Tribunal decisions

The decision

IAC-FH-CK-V1

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: PA/01521/2016

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Field House
Decision & Reasons Promulgated
On 16 March 2017
On 28 March 2017

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RAMSHAW

Between

Mr Amir Irani
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION NOT MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr R Arkhurst, Counsel, instructed by Hasan Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr K Norton, Home Office Presenting Officer

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant is a citizen of Iran whose date of birth is given as 12 February 1990. The appellant entered the United Kingdom on 10 September 2015 and claimed asylum upon arrival. The respondent refused the appellant’s asylum and humanitarian protection claim on 28 January 2016. The respondent did not accept that the appellant had converted from Islam to Christianity in 2005. The appellant appealed against the respondent’s refusal of his claim to the First-tier Tribunal.
The appeal to the First-tier Tribunal
2. In a decision promulgated on 3 November 2016 First-tier Tribunal Judge Beg dismissed the appellant’s appeal. The judge did not accept that the appellant was a genuine convert to Christianity and was not, therefore, in need of international protection. The appellant did not rely upon an Article 8 right to private and family life.
The appeal to the Upper Tribunal
3. The appellant applied for permission to appeal against the First-tier Tribunal’s decision. On 9 December 2016 First-tier Tribunal Judge Parkes refused permission to appeal. The appellant renewed his application for permission to the Upper Tribunal and on 23 January 2017 Upper Tribunal Judge Finch granted the appellant permission to appeal.
4. The grounds of appeal assert that the First-tier Tribunal judge accepted the evidence of Canon Croft and Ms Hammett that the appellant attended church and had introduced others to the church. It was submitted that the judge failed to consider the appellant’s attendance at church under sur place activities, to consider whether it was likely that the appellant would return to Iran and continue his proselytising there.
5. It is submitted that the judge erred by failing to give consideration to the fact that the appellant is a recent convert to Christianity and could not be expected to know everything in relation to the Gospels.
6. In oral submissions Mr Arkhurst submitted that at paragraph 29 of the decision it is clear that too much weight has been given by the judge to the failure of the appellant to answer some questions correctly. The judge had failed to take into consideration that the appellant was a recent convert and as such would not be able to answer all the questions put to him. He referred to the UNHCR Guidelines on International Protection No 6: “Religion-Based Refugee Claims under Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention”. He submitted that the sole reasons that the judge found that the appellant was not a genuine convert was based on her finding that he was not able to answer all the questions correctly on the Gospels. It flowed from her finding that the appellant was not a genuine convert that she erred in law by failing to go on to consider the sur place activities.
7. Mr Norton submitted that the appellant’s knowledge of the Christian religion is intrinsically linked to the account he gave of fleeing persecution in Iran. The judge dismissed those aspects of the account of persecution/events in Iran because inconsistent accounts were given. He submitted that as a matter of fact the appellant has been attending churches in the United Kingdom and referred to paragraphs 39 and 40 where the judge set out in detail the witness evidence from Canon Croft and Angela Hammett. Although the appellant has attended church and participated in services this does not necessarily equate to a genuine conversion and neither does it confer any expert status on Canon Croft or Ms Hammett, who are both simply witnesses of events. It is for the judge to determine whether those events coupled with the other evidence demonstrate that the appellant is a genuine convert. The judge found that the appellant was not a genuine convert taking into account all the evidence including all the inconsistencies with regard to other aspects of the appellant’s account both of his time in Iran and in the United Kingdom.
8. He submitted that the judge was correct not to consider sur place activities or risk on return on that basis because the judge had found that the appellant was not a genuine convert. At paragraphs 40 and 41 the judge quite correctly considered risk on return on the basis of someone who left Iran illegally (even though we do not know how he left because he destroyed his travel documents). The judge was correct to find that he would not be at risk on return. He referred to the UK Home Office, “Country Policy and Information Note - Iran: Christians and Christian converts (February 2017)”, 27 February 2017 at section 8 and submitted that there would be no reason in this case for the Iranian authorities to know that the appellant had attended a church in the United Kingdom and therefore he would not be at risk on return to Iran.
9. Mr Arkhurst in response submitted that when considering whether there was a genuine conversion the most pertinent evidence was that of Canon Croft and Ms Hammett. He submitted that Ms Hammett gave evidence that the appellant had brought other people who were prospective converts. This was evidence that he was a genuine convert and not somebody wishing to circumvent the Immigration Rules.
Discussion
