Tribunal decisions

The decision

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: PA/00214/2015

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Manchester Piccadilly
Decision and Reasons Promulgated
On 27 March 2017
On 30 March 2017

Before
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BIRRELL

Between
JABA REVAZISHVILI
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION NOT MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr R Ahmed instructed by Riaz Kahn and Co Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mrs Petterson Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. I have considered whether any parties require the protection of an anonymity direction. No anonymity direction was made previously in respect of this Appellant. Having considered all the circumstances and evidence I do not consider it necessary to make an anonymity direction.
2. The Appellant was born on 27 September 1985 and is a national of Georgia.
3. In order to avoid confusion, the parties are referred to as they were in the First-tier Tribunal.
4. This is an appeal by the Appellant against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Wedderspoon promulgated on 8 August 2016 which dismissed the Appellant’s appeal against the decision of the Respondent dated 21 May 2015 to refuse a protection claim based on imputed political opinions.
5. The refusal letter gave a number of reasons:
(a) It was not accepted that the Appellant had been threatened by his boss because he refused to involve himself in corrupt practices because of inconsistencies in his account as to when the problems arose.
(b) The claim that the Appellant was in fear for his life was undermined by the fact that the Appellant did not leave Georgia until a month after his visa to the UK had been granted.
(c) The account f the nature of the corrupt practices was inconsistent as between his interviews.
(d) The issue of references from the person the Appellant claimed was threatening him was incredible.
(e) The fact that the Appellants wife also obtained a reference from her employer was more consistent with seeking employment elsewhere than fleeing in fear for their lives.
(f) The dates given for being beaten up were discrepant.
(g) The Appellants credibility was undermined by his failure to claim asylum in a safe country en route to the UK.
(h) The details of the Appellants previous travel history as shown in the visa application was inconsistent with that given in the asylum interview.
(i) There is sufficiency of protection from the state.
(j) The Appellant could relocate.
The Judge’s Decision
6. The Appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal. First-tier Tribunal Judge Wedderspoon (“the Judge”) dismissed the appeal against the Respondent’s decision.
7. Grounds of appeal were lodged which argued that the Judges adverse credibility findings were not justified by the evidence that she had before her in relation to the issuing of the work references and in relation to the application made for visit visas. It was also argued that the Judges findings in relation to the childrens best interests wereinadequate.
8. On 20 September 2016 Designated Judge Woodcraft refused permission to appeal and the application was renewed.
9. Upper Tribunal Judge Plimmer gave permission to appeal in relation limited only to the credibility findings .
10. At the hearing I heard submissions from Mr Ahmed on behalf of the Appellant that :
(a) He relied on the grounds of appeal.
(b) The Judge made an adverse finding against the Appellant because he did not disclose or hint in his visa application that he had no intention of returning to Georgia. The Judge should have taken a sensible approach : the Appellant needed to leave Georgia and needed a visa to do it – had he told the ECO he had no intention of returning he would not have been granted an adjournment.
(c) The Judge failed to consider the delay in leaving was because the agent did not release the Appellants passport for a month.
11. On behalf of the Respondent Mrs Petterson submitted that:
(a) The decision must be read as a whole.
(b) The Judge made a number of credibility findings about the core of the Appellants account, the medical evidence, inconsistencies in the screening interview and the failure to claim en route and he was entitled to place what weight she chose on those findings.
(c) It was incredible that the Appellant got a reference from the man he claimed was persecuting him.
(d) The grounds are a mere disagreement with the reasons given.
12. In reply Mr Ahmed on behalf of the Appellant submitted that the error in paragraph 43 infected the whole decision.
The Law
13. Errors of legislative interpretation, failure to follow binding authority or to distinguish it with adequate reasons, ignoring material considerations by taking into account immaterial considerations, reaching irrational conclusions on facts or evaluation or giving legally inadequate reasons for the decision and procedural unfairness, constitute errors of law.
14. It is not an arguable error of law for an Immigration Judge to give too little weight or too much weight to a factor, unless irrationality is alleged. Nor is it an error of law for an Immigration Judge to fail to deal with every factual issue under argument. Disagreement with an Immigrations Judge’s factual conclusions, his appraisal of the evidence or assessment of credibility, or his evaluation of risk does not give rise to an error of law. Rationality is a very high threshold and a conclusion is not irrational just because some alternative explanation has been rejected or can be said to be possible. Nor is it necessary to consider every possible alternative inference consistent with truthfulness because an Immigration judge concludes that the story told is untrue.
15. In relation to challenging credibility findings in Mibanga v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 367 Buxton LJ said this:
“Where, as in this case, complaint is made of the reasoning of an adjudicator in respect of a question of fact (that is to say credibility), particular care is necessary to ensure that the criticism is as to the fundamental approach of the adjudicator, and does not merely reflect a feeling on the part of the appellate tribunal that it might itself have taken a different view of the matter from that that appealed to the adjudicator.”
