearing before me as to the circumstances in which he and his mother came to enter and reside in Ethiopia. He was not asked, for example, why his mother had not registered with the refugee authorities in Ethiopia given the claimed political struggles his father faced in Eritrea. Nor have I been referred to any background evidence relating to the position of Eritreans who reside without legal status in Ethiopia. I am however prepared to accept that there are a significant number of Eritreans residing in Ethiopia without legal status and who would not necessarily have official documentation confirming their presence or status. I note the applicant’s claim to have been fingerprinted in Lampedusa on 28 June 2025. There is however no evidence in respect of this claim one way or another.
31. The applicant has consistently maintained throughout his interaction with the Home Office and the respondent and his judicial review proceedings that his date of birth is 26 January 2008. The consistent nature of his claim is a factor supportive of the credibility of his claimed knowledge of his age. As the applicant was only subject to a Brief Enquiry age assessment he was not asked in any significant detail about his social background, or how he was aware of his age. He informed the age assessors that his mother told him his date of birth, although he could not be sure when this first was, and that he celebrated his birthday up until his 10th birthday. He repeated this in his statement dated 3 October 2025 and explained that his mother would mark his birthday by inviting the neighbours to their home to have tea or coffee, although this stopped when tensions rose in Ethiopia between Ethiopians and Eritreans. In his statement dated 2 March 2026 the applicant stated that he had not attended school but had been taught to read and write by friends and neighbours. He claimed he and his mother attended a mosque on Fridays. He gave further details about his mother and their home. None of these assertions are inherently incredible if the applicant was residing illegally in Ethiopia, and no issue has been taken by the respondent with these assertions. They do not however provide any material insight into his timeline or his knowledge of his claimed age.
32. I now consider other evidence relevant to the applicant’s general credibility. I note that no issue has been taken by the respondent with the generality or broad thrust of the applicant’s account, such as his claim to have moved to Ethiopia with his mother aged 2 from Eritrea and that he and his mother resided without legal status in Ethiopia. These aspects of the applicant’s account are inherently plausible and are supportive of his general credibility. They do not however offer any material insight into the applicant’s age. I note that the Single Competent Authority found elements of the applicant’s account of being trafficked vague and lacking in detail and concluded that there was insufficient information available to enable a determination to be made that the applicant had been trafficked.
33. The applicant has given inconsistent evidence in respect of his time in Libya. In his statements of 3 October 2025 and 2 March 2026 the applicant claims he was detained in a warehouse by the agents who brought him to Libya and that he was subjected to serious ill-treatment in order to obtain payment of $5-6,000 to secure his release. He claims he was rescued by the Libyan police who then detained him for a further 5 months. On being released he stayed for 5 months with the Habesha people who spoke Amharic and worked first as a shepherd for 2 months and then, as he was not paid, he worked in a restaurant for 3 months before leaving for Italy in April 2024.
34. In his asylum screening interview, which was conducted on 3 July 2025, the day after his arrival in the UK, the applicant was asked whether he had been exploited. He claimed he had been a shopkeeper in Libya and had not been paid for this work. At the hearing the applicant said there may have been a misunderstanding by the interpreter at the screening interview. He was asked for the words for ‘shepherd’ and ‘shopkeeper’ and his respective answers, record, were ‘reenya’ and ‘suk tabbacki’. These words sound quite different to each other. When it was pointed out to the applicant at the hearing that no correction was sought by his immigration solicitors in respect of his assertion to have worked as a shopkeeper, he stated he did not bring it to the attention of his solicitors as he did not think ‘it would bring any problem’. I do not accept this explanation given the nature of the other amendments sought by the solicitors. I am not satisfied that there was any misunderstanding by the Amharic interpreter when the applicant was questioned, or that it can be adequately explained by the applicant’s claimed minority at the time, and I find this inconsistency undermines his general credibility.
35. When asked to outline his journey to the UK in his screening interview the applicant is recorded as saying “I travelled to Sudan by foot, and I left Ethiopia in April 2024. I went to Sudan, and I stayed in Sudan for one week in a warehouse of the agent. Then I travelled to Libya by car, and I stayed in Libya for around one year and I spent two months in the warehouse in the agent’s accommodation and I was working in Tripoli, and I was a waiter in a restaurant during the other ten months.” In a letter from the applicant’s immigration solicitors dated 16 September 2025 an amendment was sought to the screening interview record to remove the reference to the applicant having worked as a waiter for 10 months and to substitute it with a reference to him being detained by the police for 5 months after being released from the warehouse, then working for 3 months as a helper in a restaurant, and afterwards working as a shepherd for 2 months. I note that no issue has been raised with the accuracy of most of the answers provided by the applicant. It is clear he understood the Amharic interpreter, and the applicant indicated that he had understood all the questions asked. The amendment sought is not a simple matter of a mistranslated word and it is difficult to understand how the interpreter could have misunderstood the applicant’s evidence, even taking into account his claimed minority at the time. I additionally note that the amendment sought suggested that the applicant worked first in a restaurant and then as a shepherd. This is inconsistent with his later evidence that he worked as a shepherd and then in the restaurant. I find these inconsistencies undermine the applicant’s general credibility.
36. In cross-examination the applicant was first asked to name the months during which he worked as a shepherd, and then for the time of year that he worked as a shepherd. The applicant said he could not remember the months, and then he said he could not remember the time of year. I do not find this answer credible. It is not clear to me why the applicant was initially unable to give any indication as to the time of year that he claimed to have worked as a shepherd. Given that he would have been outdoors I find it more likely than not that he would have been aware of the season (whilst I appreciate that Libya does not have as much seasonal variation as the UK, I do not accept that the applicant would have been unaware of whether it was winter or summer).
37. There is an inconsistency in respect of the applicant’s timeline relating to his travel to the UK. In cross-examination it was put to the applicant that he must have been released from prison in Libya around December 2024. The applicant said he thought he was Tripoli during the new year, and he agreed that he worked as a shepherd in early 2025. In re-examination the applicant confirmed that he never worked as a shepherd before January 2025. The applicant maintains that he worked as a shepherd for 2 months starting in January 2025, and in a restaurant for 3 months. Yet he claimed in his statement dated 3 October 2025 and his statement dated 2 March 2026 that he travelled to Italy in April 2025. This is inconsistent with the applicant’s claim that he worked for 5 months in Libya. There is also an inconsistency between the applicant’s statements, where he says he arrived in Italy in April 2025, and his screening interview in which he says he arrived in Italy in May 2025.
38. A further inconsistency in the applicant’s account arises from his statement dated 22 October 2025 written in support of his NRM referral. In this statement he claimed he was working in a restaurant in Libya in October/November 2024. This is inconsistent with the timeline he advanced in his oral evidence to the effect that he only began working in a restaurant in 2025.
39. There is an omission in the applicant’s account in respect of his detention by the police in Libya. In his statement dated 3 October 2025 the applicant merely refers to his imprisonment by the police for approximately 5 months. He does not refer to being detained in two separate prisons or detention centres. In his statement dated 22 October 2025, in support of his NRM referral, the applicant refers to being taken to “a prison called Aljabiya in Tripoli.” In his statement dated 2 March 2026 the applicant states that he was detained by the police in a detention centre in Aljabiya, for approximately 5 months and then he was taken to another detention centre in Tripoli where he was detained for a further week. In oral evidence the applicant explained that the 22 October 2025 statement erroneously refers to Aljabiya as being in Tripoli when in fact it is in another part of Libya. There was no record of the applicant referring to 2 different police detention centres in his Brief Enquiry assessment or in his first statement. I accept that Aljabiya is in another part of Libya and that there may have been some confusion in the NRM statement as to where Aljabiya is, but the applicant nevertheless failed to mention that he had been detained at two separate detention centres by the police in his two earlier statements.
