The decision


Case No: JR-2025-LON-004405
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
(IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER)
Field House,
Breams Buildings
London, EC4A 1WR

12 November 2026

Before:

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BULPITT

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Between:

THE KING
on the application of
SA
Applicant
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SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

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Ms R Chapman
(instructed by Leigh Day Solicitors), for the applicant

Mr R Ross
(instructed by the Government Legal Department) for the respondent

Hearing date: 26 October 2026

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J U D G M E N T

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Judge Bulpitt:
(1) Introduction
1. The applicant brings judicial review proceedings concerning the respondent’s decision, applying Appendix Victim of Domestic Abuse (“Appendix VDA”) of the Immigration Rules (“the Rules”), to refuse her application for United Kingdom entry clearance and settlement as the victim of domestic abuse who has been abandoned outside the United Kingdom (“the application”). The respondent’s decision was made on 10 January 2025 and maintained in an amended form on 12 September 2025, following an Administrative Review.
2. Permission to bring these proceedings was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Perkins on 21 May 2026 on five grounds. The parties have subsequently filed an agreed trial bundle containing all relevant documents, a second bundle containing the relevant guidance provided by the respondent to decision makers applying Appendix VDA, an agreed authorities bundle and their competing skeleton arguments. Helpful oral submissions were made at a hearing on 26 October 2026 which the applicant was able to observe from India via video link. I am grateful to Ms Chapman and Mr Ross and their legal teams for their diligent preparation and presentation of their competing cases.
3. Having considered those competing cases with care, I am not persuaded that any of the five grounds of challenge have been established. I have concluded therefore that the respondent’s decision was lawful and this application for judicial review should be dismissed. I explain that conclusion in the following paragraphs.
(2) Background
4. The applicant is an Indian citizen from Chennai. She was born in 1985 and on 29 October 2006 while in Chennai she married AB. At the time of their marriage AB had a work permit allowing him to live in the United Kingdom. Four days after their marriage the applicant applied for, and was granted United Kingdom entry clearance as the dependant of a work permit holder, (“the work permit visa”) which was valid until 8 September 2008. She arrived in London on 16 December 2006 and on arrival was granted leave to enter and remain in accordance with the work permit visa.
5. On 20 September 2007 the applicant and AB’s son, XY was born in London. In November 2007 the applicant and XY returned to India, while AB remained in the United Kingdom. On 16 June 2008 AB was granted indefinite leave to remain (ILR) in the United Kingdom. A month after that grant of leave AB returned to India where he stayed with the applicant and XY at the home of the applicant’s parents in Chennai.
6. On 31 July 2008 applications were submitted for United Kingdom entry clearance on behalf of the applicant and XY as the spouse and child respectively of AB. Their applications for entry clearance were granted on 7 October 2008 and the applicant was granted a visa (“the spousal visa”) which was valid until 7 January 2011 while XY was granted a visa with indefinite leave to enter.
7. Neither the applicant nor XY entered the United Kingdom in accordance with their visas.
8. On 14 July 2011 the applicant petitioned for divorce from AB. The petition said that AB had abused and assaulted the applicant while in London, and that after staying with the applicant and her parents in Chennai for three months following her return to India, AB had deserted the applicant.
9. Between August 2011 and February 2021 the applicant lived and worked in Singapore and from February 2023 to February 2024 she lived and worked in the UAE. In 2023, following an application, XY was granted British citizenship, though at the time of the application he was still living with the applicant in Chennai.
(3) The application and the respondent’s decisions
The application
10. On 3 January 2025 the applicant made the application. On the application she said that she was a person who has last been granted permission in the United Kingdom as a partner, who meets the relationship requirements of Appendix VDA of the Rules because she is the victim of transnational marriage abandonment (“TMA”).
11. The applicant submitted an affidavit with her application in which she said that she was abused by AB while they lived in the United Kingdom and that he had forced her to return to India in 2007. She stated that AB’s one intention when he returned to India in the middle of 2008 was to obtain a dowry from her father, and he lived with the applicant and her parents for three months. During that time AB obtained visas for the applicant and XY to enter the United Kingdom. The applicant said that “I was not aware or informed about these visas since I was overwhelmed and focusing on my marital trauma, my born child and in distress about what I could do in the future”.
12. The applicant said that her father gave AB a property as dowry and that having received that property, AB then abandoned her, leaving the house and ending all communication with her in January 2009. The applicant said that following the abandonment she applied for divorce but that she hadn’t got resolution because it is complicated to get a divorce in India without mutual consent. The applicant said that she was planning for XY to move to the United Kingdom as it was the place of his birth. The applicant said that she had recently discovered the new Immigration Rules about victims of TMA and was making the application so she could come to the United Kingdom with XY.
Decision 1
13. The respondent refused the application a week later in “Decision 1” dated 10 January 2025. The respondent stated that the applicant did not meet the eligibility requirements identified in paragraph VDA 4.1 of Appendix VDA of the Rules because:
“…you were most recently issued with leave to enter as the spouse of a British Citizen on 7 October 2008. It is noted from your personal statement that you did not return to the UK using this visa. As you have confirmed that you did not travel on this visa within three months of its issue, it is the position of the Home Office that this grant of leave is invalid”
14. The respondent remarked that the applicant’s claim in her affidavit that she was not aware or informed about the spousal visa application was inconsistent with records which showed the applicant had provided biometrics and collected her endorsed passport in person. The respondent considered that the applicant knew about the application for the spousal visa and that the onus was on her to meet the requirements to activate her visa. The respondent stated that as the spousal visa was invalidated through the applicant’s failure to activate the visa, her last grant of leave was as the dependant of a work permit holder and so the requirements of VDA 4.1 were not met. The respondent concluded therefore that:
“As you have failed to satisfy the requirements of VDA 4.1, a decision has been taken to refuse your application for Entry Clearance and Settlement under Appendix VDA”.
15. Decision 1 then considered the best interests of XY and concluded that it was in XY’s best interests that he remain with the applicant in India so they can continue to reside as a family unit, noting that if XY came to the United Kingdom it was open to the applicant to apply to enter the United Kingdom as his parent using the appropriate form.
Application for Administrative Review
16. The applicant applied for an administrative review of Decision 1. She sent with her application an “Evidence Statement” addressing and justifying issues raised in Decision 1. The applicant argued that she should have been contacted by the respondent prior to her application being refused. The applicant argued that the spousal visa she was granted on 7 October 2008 was not invalid, that the spousal visa was her most recent grant of permission and that it fulfilled the requirements of VDA 4.1, which does not mandate the activation of a visa to prove its validity.
17. The applicant addressed in her statement the conclusion in Decision 1 that she was aware of the spousal visa. The applicant stated that whilst she attended the biometric appointments and collected her passport, she was completely dependent on AB in the application process and she had no knowledge of the visa requirements. She stated that AB had abandoned her having received his dowry, leaving her uninformed, stranded and without resources and unaware that she could travel to the United Kingdom using the spousal visa. The applicant also disagreed with the respondent’s assessment of XY’s best interests and said that she planned for XY to pursue higher education and establish his life in the United Kingdom when he turned 18 in September 2025 and it was critical for her to live in the United Kingdom for his well-being
18. The applicant referred to the respondent’s policy guidance about when it is appropriate to grant settlement outside the rules and requested that the application be reconsidered including:
“If my eligibility for the visa still remain unsatisfactory, I humbly plead for the visa to be granted outside the rules, at your discretion, taking into account the hardship and extenuating circumstances caused by my spouse’s deception and abandonment, which prevented me from returning to the UK. I’ve struggled and endured enough in my life as a single mother and your decision is the only pathway for mine and my child’s bright future”.

