JR-2026-LON-000090
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The decision
Case No: JR-2026-LON-000090
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
(IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER)
Field House,
Breams Buildings
London, EC4A 1WR
5 November 2026
Before:
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE O’BRIEN
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Between:
THE KING
on the application of
CHIBUIKE ANDERSON UKAOMA
Applicant
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SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
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Chibuike Anderson Ukaoma
the applicant in person
Ms J Anderson
(instructed by the Government Legal Department) for the respondent
Hearing date: 24 August 2026
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J U D G M E N T
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Upper Tribunal Judge O’Brien:
1. The applicant challenges the respondent’s decision of 31 December 2025 refusing his application for revocation of a deportation order dated 25 August 2015.
2. The applicant’s application comprises 4 grounds, which in summary are as follows.
a. The respondent failed to apply the correct legal framework applicable to Irish citizens.
b. The respondent failed to treat the applicant’s acquisition of Irish citizenship as a material change in circumstances, or alternatively failed to give lawful reasons for not considering his Irish citizenship a material change of circumstances.
c. The respondent failed to apply her published policy on the deportation of Irish citizens.
d. The respondent failed to give adequate reasons for why it remained in the public interest to maintain the applicant’s deportation.
3. The published policy in question was not identified in the grounds but was stated in the application to be a Written Ministerial Statement (WMS) on 19 February 2007.
4. In a decision sealed on 13 March 2026, Upper Tribunal Judge Ruddick granted permission to apply for judicial review on grounds 2 and 3 only. To the extent that ground 4 complained that the applicant’s Irish nationality should have been taken into account, Judge Ruddick found that it added nothing to ground 2. Regarding grounds 2 and 3, Judge Ruddick considered it arguable that the applicant’s Irish citizenship was sufficiently material to be given some consideration, and that the respondent failed to take into account her policy concerning the deportation of Irish citizens, given the general commonality of principles applied to deportation and revocation of deportation orders.
The Parties’ Respective Cases
5. The parties have supplemented their respective statements of case with skeleton arguments provided ahead of the hearing and oral submissions before me. Hopefully without doing any disservice to either party, their positions can be summarised thus.
6. The applicant submits that citizenship is the most fundamental aspect of a person’s legal identity. Ireland is a country with whom the United Kingdom shares a uniquely close legal relationship. Irish citizenship activates a specific published policy not applicable to other nationalities, and thus the acquisition of Irish citizenship was manifestly a material change of circumstances. The respondent failed to give the change any substantive consideration and failed to explain why the change was not material. The respondent’s erroneous reference to Albania showed that the respondent had failed to have regard to the applicant’s nationality. None of the conditions for deportation prescribed by the respondent’s policy applicable to Irish citizens existed in the applicant’s case. The policy did not limit itself merely to the initial deportation decision. Deportation was not in law a single moment and so the policy applied equally to revocation applications. Neither was the policy applicable only to those who were Irish citizens when the deportation order was made; that would lead to an irrational distinction. The applicant was at the time that the decision was made (and so the time at which the applicability of the policy should have been considered) an Irish citizen. Even if the respondent was entitled to rely on the conditions permitting deportation of the applicant, none had been identified in the decision.
7. In oral submissions, the applicant submitted that the respondent was required to take into account his acquisition of Irish citizenship when considering whether to exercise her discretion to revoke the deportation order. The decision does not adequately explain why it was an irrelevant matter. Whilst the referral in the decision to his being Albanian was likely a drafting slip, it indicated a lack of attention given to his Irish citizenship.
8. The respondent submits that the applicant’s case in its entirety depends on his establishing that the WMS applied to him. It did not for the following reasons. The scope of the policy was clear: it applied to Irish citizens prima facie liable to deportation. It was wrong to claim that deportation decisions and decisions to revoke deportation orders were (or ought to be treated as) the same thing. The policy as stated was capable of lawful application. It was not open to the Tribunal to adjudicate on whether the respondent’s policy should have been wider. As the policy did not apply to the applicant, there can be no error of law in failing to apply it to him. Neither could his Irish citizenship, albeit a change of circumstances, therefore be a material change of circumstances. It was of no consequence as regards to the application of the deportation policy. There is no obligation in law to give reasons for applying the applicable law/policy and for not applying an inapplicable law/policy.