40. There are further inconsistencies in the applicant’s evidence relating to the payment of his journey to the UK. In his screening interview the applicant said, “I paid the agent 150,000 birr as total amount for my journey from Ethiopia to the UK.” Birr is the currency used in Ethiopia. In cross-examination the applicant confirmed that this was correct. In his Brief Enquiry age assessment, the applicant claimed that his journey to Sudan and Libya was paid for by the agents and that he was expected to pay the agents back when he arrived in Libya. This is inconsistent with his evidence in his screening interview. In his statement dated 2 March 2026, the applicant claimed that it was his journey from Libya to Italy cost 150,000 dinars and that the record stating that he paid 150,000 birr for the journey from Ethiopia to the UK was incorrect. I note that the dinar is the currency of Libya. The applicant’s explanation in his oral evidence for this discrepancy was that he believed he was being asked in the screening interview to give the overall cost to him personally of his journey to the UK, and that he only paid for the journey from Libya to Italy. I do not accept this explanation. The evidence recorded in the screening interview is clear, and the fact that the applicant is recorded using the Ethiopian currency and not the dinar suggests that the applicant was referring to money used to pay his way from Ethiopia and not just from Libya to Italy. This suggests that the applicant had funds in Ethiopia that he used to leave the country.
41. There is a further discrepancy in that the applicant told the Brief Enquiry age assessors that he paid for his journey from Libya to Italy with the money he earned from working in Libya, but in his statement dated 2 March 2026 he claimed he did not have enough money to pay the agent and Adam agreed to pay the remaining amount, and that the people he travelled with also agreed to contribute to the agent’s fee.
42. In his statement dated 2 March 2026 the applicant claimed he begged an agent in France to let him travel on a small boat for free, and that the agent agreed to do this so long as the people the applicant was travelling with agreed to use the agents’ boats and pay him. In oral evidence the applicant stated that a lot of people of mixed ages were getting onto the boats in France, that he was scared of the agents and that he did not see anyone pay cash on the beach. Whilst I cannot entirely discount the applicant’s assertion that he did not have to pay the agent, and whilst I note Mr Sharkey’s submission that the conditions on the beach may have been chaotic, I do not find it credible, in the context of a criminal commercial driven enterprise, that an agent would agree to allow the applicant to travel on a small boat without paying.
43. In his Initial age decision interview conducted on 2 July 2025 on the day the applicant arrived in the UK, he was asked through an Amharic interpreter when he first shaved. The response recorded was, “I cannot remember exactly. Maybe a year ago. I only shave a little bit.” The applicant was then asked when he last shaved, and answered, “about 3 days”. In his statement dated 3 October 2025 the applicant stated in respect of the Brief Enquiry age assessment, “the social workers commented that it looked like I had been shaving. This is not the case; I have never shaved my facial hair. I started growing facial hair about a year ago but have never shaved it.” This evidence is plainly inconsistent. In cross-examination the appellant sought to resolve the inconsistency by saying that he just cut his facial hair with scissors. It was pointed out to the applicant that no reference was made to the use of scissors in his statement, to which the applicant said that he did not think this would cause a problem when he read his statement and then said he was not asked about it. I do not find the applicant’s explanation credible. If the applicant had used scissors to cut his facial hair, I would have expected this to have been described in his statement. I do not accept that solicitors experienced in undertaking age assessment litigation would not have fully considered this relevant aspect of the applicant’s account. Nor is it credible that the applicant would have considered that using a pair of scissors to cut his facial hair was the same as shaving. I find that the inconsistent evidence is an attempt by the applicant to give the impression that he is younger than he actually is. I draw a similar inference from the applicant’s answers in cross-examination where he rejected the accuracy of the description in the Brief Enquiry age assessment that he had “a defined moustache”. In light of my own observation of the applicant’s facial hair, I am satisfied that the age assessors’ description was accurate.
44. Ms Wilsdon invited me to find it implausible that the applicant would not have taken a mobile phone when he left Ethiopia. Whilst there is some merit in her submission given the significance of leaving one’s only family, no evidence was put before me relating to the prevalence of mobile phone ownership among the young in Ethiopia and I decline to draw any adverse inference. It was the applicant’s evidence that he wrote down his mother’s mobile phone number when he left Ethiopia, but this was lost in Sudan and he was unable to recall it when he was being subjected to serious ill-treatment by the agents in Libya. Whilst I cannot entirely discount his explanation, I nevertheless find it more likely than not that a person leaving their closest relative and their country of habitual residence would ensure that they consigned to memory that close relative’s phone number. I note that although the applicant referred to scarring on his arms and legs no medical evidence has been produced relating to that scarring and there is no other medical evidence relating to the claimed ill-treatment to which the applicant maintains he was subjected.
45. In his screening interview the applicant said he had a sim card in France. In his oral evidence he stated that he was given a mobile phone by a charity in France and used it to look at Youtube and for scrolling and playing games. He therefore clearly had a mobile phone when he was in France. In cross-examination the applicant confirmed that his WhatsApp account terms and conditions were accepted on 8 July 2025 (6 days after his arrival in the UK), and that his mobile device was registered on 13 August 2025. The applicant registered his Facebook account on 13 August 2025, and his Instagram account on 16 September 2025. Ms Wilsdon submitted that it is incredible that the applicant would not have used his mobile phone to scroll social media accounts whilst in France and submitted that the applicant is likely to have already had social media accounts in France and that he set up new ones once he reached the UK to support his claimed age. Whilst I accept this is a possibility, it is also speculative and I am not prepared to draw an adverse inference on this speculative basis.
46. When the applicant’s TikTok account was registered a birthdate of 26 January 2003 was provided. The applicant claims that a friend of his named Anas created the account for him and gave this date of birth because Anas has seen this date of birth on Home Office documents shown to him by the applicant and that Anas remembered this date of birth when the TikTok account was created. I do not find this explanation credible. There was no statement from Anas supporting the applicant’s explanation. The applicant accepted that Anas had been added to the applicant’s Facebook profile but he claimed that Anas’ case had been ‘spoilt’ (it was not clear what the case was or what was meant by ‘spoilt’) and although contact may be possible as Anas is his friend they had not met since Anas left the same accommodation.
47. I do not find it credible that the applicant would fail to try to contact Anas to ask if he was willing to confirm the applicant’s explanation for the creation of the TikTok account. There appears to me to be no reason why the applicant could not have tried to contact Anas to ask if he was willing to support the applicant’s claim. I note that the applicant’s Facebook and Instagram accounts give his date of birth as 26 January 2008. The applicant claimed that he had set up the Facebook and Instagram accounts himself but that he was unable to set up his TikTok account without the help of Anas. The applicant provided no further explanation of any additional difficulties in creating a TikTok account in comparison to Facebook or Instagram accounts and I do not accept his assertion that Anas set up his account without confirming the applicant’s date of birth with him. I find it more likely than not that the applicant set up the TikTok account on his own and that he provided the date of birth of 26 January 2003.
48. In oral evidence the applicant confirmed that he had not approached any organisation or his solicitors for assistance in trying to regain contact with his mother. He claimed he had informed his solicitors that he was not in contact with his mother but he did not asked his solicitors to help him to try to contact her because he thought they would do this themselves. Given the applicant’s claim that he resided with his mother until he left Ethiopia and that she appears to be his closest family relative I do not find it likely or plausible that the applicant would not have asked his solicitors for any assistance in trying to locate and communicate with his mother. I find this undermines the generality of the applicant’s credibility.