10. The judge in considering whether or not the appellant was a genuine convert to Christianity considered the evidence overall. In oral submissions it was asserted that ‘the sole reason that the judge found that the appellant was not a genuine convert was based on her finding that he was not able to answer all the questions correctly on the Gospels’ I have set out in full certain passages below which make it clear that there were many reasons for the judge’s findings. The judge considered the credibility of the evidence and set out a number of inconsistencies in the appellant’s evidence:
29. I find that the reasons that the appellant gave for converting from Islam to Christianity are quite vague. I find that when the appellant was asked at question 90 of the asylum interview what aspects of the Bible brought positive change in him he stated ‘the birth of Jesus Christ. The way he was crucified. His kindness’. In the questions that followed regarding the Gospels of Matthew and John the appellant became confused with what the Gospels say. This is referred to at paragraph 25 of the respondent’s refusal letter. I find that when the appellant was asked about where Islam supports violence and killing at question 94 of the interview he stated ‘Surah Nisar’. At question 95 he stated that the Surah says a man can kill a woman. I find that the appellant was unable to state which context that was said in and where it is to be found in Surah Nisar which is one of the longest chapters of the Quran.
30. The appellant was asked between questions 51 and 62 of the substantive asylum interview about his friend Millad. I find that the appellant did not know when Millad converted to Christianity or indeed why he converted to Christianity. At question 61 of the interview the appellant was asked why he had not asked Millad out of curiosity when he became a Christian and the appellant answered ‘No. I asked him how long have you been a Christian, he did not answer me’. I do not find it credible that Millad did not tell him when and how he converted to Christianity given that it was Millad who brought him into Christianity by talking to him about the faith and taking him to the house church. Nor do I find it credible that the appellant would be drawn to converting to Christianity just because his dog was killed by security officers. At question 69 the appellant stated he took his dog to the park and the officers killed him. At question 67 of the interview he stated that he was depressed because of what had happened to his dog.
31. At the appeal hearing the appellant said that his cousin Ali Reza also converted to Christianity in the same period that he did in Iran. He said on a number of days they attended the same house church. Yet further in his evidence he said that he did not know who introduced Ali Reza to Christianity. I find that when it was put to the appellant that he must have an idea about who introduced Ali Reza to Christianity given that they attended the same house church and were extremely close friends and cousins the appellant then said that he believes 90% that he was introduced to Christianity by Millad. However he went on to state that Millad was his, that is, the appellant’s friend. He said both he and Ali Reza never met Millad together. I do not find the appellant a credible witness. I find that in light of the closeness of the appellant’s relationship to Ali Reza and given the appellant’s evidence that they met at least five days a week and were on extremely good terms, it is not credible that the appellant would not know who led Ali Reza to convert to Christianity. I find that if it was Millad who introduced him to Christianity, the appellant would have been absolutely sure of that and it is very likely that both of them at some stage would have spoken to Millad together given that they both converted to Christianity in the same period.
32. I find that the appellant made no reference in his substantive asylum interview to his cousin Ali Reza also converting to Christianity in the same period and attending the same house church. Yet in the screening interview at 4.2 the appellant mentioned that he travelled to the United Kingdom with his cousin Ali Reza and that they ‘changed religion together and attended the same house church’. However the appellant did not provide any credible explanation as to why he made no mention of his cousin converting to Christiantiy with him. I find that the appellant’s credibility is significantly damaged…
33. The appellant claimed in evidence that he did not know that his brother was in the United Kingdom when he arrived. I do not find that credible…
34. The appellant claimed that he did not know his brother had converted to Christianity until he saw him in the Oasis Church in Birmingham. He said he came to know then that his brother was a Christian. The appellant claimed that his relationship with his brother is only to say ‘hello’. He said that when he saw him in church he was happy that his brother had found the right path. I do not find it credible that the appellant would not have conversed at some length and depth with his brother about when he converted to Christianity and what led him to convert to Christianity… I find that despite the appellant’s claim that he did not know what status his brother had in the United Kingdom, he mentioned at 9.6 of the screening interview that he believes his brother has permanent residency in the United Kingdom. It is unclear what his belief is based upon.
35. The appellant claimed that on 30 August 2015 the house church that he attended in Iran was raided by the authorities and a number of the members of the congregation were arrested. The appellant claimed that as he was running late he saw from a distance that congregation members were being arrested and he therefore fled from the scene and went to a friend’s house. I find that if the appellant ran away from the vicinity of the house church without being detected by the authorities, then the authorities are not aware of the appellant attending the church or of his conversion. I do not find it credible that within a short period of time on the same day the appellant received a telephone call from his mother telling him that the authorities had raided the family house and that his Bible and laptop had been taken away. I find that that part of the appellant’s claim is completely unsupported either by documentary evidence or any other evidence.