Decision 2
19. On 12 September 2025 the respondent refused the applicant’s application for Administrative Review (“Decision AR”). Within that decision the respondent recognised that there were errors made in Decision 1 and so issued a “revised decision letter” dated 10 January 2025 (“Decision 2”) in which she omitted the reference in Decision 1 to the applicant not travelling within three months of the grant of her visa in 2008. The relevant paragraph of Decision 2 read:
“… you were most recently issued with leave to enter as the spouse of a British Citizen on 7 October 2008. It is noted from your personal statement that you did not return to the UK using this visa. As you have confirmed that you did not travel on this visa it is the position of the Home Office that this grant of leave is invalid”
20. The remainder of Decision 2 was identical to Decision 1 maintaining that the applicant did not meet the requirements of paragraph VDA 4.1 of Appendix VDA to the Rules, considering the best interests of XY and refusing the application.
21. Decision AR responded to the representations made in the applicant’s Evidence Statement. It stated that because the applicant failed to satisfy the requirements of VDA4.1 there was no need for the decision maker to contact her “as additional information would not have changed the outcome of your application.” The respondent referred to the Immigration (Leave to Enter and Remain) Order 2000 and said the effective date for the spousal visa was the date of arrival in the UK and since the applicant had not arrived in the United Kingdom “your leave was never activated and therefore not valid” The respondent accordingly upheld the conclusion that the applicant did not meet the requirements of VDA4.1.
22. Considering the applicant’s explanation of events surrounding the application for the spousal visa, Decision AR maintained that the applicant would have been aware of the status and conditions of the spousal visa and stated:
“Therefore, you would have been made aware of the outcome of this application and the requirements to activate your visa. Furthermore, it would have been open to you to seek advice if you required additional information regarding your visa”
23. Considering the applicant’s representations about the best interests of XY, Decision AR concluded that the original decision maker had correctly considered XY’s best interests and it remained open to the applicant to make a relevant application if she wished to accompany XY to the United Kingdom.
24. The respondent then referred to the applicant’s request that leave be granted outside the Rules before stating:
The administrative review of your case has confirmed that the application was considered in accordance with the correct rules, policy and guidance and correctly assessed against those rules, policy and guidance.

