Tribunal decisions

The decision

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: PA/01586/2016

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Newport (Columbus House)
Decision & Reasons Promulgated
On 11 April 2017
On 27 April 2017

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE GRUBB

Between

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
and

L M
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADe)
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr D Mills, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
For the Respondent: Mr C McWatters instructed by Migrant Legal Project

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The anonymity order imposed in my decision sent on 19 January 2017 continues in force.
Background
2. LM (whom I shall refer to as “the claimant”) is a citizen of Albania who was born on 17 August 1991. She arrived in the United Kingdom on 23 November 2015 and claimed asylum the following day. The basis of her claim was that she had been the subject of domestic violence at the hands of a man with whom she had a relationship. They had a daughter together. He had been physically and emotionally abusive. Her family disapproved of her relationship and she also claimed also to have suffered abuse from her father. She had no contact with her family other than with an aunt and her sister. In November 2015, her aunt helped her to leave Albania as a result of the domestic violence she suffered. She travelled via a number of countries before arriving in the UK.
3. On 3 February 2016, the Secretary of State rejected the claimant’s claim for asylum, humanitarian protection and under Art 8 of the ECHR.
4. The claimant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal and, in a decision sent on 24 August 2016, Judge Trevaskis allowed her appeal on humanitarian protection grounds. He accepted that she had been the victim of domestic violence and also had suffered abuse by her father. He accepted that she would be at risk on return. Secondly, the judge found that the claimant would be unable to obtain a sufficiency of protection from the authorities in Albania. Thirdly, having regard to her circumstances and in particular her mental health problems, the judge accepted that she suffered from PTSD, it would not be reasonable to expect her to relocate within Albania as a lone woman with a young child.
5. The Secretary of State appealed with permission to the Upper Tribunal.
6. In a decision sent on 19 January 2017, I concluded that Judge Trevaskis had erred in law in reaching his findings in the claimant’s favour on the issue of sufficiency of protection and internal relocation. My reasons are set out in that decision and I do not repeat them here. Consequently, I set aside the judge’s decision and adjourned the appeal for a resumed hearing in the Upper Tribunal to remake the decision. The judge’s findings in relation to the claimant’s past ill-treatment and that she would be at risk in her home area from her former partner and family on return were not challenged and, together with the finding that the claimant suffered from PTSD, were to stand.
7. The issues for the Upper Tribunal were, in essence, whether the Albanian authorities would be able and willing to provide a sufficiency of protection to the claimant on return and, given the finding that she was at risk in her home area, whether she could reasonably and safely be expected to internally relocate within Albania.
The Hearing
8. The appeal was relisted before me on 11 April 2017. The claimant was again represented by Mr McWatters and the Secretary of State was represented by Mr Mills.
9. The appeal proceeded, with one exception, upon the basis of the evidence that was before the First-tier Tribunal. The exception was that the claimant gave very brief oral evidence in which she stated that she was still suffering from PTSD and was receiving medication.
10. The primary facts were not a matter of dispute between the parties. The focus of both Mr McWatters’ and Mr Mills’ submissions were on the background evidence relating to Albania and, in particular, the position of women fearing domestic violence. In particular, I was referred to the Home Office Country Information and Guidance, Albania: Women fearing domestic violence (April 2016) at D149-D174 of the bundle; an expert report from Ms Antonia Young dated 7 August 2016 at A53-A105 and two country guidance cases: DM (Sufficiency of Protection – PSG – Women – Domestic Violence) Albania CG [2004] UKIAT 0059 and TD and AD (Trafficked women) CG [2016] UKUT 0092 (IAC).
The Submissions
11. Mr McWatters submitted that the claimant should succeed on humanitarian protection grounds.
12. First, he submitted that it was accepted that she was at risk in her home area and she was also at risk from her ex-partner and family elsewhere in Albania. He submitted that there was a real risk that she would be found given the circumstances of a returning lone woman whom Ms Young concluded in her expert report would be perceived as a victim of trafficking and prostitute who would stand out in any area in which she lived.
