Tribunal decisions

The decision

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: PA/00328/2016

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Glasgow
Decision & Reasons promulgated
on 31 January 2017
on 15 February 2017

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MACLEMAN

Between

K A
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

For the Appellant: Ms H Cosgrove, of Latta & Co, Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mrs M O'Brien, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

DETERMINATION AND REASONS

1. The appellant appeals against a determination by First-tier Tribunal Judge Farrelly, dismissing his appeal against refusal of protection.
2. In summary, the grounds are as follows.
I. At paragraph 26 the judge said,
"Having considered the account it is very bald. It is my conclusion that it is not genuine and the appellant has latched onto a type of claim but not told a very convincing story".
The judge erred by failing to give reasons for his assessment of credibility, which was central to the case, and it is not clear how he reached his decision.
II. At paragraph 27 the judge said,
"I did not find the evidence of Mr RD advanced the claim. I accept that he is Kurdish and involved with promoting Kurdish rights in the UK. His British passport shows that he was born? in Kurdistan. He acknowledged that enquiries about the appellant had not yet been completed. I appreciate that he has travelled to attend the appeal hearing and shown support for the appellant. I believe most likely this is due to their being fellow Kurds and an interest in Kurdish rights."
The judge failed to take account of all the evidence before him. Evidence was submitted to confirm Mr RD's position in the UK branch of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran, as executive secretary. Further, a letter was provided from? the chairman of the branch in the UK.
Judge should set out with some clarity what evidence was accepted, what rejected, on what evidence no conclusion could be reached and what evidence was irrelevant? The tribunal ? has not made it clear what weight, if any, is attributed to the positions of the witnesses within the party as there is been a failure to provide clear reasoning.
III. At paragraph 27 the judge said,
"The photographs show the appellant taking part in a demonstration in Glasgow. This does not appear to be a particular large gathering. He also claims some Facebook activity. I believe this is an attempt? to enhance his claim? unlikely to give a raised profile on return."
The judge failed to properly consider the evidence before him. It was submitted? that the appellant attended demonstrations in both Glasgow and London and features on the KDPI Facebook page (not the appellant's own Facebook) ? The photographs contain a picture of the appellant burning a photograph of the supreme leader of Iran ? objective evidence before the judge ? supports the position that the Iranian authorities react disproportionately to those perceived to be involved in Kurdish political activities. Particular reference is made to page 30, second bundle ? there is "no tolerance on the Iranian regime's side for any kind of activities with connection to the Kurdish political parties and any affiliation with one of those parties would be reason for arrest" ? therefore? whether the demonstration is small or large? the action of speaking out in support of Kurdish political parties ? puts the appellant at risk of persecution upon return.
3. On 1 December 2016 a FtT judge granted permission, on the view that the judge arguably failed to give adequate reasons for the finding at paragraph 26.
Rule 24 response.
4. The judge provided adequate reasons and a comprehensive decision, finding that the account lacks lacked detail which was to be expected should it be genuine; credibility was an assessment for the tribunal to make; the judge was alert to the evidence of RD, but it did not take the appellant much further, given the limited time he had known the appellant and the appellant's limited involvement in the organisation. The judge did refer to the demonstrations in London and Glasgow and to the Facebook entries. Given that the social media entries were not on the appellant's page, this would not be identified on removal. It was open to the tribunal to conclude that the appellant was not a genuine activist and would not be identified as a political dissident.
Submissions for appellant.
5. Ground 1. A claim might be baldly stated, yet still be accepted. It was unclear why the claim was said to be a bald one. No inconsistencies were identified in it. The hearing had not been short, but had included quite extensive cross-examination, although not narrated in the decision (it was accepted there is no general obligation to narrate oral evidence). Ground 2. The judge failed to consider the position of the witness in the KDPI. That had been supported by written evidence in the bundle. It was unclear why the judge said this evidence was motivated simply by their being fellow Kurds with an interest in Kurdish rights. Ground 3. This should be amended to read that the evidence did not appear only on the appellant's own Facebook page. The judge engaged in a sparse consideration of the information provided about demonstrations and social media activities. Case law showed that activity in the UK might be of considerable significance. There could be a risk arising from perceived links to Kurdish opposition parties. The case should be remitted to the FtT.
Submissions for respondent.
6. The respondent's rejection of the account had also been based to a significant extent on vagueness and lack of detail. That was the thread of the submissions made in the first-tier tribunal and a legitimate theme of the decision. It was clear from paragraph 11 of the decision that the judge was well aware of the position of the witness in the party. Enquiries made by the party had not produced any result. The judge was entitled to find that the evidence did not significantly advance the claim. Without some background checking by the party, this could not add up to more than a level of fellow feeling. The judge was also correct in saying that there would be nothing likely to connect the appellant with any internet material so as to flag him up as an activist on return. It was not credible that he was genuinely such an activist, so that aspect of the claim fell away. The judge had not gone wrong in finding that the appellant failed to establish his case even to the lower standard of proof.
Reply for appellant.
7. The appellant was criticised for not having gone into detail, but reference to the interview would show that he answered the questions put to him. It was unfair to base criticism on not expanding upon matters when they were not explored. The judge had not taken into account the view of the witness that the appellant was a genuine supporter of the party.
Conclusions.
8. The specificity of reasoning required varies by the nature of the case. Some cases merit rigorous and detailed analysis. In others, the evidence is so vague or sparse that it is not susceptible to much more than generalisation. This case is of the latter type.
9. The refusal letter at paragraphs 14 to 21 sets out the appellant's allegations about involvement with the KDPI in Iran, delivery of literature, and being caught in an ambush. It validates its observations of vagueness, lack of detail and inconsistency. That is the case the appellant had to meet at the hearing. The judge was entitled to find that he failed to do so. The appellant complains of shortage of reasoning, but he insists without showing that he had dealt with the criticisms of his account, or put forward anything of substance which the judge has overlooked.
10. The judge observed at paragraph 22 that information given was "all basic"; at paragraph 23 that the appellant gave very little detail about how he became involved in the Kurdish issue or in smuggling; and at paragraph 24 that although he claimed he kept an incriminating CD hidden at home his answer to what was on it was, "I don't know, probably party stuff". In context, these observations are sufficient to justify the finding that the account is very bald, not genuine, and that the appellant has only latched on to a basic scenario consistent with a commonly encountered type of claim (see also paragraph 20).
11. The witness RD and the party had no knowledge derived from checks on the appellant's background and history. The ground says there has been a failure to say what the evidence is worth, but it has been accepted at the face value tendered, with no adverse comment on the integrity of the witness or his standing in the party. Plainly the judge was entitled to take this aspect of the evidence as only a manifestation of fellow Kurdish feeling; it is not shown that it could logically take the appellant any further than that.
12. The judge held that the appellant failed to show any involvement in demonstrations or on the internet giving him such a profile as might realistically lead to the authorities suspecting him on return to Iran. The appellant points to no evidence which might sensibly have rendered up another conclusion; again, he simply did not prove his case.
13. The decision tells the appellant clearly why his case has failed. The judge was entitled to find this a feeble account, not probative even to the lower standard, a finding which by the standards of legal adequacy of reasoning required no further elaboration, and indeed on which further meaningful elaboration would scarcely be possible.
14. The determination of the First-tier Tribunal shall stand.
Anonymity.
15. A direction was made in the FtT. The matter was not addressed in the UT, so anonymity has been preserved in this decision.

14 February 2017
Upper Tribunal Judge Macleman