49. There was a discrepancy in the applicant’s account of his life in Ethiopia. In his Initial age decision interview conducted on 2 July 2025 the applicant claimed that he spent his last 3 years in Ethiopia helping his mother sell water at checkpoints. However, in his statement dated 2 March 2026 the applicant claimed that his mother sold vegetables on the street and that he began to help her by fetching the vegetables from a distributor when he was 14 or 15, which would, on his account, be 1 to 2 years before he left Ethiopia. He additionally claimed that he started to sell water about a year before he left Ethiopia. He made no mention of his mother selling water. The applicant claimed in oral evidence that he had informed the Home Office that his mother sold both vegetables and water but this was not recorded. I do not, on the balance of probabilities, accept this assertion. Whilst I cannot entirely discount the possibility that this further information was not written down, I do not find it likely to have been omitted given the relative detail of the other recorded answers.
Conclusion
50. In carrying out this assessment I have attempted to evaluate the evidence presented by both parties ‘in the round’ having regard to the applicable legal principles. It is not necessary for me to determine whether the Brief Enquiry age assessment was conducted in a lawful manner. I must determine the applicant’s age regardless of the lawfulness of the Brief Enquiry age assessment. In undertaking my assessment of the applicant’s age I have applied the principles relating to the benefit of the doubt as set out in R(AS) v Kent County Council [2017] UKUT 446 and R(AB) v Kent County Council [2020] EWHC 109 (Admin).
51. I have found it difficult to determine this applicant’s age. There is no documentary evidence of his age such as a birth certificate or identity document and only limited social network evidence. There is no evidence from other witnesses. Nor is there any clear evidential hook upon which one can attach a specific age other than the applicant’s own account of his mother telling him his date of birth.
52. I have balanced the various factors identified in my analysis above that both support and undermine the applicant’s claimed age. For the reasons I have given I find that his physical appearance does not significantly assist me in determining his chronological age. His physical appearance could support a finding that his chronological age is 18 just as much as it could support a finding that his chronological age is 23. Most of the factors relating to the applicant’s demeanour, presentation and behaviour, save for those affecting his credibility, have been neutral. I note in the applicant’s favour that he has consistently maintained his date of birth, and that it was his mother who told him his date of birth. I note that the respondent does not dispute the ‘general thrust’ of the applicant’s account relating to his upbringing as an Eritrean living in Ethiopia. I take into account once again that the applicant is likely to have undergone a difficult and traumatic journey to the UK, and the difficulties that young asylum-seekers can have in giving coherent accounts. I have taken into account Mr Sharkey’s submissions relating to the stressful situation faced by the applicant in Libya and the difficulties he encountered on the route taken to reach the UK, and the unchallenged evidence that he has scarring and appeared to refer to the months by their order in the year rather than by name, and of course his claimed minority. These points do not however adequately explain the inconsistencies and implausibilities I have described above. Notwithstanding the evidence I have identified above that is supportive of the applicant’s claimed age, and having directed myself in accordance with the principles established in R v Lucas [1981] QB 720 in respect of aspects of the applicant’s evidence that I disbelieve, I find that the evidence tending to undermine the applicant’s general credibility causes me to doubt his claimed date of birth.
53. I find that the applicant has attempted, through his inconsistent evidence regarding whether he had shaved and whether he had a moustache, to present himself as younger than he actually is. His incredible account of not having to pay for parts of his journey and his inconsistent evidence regarding the financing of other parts of his journey, and his inaction in seeking to contact his mother, suggests he had access to funds and may therefore still be in contact with his mother. The evidence relating to social media accounts, considered in the round, suggests that the applicant set up Facebook and Instagram accounts for the purpose of showing the date of birth of 26 January 2008, but that he inadvertently placed his correct date of birth on the TikTok account.
54. I find, having considered all the evidence holistically, that the applicant has not given credible evidence concerning his date of birth and that he has attempted to present himself as someone younger than his actual chronological age. It is difficult to fix upon what I believe his actual age to be. I must nevertheless make such a finding. Based on the totality of the evidence before me, and for the reasons given above, it is my judgment that the applicant was born on 26 January 2003, making him 23 years old at the date of this decision.
Signed:
Upper Tribunal Judge Blum
Dated: 19 June 2026
~~~~0~~~~
In the Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber)
Judicial Review
In the matter of an application for Judicial Review
The King on the application of
F.R.U.
(Anonymity Order made)
Applicant
and
Trafford Council
Respondent
Direction Regarding Anonymity – Rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008
Unless and until a Tribunal or court directs otherwise, the applicant is granted anonymity. No report of these proceedings shall directly or indirectly identify him or any member of his family. This direction applies both to the applicant and to the respondent. Failure to comply with this direction could lead to contempt of court proceedings.
ORDER
BEFORE Upper Tribunal Judge Blum
HAVING considered all documents lodged and having heard Mr P Sharkey of counsel, instructed by Bhatia Best Solicitors, for the applicant and Ms E Wilsdon of counsel, instructed by Trafford Council, for the respondent at a hearing on 26 May 2026
IT IS ORDERED THAT:
(1) The application for judicial review is dismissed for the reasons in the attached judgment.
(2) The applicant shall pay the respondent’s reasonable costs, subject to detailed assessment if not agreed. The applicant having the benefit of public funding, such costs are not to be enforced without further order from the Senior Courts Cost Office under regulation 16 of the Civil Legal Aid (Costs) Regulations 2013.
(3) There shall be detailed assessment of the applicant’s publicly funded costs.
(4) No application for permission to appeal having been made, such permission is refused.
Signed: D. Blum
Upper Tribunal Judge Blum
Dated: 19 June 2026
The date on which this order was sent is given below
For completion by the Upper Tribunal Immigration and Asylum Chamber
Sent / Handed to the applicant, respondent and any interested party / the applicant's, respondent’s and any interested party’s solicitors on (date): 22/06/2026
Solicitors:
Ref No.
Home Office Ref:
Notification of appeal rights
A decision by the Upper Tribunal on an application for judicial review is a decision that disposes of proceedings.
A party may appeal against such a decision to the Court of Appeal on a point of law only. Any party who wishes to appeal should apply to the Upper Tribunal for permission, at the hearing at which the decision is given. If no application is made, the Tribunal must nonetheless consider at the hearing whether to give or refuse permission to appeal (rule 44(4B) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008).
If the Tribunal refuses permission, either in response to an application or by virtue of rule 44(4B), then the party wishing to appeal can apply for permission from the Court of Appeal itself. This must be done by filing an appellant’s notice with the Civil Appeals Office of the Court of Appeal within 28 days of the date the Tribunal’s decision on permission to appeal was sent (Civil Procedure Rules Practice Direction 52D 3.3).
Case No: JR-2025-LON-004387
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
(IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER)
Field House,
Breams Buildings
London, EC4A 1WR
23 June 2026
Before:
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BLUM
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Between:
THE KING
on the application of
FRU
(Anonymity Order Made)
Applicant
- and -
Trafford Council
Respondent
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Mr P Sharkey
(instructed by Bhatia Best Solicitors), for the applicant
Ms E Wilsdon
(instructed by the Trafford Council) for the respondent
Hearing date: 26 May 2026
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
J U D G M E N T
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Direction Regarding Anonymity – Rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008
Unless and until a Tribunal or court directs otherwise, the applicant is granted anonymity. No report of these proceedings shall directly or indirectly identify him or any member of his family. This direction applies both to the applicant and to the respondent. Failure to comply with this direction could lead to contempt of court proceedings.
Judge Blum:
1. The purpose of these proceedings is to determine the age of FRU (the applicant). He maintains that his date of birth is 26 January 2008, which would now make him 18 years old. The respondent undertook a ‘Brief Enquiry’ age assessment and formed the view that he was older than his claimed age. The two social workers who undertook the Brief Enquiry assessment attributed to the applicant a date of birth of 26 January 2003, making him 23 years old.