13. Secondly, Mr McWatters submitted that the state would not provide a sufficiency of protection. Again he relied on the report of Ms Young supporting that view. He accepted that there were shelters in Albania for the victims of domestic violence but, according to Ms Young, as the claimant was not returning as a victim of trafficking she would require a “protection order” from a court in order to access such a shelter. He relied on the fact that the father of her ex-partner is in the police force and there is corruption within the police. He submitted that although there were legislative measures improving the situation of women in Albania, the background evidence showed that its implementation was not fully effective. Further, the law was not always effectively applied and even where protection orders were made they were not always enforced. There was often a lack of training or capacity to effectively deal with domestic violence. He submitted that the state was neither able nor, in her particular circumstances, would it be willing to protect the claimant from her ex-partner and family.
14. Thirdly, Mr McWatters submitted that it was not reasonable to expect the claimant to internally relocate. Again, he relied upon Ms Young’s report which indicated that the claimant would be questioned by the police on return, taking her details including her place of origin and her family and there was a risk that the police would make her return known in her home principality. Further, she would have to provide her personal details on the civil register and there was, therefore, a further risk of detection.
15. Mr McWatters submitted that there was, therefore, unlikely to be protection in a shelter which, in any event, was only available for a limited period.
16. He also relied upon the claimant’s vulnerability, namely that she suffered from PTSD and that her child was epileptic.
17. Mr McWatters relied upon the factors set out in TD and AD at para [119(h)]. He submitted that although the Upper Tribunal was concerned with trafficked women, the factors set out were equally relevant in determining whether they could access protection and reasonably internally relocate. He submitted that the claimant’s family was effectively non-supportive, she was not well educated, she suffered from PTSD and, although her child was not illegitimate, she was a single woman whom Ms Young identified as a person subject to prejudice and discrimination living alone with a child, she is 25 years of age and would have no support network available to her.
18. Mr Mills relied on the country guidance case of DM that established there was, in general, a sufficiency of protection to the victims of domestic violence in Albania. He acknowledged that the decision was now some fifteen years old. He submitted that a crucial issue was the availability of a shelter to the claimant which was dealt with in TD and AD even though that case concerned trafficking. He submitted that a shelter would be available to the claimant for up to two years including for her young child. He acknowledged, however, that unlike a returning victim of trafficking a court order would be required. He submitted that the issue was, therefore, whether after the two-year period the claimant would have a reasonable standard of living. He accepted that the father of the claimant’s ex-partner was in the police force but did not accept that he would be in a position to find the claimant or that the authorities would fail to provide a sufficiency of protection.
19. Mr Mills acknowledged that he could not avoid the point made in para [119(f)] of TD and AD that, albeit in the context of victims of trafficking, it was recognised that where an individual suffered from “mental illness or psychological scarring” living alone might not be reasonable. Mr Mills accepted that the claimant would be a single woman and would have no support from her immediate family but there was evidence of some previous support from her aunt and sister. In all the circumstances, Mr Mills invited me to conclude that there was a sufficiency of protection and, in any event, the claimant could safely and reasonably internally relocate.
The Relevant Law
20. Mr McWatters submissions focused upon the claimant’s claim for humanitarian protection derived from the Qualification Directive (Council Directive 2004/83/EC). The relevant provisions are transposed into the Immigration Rules (HC 395 as amended) as follows. Paragraph 339C, so far as relevant, provides as follows:
“A person will be granted humanitarian protection in the United Kingdom if the Secretary of State is satisfied that: …
(iii) substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person concerned, if he returned to the country of return, would face a real risk of suffering serious harm and is unable, or, owing to such risk, unwilling to avail himself of a protection of that country; …”
21. For the purposes of that provision, “serious harm” is defined in para 399C to include:
“(iii) torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of a person in the country of return; …”
22. The provision, in effect, reflects the level of harm required by Art 3 of the ECHR.
23. The burden of establishing entitlement to humanitarian protection lies upon the claimant.
24. As regards the issue of ‘sufficiency of protection’, para 339C(iii) sets out the requirement that there not only be a real risk of serious harm but that the relevant state will be unable or unwilling to provide a sufficiency of protection.
