Tribunal decisions

The decision

Case No: JR-2026-LON-002702
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
(IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER)
Field House,
Breams Buildings
London, EC4A 1WR

2 November 2026

Before:

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RASTOGI

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Between:

THE KING
on the application of
ANU SAJI
Applicant
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SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

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Mr Z. Raza
(instructed by Marks and Marks Solicitors), for the applicant

Mr J. Tramboo
(instructed by the Government Legal Department) for the respondent

Hearing date: 13 October 2026

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J U D G M E N T

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Judge Rastogi:

1. This judicial review concerns the circumstances in which the respondent cancelled the applicant’s extant leave pursuant to the suitability provisions found in the Immigration Rules. Fairness is at the heart of the challenge in this matter.

2. The applicant is an Indian national. The respondent cancelled her extant student leave on 29 June 2026 with immediate effect following an enforcement visit of the same date when the respondent claimed the applicant was working outside of the permission enabling her to do so (“the cancellation decision”). The consequence of the cancellation decision was that the applicant no longer had valid leave such that her studies were halted, she lost her income stream and her mental health significantly deteriorated. Her application to expedite these proceedings in light of those consequences was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Bulpitt, then extended by Upper Tribunal Judge Hoffman when he granted the applicant permission to judicially review the cancellation decision on 28 August 2026.

3. The applicant accepts working at Pepe’s Piri Piri but maintains she did so in accordance with her visa permissions limiting her to a maximum of 20 hours per week in term-time. She maintains she had been attending university in line with the purpose of her visa. Her case is that when the immigration officers visited her place of work, they were unreasonable and intimidating such that they arrived at erroneous conclusions that she had not been studying but, rather, she had been working in breach of her visa. Her efforts to prove otherwise through the pre-action protocol (“PAP”) process and the submission of evidence from her university and payslips fell on deaf ears.

4. The applicant challenges the cancellation decision on the grounds of (1) irrationality/ inadequacy of reasoning; (2) procedural unfairness; and (3) unlawful exercise of discretion. At the time the applicant filed her application for judicial review and even at the time Judge Hoffman considered the application for permission on the papers, the respondent had not disclosed any evidence arising from the enforcement visit to try to further explain the cancellation decision. The evidence was not disclosed until the respondent filed her detailed grounds of defence on 11 September 2026.

5. Therein the respondent accepts that the 82 page Visit Report (“the enforcement report”) generated on 15 August 2026 containing the operational entries and photographs from the enforcement visit should have been disclosed earlier than it was. Mr Tramboo confirmed that the respondent no longer relies on the sections of the summary grounds seeking to justify the non-production of the report in the absence of a formal order to disclose it.

6. The respondent’s overarching position is that the officers were entitled to cancel the applicant’s leave because during the enforcement visit the applicant admitted working in excess of the permitted 20 hours and the underlying evidence supported that admission. The breach was recent and sufficiently serious to warrant cancellation. In her detailed grounds of defence (paragraph 7) the respondent also confirmed that the only basis on which the decision is defended is on the grounds of breach of working conditions because that was the ground relied on in the cancellation decision itself. No ground arising from cessation of studies was relied on or pursued, although the respondent did consider the explanation about her university attendance being recorded manually rather than on the university application (“the App”). Furthermore, the applicant was given a meaningful chance to respond to the proposed intention to cancel her leave, and she raised the outstanding debt she had in India. That was considered prior to exercising discretion to cancel the leave. Nevertheless, the respondent accepts that if the interview process was found to be coercive or the outcome pre-determined, the applicant is likely to succeed in her challenge on fairness grounds (see paragraph 49 of the detailed grounds of defence).

7. I have been assisted by the 204-page hearing bundle (“HB”), a 399-page Authorities Bundle (“AB”) and written and oral submissions from both representatives, which assisted me and for which I am grateful. When I reference page numbers from the bundle, I do so using the pdf page number not the hard copy number.

Application to extend time

8. I formally record that on 9 October 2026 the parties were told, by email, that I had granted the applicant’s application to extend time for her to file the bundle and her skeleton argument (to 8 October 2026) and I extended the respondent’s time to file her skeleton argument until 4pm on Monday 12 October 2026. The pressure of time had prevented an order being drawn up to that effect and there was no objection to me dealing with the formal decision here. In due course, the parties will need to include the formal decision into the order to reflect my decision as it is set out in this judgment (see [91] below).

The Legal Framework

The Immigration Rules

9. The cancellation decision was taken pursuant to paragraph SUI 11.8 of the Immigration Rules which affords a discretionary power to cancel a person’s permission to stay on the following basis:

“Permission … may be cancelled where the person has failed to comply with the conditions of their permission”.

General principles about Procedural Fairness

10. The parties were broadly agreed about the operative legal principles concerning procedural fairness in immigration decision-making and specifically in the context of a discretionary power to cancel leave.

11. They agreed that the exercise of the power in SUI 11.8 involved at least two stages: firstly a decision that someone has breached the condition of their leave and, secondly, whether to exercise discretion to cancel that leave.

12. In R (Singaram) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 1375, Lewis LJ giving the lead judgment with which the others agreed concluded at [35] that:

“35. The requirement of procedural fairness applies to both aspects of that decision-making process although what will be required to ensure procedural fairness may differ, or be differently expressed in relation to each of those aspects.”

13. The parties were also agreed that the scope of what is required to ensure procedural fairness in any given case is context specific. They directed me to [48] of R (Kanwal) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] EWHC 110 (Admin) which summarises the authorities (albeit at relative length) as follows:

“(1) the Defendant was under a duty to act procedurally fairly in respect of the decisions challenged in this case: see R (Mohibullah) v. SSHD (TOEIC - ETS - judicial review principles) [2016] UKUT 561 (IAC) at (78) (general duty on Secretary of State to act procedurally fairly in immigration cases); and

(2) The question of whether there has been procedural fairness or not is
an objective question for the Court to decide for itself. The question is not whether the decision-maker has acted reasonably, still less whether there was some fault on the part of the public authority concerned: see R (Balajigari) and Ors. v SSHD [2019] EWCA Civ 673, [2019] 1 WLR 4647 (“Balajigari”) at [46] and R (Osborn) v. Parole Board [2013] UKSC 61, [2014] AC 1115 at [65]).

(3) “… [3] The principles of fairness are not to be applied by rote identically in every situation. What fairness demands is dependent on the context of the decision, and this is to be taken into account in all its aspects. (4) An essential feature of the context is the statute which creates the discretion, as regards both its language and the shape of the legal and administrative system within which the decision is taken.

…

[5] Fairness will very often require that a person who may be adversely affected by the decision will have an opportunity to make representations on his own behalf either before the decision is taken with a view to producing a favourable result; or after it is taken, with a view to procuring its modification; or both.

[6] Since the person affected usually cannot make worthwhile representations without knowing what factors may weigh against his interests, fairness will very often require that he is informed of the gist of the case which he has to answer.” per Lord Mustill in R v Home Secretary ex p. Doody [1994] 1 AC 531 at 570.

