The decision



Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: PA/01128/2016


THE IMMIGRATION ACTS


Heard at : IAC Birmingham
Decision and Reasons Promulgated
On : 4 April 2017
On: 6 April 2017



Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KEBEDE


Between

AO
(anonymity direction made)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT

Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Ms O Duru of Jemek Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr D Mills, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer


DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant appeals, with permission, against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dismissing his appeal against the respondent’s decision of 31 January 2016 to refuse his protection and human rights claim.

2. The appellant is a citizen of Ethiopia, born on 19 April 1997. He arrived in the UK on 14 September 2015, having left Ethiopia, he claimed, on 2 May 2015 and spent periods of time in Sudan and Libya before travelling to Italy and France. He claimed asylum on the day of arrival when served with illegal entry papers and was interviewed about his claim which was then refused on 31 January 2016.

3. The appellant appealed against that decision and his appeal was heard in the First-tier Tribunal on 6 July 2016 and was dismissed in a decision promulgated on 14 July 2016. Permission was granted in the Upper Tribunal on 15 November 2016.

The Appellant’s Case

4. The appellant is of Oromo ethnicity and claims to be at risk on return to Ethiopia because of his support for the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). His claim is that he became an active supporter of the OLF and joined a cell called the Freedom Cell, subsequent to the abduction of his father, a supporter of the OLF, on 15 March 2013. He claims to have participated in secret underground meetings, distributed leaflets and made financial contributions to the cause. On 28 April 2014 he attended a demonstration where he carried a banner. He ran to his grandmother’s house when the authorities started arresting people but was arrested by the authorities at his home on 29 July 2014. He was detained for five days in a police station and then transferred to prison where he was tortured. He was released on 30 September 2014 after signing an undertaking not to be involved in political activities and he returned home and continued his support for the OLF. In May 2015 he received a telephone call from his mother telling him that the authorities had been to this house looking for him. He called his uncle who then made arrangements for him to leave the country. He claimed to have been involved with the OLF since coming to the UK.

5. The respondent, in refusing the appellant’s claim, accepted that he was of Oromo ethnicity but did not accept that his father was abducted, that he was a supporter of the OLF and politically active, that he had been detained and released in Ethiopia or that he was politically active in the UK. On the basis that his account of his support for the OLF was not accepted and that it was not accepted that he was known to the Ethiopian authorities, the respondent did not accept that the appellant was at risk on return to Ethiopia as an Oromo. It was not accepted that his removal to Ethiopia would breach his human rights.

6. The appellant’s appeal against that decision was heard by First-tier Tribunal Judge Hawden-Beal. The judge heard from the appellant but did not find his account to be credible. The judge placed little weight upon a letter from Dr Berri, the Chairman of the OLF in the UK, in regard to his claimed activities in the UK and concluded that he was not an active supporter of the OLF, that he had no political profile with the Ethiopian authorities and that he would not be at risk on return to Ethiopia. She dismissed the appeal on all grounds.

7. The appellant sought permission to appeal Judge Hawden-Beal’s decision to the Upper Tribunal in relation to the judge’s adverse credibility findings and her findings on risk on return.

8. Permission to appeal was initially refused by the First-tier Tribunal, but was subsequently granted in the Upper Tribunal, primarily on the grounds of the judge’s assessment of the evidence in regard to the appellant’s involvement in pro-Oromo activities in the UK.

Appeal hearing and submissions

9. The appeal came before me on 4 April 2017. Both parties made submissions.

10. Ms Duru, in her submissions, referred to UNHCR guidance on the assessment of credibility. She submitted that the judge had erred in her credibility findings by placing weight on the appellant’s answers at interview without having regard to the clarification subsequently provided in the representations made in a letter dated 12 January 2016. She submitted that the judge had erred by making adverse plausibility findings based upon her own assessment of what the appellant should have done and failed to undertake a proper assessment of the evidence. As regards the appellant’s activities in the UK, the judge ought to have asked further questions to clarify matters about which she was concerned. She ought to have asked for the original photographs which were available and ought to have asked if pictures showing the appellant’s attendance at demonstrations had appeared on social media. Had she not made an error in her assessment of the appellant’s credibility, the judge ought to have allowed the appeal in line with the guidance in MB (OLF and MTA, risk) Ethiopia CG [2007] UKAIT 00030.