25. Regulation 4 of the Refugee or Person in Need of International Protection (Qualification) Regulations 2006 (SI 2006/2525) sets out the relevant “actors of protection” including principally “the state”. Regulation 4(2) states that:
“Protection shall be regarded as generally provided when the actors mentioned in paragraph (1)(a) and (b) take reasonable steps to prevent the persecution or suffering of serious harm by operating an effective legal system for the detection, prosecution and punishment of acts constituting persecution or serious harm, and the person mentioned in paragraph (i) has access to such protection.”
26. In Horvath v SSHD [2001] 1 AC 489, the House of Lords approved a test formulated in the Court of Appeal in the following terms:
“In my judgment there must be in force in the country in question a criminal law which makes the violent attacks by the persecutors punishable by sentences commensurate with the gravity of the crimes. The victims as a class must not be exempt from the protection of the law. There must be a reasonable willingness by the law enforcement agencies, that is to say the police and the courts, to detect, prosecute and punish offences”.
27. The standard is a “practical standard” and is not measured simply by the availability of a system to protect an individual but also a reasonable willingness to operate it in respect of the particular individual.
28. A holistic assessment must be made based on the background evidence and the individual circumstances of a claimant.
29. The relevant law in relation to internal relocation is set out in para 339O of the Rules as follows:
“ (i) The Secretary of State will not make:
(a) a grant of asylum if in part of the country of origin a person would not have a well founded fear of being persecuted, and the person can reasonably be expected to stay in that part of the country;
or
(b) a grant of humanitarian protection if in part of the country of return a person would not face a real risk of suffering serious harm, and the person can reasonably be expected to stay in that part of the country.
(ii) In examining whether a part of the country of origin or country of return meets the requirements in (i) the Secretary of State, when making his decision on whether to grant asylum or humanitarian protection, will have regard to the general circumstances prevailing in that part of the country and to the personal circumstances of the person.
(iii) (i) applies notwithstanding technical obstacles to return to the country of origin or country of return.”
30. In Januzi v SSHD [2006] UKHL 5 the House of Lords accepted that the relevant approach, now reflected in the Qualification Directive, was whether it would be unreasonable or unduly harsh for an individual to be expected to live in a place other than his home area. At [47], Lord Hope said this:
“The words ‘unduly harsh’ set the standard that must be met for this to be regarded as unreasonable. If the claimant can live a relatively normal life there judged by the standards that prevail in his country of nationality generally, and if he can reach the less hostile part without undue hardship or undue difficulty, it will not be unreasonable to expect him to move there.”
31. The issue is fact-sensitive and requires a consideration of all relevant factors concerning the individual’s circumstances in the proposed place of relocation. The relevant factors will include, available medical care, the ability to earn a living and find accommodation, any family links, ethnic affiliations, the ability to live a life at least at subsistence level and whether support might be forthcoming from others including from abroad (see Januzi at [20]).
Discussion
32. The primary facts are not in dispute. The claimant has been subject to domestic violence at the hands of her ex-partner and her family. She would be at risk of serious harm in her home area from her ex-partner and family. Further, if she were traced when living in a different area in Albania by her ex-partner or her family, she would be also at risk there.
33. The claimant suffers from PTSD and her daughter suffers from epilepsy.
34. Her ex-partner’s father is a police officer in Albania.
35. The first issue is whether there is a real risk that the claimant would be detected on her return by her ex-partner and her family. Mr Mills did not accept that her ex-partner’s father would be in a position to find her. Ms Young, however, expresses the view in her expert report at A85 that:
“I believe that the likelihood of her partner, or her father or other family members of learning of [LM’s] whereabouts, were she to be returned to Albania is considerable, even if not immediately, but in the long term.”