(4) “Although the courts cannot and have not purported to lay down rules of general application, there is a broad consensus in the decisions of appellate courts as to the factors that affect what is required in a given context. That consensus runs from Lord Upjohn's important statement in Durayappah v. Fernando [1967] 2 AC 337 at 349 to the refinements in more recent cases such as Lloyd v. McMahon [1987] AC 625 at 702, and Doody and Osborn's cases. The factors include the nature of the function under consideration, the statutory or other framework in which the decision-maker operates, the circumstances in which he or she is entitled to act and the range of decisions open to him or her, the interest of the person affected, the effect of the decision on that person's rights or interests, that is, the seriousness of the consequences for that person. The nature of the function may involve fact-finding, assessments of matters such as character and present mental state, predictions as to future mental state and risk, or policymaking. The decision- maker may have a broad discretion as to what to do or may be required to take into account certain matters, or to give them particular or even dispositive weight. The decision may affect the individual's rights and interests, and its effect can vary from a minor inconvenience to a significant detriment.” per Beatson LJ in R (Howard League for Penal Reform & Anor) v. The Lord Chancellor [2017] EWCA Civ 244, [2017] 4 WLR 92 at [38].

(5) In Re HK (An Infant) [1967] 2 QB 617, an immigration officer suspected that HK, a Pakistani national seeking to enter the UK as the son of a Pakistani national ordinarily resident in the UK was older than the date stated on the passport presented. Lord Parker C.J observed at p.630:

“I doubt whether it can be said that the immigration authorities are acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity as those terms are generally understood. But at the same time, I myself think that even if an immigration officer is not in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity, he must at any rate give the immigrant an opportunity of satisfying him of the matters in the subsection, and for that purpose let the immigrant know what his immediate impression is so that the immigrant can disabuse him. That is not, as I see it, a question of acting or being required to act judicially, but of being required to act fairly. Good administration and an honest or bona fide decision must, as it seems to me, require not merely impartiality, nor merely bringing one's mind to bear on the problem, but acting fairly; and to the limited extent that the circumstances of any particular case allow, and within the legislative framework under which the administrator is working, only to that limited extent do the so-called rules of natural justice apply, which in a case such as this is merely a duty to act fairly. [emphasis added]”

(6) The requirement of procedural fairness applies in respect of an entitlement to address an immigration officer in other contexts: R (Humnyntskyi & Ors) v. SSHD [2020] EWHC 1912 at [270] (entitlement of foreign national offenders inter alia, to make representations in advance of a decision as to whether to provide bail accommodation, and to know what factors will be considered significant by the decision maker); Gaima v. SSHD [1989] Imm AR 205 (an overstayer who claimed asylum where the issue in that case was that the SSHD had not put to an asylum seeker the matters taken into account in assessing their sincerity and credibility.)

(7) In Balajigari in the judgment of the Court (Underhill, Hickinbottom and Singh LJJ), it was said as follows:

“[55]…where the Secretary of State is minded to refuse ILR on the basis of paragraph 322 (5) on the basis of the applicant’s dishonesty, or other reprehensible conduct, he is required as a matter of procedural fairness to indicate clearly to the applicant that he has that suspicion; to give the applicant an opportunity to respond, both as regards the conduct itself and as regards any other reasons relied on as regards “undesirability” and the exercise of the second-stage assessment; and then to take that response into account before drawing the conclusion that there has been such conduct.

[56] We do not consider that an interview is necessary in all cases. The Secretary of State’s own rules give a discretion to him to hold such an interview. However, the duty to act fairly does not, in our view, require that discretion to be exercised in all cases. A written procedure may well suffice in most cases.”

[60] …unless the circumstances of a particular case make this impracticable, the ability to make representations only after a decision has been taken will usually be insufficient to satisfy the demands of common law procedural fairness. The rationale for this proposition lies in the underlying reasons for having procedural fairness in the first place. It is conducive to better decision-making because it ensures that the decision-maker is fully informed at a point when a decision is still at a formative stage. It also shows respect for the individual whose interests are affected, who will know that they have had the opportunity to influence a decision before it is made. Another rationale is no doubt that, if a decision has already been made, human nature being what it is, the decision-maker may unconsciously and in good faith tend to be defensive over the decision to which he or she has previously come. [emphasis added]”

(8) R. v. Hackney London Borough Council, ex p Decordova (1995) 27 HLR 108 at p.113 where Laws J observed: “… where an authority lock, stock and barrel is minded to disbelieve an account given by an applicant for housing where the circumstances described in the account are critical to the issue whether the authority ought to offer accommodation in a particular area, they are bound to put to the applicant in interview, or by some appropriate means, the maters that concern them. This must now surely be elementary law in relation to the function of decision-makers in relation to subject matter of this kind. It applies in the law of immigration, and generally where public authorities have to make decisions which affect the rights of individual persons. If the authority is minded to make an adverse decision because it does not believe the account given by the applicant, it has to give the applicant an opportunity to deal with it.”

(9) The fairness of the procedure used by the defendant falls to be evaluated at the date of the impugned procedure and decision, not in retrospect. What was unfair then remains unfair now: see R (Pathan) v. SSHD [2020] UKSC 41, [2020] 1 WLR 4506 at [131]-[135].”

14. The parties agreed that the observations set out at [48] of Mamun Ahmed V Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWHC 2333 are of significance:

“48. Although the IEOs may have been influenced in their conduct of the second interview by what they perceived to be an admission of ‘guilt’ freely made, that very perception should have heightened their appreciation of the need for great care in how they proceeded to ensure procedural fairness. Either the further questioning would confirm their perception, in which case, the details could be very important to the exercise of discretion and the assessment of extenuating circumstances or it would undermine their perception and cause them to re-evaluate their initial understanding against the further information. In either scenario, how the next interview session was conducted was crucial. The heightened appreciation for care in approach applies particularly to the Claimant's unequivocal appreciation of what the IEOs would have understood as the substantial jeopardy then in play (both curtailment and detention) and by extension to the physical circumstances in which the next stage was conducted”

15. Although in a different context, it was not in dispute that the headnotes in R (on the application of Anjum) v Entry Clearance Officer, Islamabad (entrepreneur – business expansion – fairness generally) [2017] UKUT 00406 (IAC) and R (on the application of Mushtaq) v Entry Clearance Officer (ECO – procedural fairness) IJR [2015] UKUT 224 (IAC) are also relevant to enforcement interviews.

16. Headnote (ii) in Anjum says:

“(ii) An immigration interview may be unfair, thereby rendering the resulting decision unlawful, where inflexible structural adherence to prepared questions excludes the spontaneity necessary to repeat or clarify obscure questions and/or to probe or elucidate answers given.”

17. The headnote in Mushtaq says:

“(i) The common law principles of procedural fairness apply to the decision making processes of Entry Clearance Officers (“ECOs”).

(ii) ECO interviews serve the basic twofold purpose of enabling applications to be probed and investigated and, simultaneously, giving the applicant a fair opportunity to respond to potentially adverse matters. The ensuing decison must accord with the principles of procedural fairness.

(iii) A breach of the “Case Worker Guidance” may render the decision of an ECO unlawful. As a general rule, a challenge advanced on this basis will succeed only where Wednesbury irrationality or a material procedural irregularity is established.”

18. Paragraph [19] is also useful:

“I make one concluding observation. The choice of questions and words in ECO interviews requires care and planning. Ambiguous words and phrases are to be avoided. Furthermore, fairness will often require that the interviewer invite the subject to clarify or expand an answer or probe a response. These simple mechanisms will also illuminate the court’s assessment of whether any ensuing adverse decision was preordained. The nationals of impoverished and deprived countries who have invested large sums of money and whose admission to the United Kingdom is lawful if they satisfy the requirements of the relevant legal rules are deserving of no less.”

