Tribunal decisions

The decision

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: PA/02018/2017

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Bradford
Decision & Reasons Promulgated
On 24 April 2018
On 2 May 2018

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LANE

Between

hp
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION made)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Holmes, instructed by Morgan Dias Immigration Consultants
For the Respondent: Mr Mills, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant, HP, was born in 1991 and is a male citizen of Iran. He applied for international protection but his application was refused by a decision of the Secretary of State dated 15 September 2016. The appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal (Judge Atkinson) of which, in a decision promulgated on 13 April 2017, dismissed the appeal. The appellant now appeals, with permission, to the Upper Tribunal.
2. There is one ground of appeal. The appellant claimed to be a genuine convert to Christianity. It is not disputed that he attended church in the United Kingdom, has no genuine passport and will be returned to Iran on a laissez passer. Relying on SSH v HR (illegal exit: failed asylum seeker) CG [2016] UKUT 308, the appellant argues that he would be questioned on return to Iran. Consequently, and notwithstanding the First-tier Tribunal's rejection of the credibility of his claimed conversion to Christianity, the appellant (who would not be obliged to lie to the authorities questioning him) would inform the interviewer that he had converted to Christianity, albeit solely in order to obtain leave to remain in the United Kingdom. The appellant argues that the judge erred in law by finding [47] that, "Given that the appellant has not been shown to be an ordinary (sic) convert to Christianity, it would not be reasonable to expect him to reveal nor likely that he would reveal such attendance (at church) to the authorities on return to Iran." In the light of the fact that the appellant would not be obliged to lie, such a finding was not available to the judge.
3. Mr Holmes, who appeared for the appellant, at the initial hearing developed that argument. He sought to rely on two unreported decisions by Upper Tribunal Judges. In both decisions, the judges had found that the answers which an appellant may give to questions regarding conversion to Christianity could give rise to "particular concern" in the mind of an interviewer leading, in turn, to the returnee's detention in Iranian prisons where conditions are likely to breach Article 3 ECHR. Whilst I have read my colleagues' decisions with interest they are, of course, not binding upon me. Full copies of the decisions have not been made available; only extracts were provided. It is unhelpful and possibly unlawful for me to rely upon passages from unreported decisions which are shorn from the context from which they are extracted.
4. Mr Mills, who appeared for the Secretary of State, urged me to reject the appeal arguing that it was not likely that the appellant would be asked in detail about the Christian conversion. It was highly unlikely that the appellant himself would volunteer details of his contact with the church to his interviewer.
5. I reserved my decision.
6. I find that the appeal should be dismissed. I have reached that decision for the following reasons. First, I agree with Mr Mills that there is no likelihood whatever of the appellant, an individual who was found by the judge to have pretended to have converted to Christianity in order to remain in the United Kingdom, volunteering particulars of his conversion to the authorities in Iran.
7. Secondly, I agree with Mr Mills that telling the truth for this particular appellant cannot legitimately be compared to a characteristic at the core of his personality such as his sexuality or a genuinely held religious or political belief. Accordingly, his propensity to dissemble should feature in the assessment of risk.
8. Thirdly, I find that the Iranian authorities are unlikely to waste their time and resources by detaining the appellant, even if he were to inform the authorities that he had attended church in the United Kingdom and had been baptised but had done so only in order to remain in this country. Lying and making false claims are universal characteristics and the appellant's behaviour and motivation will not be unfamiliar to the Iranian authorities.
9. Fourthly, whilst I accept that returnees should not in general be expected to tell lies, it is important to examine the characteristics which the judge found this appellant to possess. In essence, the judge has found that this appellant is an entirely unreliable witness who will tell lies for his own benefit and when it suits him. Bearing those characteristics in mind, it is entirely reasonable to conclude that, upon return to Iran, he will tell lies to protect himself whether or not he might be expected to tell the truth. The First-tier Tribunal is tasked with making findings of fact which may include findings as to how a particular individual may behave in the future in particular circumstances. The Tribunal has found that this appellant will lie in order to protect himself. Given that the appellant will know that the Iranian authorities would have no independent means of finding out about his contacts with a Christian church in the United Kingdom other than out of the appellant's own mouth, it is entirely reasonable to conclude that he would tell lies, if it suited him to do so.
10. Fifthly, we have no idea at all what questions an interviewer may pose. We do not know whether the interviewer will ask open or closed questions. An open question could, for example, be as wide as "Have you ever denigrated Iran in any way whilst you have lived abroad?" It seems likely that very many asylum seekers living in Europe are likely to have spoken ill of the state from which, for whatever reason, they have fled even if only privately amongst friends and family. Expecting all returnees to refrain from lying whilst having no regard for their individual characteristics might mean that very many individuals would be likely to incriminate themselves. Frankly, that is absurd.
11. In the light of my observations as detailed above, I find that the judge reached findings which were available to him on the evidence. The appellant's appeal is dismissed.
Notice of Decision
12. This appeal is dismissed
Direction Regarding Anonymity - Rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008
Unless and until a Tribunal or court directs otherwise, the appellant is granted anonymity. No report of these proceedings shall directly or indirectly identify him or any member of their family. This direction applies both to the appellant and to the respondent. Failure to comply with this direction could lead to contempt of court proceedings.

Signed Date 26 APRIL 2018

Upper Tribunal Judge Lane

I have dismissed the appeal and therefore there can be no fee award.

Signed Date 26 APRIL 2018

Upper Tribunal Judge Lane