36. The basis for that view derives from the process the claimant would undergo on arrival and, subsequently, her circumstances were she to relocate in Albania.
37. As regards the former, Ms Young cites supporting research at A69 of her report concerning the questioning which the claimant would be subjected to by the police on return and that this would make her known in her local community:
“Dr. Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers’ research chapter (2010) specifically addresses this question in 20 detailed pages. In particular she notes that when lone young women who say they have no place to go are returned to Albania from abroad (through Tirana airport) they are questioned by police who take all their details about their place of origin and family. The police then make their return known to their home municipality. As Dr. Schwandner-Sievers points out, these actions alone are sufficient to notify the whole area and the returning woman will be branded for life as a woman who has dishonoured her family and community.”
38. The circumstances faced by the claimant on return are also identified by Ms Young at A81:
“There is no formal reception into the country for involuntary returnees, forcing them first into police custody. The police’s first concern appears to be to check whether the returnee has a criminal record, which inevitably means that their first point of contact will be the police in the area in which she was last registered. Then they enquire about registering them back in their place of origin.”
39. At A87-A88, Ms Young dealt with the position of the claimant if she were to live elsewhere in Albania and notes her circumstances would raise her visibility and, in her expert opinion, result in her being found albeit not necessarily immediately:
“In Albania, both the rural and the urban populations are based on networks of kin and neighbours in which literally ‘everyone knows everyone’. In a society which is only just emerging from being clan-based, all affiliations and support come only through extended family membership. Outside that, as an Albanian, it is hard to find moral support. Because of a high reliance on personal networks of support, any Albanian person would be generally highly visible if dislocated from her local home area. [LM] would be particularly noticeable, especially with a baby and no accounting for his father, nor anyone to vouch for her moral standing, in an area where she were not already known. People are socially positioned through inquiries and additionally, there are strong dialectical differences. This is an issue relevant throughout Albania making it easy to locate anyone. This is a situation that has not changed since the days of the British travel writer Edith Durham, who noted that: ‘When the Near East ‘wants to know’, there are few, if any, personal details at which it draws the line’. Law requires that people moving into an area register at the civil registry office. Such registration is only possible by producing relevant documentation from last place of residence. At point 2.3.3 of the 2013 OGN it is noted that ‘Many persons could not provide this proof and thus lacked access to essential services’. Information that a former resident is registered elsewhere is easily transmitted by word of mouth, thus easing location of a targeted individual. On relocating to any other area of Albania, there is the requirement that an individual registers their last municipality of last habitation. Thus [LM] could be found, even if not immediately on return.”
40. The father of the claimant’s ex-partner is a police officer. This, potentially at least, creates the possibility that information obtained by the police concerning her return and future whereabouts would be accessible by him and passed on to those who seek to harm the claimant. The claimant would also have to register in her local area creating a further risk that she might be discovered, particularly given that her ex-partner’s father is a policeman.
41. On the basis of the evidence, I am satisfied that there is a real risk that on return, albeit not necessarily immediately, the claimant’s return and location would be discovered by those who wish to harm her.
42. The second issue is that of ‘sufficiency of protection’. In the Country Guidance case of DM decided in 2004, the Immigration Appeal Tribunal concluded on the evidence before it that in general the Albanian state did provide a sufficiency of protection against non-state actors against domestic violence (see [18]). That decision is now some thirteen years old. Technically it remains binding. There must be good reason based upon cogent evidence to depart from it (see SG (Iraq) v SSHD [2012] EWCA Civ 940).
43. Subsequently, in TD and AD, the Upper Tribunal also concluded that there was a sufficiency of protection “in general” for those who were victims of trafficking (see [119(d)]). However, the Upper Tribunal, in that context, concluded that whether or not there was a sufficiency of protection for a victim of trafficking must be determined having regard to her particular circumstances.