Principles applicable to adequacy of reasons

19. At [36] of South Bucks District Council and another (Respondents) v. Porter (FC) Appellant) [2004] UKHL 33, the Court said:

“The reasons for a decision must be intelligible and they must be adequate. They must enable the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached on the "principal important controversial issues", disclosing how any issue of law or fact was resolved. Reasons can be briefly stated, the degree of particularity required depending entirely on the nature of the issues falling for decision. The reasoning must not give rise to a substantial doubt as to whether the decision-maker erred in law, for example by misunderstanding some relevant policy or some other important matter or by failing to reach a rational decision on relevant grounds. But such adverse inference will not readily be drawn. The reasons need refer only to the main issues in the dispute, not to every material consideration. … Decision letters must be read in a straightforward manner, recognising that they are addressed to parties well aware of the issues involved and the arguments advanced. A reasons challenge will only succeed if the party aggrieved can satisfy the court that he has genuinely been substantially prejudiced by the failure to provide an adequately reasoned decision.”

The Enforcement Guidance

20. The respondent issued Instructions for ‘Enforcement interviews’ version 2.0 on 22 December 2020 (“the guidance”). There was no suggestion from either party that it did not apply to the interviews with the applicant, and a copy was provided in the Authorities Bundle. I refer only to the relevant parts of the guidance.

21. The guidance provides that “Where the purpose of the interview is to gather information for a law enforcement purpose it is a formal interview and must be conducted in accordance with this guidance” [AB319]. This is the stage following exploratory questions which can permissibly be asked for the purposes set out at page 8 of the guidance [AB322]. Thereafter, if the officer forms reasonable grounds to suspect someone may be in breach of immigration law they can be questioned by means of an initial examination under paragraph 2 of Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act 1971 [AB323]. The purpose of the interview is to establish if the person has breached immigration law, to gather evidence and to decide if they are liable to be detained and removed. It is not necessary to arrest someone for such an interview although the guidance says that if there is a reasonable suspicion of an administrative breach or criminal offence, they must be arrested and immediately given the administrative explanation or criminal caution as appropriate [AB325]. The guidance sets out what needs to be noted upon initial encounter and that includes “behaviours displayed” and that the OIC must be notified “of any issues or complaints”.

22. A ‘further examination’ can be carried out pursuant to paragraph 2 and 2A of Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act 1971 to “elicit further information or clarify information given during the initial examination”. It is usually conducted at a police station or immigration office [AB327]. The guidance sets out what needs to be recorded, that it should usually be verbatim and that at the end of the interview the person must be invited to read and sign the pages of the interview record as being an accurate account or to say what is inaccurate.

23. The guidance sets out ‘good practice’ for investigative interviewing. That includes, as relevant, taking into account the person’s “individual characteristics, physical/mental health, religion, domestic circumstances, gender” [AB322]. It says “all those present must be identified”. It says “you must aim to adopt a neutral stance remaining calm, courteous, considerate and non-confrontational throughout the interview”. It explains that open questions invite and encourage explanation and help the interviewer extract information from the interviewee; closed questions should be used sparingly and examples given as to when that may be appropriate; forced-choice questions and multiple questions may be confusing and leading questions are to be avoided. It explains how to clarify and expand the interviewee’s account is [AB335-336]. The guidance provides the process to be followed at the end of the interview. It instructs that toilet breaks must be allowed [AB337].

The cancellation decision

24. The operative part reads:

“Reasons for decision

You are liable to be removed from the UK for the following reasons:

You were granted a student visa that ran from 21/08/2025 to 30/11/2028 subject to the following condition(s): work restricted to 20 hours per week in term time

Your permission has been cancelled under paragraph SUI 11.8 of the immigration rules because you have failed to comply with the conditions of your permission.

You did not comply with these conditions because you were encountered by immigration officers working in Pepes 11 Watford Way NW4 3JL and when interviewed you admitted working in excess of your permitted hours as per your student visa.

On 29/06/2026 you were asked to give any reason why your permission should not be cancelled. You stated that you had to work to pay off loans taken out in India.

I have considered whether to exercise discretion regarding the cancellation of your permission. It is not considered that the circumstances in your case are such that discretion should be exercised in your favour, and I have decided it is appropriate to cancel your permission with immediate effect. This is because you both admitted to working over 20 hours and by working though these hours, you have failed to comply with the conditions of your stay in the UK.”

An overview of the evidence

25. I was assisted by a 204-page PDF hearing bundle (“HB”).

The applicant’s evidence

26. The applicant prepared her first witness statement shortly before the proceedings were issued. It is dated 28 July 2026 and it was, of course, prepared before the respondent complied with her duty of candour. It contained a detailed account of the events at the enforcement visit and the resulting consequences upon her. Her updating statement of 15 September 2026 responded to the respondent’s disclosure with the detailed grounds of defence.

27. The applicant also relies on evidence supporting her position that she had been attending university and had not worked outside of the conditions of her visa. In summary she provided letters from her university, her payslips and a witness statement from her employer, Mr Omar Sheikh dated 15 September 2026. Some of that evidence was sent to the respondent as part of the PAP procedure. I return to it below.

The respondent’s evidence/disclosure

28. The extent of the respondent’s evidence in this case is the 82 page enforcement report prepared on 15 August 2026. The respondent has not filed any other evidence within these proceedings, either from the person who collated the enforcement report or from any of the immigration officers who attended the enforcement visit on 29 June 2026. That has been unhelpful. As will be seen, where there are anomalies or lack of clarity in the report (or indeed a challenge to what took place at the visit), there has been little, if any, assistance from anyone on behalf of the respondent to aid the Tribunal’s understanding of what took place at the enforcement visit.

29. I return to the evidence in more detail below.

The basis of the review

30. The parties agreed at the outset that this was not a precedent fact situation. In other words, the Tribunal was not invited to make findings about the existence or otherwise of a fact underlying the respondent’s cancellation decision (such as on the disputed issue of whether or not the applicant worked in excess of the permitted 20 hours per week).

31. On behalf of the respondent, Mr Tramboo accepted that it is for the respondent to demonstrate the grounds justifying the cancellation decision. He very helpfully identified, both in his written and oral submissions, those features of the evidence which are incapable of discharging that burden alone (and to the extent the summary grounds of defence said otherwise he resiled from them).

32. The parties agreed that the Tribunal’s role was to review, on public law principles, whether the respondent was lawfully entitled to decide that the applicant had breached the conditions of her visa and/or to cancel the applicant’s leave with immediate effect.

Procedural Fairness

33. Given its prominence in this application, I deal first with the two limbs of procedural fairness encompassed within grounds 2 and 3 of the original grounds. Ground 2 relates to fairness (or otherwise) of the process the respondent followed to arrive at the decision that the applicant had breached the conditions of her stay, and ground 3 goes to the procedure by which the respondent exercised her discretion to cancel.