Relevant background
2. I summarise the applicant’s own account of his personal and immigration history and the chronology of events relevant to this assessment of his age.
3. The applicant asserts that he is a national of Eritrea, born in Assab. He lived with his parents until he was around 2 years old, when his mother took him to Ethiopia because of political problems his father was having with the Eritrean authorities (his father was imprisoned). Neither the applicant nor his mother had legal residence in Ethiopia. To the applicant’s knowledge no ID documents were issued to him or his mother. They lived in Metema, which borders Sudan. The applicant never attended school or a government owned health centre. He was taught to read and write in Amharic by friends and neighbours. The applicant believes his mother is in her 30s and sold vegetables. Around a year before the applicant left Ethiopia he started selling water.
4. The applicant was aware of his age as his mother informed him each year on his birthday. His mother would invite neighbours for tea and coffee to celebrate. This stopped when the applicant was around 10 as a result of tensions in Ethiopia between Eritreans and Ethiopians. The applicant’s mother still told him when it was his birthday and his age.
5. Fearful of the rising tensions in Ethiopia the applicant asked friends whom he overheard discussing leaving Ethiopia whether he could accompany them. The applicant did not have to pay a Sudanese agent who agreed that the applicant could travel with them. They entered Sudan and remained there for more than a week before entering Libya. There are differences in the applicant’s account of his stay in Libya which I will consider later. I focus on the account given in his most recent statement dated 2 March 2026. He was detained by the agents in a warehouse who required a ransom to be paid for his release. He was unable to contact his mother and was beaten by the agents. He remained in the warehouse for 2 months until rescued by the police who kept him in a detention centre in Aljabiya for 5 months where he was treated for his injuries and nursed back to health. He was then taken to another detention centre in Tripoli and was released after about a week after being asked to pay 5,000 to 6,000 dinars to be released (he was unable to pay).
6. The applicant went to a region of Triploi called Kareemia where the Habesha people lived who were of Eritrean/Ethiopian descent and spoke Amharic. The applicant worked as shepherd for 2 months but was not paid and left the farm. He then worked in a restaurant for approximately 3 months. He heard people discussing leaving Libya and had saved some money but was unable to afford the agent’s fee of 150,000 dinars. The applicant’s boss at the restaurant agreed to pay the remainder of the money so long as other people travelling agreed to look after the applicant, and the people he travelled with also contributed to the agent’s fee. The applicant spent approximately a year in Libya.
7. The applicant claimed he travelled by boat to Lampedusa, Italy, in April 2025 where he was fingerprinted and transported to Sicily, but left a refugee camp and travelled with other people to Rome and then took a train to France. He spent between 5 and 7 days in Italy. The applicant believes the people he travelled to France with paid for his tickets. He travelled through France by train, stayed in Paris for approximately 1 week, and then to Dunkirk where he was provided with tents by the Red Cross. He remained in France for approximately 2 months. The applicant travelled to the UK by small boat. He had no money for the crossing and begged the agent to allow him to travel for free. The agent agreed as long as the people the applicant was travelling with all agreed to travel in the agent’s boat and pay him. The applicant arrived in the UK on 2 July 2025.
8. In a decision dated 16 July 2025 the respondent concluded, based on a visual assessment of the applicant’s appearance, demeanour and a brief enquiry undertaken by two social workers with the assistance of an interpreter, that the applicant was significantly over 18 years of age. The respondent did not proceed to undertake a full age assessment.
9. A judicial review challenging the lawfulness of the decision of 16 July 2025 was lodged on 14 October 2025. In a decision sealed on 8 December 2025 Mr C M G Ockelton, sitting as a judge of the High Court, granted permission to the applicant to apply for judicial review to the extent necessary to establish the applicant’s age. The case was transferred to the Upper Tribunal to undertake the fact-finding exercise to determine the applicant’s age.
The fact-finding hearing
10. The Upper Tribunal fact-finding hearing took place on 26 May 2026. The trial bundle included, inter alia, the judicial review grounds, the Summary Grounds of Defence, two statements (accompanied by certified translations) made by the applicant for the purpose of his age assessment proceedings, and the Brief Enquiry age assessment.
11. Also included in the trial bundles were relevant Court and Tribunal orders and related correspondence, a witness statement from the applicant prepared for the purpose of his claim to be a victim of trafficking dated 22 October 2025, a completed Home Office ‘Initial age decision (Strongly over 18) questionnaire’ dated 2 July 2025 and accompanying assessing officer’s report, the applicant’s Initial Contact And Asylum Registration Questionnaire (hereafter ‘screening interview’) dated 3 July 2025, documents created by the respondent including contact records, case notes, documents and correspondence relating to the applicant’s referral to the National Referral Mechanism (NRM), the Single Competent Authority’s Conclusive Grounds decision dated 22 January 2026, correspondence between the applicant’s legal representatives instructed for the purpose of his protection claim and the Home Office, details of the creation date, settings and registration information for the applicant’s WhatsApp account, and details relating to the applicant’s social media accounts held with Facebook, Instagram and TikTok. Prior to the hearing I received skeleton arguments from the representatives.
12. I heard face-to-face oral evidence from the applicant with the assistance of an Amharic interpreter. The applicant indicated that he could understand the Tribunal interpreter, and the Tribunal interpreter indicated that he understood the applicant. I informed an Amharic interpreter instructed by the applicant’s solicitors to inform the applicant’s counsel if he considered there was any material misinterpretation or misunderstanding in the interpretation undertaken by the Tribunal interpreter. In the event the solicitor’s interpreter did not raise any issue in respect of the interpretation of the applicant’s oral evidence.
13. As the applicant was now an adult even on his own claimed age, and in the absence of any medico-legal report identifying any vulnerability, it was not necessary to apply the specific provisions of the Joint Presidential Guidance Note No 2 of 2010, relating to children and vulnerable adults, to the evidence given by the applicant at the hearing. In assessing the totality of the applicant’s evidence relating to his claimed age, including the evidence presented prior to the date he claimed to have turned 18, I have nevertheless applied the approach detailed in the Joint Presidential Guidance Note.
14. I recorded and considered the oral submissions from both Mr Sharkey and Ms Wilsdon. I have read and considered with care all the documents before me even if they are not specifically identified later in this decision. Both parties are aware of the evidence, both written and oral, that was before me. This evidence is, in any event, a matter of record. I shall refer to this evidence only in so far as it is necessary for me to lawfully determine the applicant’s age.
15. It is not my role to determine factual issues that may be relevant to the applicant’s asylum application, or to proffer a view on that application. An asylum claim is, in any event, to be assessed on a different standard of proof (the ‘real risk’ test) and in a context where the burden of proof rests on the asylum applicant.
Legal principles
16. In undertaking my assessment, I have considered the following legal principles. In R (A) v Croydon LBC [2009] UKSC 8 the Supreme Court decided that "there is a right or wrong answer" to the question whether an individual is or is not a child and that it was for the Court to determine it. A person’s age is a fact precedent to a local authority exercising any of its powers under the Children Act 1989. I must therefore determine, in my inquisitorial role and on the balance of probabilities, whether the applicant was a child when he came under the care of the Local Authority. Neither party is required to prove the precedent fact and neither party bears the burden of proof (R (CJ) v Cardiff City Council [2011] EWCA Civ 1590). It is open to me, having carried out a holistic assessment of all material evidence, to reach a conclusion that is different from both the claimed age and the assessed age.