9. Ms Anderson submitted orally that, through the increasing use of artificial intelligence, decision makers are more and more being presented with irrelevant arguments. It is an appropriate use of resources to deal only with relevant matters. The Tribunal's starting point should be that a decision maker has exercised their duty correctly unless there was cogent evidence to the contrary. The respondent in this case had clearly understood the points being made by the applicant. However, she properly applied her own policy as stated in the Immigration Rules. Those rules apply equally to Irish citizens as they do to other foreign nationals. Parliament could have made express provision in the rules for Irish citizens but did not. Article 8 was considered in a careful and fair way, both in respect of the family and private life exceptions and in considering very compelling circumstances. It was unnecessary for the respondent to explain why an inapplicable policy was not applied, or why a matter is legally irrelevant. Reasons challenges are not an end in themselves; They must demonstrate an underlying public law error
10. Whilst I summarised above the parties’ positions I have taken the entirety of their pleadings, submissions and the materials to which they referred into account when reaching my decision.
The Uncontentious Background
11. The applicant was born in Nigeria on 29 April 1987, and at the time he entered the United Kingdom in January 2006 he held Nigerian citizenship.
12. On 19 February 2007, the Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Nationality, Liam Byrne, provided a WMS to the House of Commons entitled ‘Irish Nationals (Deportation)’ including the following passage of relevance:
‘In my oral statement to the House on the prison estate, 9 October 2006, Official Report, column 32 I explained the Department was considering treating Irish citizens as a special case in respect of pursuing their deportation from the United Kingdom. A number of hon. Members have asked me to review the Government’s position on deporting Irish nationals in the light of the acknowledged close historic and political ties between the UK and the Irish Republic and I have done so.
Since April last year, we have ensured that all nationals from European economic area countries who have received custodial sentences in the United Kingdom for two years or more have been considered for deportation. This has led to deportation action being pursued against a number of Irish nationals who have committed criminal offences here.
Following recent discussions with the Irish Government, I am able to confirm that the approach to be taken with Irish nationals will now be as follows:
Irish citizens will only be considered for deportation where a court has recommended deportation in sentencing or where the Secretary of State concludes, due to the exceptional circumstances of the case, the public interest requires deportation.
In reviewing our approach in this area we have taken into account the close historical, community and political ties between the United Kingdom and Ireland, along with the existence of the common travel area.
Those Irish prisoners whose cases are not considered exceptional, whose sentences have expired and who are currently in custodial detention awaiting deportation will be released over the next week. I have already asked that the necessary arrangements be put in place to ensure that these prisoners receive proper supervision on their release from the probation service.’
13. The WMS remains Government policy and is referenced in the respondent’s extant guidance, ‘Deportation on conducive grounds Immigration Act 1971 and UK Borders Act 2007’.
14. On 8 September 2014, the applicant was convicted at St Albans Crown Court of money laundering and 24 counts of fraud by false representation and sentenced on 3 October 2014 to 32 months imprisonment. A deportation order was signed on 25 August 2015. The applicant continued at the time to hold Nigerian nationality.
15. The applicant’s appeal against refusal of his consequential human rights claim was unsuccessful and he ultimately left the United Kingdom for Ireland voluntarily on 27 June 2017 and has resided there since, with his wife and children, who are all British nationals. He has set up a business in Ireland and has not been convicted there of any criminal offence.
16. The applicant was refused entry on arrival from Ireland on 7 December 2020 and returned the same day.
17. The applicant naturalised as an Irish citizen on 2 December 2024.
The Application and Decision
18. On 14 January 2025, the applicant submitted an application for revocation of the deportation order. Following correspondence in respect of the delay in decision, about which it is unnecessary in these proceedings to say more, the application was refused on 31 December 2025.
19. A copy of the application was provided only after the hearing. In it, the applicant submitted as follows:
‘I am writing to formally request the revocation of the deportation order issued against me in 2015. This request is made pursuant to the Immigration Rules and applicable provisions of the Immigration Act 1971. I respectfully submit that the circumstances that justified the issuance of the deportation order have significantly changed, and I now meet the criteria for the revocation of this order.
Background
The deportation order was made following my conviction of Fraud and Money Laundering. I acknowledge the seriousness of the matter and have spent the past decade reflecting on and learning from my actions.
Since the issuance of the order, I have taken significant steps to rebuild my life, including Voluntarily leaving the United Kingdom in 2017. Acquiring Irish citizenship in 2024. I have also complied fully with all conditions imposed on me and have demonstrated good character and conduct during this time.
Since relocating from the UK to Ireland, my family and I have faced considerable hardship. My British wife and our children, all of whom are British citizens, have endured the emotional and social ramifications of our separation from our life in the UK. We have sacrificed our private and family life since 2017, and it has been a challenging journey for
all of us.