The competing positions

34. The applicant’s overarching position (now that she has seen the enforcement report) is that it is an incomplete record of what happened at the enforcement visit and, of itself, reveals significant procedural unfairness. The applicant’s evidence about what actually happened, as contained in her first witness statement which is detailed, supports the first part of that submission because it is clear that the enforcement report omits reference to events which must have happened, such as the seizure and search of the applicant’s phone (from which the university letter dated 29 October 2025 was obtained and on which the respondent relies to show that the excess hours the applicant worked were in term time). Furthermore, the format of the enforcement report calls into question the correct chronology because the order of the various interviews does not correlate to the applicant’s recollection as she set out in her witness statement but also, they are not always internally consistent. Mr Raza submitted that it is plain that Immigration Officer (“IO”) Ahmed had formed a view early on that the applicant was not a genuine student because she was shown to have ‘nil attendance’ on the App. Even taken at its highest, the enforcement report lacks detail in terms of what documents were being shown to the applicant and what she was actually being asked; the questions put were unclear and at times leading or closed, contrary to the respondent’s guidance as to the need for open questions. The report does not reveal whether, or if so how, the applicant was able to check the answers recorded for accuracy (although it is not disputed she signed each section). Furthermore, given that, on its face, the applicant made early admissions of excess working, applying [48] of Mamum, extra caution should have been taken to ensure that the questioning thereafter was procedurally fair to ensure their initial impression of ‘guilt’ informed by the early admission in order to test that initial perception. However, Mr Raza submitted that did not happen. Accordingly, Mr Raza submitted that the procedure followed and which (on its face) elicited the admissions relied upon was unfair. Because those admissions underpin the reasoning in the cancellation decision, that decision was infected with public law error.

35. As to the decision to cancel the applicant’s leave, Mr Raza’s submissions were that the respondent was wrong to have exercised her discretion to do so. He identified that the reasons she gave [HB86] were wrong. The reliance on the rosters is insufficient given that the other students were not subjected to enforcement action. The inference that she was not a genuine student was wrong. The applicant was not given an opportunity to make fair representations about the decision to cancel even if the condition precedent was made out. She was not permitted to secure her payslips even though those had exonerated another employee who was also a student.

36. I have summarised the respondent’s overarching position at [6] above. On the issue of the interview process, Mr Tramboo’s submissions are that the record does not just record the admissions or document answers showing the applicant agreeing with what was put to her. Her recorded answers reveal an ability to dispute or clarify what the IOs said, and to meaningfully comment on some of the documents shown to her. Accordingly he submitted that shows she was able to engage with the respondent’s case as put to her and, therefore, the parts of the interview containing the admissions are reliable. Furthermore, they are corroborated by the handwritten rosters which also provide evidence of the applicant working in excess of her permitted hours. The respondent accepts that there may be some inconsistent timings contained in the enforcement report (specifically about the time that the Chief Immigration Officer (“CIO”) was asked to make the cancellation decision see [HB86]) but that does not detract from the overall fairness of the process leading to the admissions, in turn relied on in the cancellation decision. Mr Tramboo accepted that although the cancellation decision letter only refers to the admission to working in breach of the visa condition, the contemporaneous reasons of the CIO also makes reference to the App showing nil attendance at university. Accordingly, he accepts he needed to address that. As set out above, the respondent accepts that predetermination of the decision to cancel the applicant’s leave would render the process procedurally unfair and at [16] of the skeleton argument it is accepted that an admission does not dispense with the need for the type of procedural safeguards set out in the guidance and as highlighted in the authorities.

37. On the exercise of discretion, in addition to what is recorded at [6] above, Mr Tramboo also submitted that the discretion to cancel was justified in light of the breach being immediate and substantial and because the applicant was given the chance to comment on the possibility of cancellation prior to the decision being made.

Discussion

38. Given that this is not a precedent fact case, it is not my role to decide whether, as a matter of fact, the applicant worked in excess of the permitted hours in term-time. The respondent relies on what she identifies as the applicant’s admission to that effect. In order to decide if it was lawfully open to the respondent to rely upon that, or whether the process resulting in the admission or the cancellation decision was procedurally unfair, it is incumbent upon me to firstly identify (as far as is possible) the factual context of the events of 29 June 2026. The reason for that is plain from the authorities. It is clear that each case is fact and context specific and the outcome of other cases on their own facts is unlikely to be of assistance on the (different) facts of another case.

39. I have already commented above on the absence of any witness statements from any of the immigration officers or anyone at all involved in the enforcement visit, the decision-making relating to the applicant, or the collation of the enforcement report and the difficulties the absence of such evidence poses.

40. By contrast I have two detailed witness statements from the applicant with various items of supporting documents and a supporting statement from her employer, Mr Sheikh. There was very little (if any) challenge to this evidence save in relation to Mr Sheikh’s evidence, where Mr Tramboo made the point that his witness statement is more specific than the explanation he gave when spoken to by the immigration officers which was the operative evidence at the time the cancellation decision was made. As to the other evidence (for example the university letters, payslips and medical information), the respondent’s submission was that it is post-decision evidence, although Mr Tramboo accepted it has some relevance when considering the potential unfairness of the enforcement interview process.

41. I turn first to what is not in dispute. On 29 June 2026 (which was during term time) the applicant was working at Pepes when immigration officers attended on an enforcement visit. At that time she was enrolled at Middlesex University studying a BSc in Nursing and it is in respect of that course that she was granted permission to enter the United Kingdom and to stay here until 30 November 2028. The applicant is entitled to work there as a condition of her visa providing she does not breach the term time 20 hour per week maximum. At some stage during the visit, she was arrested by the immigration officer and she was interviewed. During that process she was told her leave was to be cancelled with immediate effect. Two other students who worked at Pepes were also arrested but both were de-arrested and not subject to cancellation decisions. As a consequence of the cancellation decision the applicant has no extant leave, she is not permitted to continue her studies and since then she has experienced suicidal ideation and poor mental health (her evidence about this was not disputed).

42. As to what happened during the visit, I deal first with the enforcement report. It was created by Lucy Roberts on 15 August 2026 “for litigation”. The first 11-12 pages appear to set out the initial reasons why an enforcement visit to Pepes was felt necessary, the ‘intelligence’ relied on and the planning process for the visit. There is little detail about the source of this information [HB39]. There is no express reference to the applicant. I take from that that any intelligence they had did not relate specifically to her. The purpose of the visit was said to be “HOIE illegal working visit” [HB34].

43. Internal pages 12 and 13 set out the ‘debrief’ in which the outcome of the visit was summarised under different categories confirming that of the 5 encounters at the premises, three were arrested and two later de-arrested because of “insufficient evidence to progress” [HB42]. A summary was provided as to the encounters, the fact that a female was arrested following admission of “breaching student work conditions” and was bailed at scene. Comments were made about the owner being evasive on the issue of illegal working, concluding in a comment about deliberate non-compliance, tax evasion and low wages but the evidential threshold about this was not met [HB42-43]. The debrief section was completed by Erin MacFarlane. It is noted from elsewhere in the report that she was the CIO [HB85-86].

44. IO Ahmed was the immigration officer who dealt with the applicant. His records start at [HB44] although, as Mr Raza pointed out at the hearing, the records are not chronological. The chronology can only be identified by a careful piecing together of what happened by reference to the stated times in the report according to the inputted data from the various immigration officers who were involved. I set out below the relevant parts of the enforcement report in chronological order (as best as I am able to identify it).