17. The judgment in R (B) v Merton London Borough Council [2003] EWHC 1689 (Admin), [2003] 4 All ER 280 laid down guidance in judicial review proceedings on appropriate processes to be adopted when a local authority is assessing a young person's age in borderline cases. Assessments which comply with those guidelines are said to be ‘Merton compliant.’ VS v The Home Office [2014] EWHC 2483 (QB) contains the following helpful summary of the Merton guidelines, as modified by subsequent decisions. Although there has been no full age assessment in this JR challenge, the factors identified below are nevertheless of some relevance when assessing the applicant’s age.
(1) The purpose of an age assessment is to establish the chronological age of a young person.
(2) The decision makers cannot determine age solely on the basis of the appearance of the applicant, except in clear cases: Merton per Stanley Burnton at [37].
(3) Demeanour can be notoriously unreliable and by itself constitutes only "somewhat fragile material": NA v LB of Croydon [2009] EWHC 2357 (Admin) per Blake J at [28]. Demeanour will generally need to be viewed together with other things.
(4) There should be "no predisposition, divorced from the information and evidence available to the local authority, to assume that an applicant is an adult, or conversely that he is a child": see Merton per Stanley Burnton J at [37-38]. The decision, therefore, needs to be based on particular facts concerning the particular person.
(5) There is no burden of proof imposed on the applicant to have to prove his or her age in the course of the assessment: see Merton per Stanley Burnton J at [38], confirmed by R(CJ) v Cardiff CC [2011] EWCA Civ 1590.
(6) In similar vein, benefit of any doubt is always given to the unaccompanied asylum-seeking child since it is recognized that age assessment is not a scientific process: A and WK v London Borough of Croydon & Others ([2009] EWHC 939 (Admin) per Collins J at [40]; see also [21] of R(AB) v Kent County Council [2020] EWHC 109 (Admin).
(7) The two social workers who carry out the age assessment should be properly trained and experienced: A and WK per Collins J at [38].
(8) The applicant should have an appropriate adult, and should be informed of the right to have one, with the purpose of having an appropriate adult also being explained to him or her.
(9) The applicant should be told the purpose of the assessment.
(10) The decision "must be based on firm grounds and reasons …[and] must be fully set out and explained to the applicant": A and WK per Collins J at [12].
(11) The approach of the assessors must involve trying "to establish a rapport with the applicant and any questioning, while recognising the possibility of coaching, should be by means of open-ended and not leading questions". It is "equally important for the assessors to be aware of the customs and practices and any particular difficulties faced by the applicant in his home society": A and WK per Collins J at [13].
(12) It is "axiomatic that an applicant should be given a fair and proper opportunity, at a stage when a possible adverse decision is no more than provisional, to deal with important points adverse to his age case which may weigh against him": R (FZ) v Croydon LBC [2011] EWCA Civ 59, at [21]. It is not sufficient that the interviewing social workers withdraw to consider their decision, and then return to present the applicant "with their conclusions without first giving him the opportunity to deal with the adverse points".
(13) Assessments devoid of details and/or reasons for the conclusion are not compliant with the Merton guidelines; and the conclusions must be "expressed with sufficient detail to explain all the main adverse points which the fuller document showed had influenced the decision" (FZ, at [22]).
18. In R(AM) v Solihull Metropolitan Borough Council [2012] UKUT 000118 (IAC) the Vice-President of the Upper Tribunal stated, at [15],
In the present case the evidence is wide ranging. It may therefore be appropriate to make some general observations about the impact of evidence of various sorts and from various sources in this type of case. First, we think that almost all evidence of physical characteristics is likely to be of very limited value. That is because, as pointed out by Kenneth Parker J in R (R) v Croydon [2011] EWHC 1473 (Admin) there is no clear relationship between chronological age and physical maturity in respect of most measurable aspects of such maturity.
19. The observations in R(AM) were endorsed by the Administrative Court in GE (Eritrea), R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department & Anor [2015] EWHC 1406 (Admin) (at [74]). I note that in the earlier decision of NA v LB of Croydon [2009] EWHC 2357 (Admin) Blake J indicated, at [27], that physical appearance alone was a notoriously unreliable basis for assessment of chronological age. This was endorsed in VS (at [78]).
20. In R (AM) Mr Ockelton additionally indicated that “…there may be value to be obtained from observations of demeanour and interaction with others made over a long period of time by those who have opportunity to observe an individual going about his ordinary life.” The Tribunal however found “… it difficult to see that any useful observations of demeanour or social interaction or maturity can be made in the course of a short interview between an individual and a strange adult.” This could occur because of cultural and “ordinary social difficulties”. The asserted expertise of a social worker conducting an interview was not, in the Tribunal’s judgement, sufficient to counteract those difficulties. The view of a person who could point to consistent attitudes, and a number of supporting instances over a considerable period of time, was likely to carry weight that observations made in the artificial surroundings of an interview could not carry. The Tribunal additionally noted that evidence of interaction between an age disputed individual and other young people may well assist in making an age assessment.
21. The approach in R(AM) was endorsed in R(GE) v SSHD and Bedford Borough Council [2015] EWHC 1406 (Admin) where the Administrative Court noted that people can behave in a formal interview in a way that is very different from their normal behaviour as a result of nervousness, fear, feeling of intimidation, or because they simply want the experience to end.
22. In MVN v LB Greenwich [2015] EWHC 1942 the Administrative Court observed that the primary focus will be on the credibility of the person’s evidence concerning their age, but it is permissible to have regard to credibility more generally, as long as the primary focus is not forgotten. Any assessment of credibility must be made ‘in the round’ and in light of all relevant evidence, including background country evidence and expert reports (Mibanga v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 367, Karanakaran v SSHD [2000] EWCA Civ 11), and allowance should be given to the fact that asylum-seekers may have problems giving coherent accounts of their history (R(N) v SSHD [2008] EWHC 1952 (Admin)). When assessing the plausibility of the applicant’s account I additionally remind myself that reliance on inherent improbability may be dangerous or inappropriate where the conduct in question has taken place in a society whose culture and customs are very different from those in the United Kingdom (HK v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 1037, at [29]; Araghi v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 973, at [7]). In approaching the applicant’s evidence, I take into account the content of the Joint Presidential Guidance Note No 2 of 2010 and the authority of AM (Afghanistan) v SSHD [2017] EWCA Civ 1123, and note, inter alia, that a minor may encounter greater difficulty understanding questions, and that I must make proper allowance for that possibility. I have additionally taken into account the ADCS Age Assessment Guidance, October 2015 and in particular an extract from Appendix C of the Guidance indicating that “… the very fact” that a young person is being assessed to determine their age “means that by definition they have undergone extraordinary, difficult and distressing experiences.”
My analysis
23. My assessment has been undertaken on a holistic approach, and my conclusions have been reached after a cumulative assessment of the various factors considered below, applying the principles identified above.
24. I begin my analysis by considering the applicant’s physical appearance. The Brief Enquiry age assessment observed that the applicant “…presented with numerous physical indictors consistent with someone significantly over the age of 18.” Reference was made to the applicant’s visible facial hair which included “a defined moustache”, and that he had “residual scarring indicative of previous acne”. The applicant was described as having “a pronounced jawline” and there were said to be lines on his forehead and “noticeable creases around the mouth, all suggestive of full physical maturity.” The applicant’s hairline was said to be visibly receding, and he was described as having “… a broad, well-developed physique, particularly around the shoulders, inconsistent with adolescent development.” The applicant’s voice was described as being “notably deep and the tone in which he spoke carried the maturity and cadence typically associated with adulthood.”