You applied for Settlement as a victim of domestic abuse who has been abandoned outside the UK (transnational marriage abandonment) and the application was therefore assessed under Appendix VDA of the Immigration Rules. Under these rules you were required to demonstrate that you satisfy the requirements of the rules under this appendix. As stated in the original refusal decision letter, you failed to satisfy the requirements of VDA4.1 and therefore your application has correctly been refused under Section VDA9.1 of Appendix VDA of the Immigration Rules. As a result, I have maintained the original decision.
(4) Application for Judicial Review
25. Having followed the Pre-Action Protocol, the applicant sought permission to bring judicial review proceedings in connection with the respondent’s decisions. She was granted permission by Upper Tribunal Judge Perkins on the following five grounds:
i. The Decision was contrary to the underlying purpose of the Rules
ii. The Decision irrationally excluded the applicant on the basis that her spouse visa was never activated
iii. Appendix VDA fails to reflect the true policy intention of the Rules
iv. The Decision was not in accordance with the respondent’s policy guidance
v. The Decision is in breach of article 14, when read in conjunction with article 8, of the ECHR
26. There has been no subsequent application to amend the grounds, though the precise challenges raised in the grounds have crystallised through the service of detailed grounds of defence, a reply to those detailed grounds and the parties’ skeleton arguments. I set out the competing submissions in respect of each ground in my analysis below.
(5) Legal Framework
Leave to enter, leave to remain and entry clearance
27. Section 3(1)(a) of the Immigration Act 1971 (the 1971 Act) provides that a person who is not a British citizen, shall not enter the United Kingdom unless given leave to do so. Section 3(1)(b) provides that such a person may be given leave to enter the United Kingdom or, when already there, leave to remain in the United Kingdom for either a limited of for an indefinite period.
28. Section 3A of the 1971 Act provides that the Secretary of State may by order (which must be by statutory instrument) make further provision with respect to the giving, refusing or varying of leave to enter the United Kingdom. By virtue of s.3A(3) such an order may provide that, in such circumstances as may be prescribed, an entry visa, or such other form of entry clearance as may be prescribed, is to have effect as leave to enter the United Kingdom. “Entry clearance” is defined in s.33 of the 1971 Act as follows:
“entry clearance” means a visa, entry certificate or other document which, in accordance with the immigration rules, is to be taken as evidence [or the requisite evidence] of a person's eligibility, though not [a British citizen], for entry into the United Kingdom (but does not include a work permit);
29. The Secretary of State exercised the powers conferred by s.3A of the 1971 by making the Immigration (Leave to Enter and Remain) Order 2000/1161. Article 2 of that order states that an entry clearance that complies with requirements that are specified in Article 3 shall have effect as leave to enter the United Kingdom to the extent specified in Article 4. The following provisions of Article 4 are relevant to the present case:
4. – Extent to which Entry Clearance is to be Leave to Enter
…
(3) In the case of any form of entry clearance to which this paragraph applies, it shall have effect as leave to enter the United Kingdom on one occasion during its period of validity; and, on arrival in the United Kingdom, the holder shall be treated for the purposes of the Immigration Acts as having been granted, before arrival, leave to enter the United Kingdom:
….
(b) in the case of an entry clearance which is endorsed with conditions, for a limited period, being the period beginning on the date on which the holder arrives in the United Kingdom and ending on the date of expiry of the entry clearance.

(3A) Paragraph (3) applies to-
….
(c) any other form of entry clearance …

(4) In this article “period of validity” means the period beginning on the day on which the entry clearance becomes effective and ending on the day on which it expires.

The Immigration Rules
30. Section 3(2) of the 1971 Act provides for the Secretary of State to lay before Parliament statements of the rules laid down by her as to the practice to be followed when regulating the entry into and stay in the United Kingdom of persons who require leave to enter in accordance with section 3(1) of the Act. These are defined in s.33 of the 1971 Act as the Immigration Rules (the Rules). The section also provides that the House may disapprove the Rules by resolution which means that the Rules are made in the exercise of powers which have been democratically conferred and are subject, albeit to a limited extent, to democratic procedures of accountability (see the judgment of Lord Reed in Ali v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] UKSC 60).
31. The relevant part of the Rules in this case is Appendix VDA which “allows settlement where a person has, or was last granted, permission as a partner of a specified route and the relationship has permanently broken down due to domestic abuse”. The eligibility requirements for such a grant of settlement include at VDA3.1 that a person outside the United Kingdom apply for and obtain entry clearance on the Victim of Domestic Violence route before they arrive in the United Kingdom.
32. The relationship requirements that must be met under Appendix VDA are set out at VDA 4.1 – VDA 4.3 which so far as is relevant to the present case, provide that:
VDA 4.1 The applicant must have, or have last been granted, permission as one of the following:
(a) a partner under Appendix FM (except for permission as a fiancé(e) or proposed civil partner) of a person who is a British citizen, settled in the UK or an EEA national in the UK with limited leave to enter or remain granted under paragraph EU3 of Appendix EU on the basis of meeting condition 1 in paragraph EU14 of Appendix EU; or…

(c) a partner of a person present and settled in the UK under paragraph
285 or 295E of Part 8; …

VDA 4.2 The relationship between the applicant and their partner must have broken down permanently as a result of domestic abuse.

VDA 4.3 If the applicant is applying from outside the UK, they must have been abandoned outside the UK.
33. Under the title “Interpretation” paragraph 6.2 of the Rules provides that, unless the contrary intention appears, the following definitions apply: within the Rules:
“Permission to enter” has the same meaning as leave to enter under the Immigration Act 1971.

“Permission to stay” has the same meaning as leave to remain under the Immigration Act 1971 (and includes a variation of leave to enter or remain and an extension of leave to enter or remain).

And references in these rules to a person having, having had or being granted “Permission” means either permission to enter or permission to stay and includes settlement.