Legal Basis for Revocation
Under Section 5(2) of the Immigration Act 1971, a deportation order may be revoked if it is appropriate to do so in light of changed circumstances or compelling reasons. I believe my case satisfies this standard for the following reasons:
1. Sentence Spent: The sentence of 32 months has now been spent in accordance with UK rehabilitation laws, and over 10 years have passed since the sentence.
2. Change in Immigration Status: I am now an Irish citizen, which provides me with rights under the Common Travel Area (CTA) agreement. This includes a right to live and work in the UK, subject to certain conditions. The UK and Ireland CTA Memorandum of Understanding (2019) recognizes the close ties between the two nations and provides for mutual cooperation on matters relating to the free movement of Irish citizens within the UK.
3. Proportionality: I have demonstrated rehabilitation, have not reoffended, and have reintegrated into society as a law-abiding individual. Enforcing the deportation order at this stage would be disproportionate and contrary to principles of fairness under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which safeguards my private and family life.
4. Deportation of Irish citizens: The UK does not routinely deport Irish citizens. On 19 February 2007, the Secretary of State announced in Parliament, through a Written Ministerial Statement, that Irish citizens will be considered for deportation only where a court has recommended deportation in sentencing or where the Secretary of State concludes that, due to the exceptional circumstances of the case, the public interest requires deportation.
In light of the above, I kindly request that the Home Office revokes the deportation order issued against me. I have enclosed the following documents to support my application:
• A copy of my Irish Naturalisation Certificate.
Please do not hesitate to contact me at email address: chibuikeukaoma@yahoo.com
I kindly urge you to reconsider the circumstances surrounding my deportation order. I believe that my transformation into a reformed citizen, coupled with the significant changes in my life, warrants a review of my case. It is in the spirit of family unity and the best interests of my children that I make this appeal.’
20. Consequently, I was satisfied that the respondent’s summary in the challenged decision of the application was comprehensive and accurate. In her subsequent consideration of the application, the respondent directed herself to the provisions of part 13, section 4, of the Immigration Rules, stating at paragraph 19:
‘9. Your deportation remains conducive to the public good and in the public interest because you have been convicted of an offence for which you have been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of less than four years. Therefore, in accordance with paragraph 13.4.4(a) of the Immigration Rules, the public interest requires your exclusion be maintained unless an exception to deportation applies. The exceptions are set out at paragraphs 13.2.3 and 13.2.4 of the Immigration Rules.’
21. The respondent considered the application of those exceptions at paragraphs 31 to 41 and 10 to 30 respectively, concluding that neither applied. The respondent then considered whether there were very compelling circumstances such that the applicant’s deportation should not be maintained. Within that consideration at paragraphs 42 to 50, the respondent said the following at paragraph 47 about the submissions on Irish citizenship:
• ‘In your representations dated 14 January 2025, you claim that you are an Irish citizen and have provided a certificate of naturalisation in support of this claim. It is noted, however, that at the time the Deportation Order was lawfully signed, you were a Nigerian citizen. Accordingly, the circumstances under which the Deportation Order was issued were proper and in accordance with the relevant legal framework, and that there has been no violation of Common Travel Area (CTA) Rights.
• You contend that Irish citizens are generally not subject to Deportation Orders. While this may be correct as a general principle, it is material that, at the time the Deportation Order was made, you were a Nigerian citizen. At present, you are not being deported; rather, the decision is to maintain the existing Deportation Order, which was validly issued and subsequently enforced when you departed the UK for Ireland.
• You have not provided any very compelling circumstances which would warrant the revocation of the Deportation Order under the applicable statutory or policy provisions.
• Although you claim that your sentence has been ‘spent’ in accordance with UK rehabilitation laws, and over 10 years has passed since the sentence. It is considered that there has been no material change in circumstances that would warrant the revocation of the Deportation Order, nor are there any very compelling circumstances that would lead to the revocation of the deportation Order.’
Consideration
22. The question of whether the respondent’s policy, as set out in the WMS, applies to Irish citizens applying for revocation of a deportation order is relevant to all of the permitted grounds of this application. Consequently, it is convenient to deal with ground three first.
Ground Three – The Respondent Failed to Apply Her Published Policy on the Deportation of Irish Citizens
23. The contents of the WMS are set out above. Whilst acknowledging that the statement was made specifically ‘in the light of the acknowledged close historic and political ties between the UK and the Irish Republic’, the WMS applied expressly to Irish citizens ‘being considered for deportation’. The Minister went on to deal expressly with Irish prisoners in detention awaiting deportation, effectively providing that the policy would if necessary apply retrospectively to them. He did not deal at all with the situation of Irish citizens already deported from the United Kingdom under previous policies.