44. That latter approach applies no less in the context of the claimant, as a victim of domestic violence.
45. In para 16 of his skeleton argument, Mr McWatters in effect relied upon section 2.4 of the Home Office guidance on domestic violence which at para 2.4.2 to 2.4.5 is as follows:
“2.4.2 Since then there have been a number of legislative measures undertaken to further improve the situation of women in Albania, including amendments to the criminal code to specifically protect against domestic violence and spousal rape. Although the appropriate legislation is now in place, its implementation is not fully effective (see Legal context)
2.4.3 Significant numbers of prosecutions and protection/restraining orders have been made by the courts (see Domestic violence). However, the law is not always effectively applied. Criminal proceedings are slow and courts violate procedural deadlines for reviewing protection orders and issuing decisions. Where protection orders are issued they are not always enforced. Reports state that the government is making greater efforts to address the problem but noted that police often did not have the training or capacity to deal effectively with domestic violence cases and the number of women victims who benefit from free legal aid is small compared with the need. (see Police and judiciary attitudes and responses and Police training).
2.4.4 There are a number of nongovernmental organisations in Albania who are active in domestic violence issues – including operating shelters – and can potentially assist the person to avail themselves of the protection of the state. (see Assistance available to women and Non-government run shelters).
2.4.5 There are legal remedies available for women fearing domestic violence, although perpetrators are not always properly prosecuted and punished by the courts. There were reports of police failing to respond to or investigate complaints of domestic violence and some cases were identified where police officers tried to reconcile the victims with their perpetrators. However, in general, the authorities are willing and able to provide effective protection for women fearing sexual or gender-based violence.”
46. As that document recognises, since DM, there have been a number of measures taken to improve the situation of women in Albania.
47. Mr McWatters also relied upon material set out in Ms Young’s report at A73-A75.
48. At A73, Ms Young notes that:
“It is true that the situation is reported to be gradually improving, and there has been an increase in the number and quality of police trained …”
49. However, her report goes on to cite and comment upon difficulties based “through the ineffectiveness of the Albanian police force” and refers to a “whole culture of corruption” (see A74). Ms Young cites the United States State Department “Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Albania” 2015 at A75 identifying corruption among the police and noting that the Albanian State Police Corruption Section which investigated corruption cases has “a limited capacity for uncovering investigating and surveillance, hampering its investigations”.
50. Ms Young also cites the Home Office own Operational Guidance Note for Albania (May 2013) at para 2.2.3 stating that:
“Instances of police accepting bribes in return for not issuing citations or not entering personal information into the crime databases were widespread”.
51. In my judgment, despite the recognised corruption, there have been improvements in the system and provision made for the protection of the victims of domestic violence by the Albanian authorities. The position has improved since DM rather than deteriorated. There is, in my judgment, insufficient evidence to provide cogent reasons for departing from the position in DM that recognised that “in general” a sufficiency of protection is available.
52. However, looking at the individual circumstances of the claimant, I accept Mr McWatters’ submissions that she will not personally obtain a sufficiency of protection from the Albanian authorities. First, I accept the evidence concerning the corruption that exists within the police force. Secondly, the father of the claimant’s ex-partner is a police officer. I accept that if the claimant were to seek protection there is a real risk that he would become aware of the situation and would be in a position to negate any protection that would otherwise be available. He would, in my judgment, likely side with his own son and the claimant’s family and influence whether any action were taken to protect or prosecute those who would seek to harm the claimant.
53. Mr Mills relied upon the existence of shelters for victims of domestic violence. He submitted that they would be available to assist the claimant on return for up to two years including young children and the issue was, in effect, whether it would be safe and reasonable for her to live outside a shelter thereafter. Mr McWatters submitted that as a victim of domestic violence, rather than trafficking, the claimant could only access such accommodation if a court made a “protection order”. Relying upon Ms Young’s report he submitted that there was limited availability and they were ineffective to enable the reintegration of returnees into the community following their stay in the shelters.