Appendix Victim of Domestic Abuse Guidance
34. The Secretary of State has been given a wide discretion under the 1971 Act to control the grant and refusal of leave to enter or to remain and the language of the provisions in the 1971 Act authorise(s) the Secretary of State to grant leave to enter or remain even when leave would not be given under the Immigration Rules per Lord Dyson at [44] of R (Munir) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] UKSC 32. As Lord Dyson went on to make clear at [46]: “subject to the constraints to which I have referred and any relevant public law principles, the Secretary of State is authorised by the 1971 Act to make policies setting out the principles by which she may, as a matter of discretion, grant concessions in individual cases to those seeking leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom.”.
At the time the applicant made her application, the relevant guidance for decision makers acting on behalf of the Secretary of State for the Home Department was: Appendix Victim of Domestic Abuse. Version 18. Under the heading “Last grant of permission” that guidance includes the following:
There may be circumstances in which it would be appropriate to consider a grant of settlement outside the rules, even though their most recent grant permission was not in one of the categories listed above. This may be appropriate, for example, when:

• applicants were victims of transnational marriage abandonment who made an application for entry clearance before the introduction of the route under Appendix VDA and were granted a different form of permission (for example, a visitor visa; leave outside the rules; or permission as a parent)

• a perpetrator of abuse used the applicant’s immigration status as a form of controlling behaviour, deliberately ensuring that they were not on a route to settlement, or that they were on a longer route to settlement (for example, a perpetrator prevents an applicant from switching from permission as a fiancé or proposed civil partner to permission as a spouse or civil partner)

• the applicant entered the UK as a visitor and the perpetrator assured them they would arrange the subsequent applications for permission to stay or provided assurance this had been done on their behalf which then leaves the victim as an overstayer