45. Most, if not all, of the officers said that entry to the premises was gained at 20.20 hours, including IO Ahmed at [HB44]. His initial contact with the applicant took place at 20.30 hours. That was not mentioned until [HB75]. Therein he noted that at 20.30 hours he became suspicious of her when she was serving customers. He noted “POI was nervous and avoiding simple questions. she was avoiding eye contact”. He noted she was a student with leave from 25 August 2025 to 30 November 2028.

46. Another officer recorded that at 20.59 the manager Mr Sheikh arrived at the premises saying he has attended as the staff had called him to show the staff rotas [HB75].

47. At 21.33 IO Ahmed obtained some of the applicant’s personal details [HB45] and at 21.36 he exhibited a “term letter” which was a photo of a letter from Middlesex University dated 29 October 2025 setting out the term dates [HB47]. There is no reference to how the document came to IO Ahmed’s attention.

48. Thereafter the enforcement report includes copies of 6 additional exhibits of handwritten documents which (it is not in dispute) is what the respondent classifies as ‘rotas’ or ‘rosters’ although that classification of them is disputed. I shall call them the ‘rosters’ for convenience but that does not mean I find them to be, in fact, a record of the staff’s working hours. There is no express reference in this part of the enforcement report as to when or how they were found, although reference is made in some of the interview sections to Mr Sheikh having provided them.

49. At 21.44 hours there is a record of an interview conducted with the applicant [HB51-2]. It is said to have taken place in the kitchen at Pepes. The language used was English. I pause here to note that the applicant has not taken any issue with the language of the interview. Given the centrality of this interview to the issues in this case, I set out this section in full (spelling mistakes included):

“Q&A
Are you fit and well to be interviewed? Yes.
Is the area quiet enough for you to hear and understand everything? Yea.
What ia your purpose in the UK? Im studying Bsc adult nurisng at Middlesex University.
When did you last University? I have been in study leave since May.
Are you working over 20 hours? Yes.
Why are you working over 20 hrs? I took out alot of loans and had to start paying back money.
I am showing you this roster with with days hours as wed 06.30 to 0300, thurs 12 to 08.30, Fri 10 to 6, Sat 0400 to 12, sun 05 to 0230 which equas to 39.5 hours. Are these hours that you have worked?
I cant remember as there no dates.
Is there a possiability that you have worked these hours? It may be possiable that I have worked these hours. You can put it like that.
I am showing this roster over two weeks. we will talk about the first week. It states Monday 4 to 11, tuesday 05 to 01, wednesday 06 to 01, Thursday 05 to 01, Friday 2 to 0. Have you worked these hours? All the days are fine but On friday I worked 2pm to 8pm as I was tirped and it was hot.
You have worked 38 hours so this is excess of 18 hours? Yes
When was these hours worked? These were worked between 22/06/2026 to 26/06/2026.
This week you showed me this roster W/c 28/06/2028 which carried on from last week. Monday 4 to 11, wed 4 to 11, fri 12 to 10, sat 05 to 01. would you have worked these hours? Only Monday as I have had a job offer at KFC.
Would you worked these hours? No because i want to leave and go to kfc.
I am showing you another roster with date that shows Tuesday 3 to 1, thurs 3 to 12, Fri 12 to 6, sat 12 to 6. This is is equal to 39 hours which is excess of 19 hours. Have you worked these hours? I dont know.

Is it possiable that you worked these hours? I dont know.
This roster listed as 01/06/2026. Mon 12 to 12.30, tuesday 12 to 6, Thursday 2pm to 2 to 10, fri 11.30 to 6, sun 3 to 02.30 am. This equals to 43 hours. Have you worked theae hours? Probbly.
I am showing you another roster that you worked 22/06/2026 to 28/ 06/ 2026. You have worked Monday 4 to 2.30, tuesday, 05 to 02.30, wednesday 06 to 02.30, thursday 05 to 02.30, Friday 2 to
3.30 which equala to 47 hrs. Did you work these hours? Yes.
These are 27 hours excess of your permited hours. Is this is correct?
Yes.
I am showing you another roster that has no date Tueaday 3 to 02.30, Thursday 3 to 11.30, Friday 12 to 6, Saturday 12 to 6, Sunday 10 to 6. Have you worked these hours? I only worked Thursday Friday and Saturday.
On your university website, you have no attendece. Is this because you have been working full time? Attendence is paperbased and that why.
Is there anything else you would like to add? No.
I'm minded to cancel your leave with immediate effect or in 60 days. Do you have any further evidence or anything else I should take into consideration before making a decision? Sorry please dont cancel my visa. I have loads of debt in India. Who will pay the loan if I go back to India.” (My emphasis)

50. At 22.47 the applicant’s signature was obtained and it appears at the end of the above section [HB54]. That is immediately followed with an “Illegal Working – Employee” section noted to start at 22.47. From [HB55] it can be seen that the types of questions then being asked were organised under the headings of ‘obligations’, ‘control’, ‘remuneration’, and ‘pre-employment checks’. The information obtained was factual, relating to the applicant’s employment more generally. That was signed by the applicant at 22.57, this time with the declaration “I confirm that I have understood all the questions and that the details are true and correct” [HB56]. Such a declaration did not appear before the earlier (or any other) signature. The ‘observations’ section said “POI was front of house and wearing uniform” and the officer confirmed their suspicion that the applicant was illegally working [HB56].

51. The next section is headed “Mitigating circumstances” comprising 16 questions and timed at 22.50. The signature concluding that sentence was timed at 22.59 [HB59]. At that time the enforcement record also shows the applicant was asked about voluntary departure which she declined.

52. At [HB77] the enforcement record shows that CIO MacFarlane authorised the service of a Notice of Liability (to removal) for the applicant at 23.21. The notice was in fact served on the applicant at 00.21 on 30 June 2026 by IO Ahmed and a photo of the notice appears at [HB78] with the applicant then being released on bail.

53. At [HB86] CIO MacFarlane entered into the record that at 12.351 on 30 June 2026 she issued “authority to cancel leave” with the following text being entered:

“Referral received from IO AHMED regarding IND female encountered working in the premises.

Rotas found displaying the POI had worked in excess of her student visa
conditions, she admitted to working and her attendance was nil on her
university app.

I have considered whether to use discretion and her response to the question if there is any reason why her leave should not be cancelled however I am satisfied she is working in breach of her 20 hours term time stipulation and has failed to comply with the conditions of her visa. Therefore her leave should be cancelled with immediate effect.”

54. That is the end of the relevant chronology elicited from the enforcement report. The striking feature emerging from this chronology is that it was CIO MacFarlane who authorised the decision to cancel the applicant’s leave and that she did so at 00.35 on 30 June 2026. Given that the cancellation decision letter was dated 29 June 2026, on the face of it, the cancellation decision was made and the letter served before that authorisation had been obtained. Furthermore it also appears on its face, that CIO MacFarlane decided to issue a Notice of Liability for removal to the applicant (23.21) on the basis of a lack of lawful leave and that decision was served on the applicant at 00.21, before she had authorised the decision to cancel the applicant’s leave.

55. As there are no witness statements to explain this apparent tension, the respondent’s case taken at its highest is highly suggestive of some form of procedural irregularity. I will return to this below.