16. I remind myself also of the helpful remarks in VW(Sri Lanka) v SSHD Case C5/2012/ 3037 where Lord Justice McCombe quoted with approval the comments of Lord Hoffmann in Biogen Inc v Medeva Ltd 1997 RPC 1 that
"the need for appellate caution in reversing the trial judge's evaluation of the facts is based upon much more solid grounds than professional courtesy. It is because specific findings of fact, even by the most meticulous judge, are inherently an incomplete statement of the impression which was made upon him by the primary evidence. His expressed findings are always surrounded by a penumbra of imprecision as to emphasis, relative weight, minor qualification and nuance… Of which time and language do not permit exact expression, but which may play an important part in the judge's overall evaluation".
Lord Justice McCombe went on to say that
"regrettably there is an increasing tendency in immigration cases, when a first tier tribunal judge has given a judgement explaining why he has reached a particular decision, of seeking to burrow out industriously areas of evidence that have been less fully dealt with than others and then to use this as a basis for saying the judge's decision is legally flawed because it did not deal with the particular matter more fully. In my judgement, with respect, that is no basis on which to sustain a proper challenge to a judge's findings of fact."
Finding on Material Error
17. Having heard those submissions, I reached the conclusion that the Tribunal made no material errors of law.
18. The grounds challenge two of the adverse cerdibility findings made by the Judge arising out of the fact that the Appellant obtained a reference from his persecutor which he used to obtain a visit visa, that he gave no hint of his intention not to return in his visit visa and that he delayed his flight from Georgia arguing that the conclusions reached by the Judge were not justified by the evidence.
19. I am satisfied that firstly that the decision must be read fairly and as a whole. Therefore I note that those findings that are challenged relate to some, but not all, of the adverse credibility findings made by the Judge. I do not accept that there is anything in the way that the Judge reached those findings that are challenged that shows a fundamental failure in her approach and would therefore suggest those other findings were ‘infected.’
20. Thus the Judge made a number of clear and well-reasoned findings that went to the core of the Appellants case. She found at paragraph 44 that the Appellant gave inconsistent accounts in the Screening Interview as to when these problems began and in his asylum interview and the medical evidence as to when the assault occurred. She was entitled to conclude (paragraph 41) that having claimed that his boss GG pressured and threatened him and was behind an assault that took place at his home it was incredible that he gave evidence before her that he informed that same person about the problems he was having. She also found it incredible that given his claim that he could not seek the protection of the authorities who were corrupt (paragraph 20) this complaint was made in front of a secret service agent but no action was taken against him. She was entitled to conclude in those circumstances that the authorities had no interest in him. The Judge also found at paragraph 42 that the medical evidence he produced to show that he had been assaulted did not support that claim as it recorded his complaint of an ‘fight.’ She also noted at paragraph 45 that his credibility was undermined by his failure to claim asylum in Germany.
21. It is against this background of soundly reasoned findings that the impugned findings are made. The Judge heard evidence from the Appellant, his explnantions. in relation to the references, the visit visa and when he left Georgia. In relation to the refences the Judge heard the Appellants evidence that the Appellant told his boss that he needed the reference for a loan not for a visit visa and found that the obtaining of such references was more consistent with economic migrants needing them for future employment rather than fleeing for their life. I am satisfied that given his claim of repeated problems with his boss at work and where he attributed a beating to his boss that the Judge was entitled to conclude that going to that person for a reference even for a loan was incredible and that another motive was behind the provision of the document.
22. The Judge found the delay between obtaining a visa and fleeing from Georgia was inconsistent with being in fear for their life and I am satisfied this was a conclusion that was open to her: while the Appellant in evidence ‘blamed’ the agent for failing to release his passport, it was incredible that the urgency of this matter was not conveyed to the agent and that no explanation was given as to why the agent held onto the passports in this way.
23. I accept that the adverse finding in paragraph 43 that the Appellant gave no hint of the intention not to return to Georgia in the visit visa was not one that was open to her as clearly had such a decision been hinted at it was unlikely that he would have obtained a visa as he had to show an intention to return. However in the light of the other credibility findings which are well reasoned I am satisfied that this error could have made no material outcome to the case.
24. I also note that having rejected the Appellants account of his work problems that she considered his case on the basis that he had been threatened at work but having concluded that the state had no interest in him she was satisfied that the Appellant could relocate. This finding was not challenged and therefore any error in relation to the obtaining of the visit visa could not have made a material difference to the outcome of the case on that basis also.
CONCLUSION
25. I therefore found that no errors of law have been established and that the Judge’s determination should stand.

DECISION
26. The appeal is dismissed.

Signed Date 28.3.2017
Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Birrell