37. At question 111 of the substantive asylum interview the appellant stated that he was arrested on one occasion in Iran. At question 112 he stated that this happened in July 2015. He was at home with his maternal uncle’s daughter and the authorities arrested him because they thought that he had had sexual relations with a girlfriend. In evidence the appellant said that he was detained for ten days before he was released without charge. I find that there is no corroborative evidence that the appellant was ever detained in Iran. I bear in mind that the appellant’s father is a military officer. In any event the appellant himself accepts that he was never charged with an offence. The authorities did not question him about his conversion from Islam to Christianity despite the fact that by the time he was arrested he had already converted to Islam. The authorities clearly were unaware of this.
38. The appellant relies upon a baptism certificate showing that he was baptised at the Oasis Church in Edgbaston, Birmingham on 11 October 2015. I find that there is no evidence of the appellant’s involvement in the church activities or any evangelical activities... I bear in mind that at the time of the appellant’s baptism Home Office records show that he was accommodated in Wakefield and this was between 15 September 2015 and 9 November 2015. I find that there is no credible explanation as to why the appellant chose a church in Birmingham for the baptism. I find that the only reason that the appellant could have chosen the church in Birmingham is because his brother was attending the same church. I do not find the appellant’s evidence credible as he was not on good terms with his brother and they only ever say ‘hello’ to each other…
41. I find that the appellant’s evidence is further damaged by Section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 because the appellant presented himself to the Border Force at Heathrow Airport without any documents to show where he had travelled from and he admitted that he had deliberately destroyed his boarding pass whilst on the flight to the United Kingdom. I do not find it credible that the appellant was ignorant of the route to the United Kingdom. I bear in mind that the appellant was linked with a flight that departed from Ciampino Airport in Rome. In considering the evidence as a whole and on the lower standard of proof I do not find the appellant a credible witness. I find that the appellant’s conversion from Islam to Christianity is not genuine. I find that in the substantive asylum interview the appellant did not give a credible account of why he converted to Christianity. I find that there was no reference to the appellant’s inner struggles or indeed to his study of the Christian faith before his conversion.
42. I find that in cross-examination the appellant mentioned the five pillars of Islam and went on to give some evidence about his knowledge and understanding of the principles of the Islamic faith into which he was born and yet he was not able to give significant details about the Christian faith into which he was not born but claims to have chosen. Moreover I find that the number of discrepancies in the appellant’s various accounts cast doubt upon his overall credibility. I find that the appellant was well aware that his brother was already in the United Kingdom when he arrived. I find that the appellant’s brother and his cousin Ali Reza jointly planned with the appellant to claim asylum on the basis of a conversion to Christianity…
11. At paragraphs 39 and 40 the judge set out and considered the evidence of Cannon Croft and Ms Hammett. The judge found “Whilst I find that the appellant attends The Holy Spirit Church, I find that that in itself is not determinative of whether the appellant has genuinely converted to Christianity.”
12. It is clear from the decision that the inability to answer certain questions about the Gospels and the Christian faith formed only a very small part of the judge’s assessment of the appellant’s credibility. The judge took into consideration the evidence of Cannon Croft and Ms Hammett. The inconsistencies in the appellant’s account were numerous. The judge set out in considerable detail, supported by references to specific evidence, why she found the appellant’s evidence was inconsistent, lacked credibility and why she was not satisfied that the claimed conversion to Christianity was genuine. The findings of the judge were ones that was open to her.
13. The judge considered at paragraph 43 the objective evidence regarding Christians in Iran. The judge concluded that there ‘is no credible evidence before me that the appellant is a genuine convert and he has proselytised or intends to do so on return’. On the basis that she did not consider the appellant to be a genuine convert, and in the absence of any evidence indicating that the Iranian authorities might be aware of his activities in the UK, the sur place activities were correctly not considered by the judge to give rise to a risk on return.
14. For the above reasons there is no material error of law in the First-tier Tribunal’s decision.

Notice of Decision

There was no error of law such that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal is set aside. The appellant’s appeal is dismissed. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal stands.

I have considered whether any parties require the protection of an anonymity direction. No anonymity direction was made previously. Having considered all the circumstances and evidence I do not consider it necessary to make an anonymity direction.

Signed P M Ramshaw Date 23 March 2017

Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Ramshaw