25. Having observed the applicant throughout the hearing I was unable to detect any significant receding hairline consistent with the loss of hair, although his hairline was slightly set back. I am not assisted by the evidence of the fact that his voice was broken or in respect of his build. These factors are not indicative of a person’s age beyond a relatively wide age range and varies considerably. The evidence that the applicant had a defined moustache is a neutral factor given that facial hair can start growing across a range of different ages. The fact that the applicant has a ‘pronounced jawline’ is also a neutral factor – it is perfectly possible for a child to have a pronounced jaw line and an adult to have a jawline that is not pronounced. I could not observe any pronounced lines on the applicant’s forehead or creases around his mouth. In any event, the existence of such lines and creases is ultimately a neutral factor given that the Brief Enquiry age assessment did not appear to consider the applicant’s background living in a hot and semi-arid part of Ethiopia, or the degree to which he had been exposed to the elements whilst living in Ethiopia and then Libya, or the impact that his journey to the UK may have had on his physical appearance. I remind myself that physical appearance alone is a notoriously unreliable basis for assessment of chronological age. Ultimately, having considered the evidence relating to the applicant’s physical appearance, I find that he could fall anywhere in the range from 18 years old to 23 years old.
26. I now consider the evidence relating to the applicant’s demeanour, his presentation, and his behaviour. The Brief Enquiry age assessment stated that throughout the assessment the applicant appeared relaxed to the point of disengagement. “He was said to have continuously rocked back and forth in his chair, which the assessors perceived as “deliberate and habitual rather than nervous.” The applicant’s body language and manner suggested a high level of self-confidence, bordering on defiance at times. Although the applicant “maintained strong eye contact” he “… intermittently but frequently looked around the room, giving the impression of boredom or disinterest.” When asked to put his phone away so the interview could proceed the applicant continued to use it until he had completed his task. The assessors believed this “… conveyed a sense of assertiveness and control over the interaction.” The assessors stated that the applicant’s “… verbal responses were articulate, coherent and delivered without hesitation”, and that he “… demonstrated a high level of cognitive maturity” and expressed himself clearly and confidently throughout the assessment.
27. The age assessors made much of the fact that the applicant was confident and maintained good direct eye contact. When assessing the applicant’s interaction with the age assessors I remind myself of what was considered in R(AM), at [19] & [20], and in GE (Eritrea), at [73]. The applicant’s presentation to the age assessors as someone who was generally calm and confident are ultimately neutral factors. A child aged 17 years old could present as confidently as someone over the age of 18, although confidence may generally increase with age.
28. I regard the observation concerning the applicant’s body language and manner (which was otherwise unparticularised), and the description of his reaction when he was asked to put his phone away, as neutral points when assessing his age. Whilst some adults may feel sufficiently confident to continue using their phones when asked to stop, others may comply immediately. Equally, whilst there are considerable numbers of mid to late teenagers who do abide by rules, conditions and requests, the teenage years are generally characterised by rebellious behaviour and assertions of independence. Coupled with the difficult journey the applicant had to the UK (regardless of his age) and his experiences, I do not consider his confidence and perceived ‘defiance’ as being anything other than neutral factors.
29. The primary focus in an age assessment will be on the credibility of the person’s evidence concerning their age (MVN v LB Greenwich [2015] EWHC 1942). I will now consider the applicant’s evidence concerning his knowledge of his age. In assessing the applicant’s evidence relating to his knowledge of his age, and in respect of his general credibility, I proceed on the basis that the applicant did undertake an arduous journey to the UK during which he may well have been significantly mistreated, although I note the absence of any independent evidence such as a medico-legal report relating to the applicant’s mental health.
30. The applicant has not produced any documentary evidence supportive of his claimed age. He was not pressed in the Brief Enquiry age assessment or at the hearing before me as to the circumstances in which he and his mother came to enter and reside in Ethiopia. He was not asked, for example, why his mother had not registered with the refugee authorities in Ethiopia given the claimed political struggles his father faced in Eritrea. Nor have I been referred to any background evidence relating to the position of Eritreans who reside without legal status in Ethiopia. I am however prepared to accept that there are a significant number of Eritreans residing in Ethiopia without legal status and who would not necessarily have official documentation confirming their presence or status. I note the applicant’s claim to have been fingerprinted in Lampedusa on 28 June 2025. There is however no evidence in respect of this claim one way or another.
31. The applicant has consistently maintained throughout his interaction with the Home Office and the respondent and his judicial review proceedings that his date of birth is 26 January 2008. The consistent nature of his claim is a factor supportive of the credibility of his claimed knowledge of his age. As the applicant was only subject to a Brief Enquiry age assessment he was not asked in any significant detail about his social background, or how he was aware of his age. He informed the age assessors that his mother told him his date of birth, although he could not be sure when this first was, and that he celebrated his birthday up until his 10th birthday. He repeated this in his statement dated 3 October 2025 and explained that his mother would mark his birthday by inviting the neighbours to their home to have tea or coffee, although this stopped when tensions rose in Ethiopia between Ethiopians and Eritreans. In his statement dated 2 March 2026 the applicant stated that he had not attended school but had been taught to read and write by friends and neighbours. He claimed he and his mother attended a mosque on Fridays. He gave further details about his mother and their home. None of these assertions are inherently incredible if the applicant was residing illegally in Ethiopia, and no issue has been taken by the respondent with these assertions. They do not however provide any material insight into his timeline or his knowledge of his claimed age.
32. I now consider other evidence relevant to the applicant’s general credibility. I note that no issue has been taken by the respondent with the generality or broad thrust of the applicant’s account, such as his claim to have moved to Ethiopia with his mother aged 2 from Eritrea and that he and his mother resided without legal status in Ethiopia. These aspects of the applicant’s account are inherently plausible and are supportive of his general credibility. They do not however offer any material insight into the applicant’s age. I note that the Single Competent Authority found elements of the applicant’s account of being trafficked vague and lacking in detail and concluded that there was insufficient information available to enable a determination to be made that the applicant had been trafficked.
33. The applicant has given inconsistent evidence in respect of his time in Libya. In his statements of 3 October 2025 and 2 March 2026 the applicant claims he was detained in a warehouse by the agents who brought him to Libya and that he was subjected to serious ill-treatment in order to obtain payment of $5-6,000 to secure his release. He claims he was rescued by the Libyan police who then detained him for a further 5 months. On being released he stayed for 5 months with the Habesha people who spoke Amharic and worked first as a shepherd for 2 months and then, as he was not paid, he worked in a restaurant for 3 months before leaving for Italy in April 2024.
34. In his asylum screening interview, which was conducted on 3 July 2025, the day after his arrival in the UK, the applicant was asked whether he had been exploited. He claimed he had been a shopkeeper in Libya and had not been paid for this work. At the hearing the applicant said there may have been a misunderstanding by the interpreter at the screening interview. He was asked for the words for ‘shepherd’ and ‘shopkeeper’ and his respective answers, record, were ‘reenya’ and ‘suk tabbacki’. These words sound quite different to each other. When it was pointed out to the applicant at the hearing that no correction was sought by his immigration solicitors in respect of his assertion to have worked as a shopkeeper, he stated he did not bring it to the attention of his solicitors as he did not think ‘it would bring any problem’. I do not accept this explanation given the nature of the other amendments sought by the solicitors. I am not satisfied that there was any misunderstanding by the Amharic interpreter when the applicant was questioned, or that it can be adequately explained by the applicant’s claimed minority at the time, and I find this inconsistency undermines his general credibility.