56. The applicant relies on her witness statements to support her submission that the enforcement report is unreliable in terms of chronology and content. The operative parts of the applicant’s first witness statement are summarised as follows:

a) the IO took her phone and went through her pictures asking her about some of them including quite personal matters such as a photo of a pregnancy test and about photos of males in her phone. These questions made her feel uncomfortable but she lacked the confidence to challenge them;
b) he asked her to open the App which she did. He did not comment on it at that stage. He also looked at her WhatsApp and from that found the ‘staff availability’ documents following which he asked her questions about her work arrangements (these are the ‘rosters’). After having moved her into the kitchen, he returned to the App and asked why her attendance was showing as 0%. She explained that her attendance is manually recorded. She formed the impression the IO had already decided that she was lying about her studies;
c) she was asked about her online banking which was on a different phone. She was moved into the courtyard and joined by 2 other officers. She was told that she needed to tell the truth and they would be cancelling her visa anyway. She felt very nervous, became upset to the extent that one of the officers asked if she needed an ambulance. She declined because she was scared they would think she was trying to escape. However, she continued to cry because she felt under pressure and duress. She felt she was being targeted as she is very petite and appeared the most vulnerable and so would be the easiest to coerce;
d) Mr Sheikh had arrived. She was moved into the kitchen and offered water as the officers realised the extent of her distress. The other staff members were present and tried to calm her down. After a while the original officer returned with the roster which she explained was a document showing availability, not the actual working rota. She does not recall being asked about working over 20 hours per week although she does remember that she gave different answers including that she does not know about some things. She does not recall admitting that she worked over 20 hours per week. She was not because she knew she was not allowed to;
e) she does remember mentioning the loan in India and she does not remember precisely what she said because she was in a state of panic by then;
f) although she remembers the officer typing on his hand held device, at no stage was she shown what had been written. When he had finished typing she was told to sign so she did so. He then told her that her visa was cancelled and that she could no longer work or study in the UK. She was very upset.

57. The above account was provided before the respondent’s disclosure. The second witness statement says that the interview noted in the enforcement report as starting at 21.44 did not take place then but after her boss arrived, whereas the line of questioning marked at 22.47 took place before the interview about the rosters. In other words, they took place the other way around. The applicant reiterates her view that the officers had made up their mind about her not studying and that she was lying at an early stage. The whole incident was lengthy and she was often surrounded. She felt very intimidated. She realised afterwards that she already had a letter from her university confirming her attendance on her phone at the time of the interview, but she was in such a state of shock she did not remember it.

58. In his witness statement, Mr Sheikh said he heard the applicant crying, in distress and asked about an ambulance. At that point he came out to check on her and he was told to leave. She was with 3 immigration officers. He heard them refuse to allow her to use the washroom twice. He confirmed she was not working more than 20 hours per week.

59. The appellant and Mr Sheikh’s evidence is corroborated by the CCTV stills. The first is timed at 22.23 hours on 29 June 2026 and shows the applicant sitting in the corner of the kitchen area. Seated immediately next to her is a man and there are 4 other men and one other person standing in the rest of the visible space such that they effectively fill that space, with a fifth man outside the door. The seated man appears to be holding a device. Three of the men appear relatively large in stature and they tower over the applicant who is seated and much smaller in comparison. She is effectively cornered in by a combination of the men and the kitchen furniture. Her route to exit is completely closed. It is not clear whether all persons present were immigration officers or whether some were other staff members. The second still is timed at 22.38. By this time two of the people from inside the kitchen appear to have left as has the man outside the door but the remaining (large) men continue to stand near to and over the applicant, save one of the men who was seated next to her. These appear to be immigration officers rather than staff members. She is still cornered. In my judgment, this evidence supports the applicant’s evidence about why she felt intimidated. There is no doubt that such a physical set up would be intimidating for anyone, let alone a lone female.

60. The timing of the stills corresponds with the section of the enforcement report which places the applicant in the kitchen at Pepes during the interview recorded as starting at 21.44 and ending at 22.47. The enforcement record does not record the presence of any other immigration officers. IO Ahmed does not mention it. I cannot see any entries from other officers about their presence at that interview. I note from the respondent’s guidance for enforcement interviews that it says an interviewee is to be told about everyone present at the interview. It is not clear from the enforcement report that the applicant was told. The stills demonstrate that for at least 15 minutes during that interview, there were at least 4 men in the room and at times more. It is possible, if not probable, that most of those men were immigration officers, and that there was a significant presence of men there throughout the 1 hour 3 minutes the report said the interview lasted.

61. I return to the content of that interview as recorded in the enforcement report and which I have set out at [49] above. I deal first with the timing of it. According to the enforcement report, this was the first interview conducted with the applicant. Mr Raza made the point that, at only the fifth question, the applicant was asked “are you working over 20 hours?”. The first observation is that this is a closed not open question. The guidance says that closed questions should be used sparingly. They can be used to give the interviewer more control; to elicit information not yet provided in response to open questions; to clarify an extend an account already given. Secondly, that question does not identify the period over which the 20 hours is worked and neither does it even identify what work is being referenced. It is clear that, at the point at which that question was asked, the applicant had not been asked a single question about her employment. On the respondent’s case that came later (at 22.47 hours). In my judgment, asking a question which is capable of confusing an interviewee is contrary to the general thrust of the guidance about appropriate questions. The use of a closed question such as this at such an early stage does not accord with the thrust of the guidance either.

62. Moving on to the questions about the rosters, Mr Raza submitted that it is not clear what the applicant was being shown. I agree that the record of questions and answers does not identify them by name or other description. It is not helped by the fact that all of the photos of the rosters are identified with the same exhibit number ‘Sha/001’.

63. Some of them, at least, can be identified by description. The rosters themselves are pictured within the enforcement report and by cross-referencing the days and hours as read out by IO Ahmed with those rosters it is possible to identify some of the ones which the applicant was asked about. For example, the first of those (total 39.5 hours) is the one which appears at [HB51]. As the applicant noted it is not dated.

64. But in respect of the others the picture is more puzzling. The respondent accepted at paragraph [24] of the detailed grounds of defence, that reference is made to the period 22-26 June when apparently talking about two different rosters. Firstly, the applicant referred to these dates when asked about the roster which I assume to be the one at [HB49] (as the days and time tally). However, later IO Ahmed shows her a roster which shows a total of 47 hours and which he says relates to 22-28 June 2026 (obviously encompassing 22-26 June). That is the roster shown second at [HB48].

65. It does not appear that IO Ahmed was alive to this inconsistency. Accordingly, he did not seek her clarification as to what hours she in fact worked throughout the period 22-28 June 2026.

66. According to paragraph [8] of Mr Tramboo’s skeleton argument and paragraph 23 of the detailed grounds of defence, it is the applicant’s admission to working in excess of 20 hours over the period of 22-28 June 2026 that the respondent relies on to explain the cancellation decision. However, as can be seen from both the cancellation decision itself and CIO MacFarlane’s reasoning, no time-period at all is identified. The reasoning relies on a general admission to working excess hours. Mr Tramboo’s alternative submission was that, taken together, the rosters and the admissions establish clear evidence of working in excess of the permitted hours.

