Tribunal decisions

The decision

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: PA/01861/2015

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at North Shields
Decision & Reasons Promulgated
On 3 February 2017
On 6 February 2017
Prepared on 3 February 2017

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE JM HOLMES

Between

R. D.
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellant
And

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Cleghorn, Counsel, instructed by Halliday Reeves Law Firm
For the Respondent: Mr Diwnycz, Home Office Presenting Officer

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The Appellant entered the United Kingdom on 22 April 2015 as a domestic servant, and shortly afterwards claimed asylum. That application was refused on 8 October 2015. The Appellant's appeal to the Tribunal against the refusal of her protection claim was dismissed on all grounds by decision of Judge Fisher, promulgated on 21 September 2016.
2. The Appellant was granted permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal by decision of Upper Tribunal Judge Storey of 14 November 2016. The Respondent filed a Rule 24 Notice dated 8 December 2016 in relation to the grant of permission to the Appellant, but the content of that notice did not engage with either the Appellant's complaint, or the reasons given by Upper Tribunal Judge Storey for granting permission.
3. Thus the matter comes before me.

The Appellant's case
4. It is common ground before me that the Appellant's case before the Tribunal was accepted as true on the applicable low standard of proof by Judge Fisher [20]. Thus he accepted that as a woman of 52, although the mother of three children, she had been trafficked from Cameroon to Dubai. Once in Dubai she had found herself being used as a sex slave or prostituted, and held against her will. When brought to the UK she had escaped from those who had held her, and had claimed asylum.
5. It is also common ground that it followed that the Judge accepted the details of the Appellant's account of how she came to be trafficked from Cameroon, and thus of which individual within her local community was responsible for doing so. It was accepted that it followed, although the decision is silent upon this, that in the light of the Court of Appeal's approach to the evidence concerning the way society with Cameroon operated in CM (Cameroon) [2008] EWCA Civ 125 that the individual responsible for doing so would know if she returned to Cameroon, to her home area, to seek to be reunited with her children.
6. It is also common ground before me that there was no dispute before Judge Fisher over the mental state of the Appellant, and the very significant symptoms that had been exhibited and reported by her to the medical professionals who had from time to time sought to assist her [20]. The undisputed evidence showed that she was very far from well.
7. The Judge also accepted on the evidence before him that the authorities in Cameroon were unable, or unwilling, to offer any adequate level of state protection to those at risk of trafficking, or to those returnees who were at risk of being re-trafficked [24].
8. In the circumstances, it is common ground before me, that although the decision does not specifically address the point, Judge Fisher must either be taken to have accepted that the Appellant was at risk of harm (which would include the risk of being re-trafficked) in the event that she returned to her home area, or, that he erred if he failed to do so. Moreover that such a risk would not be alleviated by the availability to her of any adequate level of state protection, because he had already concluded to the contrary.
9. Thus Judge Fisher turned to consider whether it was reasonable to expect the Appellant to relocate within Cameroon. The undisputed evidence before him described the serious problems that country has with the trafficking of its nationals, and indicated that the Appellant in her highly vulnerable condition would be unable to protect herself from such a threat if she sought to return to an area that was not her home area, and in which she necessarily had no family or friendship network that could provide her with support and protection. It is accepted that this was not engaged with.
10. In the circumstances the Respondent confirmed through Mr Diwnycz that she no longer sought to argue that the Appellant as one returning to her country of origin as a victim of sex trafficking, and at risk of being re-trafficked, was not a member of a particular social group and at risk of serious harm as such. Moreover, and more importantly, he confirmed that the Respondent did not resist the conclusion that the Judge's decision should be set aside and remade so as to allow the asylum appeal.

DECISION
The Decision of the First Tier Tribunal which was promulgated on 21 September 2016 did involve the making of an error of law that requires that decision to be set aside and remade.
The asylum appeal is allowed.

Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge JM Holmes
Dated 3 February 2017

Direction regarding anonymity - Rule 14 Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008
Unless and until the Tribunal directs otherwise the Appellant is granted anonymity throughout these proceedings. No report of these proceedings shall directly or indirectly identify her. This direction applies both to the Appellant and to the Respondent. Failure to comply with this direction could lead to proceedings being brought for contempt of court.

Signed
Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge JM Holmes
Dated 3 February 2017