35. When asked to outline his journey to the UK in his screening interview the applicant is recorded as saying “I travelled to Sudan by foot, and I left Ethiopia in April 2024. I went to Sudan, and I stayed in Sudan for one week in a warehouse of the agent. Then I travelled to Libya by car, and I stayed in Libya for around one year and I spent two months in the warehouse in the agent’s accommodation and I was working in Tripoli, and I was a waiter in a restaurant during the other ten months.” In a letter from the applicant’s immigration solicitors dated 16 September 2025 an amendment was sought to the screening interview record to remove the reference to the applicant having worked as a waiter for 10 months and to substitute it with a reference to him being detained by the police for 5 months after being released from the warehouse, then working for 3 months as a helper in a restaurant, and afterwards working as a shepherd for 2 months. I note that no issue has been raised with the accuracy of most of the answers provided by the applicant. It is clear he understood the Amharic interpreter, and the applicant indicated that he had understood all the questions asked. The amendment sought is not a simple matter of a mistranslated word and it is difficult to understand how the interpreter could have misunderstood the applicant’s evidence, even taking into account his claimed minority at the time. I additionally note that the amendment sought suggested that the applicant worked first in a restaurant and then as a shepherd. This is inconsistent with his later evidence that he worked as a shepherd and then in the restaurant. I find these inconsistencies undermine the applicant’s general credibility.
36. In cross-examination the applicant was first asked to name the months during which he worked as a shepherd, and then for the time of year that he worked as a shepherd. The applicant said he could not remember the months, and then he said he could not remember the time of year. I do not find this answer credible. It is not clear to me why the applicant was initially unable to give any indication as to the time of year that he claimed to have worked as a shepherd. Given that he would have been outdoors I find it more likely than not that he would have been aware of the season (whilst I appreciate that Libya does not have as much seasonal variation as the UK, I do not accept that the applicant would have been unaware of whether it was winter or summer).
37. There is an inconsistency in respect of the applicant’s timeline relating to his travel to the UK. In cross-examination it was put to the applicant that he must have been released from prison in Libya around December 2024. The applicant said he thought he was Tripoli during the new year, and he agreed that he worked as a shepherd in early 2025. In re-examination the applicant confirmed that he never worked as a shepherd before January 2025. The applicant maintains that he worked as a shepherd for 2 months starting in January 2025, and in a restaurant for 3 months. Yet he claimed in his statement dated 3 October 2025 and his statement dated 2 March 2026 that he travelled to Italy in April 2025. This is inconsistent with the applicant’s claim that he worked for 5 months in Libya. There is also an inconsistency between the applicant’s statements, where he says he arrived in Italy in April 2025, and his screening interview in which he says he arrived in Italy in May 2025.
38. A further inconsistency in the applicant’s account arises from his statement dated 22 October 2025 written in support of his NRM referral. In this statement he claimed he was working in a restaurant in Libya in October/November 2024. This is inconsistent with the timeline he advanced in his oral evidence to the effect that he only began working in a restaurant in 2025.
39. There is an omission in the applicant’s account in respect of his detention by the police in Libya. In his statement dated 3 October 2025 the applicant merely refers to his imprisonment by the police for approximately 5 months. He does not refer to being detained in two separate prisons or detention centres. In his statement dated 22 October 2025, in support of his NRM referral, the applicant refers to being taken to “a prison called Aljabiya in Tripoli.” In his statement dated 2 March 2026 the applicant states that he was detained by the police in a detention centre in Aljabiya, for approximately 5 months and then he was taken to another detention centre in Tripoli where he was detained for a further week. In oral evidence the applicant explained that the 22 October 2025 statement erroneously refers to Aljabiya as being in Tripoli when in fact it is in another part of Libya. There was no record of the applicant referring to 2 different police detention centres in his Brief Enquiry assessment or in his first statement. I accept that Aljabiya is in another part of Libya and that there may have been some confusion in the NRM statement as to where Aljabiya is, but the applicant nevertheless failed to mention that he had been detained at two separate detention centres by the police in his two earlier statements.
40. There are further inconsistencies in the applicant’s evidence relating to the payment of his journey to the UK. In his screening interview the applicant said, “I paid the agent 150,000 birr as total amount for my journey from Ethiopia to the UK.” Birr is the currency used in Ethiopia. In cross-examination the applicant confirmed that this was correct. In his Brief Enquiry age assessment, the applicant claimed that his journey to Sudan and Libya was paid for by the agents and that he was expected to pay the agents back when he arrived in Libya. This is inconsistent with his evidence in his screening interview. In his statement dated 2 March 2026, the applicant claimed that it was his journey from Libya to Italy cost 150,000 dinars and that the record stating that he paid 150,000 birr for the journey from Ethiopia to the UK was incorrect. I note that the dinar is the currency of Libya. The applicant’s explanation in his oral evidence for this discrepancy was that he believed he was being asked in the screening interview to give the overall cost to him personally of his journey to the UK, and that he only paid for the journey from Libya to Italy. I do not accept this explanation. The evidence recorded in the screening interview is clear, and the fact that the applicant is recorded using the Ethiopian currency and not the dinar suggests that the applicant was referring to money used to pay his way from Ethiopia and not just from Libya to Italy. This suggests that the applicant had funds in Ethiopia that he used to leave the country.
41. There is a further discrepancy in that the applicant told the Brief Enquiry age assessors that he paid for his journey from Libya to Italy with the money he earned from working in Libya, but in his statement dated 2 March 2026 he claimed he did not have enough money to pay the agent and Adam agreed to pay the remaining amount, and that the people he travelled with also agreed to contribute to the agent’s fee.
42. In his statement dated 2 March 2026 the applicant claimed he begged an agent in France to let him travel on a small boat for free, and that the agent agreed to do this so long as the people the applicant was travelling with agreed to use the agents’ boats and pay him. In oral evidence the applicant stated that a lot of people of mixed ages were getting onto the boats in France, that he was scared of the agents and that he did not see anyone pay cash on the beach. Whilst I cannot entirely discount the applicant’s assertion that he did not have to pay the agent, and whilst I note Mr Sharkey’s submission that the conditions on the beach may have been chaotic, I do not find it credible, in the context of a criminal commercial driven enterprise, that an agent would agree to allow the applicant to travel on a small boat without paying.
43. In his Initial age decision interview conducted on 2 July 2025 on the day the applicant arrived in the UK, he was asked through an Amharic interpreter when he first shaved. The response recorded was, “I cannot remember exactly. Maybe a year ago. I only shave a little bit.” The applicant was then asked when he last shaved, and answered, “about 3 days”. In his statement dated 3 October 2025 the applicant stated in respect of the Brief Enquiry age assessment, “the social workers commented that it looked like I had been shaving. This is not the case; I have never shaved my facial hair. I started growing facial hair about a year ago but have never shaved it.” This evidence is plainly inconsistent. In cross-examination the appellant sought to resolve the inconsistency by saying that he just cut his facial hair with scissors. It was pointed out to the applicant that no reference was made to the use of scissors in his statement, to which the applicant said that he did not think this would cause a problem when he read his statement and then said he was not asked about it. I do not find the applicant’s explanation credible. If the applicant had used scissors to cut his facial hair, I would have expected this to have been described in his statement. I do not accept that solicitors experienced in undertaking age assessment litigation would not have fully considered this relevant aspect of the applicant’s account. Nor is it credible that the applicant would have considered that using a pair of scissors to cut his facial hair was the same as shaving. I find that the inconsistent evidence is an attempt by the applicant to give the impression that he is younger than he actually is. I draw a similar inference from the applicant’s answers in cross-examination where he rejected the accuracy of the description in the Brief Enquiry age assessment that he had “a defined moustache”. In light of my own observation of the applicant’s facial hair, I am satisfied that the age assessors’ description was accurate.