This list is not exhaustive, and you should refer to the section "grant or refuse settlement" for further circumstances in which it may be appropriate to consider leave outside of the rules. Complex cases should be referred to a senior caseworker.
35. Later, under the heading “Consideration outside the rules” the guidance adds:
Leave outside the rules (LOTR) on compelling compassionate grounds may be granted where the decision maker decides that the specific circumstance of the case includes exceptional circumstances. These circumstances will mean that a refusal would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the applicant or their family, but which do not render refusal a breach of Article 8 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), Article 3 ECHR, Refugee Convention or other obligations.”
(6) Analysis
Ground One: Contrary to the underlying purpose of the Rules
36. Although the description of this ground of challenge is somewhat ambiguous, the applicant has clarified in her written reply to the respondent’s detailed grounds of defence, the skeleton argument submitted in advance of the final hearing and Ms Chapman’s oral submissions, that her case is that she meets the requirements of VDA 4.1 of the Rules and is therefore eligible, applying the Rules, for the leave she seeks. It is asserted therefore that when finding otherwise, the respondent has not properly applied the Rules.
37. Ms Chapman submitted that the grant of the spousal visa meant that the applicant fulfilled the requirements of VDA 4.1. Ms Chapman submitted that the fact the applicant did not activate her spousal visa by travelling to the United Kingdom was immaterial and nothing to the point because VDA 4.1 refers only to an applicant last being granted permission as the partner of a person settled in the United Kingdom and does not mention a requirement to activate that permission. Ms Chapman argued that the reliance of the respondent on the 2000 Order was misplaced and that the Order does not assist with determining whether the requirements of VDA 4.1 are met. Ms Chapman also submitted that the respondent was wrong to say that the spousal visa was invalidated by the failure to travel to the United Kingdom.
38. Mr Ross submitted that the applicant did not meet the requirements of VDA 4.1 and that the respondent correctly applied the Rules when reaching this conclusion. He submitted that the spousal visa was “entry clearance” as defined in the 1971 Act and that, since the applicant never arrived in the United Kingdom after the grant of the spousal visa, it was never converted into the grant of leave, which VDA 4.1 requires. The spousal visa then expired and was not valid when the applicant made her application. In these circumstances Mr Ross argued that the 2000 Order makes clear that the spousal visa was not leave to enter and the applicant did not meet the requirements of VDA 4.1.
39. Although the position is obscured by the inconsistent terms used in the different pieces of legislation and the Rules, and further confused by the imprecise and incorrect phrasing used by the respondent in the Decisions, I agree with Mr Ross’s submission that the applicant unambiguously did not meet the requirements of VDA 4.1 of the Rules.
40. The requirement in VDA 4.1 is that the applicant must have last been granted “permission” as a partner of a person settled in the United Kingdom. The meaning of “permission” in VDA 4.1 is provided in paragraph 6.2 of the Rules. That paragraph (see [33] above) makes clear that references to “permission” in the Rules means permission to enter or permission to stay, while the same paragraph identifies that permission to enter and permission to stay in turn mean leave to enter or leave to remain under the 1971 Act. What was required therefore was leave to enter or leave to remain as the partner of a settled person.
41. The grant of the spousal visa to the applicant on 7 October 2008 was not a grant of leave to enter or to remain in the United Kingdom. Instead it was the grant of entry clearance and as such was, as per s.33 of the 1971 Act, only evidence of her eligibility for entry to the United Kingdom as the spouse of a settled person.
42. Article 2 of the 2000 Order identifies that the entry clearance granted to the applicant would only have effect as leave to enter the United Kingdom, to the extent specified in Article 4 of the 2000 Order. Articles 4(3) and 4(4) make clear that the entry clearance only takes effect as leave to enter “on arrival in the United Kingdom” where that arrival occurs between the date on which the entry clearance becomes effective and the day on which it expires (the period of validity). The period of validity begins on the date of arrival. Since the applicant did not arrive in the United Kingdom during this period of validity, the spousal visa never took effect as leave to enter. Contrary to Ms Chapman’s submission therefore, the 2000 Order was highly relevant because it identified why the applicant has never been granted leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom as the spouse of a person settled in the United Kingdom as VDA 4.1 requires, and therefore never held the required “permission”.
43. In summary therefore, contrary to what was said in Decision 1 and Decision 2, the applicant was not granted leave to enter as the spouse of a British Citizen on 7 October 2008. (That statement was in fact wrong twice because not only was the applicant not granted leave to enter but AB was not a British citizen). Instead, the applicant was on 7 October 2008 granted entry clearance which would have had effect as leave to enter if she arrived in the United Kingdom. Since the applicant did not arrive in the United Kingdom however, it did not have that effect. As VDA 4.1 requires the applicant to have been granted leave to enter or leave to remain in the United Kingdom as the partner of a settled person and not just to be eligible for such leave, the applicant does not meet the requirements of that paragraph. The respondent therefore correctly applied the Rules when determining that the applicant could not meet the requirements of VDA 4.1. This remains the case despite the fact the Decision letters confusingly and erroneously referred to a grant of leave to enter which became invalid.
44. The alternative argument made in ground one, and the way the argument is put in the original grounds of challenge, is that the respondent’s decision is contrary to the “underlying purpose of the Rules”. Ms Chapman submitted that Appendix VDA was designed to protect victims of domestic violence who have an expectation of settlement in the United Kingdom because of the status of their spouse. Ms Chapman submitted that there was a deliberate policy decision not to limit the application of the rule to those inside the United Kingdom, and not to have a time limit in relation to victims of domestic violence and TMA. In these circumstance Ms Chapman argued that the purpose of Appendix VDA was to ensure that someone in the applicant’s position be granted settlement in the United Kingdom and that the respondent’s decision failed to fulfil that purpose.
45. Mr Ross submitted that the purpose of Appendix VDA should be taken solely from what Appendix VDA itself says. Mr Ross submitted that paragraph VDA 4.1. identifies the requirements an applicant must meet and the applicant having failed to meet those requirements, the clear purpose of the Rules is that she does not qualify for the leave she seeks. Mr Ross pointed to the rejection of a similar argument to the one being made presently in R(AM) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] EWHC 2591 in which Lieven J, as she then was, said at [57] “There is therefore no error of law in not making a rule to protect every situation or every individual’s personal circumstances, even where they might fall within the broad purpose of the Immigration Rules”.
46. I agree with Mr Ross’s submission that the purpose of Appendix VDA is to be gleaned from the what is said in Appendix VDA. The Appendix begins with a statement which in my judgment identifies with some precision the purpose of the Appendix: “This route allows settlement where a person has, or was last granted, permission as a partner on a specified route and the partnership has broken down due to domestic abuse”. The terms of paragraph VDA 4.1 reflect that purpose by including the requirement that an applicant must have or last been granted permission as a partner of a person settled in the United Kingdom. As already seen the definition of “permission” in this context means leave to enter or leave to remain under the 1971 Act.