11. Mr Mills submitted that the written representations of 12 January 2016 had clearly been taken into account by the respondent, as the letter appeared in the respondent’s appeal bundle, and he could not see how the judge’s findings were undermined by anything in those representations. The judge had given numerous reasons for not finding the appellant’s account credible, including various discrepancies in his evidence. It was not for the judge to seek further evidence or clarification about the appellant’s claimed activities in the UK, as the burden of proof lay upon the appellant. The judge did all she could on the evidence before her, which did not include any claim that the appellant appeared in social media or that he had come to the attention of the Ethiopian authorities. She gave full consideration to the letter from Dr Berri which did not address the matter of whether the authorities were aware of the appellant’s activities. The question of risk did not apply if the appellant was not found to be credible.

12. In response Ms Durro reiterated the points previously made.

Consideration and findings.

13. Whilst the grounds and the submissions made by Ms Durro were lengthy, they were in essence little more than a disagreement with the judge’s adverse credibility findings and an attempt to provide further clarification of the appellant’s evidence to address the various discrepancies identified in the decision. However the judge was perfectly entitled to make the adverse credibility findings that she did and she provided full and cogent reasons for making those findings. Contrary to Ms Duru’s submission, the judge clearly took account of the written representations made in the appellant’s solicitor’s letter of 12 January 2016, referring to it either directly or indirectly at various points in her decision, including at [2], [9] and [26], and gave careful consideration to all the evidence and the appellant’s explanations for the changes in his accounts. Furthermore, as Mr Mills properly submitted, the suggestion made by Ms Duru that it was for the judge to seek further clarification and evidence, such as enquiring of the appellant whether his picture appeared on social media, completely ignored the fact that the burden of proof lay upon the appellant to make out his claim. It was for the appellant to present his claim in full together with supporting evidence, and not for the judge to seek out further explanations and evidence. On the evidence before her, the judge was perfectly entitled to reject the appellant’s claim as lacking in credibility and to reach the conclusions that she did in regard to his claimed activities in the UK. She was entitled to place the weight that she did on the letter from Dr Berri for the reasons cogently given in [28] and was entitled to conclude that there was no evidence demonstrating that the appellant had ever come to the attention of the Ethiopian authorities or that he had a profile that would give rise to any adverse interest.

14. The appellant’s grounds assert that the judge failed to apply the country guidance in MB and failed to take into account the appellant’s Oromo ethnicity. However, having rejected the appellant’s claim as regards his involvement with the OLF and having found him to have no political profile, the judge properly found that he would be at no risk on return to Ethiopia and such a conclusion was entirely consistent with the guidance in MB. The judge, at [29], considered the question of risk to the appellant on the sole basis of his Oromo ethnicity, but properly found that such a risk did not arise on that basis alone.

15. It seems to me, therefore, that the judge gave full and careful consideration to all the evidence and to all relevant matters, that she provided cogent reasons for making the findings that she did, and that she reached a conclusion that was fully and properly open to her on the evidence before her. For all of these reasons I conclude that the grounds of appeal do not disclose any errors of law in the First-tier Tribunal’s decision.

DECISION

16. The appellant’s appeal is accordingly dismissed. The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve an error on a point of law. I do not set aside the decision. The decision to dismiss the appellant’s appeal therefore stands.

Anonymity

The First-tier Tribunal made an order for anonymity. I maintain that order pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008.

Signed
Upper Tribunal Judge Kebede Dated: 5 April 2017