Tribunal decisions

The decision

IAC-FH-CK-V2

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: PA/00819/2015

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Newport Immigration and Asylum Centre
Decision & Reasons Promulgated
On 27 June 2016
On 01 August 2016
Prepared 27 June 2016

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE DAVEY

Between

S K
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr J Edwards, Adam - Khattak Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr M Diwnycz, Senior Presenting Officer

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The Appellant, a national of Pakistan, date of birth [ ] 1966, appealed against a decision [D] of First-tier Tribunal Judge Y J Jones, who on 7 January 2016 dismissed the appeal against the Respondent's decision dated 18 August 2015 to refuse an asylum, Humanitarian Protection, and human rights claim to remain.

2. When the matter came before the judge, she heard a range of evidence concerning amongst other things the fear of ill-treatment held by the Appellant and the availability of internal relocation and the sufficiency of protection to which the Appellant could have recourse. At its heart the judge rejected the Appellant's credibility taking the view and expressed as such that the Appellant was simply an economic migrant. Permission to appeal that decision was given by a First-tier Tribunal Judge in January 2016. .

3. The Appellant's credibility was substantially challenged by three particular points although there were other aspects in which her claim was not wholly accepted. First, [D 56] the judge found a difference in accounts as undermining the Appellant's credibility. I have to say that the difference lit upon is a difference without any significance and it is hard to see, in the reasoning disclosed; why that should o against the Appellant's credibility. I bear in mind, as it appears the judge did not, the low standard of proof to be applied in asylum cases.

4. The second discrepancy, set out by the judge at [D 16], was a difference in recollection as to the date when she, that is the Appellant, became a head teacher. The difference between whether she was appointed a head teacher on 10 December 2014 to take up the post a week to ten days later really adds very little to the matter. I cannot see how that discrepancy on a rational basis could form a proper way to assess credibility rather than looking at the evidence as a whole.

5. The third criticism of the Appellant's claim was her inability to provide independent evidence of a particular attack, which she had given evidence about, and/or her husband's inability to obtain independent evidence to confirm her claim.

6. It is said by the Appellant that had the judge put her mind to it she would have taken into account that there was no willing informant as to the circumstances of the attack and it was not as widely reported as other attacks had been. It seems to me again once the judge had made up her mind to reject the claim this criticism is very superficial and appears to be again unreasoned.

7. Accordingly I find the inadequate reasons for the adverse findings on the Appellant's credibility significantly undermine the overall assessment of risk on return and the extent to which the Appellant had indicated that she was concerned of risk to herself. To some extent there is a clear point to be made by reference to the case of Bagdanavicius [2003] EWCA Civ 1605, reported [2004] 1 WLR 1207 at paragraph 55 where there is a familiar recitation of the essential elements of an asylum claim but in particular the effectiveness of a system of protection is to be judged by the systemic ability to deter or prevent persecution of which there is a risk.

8. It was not an issue that teachers in particular parts of Pakistan were facing risks and the government was contemplating providing firearms training and firearms permits to be issued to teachers who wanted protection. Whether or not it is really sufficient protection for the State to arm the individual teachers is perhaps not a matter that the judge was ever in a position to resolve but it seemed to me that absent of a level of police protection for schools it was hard to see how arming teachers was ever going to be a protection from attacks upon them. Nevertheless I do not find that that was an issue which was determinative of the matter. Rather parties to a decision are entitled to expect adequately and sufficiently reasoned findings. In the circumstances I do not find that the judge provided those reasons not least in the context of the background evidence with which the judge had been provided.

9. Accordingly it is with considerable reluctance that I interfere with the judge's decision and findings of fact but it appears to me that the wrong standard of proof was actually being applied to that which was said to be applied and there was a lack of adequate reasons. Accordingly I am satisfied that the Original Tribunal decision cannot stand.

10. Mr Edwards submits that without the credibility findings much of the Appellant's case has never been subject to findings of fact. In the circumstances he seeks this matter to be remade in the First-tier Tribunal.

11. In the light of the President's direction I am content that this is just about an appropriate case for it to be remade and no findings of fact stand.

NOTICE OF DECISION

The appeal is allowed to the extent the decision returned to the First-tier Tribunal on all grounds.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR LISTING

(1) Return to the First-tier Tribunal.

(2) List for hearing two hours.

(3) Not before First-tier Tribunal Judge Y J Jones.

(4) Interpreter required in Urdu.

(5) Any fresh evidence to be served not later than ten working days before the resumed hearing in the First-tier Tribunal.

(6) Issues on remaking: grounds previously argued unless the Tribunal is otherwise informed.

(7) If any witnesses are to be called other than the Appellant notice should be given to the Respondent including particulars of the witness' nationality and/or identity document relied upon not later than ten working days before the date of the resumed hearing.

ANONYMITY ORDER

An anonymity order is appropriate in the circumstances of the case, not least when one was previously made but also because of the issues raised.

DIRECTION REGARDING ANONYMITY - RULE 14 OF THE TRIBUNAL PROCEDURE (UPPER TRIBUNAL) RULES 2008

Unless and until a Tribunal or court directs otherwise, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No report of these proceedings shall directly or indirectly identify her or any member of her family. This direction applies both to the Appellant and to the Respondent. Failure to comply with this direction could lead to contempt of court proceedings.

Signed Date 22 July 2016

Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Davey