24. In his skeleton argument, the applicant submitted that deportation was a state of affairs and thus that the WMS applied to him, as the subject of an extant deportation order. He did not pursue that point at the hearing and properly so. Whilst there might be some force to what he says about the nature of deportation, bearing in mind the definition in s5(1) of the Immigration Act 1971 of ‘deportation order’ (‘an order requiring [an individual] to leave and prohibiting him from entering the United Kingdom’; my emphasis), it ultimately takes the applicant no further. The policy statement within the WMS expressly addresses only those for whom a deportation order has not yet been made, albeit that the Minister indicates that it will also be applied to those subject to a deportation order made but not yet enforced.
25. As submitted by Ms Anderson, provided that a policy is capable of lawful implementation, it is not for a reviewing court to consider whether it should have been cast more widely. As said by Lord Sales JSC and Lord Burnett of Maldon CJ in R (on the application of A) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] UKSC 37; [2021 1 WLR 3931 at [39]:
‘There is often no obligation in public law for an authority to promulgate any policy and there is no obligation, when it does promulgate a policy, for it to take the form of a detailed and comprehensive statement of the law in a particular area, equivalent to a textbook or the judgment of a court.’
26. The question instead is whether the published policy authorises or approves unlawful conduct by those to whom it is addressed (ibid at [38]).
27. It is not said that the policy arising from the WMS does either authorise or approve unlawful conduct, merely that it is insufficiently comprehensive. It is not open to me in such circumstances to interfere.
28. As it is, there is no reason to believe that the Minister did not choose his words, and therefore the scope of the policy, carefully, and thus deliberately exclude from the policy Irish citizens already deported from the United Kingdom.
29. Consequently, I find that the WMS does not apply to the applicant, and thus ground three fails.
Ground Two – Failure to Treat Irish Citizenship as a Material Change of Circumstances or Failing to Give Adequate Reasons For Not Doing So
30. The respondent acknowledged that the applicant had been naturalised as an Irish citizen. It is not in issue that she did not treat that as a material change of circumstances. The first, and principal, question is whether that was an approach lawfully open to her.
31. The applicant advanced two bases on which his Irish citizenship was relevant to the revocation application: summarised by the respondent in the second and fourth bullet points under the heading ‘Legal Basis for Revocation’ in paragraph 4 of the decision letter. As noted above, those submissions are accurately summarised in the challenged decision, and are quoted verbatim from the application itself at paragraph 4 of the Detailed Grounds of Defence:
‘2. Change in Immigration Status: I am now an Irish citizen, which provides me with rights under the Common Travel Area (CTA) agreement. This includes a right to live and work in the UK, subject to certain conditions. The UK and Ireland CTA Memorandum of Understanding (2019) recognises the close ties between the two nations and provides for mutual cooperation on matters relating to free movement of Irish citizens within the UK.
4.Deportation of Irish citizens: The UK does not routinely deport Irish citizens. On 19 February 2007, the Secretary of State announced in Parliament, through a Written Ministerial Statement, that Irish citizens will be considered for deportation only where the Court has recommended deportation in sentencing or where the Secretary of State concludes that, due to the exceptional circumstances of the case, the public interest requires deportation.’
32. The applicant now correctly accepts that he does not enjoy free movement rights across the CTA, even though he is now an Irish citizen. Section 3ZA of the Immigration Act 1971 provides:
‘3ZA Irish citizens
(1) An Irish citizen does not require leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom, unless subsection (2), (3) or (4) applies to that citizen.
(2) This subsection applies to an Irish citizen if the Irish citizen is subject to a deportation order made under section 5(1).
(3) This subsection applies to an Irish citizen if—
(a) the Secretary of State has issued directions for the Irish citizen not to be given entry to the United Kingdom on the ground that the Irish citizen's exclusion is conducive to the public good,
(b) the Secretary of State has given the Irish citizen notice of the directions, and
(c) the directions have not been withdrawn.
(4) This subsection applies to an Irish citizen if the Irish citizen is an excluded person for the purposes of section 8B (persons excluded under certain instruments).
(5) Where subsection (2), (3) or (4) applies to an Irish citizen, section 1(3) does not permit the Irish citizen to enter the United Kingdom without leave on arriving in the United Kingdom on a local journey from any place in the common travel area.’
33. Consequently, it cannot be said that the applicant’s status as an Irish citizen gave him any greater rights under the CTA agreement than he has/had as a Nigerian citizen.