54. The position as regard the availability of government shelters for domestic violence victims is set out in the Home Office guidance of April 2016 at paras 7.2.1-7.2.8 as follows:
“7.2 Government run shelters
7.2.1 The U.S Department of State, Country Report into Human Rights Practices, Albania 2014 stated that:
‘The Ministry of Youth and Social Welfare oversees women’s issues, including domestic violence. The government shelter for domestic violence victims in Tirana assisted 21 women and 36 children through August but could not accept victims without a court order. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) operated four shelters to protect victims from domestic violence. There is two in Tirana and two outside the capital.
7.2.2 At the time of writing, Albania did not meet the Council of Europe Taskforce Recommendations for national women’s helpline and women’s shelter provision. There are five women’s centres in Albania but no women’s centres for survivors of sexual violence. Another service available in Albania is a local women’s helpline, which was established in March 2013 by the Tirana Municipality and the Network of Community Centres. This helpline does not operate 24/7, but is free of charge and offers assistance for cases of domestic violence.
7.2.3 According to Women Against Violence in Europe (WAVE) Report 2014:
‘There is one national women’s helpline in Albania that is free of charge, but it does not operate 24/7. In 2012, the helpline provided 1,800 phone counselling sessions and 756 face-to-face sessions. Furthermore, there are eight women’s shelters in Albania, with approximately 200 shelter places available. Currently, 29% of recommended shelter places are missing.’
7.2.4 According to sources cited by the Research Directorate of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (IRB), reporting on domestic violence in Albania between 2011 and April 2014:
‘Several sources indicate that there is not a sufficient number of shelters for victims of domestic violence and according to Data Centrum, the current shelters have a limited capacity, and there is a particular lack of emergency and long-term shelters in the North.
‘Sources indicate that there is a national government-run shelter for victims of domestic violence located in Tirana, which opened in 2011. A report by the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary of Arbitrary Executions indicates that the shelter can accommodate up to 30 people. Country Reports 2013 states that 27 women and 27 children were assisted at the government-run shelter in Tirana between January and November 2013. According to the Researcher, women are referred to the shelter by the police, social services or hospitals, and the shelter offers “integrated services” to victims. She said that, once admitted, the duration that women stay at the shelter depends on the court orders and/or the treatment plan prescribed by the social worker.
‘Sources indicate that victims of domestic violence are required to have a protection order to stay at the national shelter. The Centre for Legal Civic Initiatives (CLCI) attorney noted that the 48 hour period required to obtain an emergency protection order it is often a “dangerous time” for the woman. According to an assessment made by the European Commission, the national shelter “applies unnecessarily restrictive criteria for admission and provides few facilities for emergency needs.” According to the UN Special Rapporteur, many staff involved with domestic violence victims are not properly trained or specialized and the budget for the national shelter is very low compared to the need.
‘In 2011 and 2012, victims of domestic violence reported that they were mistreated and verbally abused by the Director of the national shelter. There was also a case in which a victim at the shelter was attacked by her former husband and seriously injured. According to the UN Special Rapporteur, the victim was not given a security escort and was attacked while walking her children to school. According to the People’s Advocate, the victim lost her eye as a result of the attack and after receiving complaints, the People’s Advocate inspected the shelter in April 2012 and called for the Director’s dismissal. The People’s Advocate also confirmed illegal disciplinary measures taken against the women, such as denying them meals, denying them visits to see their children, restricting communication with their families, and banning cell phone use. The Director was subsequently dismissed although sanctions were not taken against her, and she was appointed to another official management position.
‘According to the CLCI attorney, there is a need for regional shelters, as it is often a “difficult solution” for women from other areas of Albania to travel to Tirana. The same source indicated that there is also a need for victims to receive services even if they do not have a protection order, as some women are afraid to get a protection order.
‘Data Centrum indicates that the municipalities of Korça and Durrës offer shelter to victims of domestic violence in rented apartments but further information about accommodations in rented apartments could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.’