67. When Mr Sheikh was asked about the rosters at the time of the enforcement visit he explained that they were not rosters but “they are just the availability that she is able to work on those occasions” [HB84]. When the rosters were put to one of the other student staff members (UU), he denied that they were work rotas and instead relied on his payslips for the number of hours worked. Although the officer noted the payslips did not tally with the rosters, a decision was nevertheless made that there was insufficient evidence to proceed with enforcement against UU because CIO MacFarlane decided his “payslips did reflect his claimed working hours” [HB100]. Another of the student staff-members (R) was presented with the rosters and denied working those hours, setting out instead the hours in fact worked. I note that when the rosters were presented to R, the officer introduced them as “we have been presented further evidence a rota by the ownet of this shop omar, which shows you have worked more than your required 20 hours per week”. This is misleading because it is clear from what Mr Sheikh said, that he was not presenting these rosters as rotas but as availability sheets.

68. In any event, there is no reference in the enforcement report to R presenting conflicting documentary evidence such as the payslips. However, at some stage a decision was made that there was insufficient evidence to proceed and R was de-arrested.

69. In the applicant’s first witness statement, she said the rosters were availability sheets and that she explained that to the officers. If she did, that is not recorded in the enforcement report. However, an overall evaluation of the information available to the respondent at the time the cancellation decision was made is that both staff members denied that the rosters represented the hours they actually worked, and both UU and Mr Sheikh expressly explained that the rosters were not rotas for hours worked but rather, times the staff provided to show when they were available for work. Furthermore, where there was a conflict in the evidence between the rosters and the payslips, the officers decided the rosters were not sufficient to establish that the staff member had been working in excess of their permitted times. In R’s case, there was not even a payslip. Accordingly, even without contradictory evidence, the respondent did not appear confident that the rosters alone were sufficiently reliable to support further enforcement measures. That means that the respondent placed significant weight upon the applicant’s admissions when deciding there was sufficient evidence to cancel her leave.

70. Turning briefly to the post-decision evidence. The applicant’s payslips cover the period March to June 2026. Two of them show that she worked 80 hours over the period covered by the payslip and the remaining two say 100 hours each. Mr Tramboo accepted that alone, they are not sufficient to prove the appellant worked in excess of the weekly limit. As mentioned, UU produced similar payslips also showing either 80 or 100 hours worked, yet a decision was made that there was insufficient evidence to proceed with enforcement. There is no reason to think that these payslips could not have been accessed with relative ease by the applicant following the enforcement visit. Indeed, she sent them to the respondent with her PAP letter on 9 July 2026.

71. The evidence from the applicant’s university stating that she had, in fact, been attending her course placements and that her attendance is not recorded on the App was not challenged. Of course it was not before the decision maker but it supports what the applicant is recorded as having told IO Ahmed (see [56(d)] above). That the applicant managed to secure the evidence in time to send it to the respondent on 9 July 2026 demonstrates that it would have been fairly easily obtainable should the officers have wanted to verify what they were told about the applicant being a genuine student. In fact, the applicant now realises it was available on her phone on the day.

72. The remaining evidence is a letter from the applicant’s university dated 29 July 2026 and which relates to her health. It confirms that since the enforcement visit she has had suicidal ideation and distress on 10 and 14 July 2026 and that at the visit she felt “highly pressured”. This offers some support for the impact on the applicant of the visit and it is also capable of illuminating the likelihood of the applicant’s presentation during the enforcement visit being as she and Mr Sheikh described.

73. I accept Mr Tramboo’s submission that none of the above evidence is determinative or probative of the hours that the applicant worked at Pepes. However, I am satisfied that the evidence corroborates much of the information the applicant was recorded as mentioning in the interview. It also demonstrates that the applicant was in possession of very similar evidence to UU and which were found acceptable to the CIO.

Conclusions

74. Having considered carefully the process employed throughout the enforcement visit, in particular during the interviews with the applicant, and having considered the reliability of the enforcement report, I have decided that the admissions are not reliable, in part because I do not find the enforcement record reliable and, in part because of the process surrounding the events of 29 and 30 June 2026 and which gave rise to the admissions relied upon. I have arrived at this decision for the following reasons.

75. Firstly, in my judgment, the enforcement report is not a chronological or verbatim record of the respondent’s interactions with the applicant. I rely in part on what I have said about obvious things which are missing from the enforcement report such as reference to the search of the applicant’s phone; the lack of record to who else was present in the interviews. I think it is more likely that the introductory questions about the applicant’s employment took place before the interview about the rosters, as the applicant said in her witness statements. That is the logical order of questioning and would accord with the type of questioning process advocated in the guidance. That the timing says otherwise in the enforcement report calls into question its accuracy. Even if I am wrong about that and the chronology in the enforcement report is correct, that is just as concerning given the nature of the questioning so near the start of the interview as discussed at [61] above. All of this reduces the weight to attach to the enforcement report. That weight is further reduced because where there are anomalies or aspects of the report which would benefit from further explanation (as there clearly are), the respondent has failed to provide evidence to explain the context or content of the enforcement report.

76. Secondly, on its face, the enforcement report discloses a procedural irregularity regarding the timing of the cancellation decision, the issuing of the cancellation decision letter, and the issue Notice of Liability (see [54] above), all of which appear to have been undertaken before the CIO authorised the decision to cancel the applicant’s leave. If that is right, that is strong evidence that the decision to cancel the applicant’s leave was undertaken outside the proper process. It is notable that it is not IO Ahmed that seeks to explain the reasons for the cancellation decision, it is CIO MacFarlane. If the decision was in fact permissibly made by IO Ahmed, then I would expect there to be a contemporaneous record from him as to the reasons. There is not. The only one in the enforcement report is from CIO MacFarlane who, by virtue of his referral to her, is the person to whom IO Ahmed deferred.

77. Thirdly, there is good evidence that the applicant was distressed throughout the interview, yet there is no reference to that in the enforcement report nor any notification of those matters to the CIO, contrary to the guidance. The evidence which speaks of her distress comes from the applicant, Mr Sheikh and is corroborated by the CCTV stills. None of that evidence was the subject of any challenge or submissions before me. In my judgment that infects the reliability of the enforcement report (and the content therein) as evidence which justifies the cancellation decision. The guidance puts the onus on the respondent’s officers to ensure that a person’s individual characteristics are considered. Here, the applicant is a female. All the officers encountering her appear to have been male (based on the names in the enforcement report and the CCTV stills). That does not mean to say that she needed to be interviewed by females – there is nothing to say that in the guidance. However, consideration of her gender and how she might feel to be surrounded by men in the way seen in the CCTV stills is not something captured in the enforcement report as being in the mind of IO Ahmed. Furthermore, there is evidence from both the applicant and Mr Sheikh as to her distress and that this was picked up by at least one of the officers (see [56(c) above). That is another characteristic which, according to the guidance should have been considered, when thinking about how the interview should proceed. In my judgement the arrangements for the interview were unfair. The placement of the officers, the positioning of the applicant and the number of people in the room were all factors which are capable of putting the applicant under a great deal of pressure. In those circumstances, that calls into question the reliability of the answers she gave, particularly when those answers appear, on their face, to be contrary to a position which the applicant now maintains to be the case and where there is some evidence to support that (her payslips).