44. Ms Wilsdon invited me to find it implausible that the applicant would not have taken a mobile phone when he left Ethiopia. Whilst there is some merit in her submission given the significance of leaving one’s only family, no evidence was put before me relating to the prevalence of mobile phone ownership among the young in Ethiopia and I decline to draw any adverse inference. It was the applicant’s evidence that he wrote down his mother’s mobile phone number when he left Ethiopia, but this was lost in Sudan and he was unable to recall it when he was being subjected to serious ill-treatment by the agents in Libya. Whilst I cannot entirely discount his explanation, I nevertheless find it more likely than not that a person leaving their closest relative and their country of habitual residence would ensure that they consigned to memory that close relative’s phone number. I note that although the applicant referred to scarring on his arms and legs no medical evidence has been produced relating to that scarring and there is no other medical evidence relating to the claimed ill-treatment to which the applicant maintains he was subjected.
45. In his screening interview the applicant said he had a sim card in France. In his oral evidence he stated that he was given a mobile phone by a charity in France and used it to look at Youtube and for scrolling and playing games. He therefore clearly had a mobile phone when he was in France. In cross-examination the applicant confirmed that his WhatsApp account terms and conditions were accepted on 8 July 2025 (6 days after his arrival in the UK), and that his mobile device was registered on 13 August 2025. The applicant registered his Facebook account on 13 August 2025, and his Instagram account on 16 September 2025. Ms Wilsdon submitted that it is incredible that the applicant would not have used his mobile phone to scroll social media accounts whilst in France and submitted that the applicant is likely to have already had social media accounts in France and that he set up new ones once he reached the UK to support his claimed age. Whilst I accept this is a possibility, it is also speculative and I am not prepared to draw an adverse inference on this speculative basis.
46. When the applicant’s TikTok account was registered a birthdate of 26 January 2003 was provided. The applicant claims that a friend of his named Anas created the account for him and gave this date of birth because Anas has seen this date of birth on Home Office documents shown to him by the applicant and that Anas remembered this date of birth when the TikTok account was created. I do not find this explanation credible. There was no statement from Anas supporting the applicant’s explanation. The applicant accepted that Anas had been added to the applicant’s Facebook profile but he claimed that Anas’ case had been ‘spoilt’ (it was not clear what the case was or what was meant by ‘spoilt’) and although contact may be possible as Anas is his friend they had not met since Anas left the same accommodation.
47. I do not find it credible that the applicant would fail to try to contact Anas to ask if he was willing to confirm the applicant’s explanation for the creation of the TikTok account. There appears to me to be no reason why the applicant could not have tried to contact Anas to ask if he was willing to support the applicant’s claim. I note that the applicant’s Facebook and Instagram accounts give his date of birth as 26 January 2008. The applicant claimed that he had set up the Facebook and Instagram accounts himself but that he was unable to set up his TikTok account without the help of Anas. The applicant provided no further explanation of any additional difficulties in creating a TikTok account in comparison to Facebook or Instagram accounts and I do not accept his assertion that Anas set up his account without confirming the applicant’s date of birth with him. I find it more likely than not that the applicant set up the TikTok account on his own and that he provided the date of birth of 26 January 2003.
48. In oral evidence the applicant confirmed that he had not approached any organisation or his solicitors for assistance in trying to regain contact with his mother. He claimed he had informed his solicitors that he was not in contact with his mother but he did not asked his solicitors to help him to try to contact her because he thought they would do this themselves. Given the applicant’s claim that he resided with his mother until he left Ethiopia and that she appears to be his closest family relative I do not find it likely or plausible that the applicant would not have asked his solicitors for any assistance in trying to locate and communicate with his mother. I find this undermines the generality of the applicant’s credibility.
49. There was a discrepancy in the applicant’s account of his life in Ethiopia. In his Initial age decision interview conducted on 2 July 2025 the applicant claimed that he spent his last 3 years in Ethiopia helping his mother sell water at checkpoints. However, in his statement dated 2 March 2026 the applicant claimed that his mother sold vegetables on the street and that he began to help her by fetching the vegetables from a distributor when he was 14 or 15, which would, on his account, be 1 to 2 years before he left Ethiopia. He additionally claimed that he started to sell water about a year before he left Ethiopia. He made no mention of his mother selling water. The applicant claimed in oral evidence that he had informed the Home Office that his mother sold both vegetables and water but this was not recorded. I do not, on the balance of probabilities, accept this assertion. Whilst I cannot entirely discount the possibility that this further information was not written down, I do not find it likely to have been omitted given the relative detail of the other recorded answers.
Conclusion
50. In carrying out this assessment I have attempted to evaluate the evidence presented by both parties ‘in the round’ having regard to the applicable legal principles. It is not necessary for me to determine whether the Brief Enquiry age assessment was conducted in a lawful manner. I must determine the applicant’s age regardless of the lawfulness of the Brief Enquiry age assessment. In undertaking my assessment of the applicant’s age I have applied the principles relating to the benefit of the doubt as set out in R(AS) v Kent County Council [2017] UKUT 446 and R(AB) v Kent County Council [2020] EWHC 109 (Admin).
51. I have found it difficult to determine this applicant’s age. There is no documentary evidence of his age such as a birth certificate or identity document and only limited social network evidence. There is no evidence from other witnesses. Nor is there any clear evidential hook upon which one can attach a specific age other than the applicant’s own account of his mother telling him his date of birth.
52. I have balanced the various factors identified in my analysis above that both support and undermine the applicant’s claimed age. For the reasons I have given I find that his physical appearance does not significantly assist me in determining his chronological age. His physical appearance could support a finding that his chronological age is 18 just as much as it could support a finding that his chronological age is 23. Most of the factors relating to the applicant’s demeanour, presentation and behaviour, save for those affecting his credibility, have been neutral. I note in the applicant’s favour that he has consistently maintained his date of birth, and that it was his mother who told him his date of birth. I note that the respondent does not dispute the ‘general thrust’ of the applicant’s account relating to his upbringing as an Eritrean living in Ethiopia. I take into account once again that the applicant is likely to have undergone a difficult and traumatic journey to the UK, and the difficulties that young asylum-seekers can have in giving coherent accounts. I have taken into account Mr Sharkey’s submissions relating to the stressful situation faced by the applicant in Libya and the difficulties he encountered on the route taken to reach the UK, and the unchallenged evidence that he has scarring and appeared to refer to the months by their order in the year rather than by name, and of course his claimed minority. These points do not however adequately explain the inconsistencies and implausibilities I have described above. Notwithstanding the evidence I have identified above that is supportive of the applicant’s claimed age, and having directed myself in accordance with the principles established in R v Lucas [1981] QB 720 in respect of aspects of the applicant’s evidence that I disbelieve, I find that the evidence tending to undermine the applicant’s general credibility causes me to doubt his claimed date of birth.
53. I find that the applicant has attempted, through his inconsistent evidence regarding whether he had shaved and whether he had a moustache, to present himself as younger than he actually is. His incredible account of not having to pay for parts of his journey and his inconsistent evidence regarding the financing of other parts of his journey, and his inaction in seeking to contact his mother, suggests he had access to funds and may therefore still be in contact with his mother. The evidence relating to social media accounts, considered in the round, suggests that the applicant set up Facebook and Instagram accounts for the purpose of showing the date of birth of 26 January 2008, but that he inadvertently placed his correct date of birth on the TikTok account.
54. I find, having considered all the evidence holistically, that the applicant has not given credible evidence concerning his date of birth and that he has attempted to present himself as someone younger than his actual chronological age. It is difficult to fix upon what I believe his actual age to be. I must nevertheless make such a finding. Based on the totality of the evidence before me, and for the reasons given above, it is my judgment that the applicant was born on 26 January 2003, making him 23 years old at the date of this decision.
Signed:
Upper Tribunal Judge Blum
Dated: 19 June 2026
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