7.2.5 The Special Rapporteur in his 2013 report to the Human Rights Council noted: ‘an insufficient level of professional preparation of the staff from the system of assistance, including shelters, who are not sufficiently specialized and are frequently unaware of the policies conducted by the central authorities.’
7.2.6 The EU Commission’s Albania Progress Report of October 2014 stated: ‘The national shelter for victims of domestic violence has treated 132 cases of domestic violence since September. It improved its cooperation with the employment office and provided training to victims. However, the shelter continues to apply unnecessarily restrictive criteria for admission.’
7.2.7 In its 2015 Albania Report the European Commission highlighted the: ‘poor functioning of mechanisms to address gender equality and gender-based violence … The number of shelters and reintegration services needs to be increased, and existing volunteer-run shelters have yet to be supported by the authorities. Due to poor administrative and financial resources, the national referral mechanism for domestic violence is operational in very few municipalities, and it applies unnecessarily restrictive admission criteria for victims.’
7.2.8 In the 2015 report to CEDAW the People’s Advocate stated about the National Centre for the Treatment of Victims of Domestic Violence ‘until September 2014 the number of people benefitting from its services reached to 174 of who 69 are women and 105 are children […]. Domestic violence victims may benefit accommodation or other services in the Centre only if equipped with a PO/IPO. Services should not be provided only to victim, who are willing to report the case or testify against a perpetrator. Non offering of accommodation for victims during the period of 48 hours in which the court decide on issuing IPO, face them with a high risk for life’.”
55. The report goes on at para 7.3.1 to refer to a number of shelters provided for the victims of domestic violence by NGOs:
“7.3.1 The IRB Research Directorate response reported that:
‘Sources indicate that there are some NGOs that operate shelters for victims of domestic violence and that provide shelter for victims of domestic violence located in Berat, Korca, Elbasan, Vlora and two in Tirana. The UN Special Rapporteur also mentioned a shelter run by an NGO in Gjirokastra. The attorney from CLCI stated that an additional shelter in Elbasan operated by the NGO “Women’s Forum” provides temporary emergency service. According to the CLCI attorney, the shelter in Vlora is operated by the NGO “Vatra,” the one in Elbasan by the NGO “Other Vision,” and the ones in Tirana are operated by “Different but Equal” and “Shelter for Women and Girls.” The UN Special Rapporteur has stated that these NGOs have “very limited hosting capacity.” He indicated that the Elbasan shelter has a capacity to accommodate 21 people and the Vlora shelter has a capacity of 20 people. According to the Researcher, there are four NGO shelters with a total capacity of 60 beds, whereas Albania would need approximately 300 beds to meet European standards.
‘The European Commission indicates that NGO-run shelters do not receive state funding and according to the UN Special Rapporteur, public funding of shelters is “very limited.” According to the CLCI attorney, the NGO shelters work in co-operation with the municipalities but generally do not receive funding from the municipalities. She said that the NGO shelters are a bit more flexible than the national shelter and can accommodate victims without a protection order if the victim “denounces” the domestic violence and starts the process of obtaining a protection order. A police officer interviewed by Data Centrum also indicated that NGOs can accommodate victims before the protection order is secured. The CLCI attorney said that many of the NGO shelters offer counselling or psychological support to victims, or refer the women to other organisations that can offer psychological support.
‘The European Commission describes reintegration services for domestic violence victims as “minimal.” The attorney at CLCI stated that she was not aware of any long-term housing programs for victims of domestic violence and, while there may be some opportunities for women to participate in employment training, there are few “concrete results” in terms of finding employment. The Data Centrum report also states that there are “insufficient employment and vocational services for victims of domestic violence,” as well as insufficient and delayed economic assistance for victims, and a lack of rehabilitative and psycho-social services for perpetrators’.”