78. Fourthly, the section of the interview containing the admissions is particularly unreliable. For the reasons I give at [61]-[67] above, there is confusion both about what exactly the appellant was being asked about and how they were asked. This results in a lack of clarity as to exactly what the applicant ‘admitted’. The ‘fifth’ question she was asked and the answer she gave in fact says no more than she has worked more than 20 hours. It is not an admission that she worked more than 20 hours per week. The answer she gave in response to the rosters is flawed in its premise. I say that partly because it is the applicant’s case that the rosters were in fact availability sheets (and there is support for this from what Mr Sheikh and UU said). In her distressed state, I find there to be enough uncertainty about what she thought she was admitting to make her answers here unreliable. Furthermore, given that two rosters were shown covering partly the same period, there is a tension in the rosters which IO Ahmed did not follow up. Accordingly, there is a further lack of clarity about what the applicant was admitting. I find this approach to disclose a lack of the sort of care which would be required in the event of an early ‘admission of guilt’ applying [48] of Mamun Ahmed. In the next section which the applicant has signed, there is no declaration as to the accuracy of her answers or what she is signing to say. That is to be contrasted with elsewhere in the report. That omission, coupled with her evidence that her answers were not shown or read to her, is sufficient to disclose doubt about whether she was in fact aware of what answers had been recorded. By the time of this interview, she had been arrested and so it is likely (and this was Mr Raza’s position at the hearing, which Mr Tramboo did not take any issue with) that this was an investigative interview and not exploratory questioning. The enforcement report does not readily identify the type of interviews being carried out. Accordingly, applying the guidance, the applicant should have been required to confirm the accuracy of her answers. I do not find the respondent’s position that her answers, read as a whole, show that the applicant was able to engage in the interview and rebut some things IO Ahmed put to her, to be sufficient to displace the grave concerns I have about the content of this interview and/or the accuracy of what is recorded about it.

79. Fifthly, in my judgement, whilst the cancellation decision letter does not reference the applicant’s nil attendance on the App, CIO MacFarlane’s reasoning does refer to it. My reading of her decision was that there were three underlying reasons for finding the applicant to be in breach of her visa: her admissions; the rosters, and the nil attendance on the App. I have already explained why, in other circumstances, CIO MacFarlane did not treat the rosters themselves as sufficient evidence. To the extent she relied on the display of nil attendance on the App, I find that also to reveal a failure to pursue with any care early identified evidence that the applicant may have breached the terms of her visa. Even on the face of the enforcement report, the applicant gave a reason why her attendance was not to be found on the App. There was no follow up questions about that to try to elicit the true position. If CIO MacFarlane had not mentioned it, it may have been the applicant’s answers were treated as satisfactory and that was not a factor relied upon. But she did mention it. That reasoning did not make its way into the cancellation decision letter. As revealed above, that letter was served before the authorisation decision was made. Even if the respondent’s position had been (which it was not) that the authorisation was retrospective, the problem is that it may be CIO MacFarlane’s authorisation was conditional upon the existence of all three factors mentioned, not on any one or two alone. In my judgment, it was not open to the respondent to rely on the nil attendance on the App when the applicant’s explanation for why that was so was not explored in anything like the sort of detail as would be required to amount to a fair opportunity to answer the implied accusation that she was not a genuine student. That is particularly so in light of the gravity of such a finding and the consequences for the applicant of her leave being curtailed.

80. For a combination of all these reasons I find the respondent’s decision that the applicant breached her visa to be procedurally unfair. The gravity of having been found to have breached the conditions of her permission to stay is cancellation of her leave and immediate exposure to the hostile environment. Such a consequence underlines the importance of providing the applicant with a fair opportunity to understand what she was being accused of and the case against her and to enable her to answer that. In my judgment, for the reasons I have given, she was not afforded such an opportunity.

81. In light of the above, it is not strictly necessary for me to consider procedural fairness in the context of the exercise of discretion. However, I will add this. The decision to cancel is discretionary. It does not mandate that it has to take place immediately, or if it does, it does not have to have immediate effect. Accordingly, there are a number of options available to the respondent.

82. I accept there is support in the authorities for a swift cancellation decision with immediate effect in some situations like this, for example at [65] of Kanwal. However, therein Freedman J also said the following about why it was justified in that case:

“The Defendant was not obliged to give to the Claimant some further opportunity before the immediate enforcement action and taking a decision to curtail her leave. There was no reason to believe at that time that she needed the time and opportunity to obtain and submit documentary evidence (for example, her company’s contracts with, and its invoices to, the Hotel and evidence from witnesses (for example, Mr Mussadiq)…”

83. By contrast, in the instant case I do find there to be factors which call into question whether the respondent was entitled to cancel the applicant’s leave when she did and to do so with immediate effect. I say that for the following reasons.

84. Firstly, as mentioned at [79] above, CIO MacFarlane placed weight on the App showing nil attendance. That indicates a view that the applicant was not studying as she was supposed to in accordance with her visa. The applicant had explained that proof she was in fact studying could be found elsewhere. Fairness required she be given a chance to demonstrate that in order to correct what could be characterised as a pre-determined or erroneous belief that she was not, in fact, a student at all.

85. Secondly, with reference to the other students, the immigration officers accepted alternative evidence (in the case of UU) or denials (in the case of R) as outweighing the ‘evidence’ of work in the rosters. Providing the applicant with a chance to submit some evidence of her actual working hours would have clarified some of the ambiguities in the answers she gave (present even on the respondent’s case taken at its highest) and to ensure that the applicant had had a fair opportunity to answer the case against her and, if cancellation was still justified, that it was taken on the basis of a sound evidential footing.

86. Thirdly, the difficulty the applicant had in explaining the true position after the enforcement visit (through the PAP letter) is exactly the sort of problem contemplated at [60] of Balajigari (see [13] above) and reveals the need for a fair investigation of the facts before a decision is made.

87. For these reasons the respondent’s exercise of her discretion to cancel the applicant’s leave, and to do so with immediate effect, was procedurally unfair. It is not rectified by the fact she was given an opportunity to comment on the possibility of her leave being cancelled. On its own that was not sufficient. On the facts of this case, fairness required the applicant to have the opportunity to answer the suspicion that she was not a genuine student and to show what her actual hours of work were. In my judgment, that was required even in light of the ‘admissions’ she made. These were not unequivocal admissions which were capable of being readily understood. On the respondent’s case at its highest it is not clear exactly what the applicant was admitting to. The exercise of discretion needs to consider what the breach was and then decide if that justifies cancellation. On that point, I cannot agree with Mr Tramboo that this was a serious breach which justified immediate cancellation. Apart from the fact that was not a reason given by CIO MacFarlane to explain why she had exercised discretion to cancel, the specific facts of the breach are simply not identifiable from the decision, or indeed the enforcement report.

88. Given my conclusions on the procedural fairness grounds, it is not necessary for me to deal with ground 1 in any detail. Suffice to say, in light of everything I have said so far, the impugned decision was not one rationally open to the respondent. Furthermore, the reasons the respondent gave for finding the applicant to have breached the conditions of her visa and to have exercised her discretion to cancel the applicant’s leave with immediate effect were not ones which adequately explain the decision or were rationally open to her.

Summary of Conclusions on the Grounds of Review

89. For the foregoing reasons, the appellant succeeds on all three of the grounds advanced.

Remedy

90. Accordingly, having succeeded on all grounds, I find the applicant entitled to the remedy sought, namely the quashing of the cancellation decision of 29 June 2026.

91. The parties are to draw up an order reflecting my decision and dealing with any ancillary matters.

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