34. As for the applicant’s submission that the United Kingdom does not generally deport Irish citizens and his reliance on the WMS, the applicant was not an Irish citizen at the time the deportation order was made, and so did not then fall within scope of the WMS. For the reasons given above, he remained outside the scope of the WMS after he became an Irish citizen.
35. Those being the only two bases upon which the applicant submitted his Irish citizenship should be taken into account, it follows that the respondent was entitled not to consider the applicant’s naturalisation a material change in circumstances.
36. The applicant submitted at the hearing that the respondent should have taken into account his naturalised Irish citizenship when considering whether to exercise discretion to revoke the deportation order. However, the respondent had directed herself repeatedly to that fact. It is true that the paragraph 49 refers erroneously to ‘Albania’ rather than Ireland. However, that is manifestly a typographical error. I do not accept that, having dealt expressly with the applicant’s specific nationality-related submissions, the respondent in fact mistakenly thought he was Albanian. Instead, I am satisfied that the respondent did take into account his subsequently acquired Irish nationality when considering whether there were very compelling circumstances such as to outweigh the public interest in deportation.
37. Ground two complains in the alternative that the respondent failed to give adequate reasons for not treating his Irish citizenship as a material change of circumstances. I agree with Ms Anderson that a reasons challenge cannot succeed in a vacuum. The inadequacy of reasons must disclose an underlying public law error. As said by Simmler J in Hamzeh & ors v SSHD [2013] EWHC 4113 (Admin) at [89]:
‘So far as the reasons challenge in this case is concerned, the jurisdiction to quash a decision on public law grounds only exists where there has in fact been an error of law. As was explained in Westech College [2011] EWHC 1484 (Admin) at [29], the court should not intervene to grant judicial review, simply because the reasons given may disclose an error of law, unless the perceived deficiency in reasoning denotes that the decision is flawed by error of law. Accordingly, insofar as the reasoning in any of the refusal decisions in these cases is deficient, unless the defective reasoning indicates or demonstrates that there would have been a different outcome (so that the decision is in error of law), this court should not intervene.’
38. A decision-maker can be criticised for failing to explain how material factors influenced a decision, in particular where the factors point strongly to a different outcome, because an inference might be drawn that the factors were overlooked. However, there is no obligation to explain why an inapplicable policy was not applied, as much as there is no obligation to explain why applicable law and policy were applied. In this regard, Dove J said in R (on the application of MS) v SSHD (excluded persons: Restrictive Leave policy) IJR [2015] UKUT 00539 (IAC) at [161]:
‘Thus, in our view, Ms Weston's submission, that the respondent unlawfully failed to consider whether the DLR policy as opposed to the RLR policy should be applied to MBT, is misconceived. It presupposes that MBT had some right to have the status quo of being considered under the DLR policy continue or that he had some right to be considered under the DLR policy, whereas the correct position is that the policy which applied to him was the RLR policy unless the respondent considered that there were exceptional circumstances to justify diverting him to the DLR policy. Accordingly, it is not the case that the respondent had to justify diverting MBT from the DLR policy. To the contrary, any diversion of MBT from the RLR policy had to be justified. It is implicit in the respondent’s decision to apply the RLR policy to MBT that she considered that there were no exceptional circumstances to justify diverting him from the RLR policy. She did not need to give reasons to apply her overarching policy (see R (Mohammed) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] EWHC 98 (Admin), Lewis J), unless there are plainly exceptional circumstances which she may have overlooked capable of outweighing the public interest in the three purposes of the RLR policy.’
39. As it was, the applicant advanced two reasons why his Irish citizenship was relevant to the application, and the respondent dealt with each of them in turn.
40. In respect of the first, the applicant’s claimed rights under the CTA, she said:
‘It is noted, however, that at the time the Deportation Order was lawfully signed, you were a Nigerian citizen. Accordingly, the circumstances under which the Deportation Order was issued were proper and in accordance with the relevant legal framework, and that there has been no violation of Common Travel Area (CTA) Rights.’
41. As for the applicant’s submission that the United Kingdom does not generally deport Irish citizens and his reliance on the WMS, the respondent said:
‘You contend that Irish citizens are generally not subject to Deportation Orders. While this may be correct as a general principle, it is material that, at the time the Deportation Order was made, you were a Nigerian citizen. At present, you are not being deported; rather, the decision is to maintain the existing Deportation Order, which was validly issued and subsequently enforced when you departed the UK for Ireland.’
42. Given the application of s3ZA of the Immigration Act 1971 and the inapplicability of the WMS, nothing more needed reasonably to be said.
43. For these reasons, ground two also fails.
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