56. Mr Mills acknowledged that, unlike a victim of trafficking, the claimant would require a court order in order to obtain access to a shelter. In my judgment, there is a real risk that the claimant would be unable to access a shelter on return. First, in order to make a court application she would, of course, first have had to go through the investigative procedure on arrival to which I referred above. There is, therefore, the risk that her presence in Albania would become known before she could obtain such an order. Secondly, in any event, the availability of shelter accommodation is limited and there are no guarantees that she could obtain such a place in any event. Ms Young, in her expert report at A81-A82 noted that “victims at the state-run shelter received inadequate mental health services”. The claimant suffers from PTSD and her daughter is epileptic.
57. In any event, even if the claimant were able to live in a shelter, Mr Mills accepted that it could be for no longer than two years. Thereafter, the claimant would be required to live in the community. There is the obvious point, I made earlier, that her whereabouts may be discovered by her ex-partner and her family. She would, in any event, live in fear of that discovery. It is clear to me having regard to the background material and Ms Young’s report that it would not be reasonable to expect the claimant in her particular circumstances to live independently in the community. I accept the evidence, to which I was referred, that the claimant is likely to be stigmatised because of her circumstances and is likely to stand out in any community in which she seeks to live. Her own mental health problems are an aggravating feature which contribute, in my judgment, to the real risk that she would not be able to survive financially and socially in the community. She also has a child who suffers from epilepsy. Ms Young refers to both of these features of the claimant’s circumstances as creating difficulties for her to live effectively and securely in the community. She would not have the support of her family. Mr Mills referred to the fact that the claimant had an aunt and sister in Albania who had previously assisted her but, in reality, if she were to seek their assistance in any meaningful and practical way in the future she would run the risk of exposing herself to her own family and her ex-partner and the real risk to her that would necessarily entail.
58. In considering whether it would be unduly harsh or unreasonable to expect the claimant to live elsewhere in Albania once the period of time, if any, she could spend in a shelter had ended, I take into account all the circumstances including the factors set out at [119(h)] of TD and AD. I bear in mind my earlier findings in relation to ‘sufficiency of protection’ above. The claimant would be effectively without any support. She is not well-educated and suffers from PTSD. Her vulnerability, not least because of the latter condition, is attested to by Dr Battersby in her report at, for example, A33 of the bundle. The claimant also has a daughter with mental health problems, namely epilepsy. I accept the evidence that the claimant’s circumstances would lead to her being regarded as kurva with the resulting discrimination and “shunning” attested to by Ms Young at pages A67-A73 of her report.
59. I accept Mr McWatters submission, which was not gainsaid by Mr Mills, that it would not be in the best interests of the claimant’s daughter to live in such circumstances in Albania.
60. I also note and accept Ms Young’s view that the claimant’s circumstances are likely to exacerbate the difficulties the claimant would face in obtaining employment in which employment is “stubbornly high” (see A83-A84). There is a real risk that the claimant would not, once in the community, be in a position to support herself and her daughter.
61. Taking all these factors into account, I am satisfied that it would be unduly harsh and unreasonable for the claimant to live in the community in Albania outside her home area. Whether that situation arises immediately (because shelter accommodation is not available) or after two years in a shelter, internal relocation is not a reasonable option for her.
62. For these reasons, I am satisfied that there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of serious harm to the claimant on return to Albania and that the Albanian state would not be able or willing to provide a sufficiency of protection and that it would be reasonable and not unduly harsh for her to internally relocate within Albania. Thus, the claimant’s claim to humanitarian protection is established.
63. Although Mr McWatters also relied upon Art 8, he only did so in the context that the claimant could not establish her claim to humanitarian protection. In the light of my findings and decision in respect of that claim, the claimant clearly succeeds in respect of Art 8, in particular in establishing that she falls within para 276ADE(1)(vi) of the Rules.
Decision
64. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal was set aside by my earlier decision sent on 19 January 2017.
65. I remake the decision dismissing the claimant’s appeal on asylum grounds.
66. I allow the appeal on humanitarian protection grounds and under Art 8 of the ECHR.

Signed

A Grubb
Judge of the Upper Tribunal

Date 25 April 2017