47. The expressed purpose of Appendix VDA therefore is to allow settlement for victims of domestic violence who not only are the partner of a person settled in the UK (or a British Citizen or a refugee etc) but who also have, or have last been granted, leave to enter or leave to remain on the basis of that relationship. As already identified the applicant was not such a person because although eligible for such leave, her eligibility was never converted into leave to enter or leave to remain because she never arrived in the United Kingdom.
48. The effect of Ms Chapman’s submission is an assertion that, despite this express indication of the purpose behind Appendix VDA provided in the Appendix itself, I should determine the Appendix had a different purpose, namely to allow settlement of a victim of domestic violence who has been found to be eligible for leave to enter or leave to remain on the basis of their relationship with a person settled in the United Kingdom but who does not have or has not last been granted such leave. Ms Chapman was not however able to provide any legitimate basis upon which the clear purpose of the Appendix as revealed in the Appendix itself, should be extended in this way and I decline to do so.
49. Whilst, as both parties recognise, Appendix VDA was intended to provide protection and a route to settlement in the United Kingdom to victims of domestic abuse, it was for the Secretary of State for the Home Department, as the person democratically responsible for such matters, to define the parameters of that intention. As Lieven J said at [56] of R(AM) v Secretary of State for the Home Department:
“There is no duty on the Secretary of State, whether in statute or the rules, to make provision for all such victims and in all circumstances. That must be a matter for the [SSHD], exercising her discretion making the rules, and not a matter of legal requirement.”
50. In this instance the Secretary of State for the Home Department has determined that a route to settlement should be provided for victims of domestic abuse, including those who have suffered TMA, but has limited that route to those who have, or have last been granted, leave to enter or remain on the basis of their relationship with a person settled in the United Kingdom. That was a choice of the SSHD and there is no legitimate basis for me to decide that she actually meant to limit route to settlement in a different way and to include those who were not granted such leave though they were eligible for it. Ms Chapman confirmed that, unlike in the case of AM the applicant was not challenging the legality of the Rules.
51. In summary therefore, I am satisfied that the purpose of Appendix VDA was precisely as described in the Appendix itself - to provide a route to settlement for victims of domestic abuse who have or have last been granted leave to enter or remain on the basis of their relationship with the defined category of person. I am not persuaded by the applicant’s suggestion, that contrary to the express words in Appendix VDA, the purpose of the Appendix was to provide a route to settlement to a wider category of victims of domestic abuse, namely those who were eligible for leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom on the basis of their relationship with the defined category of person but had not been granted such leave.
52. Consequently, the decision to refuse the applicant’s application was consistent with the Rules and the underlying purpose of the Rules. The first ground of challenge which argues otherwise is consequentially dismissed.
Ground two: Irrationally excluded the applicant on the basis that her spousal visa was never activated
53. It follows from my analysis of the first ground of challenge that the second ground, which asserts that it was irrational for the respondent to refuse the applicant’s application on the basis that the spousal visa was never converted into leave to enter, must also be dismissed. As discussed already, in circumstances where the spousal visa never took effect as leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom, the applicant could not meet the requirements of Appendix VDA for being granted the leave she sought. The respondent’s decision to refuse the application on the basis that the applicant did not meet the relevant requirements of the Rules was therefore entirely rational. Indeed it would have been irrational for the respondent to allow the application applying Appendix VDA when, for all the reasons already discussed the applicant did not fulfil the requirements identified in the Appendix.
54. The submission made in this ground that respondent’s refusal was contrary to the clear underlying intention of Appendix VDA mirrors the alternative submission made in ground one which I have rejected for the reasons already stated. The underlying intention of Appendix VDA involved, as already discussed, limiting the route of settlement available to victims of domestic abuse and TMA to those who have already started on a route to settlement having been granted leave to enter or remain on the basis of their relationship with a defined category of person. In those circumstances it was unquestionably rational for the respondent to refuse the application on the basis the applicant was not such a person.
55. Ms Chapman submitted that the only reason the spousal visa did not take effect as leave to enter was the abandonment of the applicant by her husband. Although it may well be relevant to whether leave outside the Rules should be granted (see ground four), this explanation cannot alter the fact that it was rational for the respondent to find the applicant did not meet the requirements of the Rules. Those Rules required the applicant to have last been granted leave to enter or remain on a particular basis. The respondent was right to find that the applicant could not meet that requirement and the decision to refuse the application on the basis that the requirements of the Rules were not met, was therefore rational.
Ground three: VDA fails to reflect true policy intention of the Rules
56. It was common ground that Appendix VDA when originally drafted contained an error. It is equally common ground that the respondent’s policy guidance that was in force at the time the applicant made her application acknowledged that error and stated that those disadvantaged by the error should be granted settlement outside the Immigration Rules where they meet all the other requirements of Appendix VDA. Ms Chapman submitted that this error indicates the lack of scrutiny that was applied when drafting Appendix VDA but recognised that the drafting error had been identified and resolved and did not have detrimental consequences for this applicant. In these circumstances Ms Chapman acknowledged that there was no further need to engage with this ground of challenge in any detail.
57. I agree that this ground does not identify a public law error in the respondent’s decision and does not require further engagement. I have found, for all the reasons previously explained, that the applicant has not been granted permission - i.e. leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom – since she was granted leave as the dependant of a skilled worker in November 2006. There is therefore no prospect of the applicant meeting all the requirements of Appendix VDA irrespective of the acknowledged error made when Appendix VDA was first drafted.
58. For the avoidance of doubt, I make clear that I do not consider that the existence of the acknowledged error in the drafting of Appendix VDA provides any legitimate basis for concluding that the Appendix as a whole should be interpreted as meaning something other than what it actually says. The error has subsequently been remedied and the fact the error was made does not mean that the applicant should be considered to be someone who meets the requirements of Appendix VDA, when the reality is that she does not meet all of those requirements. As previously explained the “true intention” of this part of the Rules is to be gleaned from what the Rules actually say.
Ground 4: Not in accordance with the Respondent’s policy guidance
59. Ms Chapman submitted that the respondent’s policy guidance explicitly recognises that there may be circumstances in which it would be appropriate to consider a grant of settlement even though an applicant’s last grant of permission was not in one of the categories identified in VDA 4.1. Ms Chapman submits that having found that the applicant failed to meet the requirements of VDA 4.1, the decision maker was required to apply the passages of the respondent’s policy guidance set out at paragraphs [35] and [36] and to consider whether leave should nonetheless be granted outside the Rules. Ms Chapman submitted that, notwithstanding the respondent’s claim to have considered exercising her discretion to grant leave outside the Rules, this was simply not done.
60. Mr Ross submitted that the respondent did give explicit consideration to granting leave outside the Rules in Decision AR, in which she also expressly said she had considered the relevant policy guidance. This he argued provided a complete answer to ground four which does not aver inadequacy in the reasons given for not granting leave outside the Rules. Mr Ross pointed out that decision letters are not drafted by lawyers and are not likely to withstand a line by line critique. He argued however that it is the substance rather than the form which is important and submitted that the decision maker had considered and addressed all the factors that had been raised in the applicant’s explanation statement.
61. Under the heading “Last grant of permission” the respondent’s policy guidance can be broken down to identify a four stage process to be followed by a decision maker considering an application under Appendix VDA. The decision maker is told that “You must first establish whether the applicant currently has permission and the basis on which it was granted” . Second, the decision maker is then instructed that if the applicant’s permission has expired, they “must establish the basis on which their last grant of permission was made.” Thirdly the decision maker is instructed that “Once you have established the most recent grant of permission you must establish whether it meets the requirements of [VDA 4.1]”
62. The fourth stage of consideration is identified in the paragraph which I have set out at [35] above in which it is recognised that “there may be circumstances in which it would be appropriate to consider a grant of settlement outside the rules even though their most recent grant permission (sic) was not in one of the categories listed.” The paragraph goes on to give a non-exhaustive list as examples of such circumstances, before signposting the decision maker to the section of the guidance concerning the grant of leave outside the Rules.
63. The proper application of the respondent’s policy guidance therefore involves a decision maker, having determined that the requirements of VDA 4.1 have not been met, going on to consider whether it would nevertheless be appropriate to grant settlement outside of the Rules. It is at this stage of the decision making process that the applicant’s assertion that, if she does not meet the requirements of VDA 4.1 it is only because of AB’s abusive behaviour, falls to be considered.
64. I am satisfied that, contrary to the applicant’s submissions, the respondent followed this process in Decision 2 and Decision AR. Those decisions began by establishing the applicant’s last grant of permission. For the reasons already explained, the decisions, although unhelpfully expressed, correctly concluded that the applicant’s last permission (i.e. period of leave to enter or remain) was as a dependant to a skilled worker, meaning the requirements of VDA 4.1 were not met.
65. Decision 2 then gives the following consideration to the Affidavit that the applicant provided with the application:
It is noted you state that you were “not aware or informed about” the above Spousal visa application. However your position is inconsistent with the records for this case as these note that you enrolled your biometrics on 31 July 2008 to validate this application. Moreover, it is considered that you would have had to attend the Visa Application Centre in-person upon conclusion of this application to collect your Passport containing your vignette. As such, it is the position of the Home Office that you had knowledge that this application had been submitted, and that the onus was on yourself to ensure that you were aware of the outcome of this application and met the requirements to activate you visa”
66. Although it does not explicitly reference the policy guidance or leave outside the rules, it is clear in my judgment that in this paragraph the decision maker is undertaking the fourth step of the decision making process recognised in the policy guidance and considering whether, on the basis of the information provided by the applicant, this was a case where it would be appropriate to grant settlement outside the Rules even though VDA 4.1 was not met.
67. Further, it is clear from the content of the paragraph that having given the matter consideration, the conclusion was reached that the circumstances were such that a grant of settlement outside the Rules was not appropriate because the explanation given by the applicant for not giving effect to the spousal visa was inconsistent with the respondent’s records.
68. That paragraph and that conclusion was reviewed by the respondent in Decision AR following the applicant’s additional explanation of events in her Evidence Statement. The same conclusion was reached however, with the decision stating:
However, on review it is noted that throughout the process of the application, you must have been aware as you enrolled your biometrics to validate this application and would have had to attend the Visa Application Centre in-person upon conclusion of this application to collect your Passport containing your vignette. As a result, it is considered the status and conditions of your visa would have been communicated with you as part of the decision. Therefore you would have been made aware of the outcome of this application and the requirements to activate your visa. Furthermore, it would have been open to you to seek advice if you required additional information regarding your visa.
69. Decision AR goes on to explicitly refer to the applicant’s request in her Evidence Statement that leave be granted outside the Rules but states that:
“the administrative review of your case has confirmed that the application was considered in accordance with the correct rules, policy and guidance and correctly assessed against hose rules, policy and guidance”
70. When these paragraphs from the two Decisions are considered holistically and fairly, it is in my judgment clear that the policy guidance has been lawfully applied. The respondent has not stopped her consideration having found that the requirements of VDA 4.1 have not been met, but has gone on to consider whether the circumstances mean that a grant of settlement outside the rules is appropriate, as the policy guidance directs. I acknowledge that neither decision refers to the non-exhaustive list in the policy guidance, but there is no requirement to do so and it is apparent that the decision maker is having regard to the particular circumstances the applicant identified, first in her Affidavit and later in the Evidence Statement. There is no reason for the respondent to consider those circumstances unless she is considering whether to exercise discretion and grant settlement outside the Rules.
71. The conclusion was reached however that a grant of settlement outside the Rules was not appropriate where the applicant’s initial claim to have been unaware of the spousal visa was inconsistent with the respondent’s records. There has been no pleaded complaint about the rationality of that conclusion, although the skeleton argument argues that the applicant’s “progressive disclosure” in this case (described by the respondent as “a shift in her account”) should not be treated as adverse to the applicant’s credibility. These arguments about how the respondent has assessed the applicant’s evolving account serve only to demonstrate the fact that there has been an exercise of discretion and consideration by the respondent of whether leave outside the Rules should be granted, just as is required by the guidance policy. For the avoidance of doubt, I am satisfied that was a conclusion that a reasonable decision maker properly directed could reach.
Ground 5: breach of article 14, when read in conjunction with article 8, of the ECHR
72. Article 1 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) provides that
The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention
73. Section I of the ECHR includes Article 14 which is not a freestanding provision but provides that:
the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status
74. Ms Chapman submitted that it is the applicant’s right to respect for her private and family life which is “set forth” in Article 8 of the Convention which is being infringed by the respondent’s decision to refuse her settlement, and that that decision discriminates against the applicant on the grounds that she is in India and not the United Kingdom.
75. It follows that for ground five to succeed the applicant must establish that the respondent’s decision interferes with her Article 8 right to respect for her private and family life. Article 8 provides:
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.

2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
76. Ms Chapman accepted in her submissions that the applicant does not have a family life in the United Kingdom. She is estranged from her husband and is currently living with her son in India. Ms Chapman submitted however that the applicant commenced a private life in the United Kingdom when she lived in the country between December 2006 and November 2007 and that the respondent’s decision prevents her from continuing that private life now and developing a family life in the United Kingdom with her son.
77. Mr Ross submitted that it is not tenable to rely on the applicant’s private life in the United Kingdom when she only lived in the country for eleven months, almost twenty years ago. Mr Ross points to the territorial limitation which arises from Article 1 of the Convention and relying on the judgments of the Master of the Rolls in IA and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 1516 and of Andrews LJ in Al-Hashimi v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWCA Civ 943, argues that the applicant has no connecting links to the United Kingdom which engage Article 8, having spent long periods of time in Singapore and Abu Dhabi since her brief stay in the country.
78. I agree with Mr Ross that the applicant does not have the connecting links to the United Kingdom which would exceptionally engage the extra-territorial jurisdiction of the Convention and mean that the respondent’s decision involved an interference with the applicant’s Article 8 right to respect for her private life, notwithstanding the fact that she has been living that private life outside the United Kingdom for almost all her life. In summary the applicant’s connection to the United Kingdom is so tenuous and brief that it cannot be said to have crossed the “threshold criterion” (the phrase used by Andrews LJ in Al Hashimi) and brought the respondent’s decision within the jurisdiction of the Convention.
79. It is relevant when reaching that conclusion that the applicant only spent 11 months in the United Kingdom between December 2006 and November 2007 i.e almost twenty years ago. It is further relevant to note that no evidence of a private life in the United Kingdom formed in 2007 has been provided – there is no evidence of connections, friendships or bonds established during that time. In fact the applicant made no reference to a private life in the United Kingdom at all in her application, which was pursued instead on the basis she wanted to share family life with her son in the event he moved to study in the United Kingdom.
80. Since leaving the United Kingdom in November 2007 the applicant has spent ten years developing a private life in Singapore and a year establishing a private life in the UAE, in addition to the time she has spent continuing her private and family life in her home city of Chennai. On any sensible view the decision taken by the respondent on 10 January 2025 cannot be said to have interfered with the limited private life the applicant may have developed in the United Kingdom almost twenty years earlier.
81. I cannot accept Ms Chapman’s submission that because the applicant has been the victim of TMA, it is accepted that she has a continuing connection to the United Kingdom or should have been enabled to do so. The issue, as it was in Al Hashimi is a territorial and jurisdictional one. If the connection between the applicant and the United Kingdom is insufficient to cross the threshold criterion and establish that Article 1 of the Convention applies to the respondent’s decision then the decision simply cannot breach the Convention.
82. In reality the applicant’s claim is not that her private life from nearly twenty years ago is being interfered with, but that she is being deprived the right to come to the United Kingdom to now develop a private life in the United Kingdom. Such an argument was rejected however by Burnett LJ, as he then was, in Abbas v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] EWCA Civ 1393 when he said that no case or settled line of authority could be identified in which the Strasbourg court has held article 8 in its private life aspect to be engaged in respect of a person outside the contracting state seeking to enter to develop that private life, and that it would be wrong as a matter of principle and impermissible to do so.
83. The facts in the applicant’s case are very different to those in R (AM) where the applicant had lived in the United Kingdom for three years on a route to settlement and was then only out of the country for a period of six months before returning, and where it was clearly established that the applicant had a private and family life in the United Kingdom with which the respondent’s decision interfered.
84. Overall therefore I am satisfied that the respondent’s decision does not involve an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for her private and family life and accordingly that neither Article 8 and Article 14 of the Convention are engaged in this case. The applicant has only a tenuous connection to the United Kingdom, having been in the country for eleven months almost twenty years ago, which is insufficient to establish the Convention applies extra-territorially. Her desire to develop a private life in the United Kingdom now, does not have the effect of meaning the Convention applies either.
(7) Conclusion and Disposal
85. For all the reasons I have explained I am satisfied that none of the grounds advanced by the applicant identifies a public law error in the respondent’s decision. I am satisfied that the respondent applied the relevant Immigration Rules and fulfilled the underlying purpose of those Rules as established in the Rules themselves. I am satisfied that the respondent applied her policy guidance and considered leave outside the Rules and that the decision not to exercise her discretion and grant such leave, whilst disappointing to the applicant was rationally reached. Finally I am satisfied that the respondent’s decision does not come within the ambit of the Convention in circumstances where the applicant does not have a private and family life in the United Kingdom.
86. The parties are invited to draw up an Order which reflects the terms of this judgment. The Order should address any ancillary matters, including any application for permission to appeal and costs.
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