Tribunal decisions

The decision

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: PA/02040/2016

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Field House
Decision & Reasons Promulgated
On 12 January 2017
On 7 March 2017

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PERKINS

Between

s i a
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION made)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr R Slatter of Counsel instructed by Wimbledon Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr P Singh, Home Office Presenting Officer
DECISION AND REASONS
1. Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 I make an order prohibiting the disclosure or publication of any matter likely to lead members of the public to identify the respondent. Breach of this order can be punished as a contempt of court. I make this order because it is possible that publicity identifying the Appellant could create a risk.
2. This is an appeal by a citizen of Pakistan against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dismissing his appeal against the decision of the respondent on 16 February 2016 to refuse him asylum or other form of international protection. At the risk of over simplification it was his case that he would be the victim of honour killing by his family because he refused to kill his wife who he said had disgraced the family by conceiving children outside of marriage. He was roundly disbelieved by the First-tier Tribunal Judge.
3. The adverse credibility findings are challenged but I am quite persuaded by Mr Singh for the Secretary of State that some of the challenges at least can be described properly only as disagreements with the way the judge analysed the evidence.
4. There are proper reasons given in the determination for disbelieving the appellant and these include late disclosure of important acts of violence and surprising uncertainty about the dates of a marriage and I have given these points full weight as Mr Singh properly urged me to do.
5. There are two main attacks on the credibility findings. The first is that the judge misunderstood strands of evidence and did not record points of assistance to the appellant that led him to make mistakes. The difficulty here is that the allegations were not supported by a witness statement from Counsel who presented the case before the First-tier Tribunal, that as a consequence of that there was nothing directly to put to the judge for the judge’s comments and the case came to hearing without any input from the judge and without any Record of Proceedings from the Secretary of State that might have been prepared and without clear evidence from the appellant. This is unsatisfactory and Counsel for the appellant who brought the case this far, not Mr Slatter, might want to reflect on this in case she is involved in a similar situation in the future.
6. One thing though is entirely clear and it is that the judge made a mistake because there is discussion about the significance of threatening texts allegedly received by the appellant from his brother. The texts are in the English language and the judge finds unequivocally that no explanation was offered for the texts being sent in English but that is demonstrably wrong because an explanation was offered. The explanation was that the telephones do not or do not normally have Urdu characters and so it was appropriate to use the English language. That may or may not be a particularly satisfactory explanation but it was an explanation that was given and the judge was just wrong to say otherwise.
7. Mr Singh accepted that the error created a difficulty but argued strongly that in the context of the case as a whole it is an error that cannot be thought material. It is always unsatisfactory to uphold a decision when there is a plain mistake on a credibility finding but it is sometimes the right thing to do.
8. However there is another element to this case which concerns me very greatly and it is that the First-tier Tribunal Judge has made assumptions about the attitudes towards honour killing amongst the appellant’s family which are based on their social standing and apparent level of education. They are assumptions that, I find, are quite unwarranted. I think I should make it plain that nobody is suggesting that every citizen of Pakistan is intent on murdering a relative who offends family honour. That would be a monstrous suggestion and demonstrably untrue. However, honour killings do take place in Pakistan and I am not aware of any evidence that says they are particularly unlikely amongst any strata in the community. The judge’s finding that educated people would be highly unlikely has dangerously screwed the whole approach to credibility. It may be that the comments about attitudes to honour killing are a make weight after the decision making process but that is not something I can say with any certainty. I am satisfied that the decision-making has been obscured by findings about attitudes to honour killing which are not explained and are not clearly right. It follows therefore that I find the context of the fact-finding exercise is based on false premises and that will not do.

9. There is a further aspect to the case which again creates a difficulty for the appellant, namely the unequivocal alternative finding that he could in any event internally relocate. The answer to that is that if he is telling the truth his father is a man of significant influence in Pakistan and he would not be able to hide. The judge did not believe that the father was a man of that kind of influence and gave reasons that have not really been challenged but the case has to be looked at in the round and for the reasons I have given I am not satisfied that the findings of fact have been made for lawful reasons.
10. It follows therefore that I find that the appeal must be determined again and I set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal and direct the case is heard again in the First-tier Tribunal.
11. I wish to make it plain that the appellant should not assume this is somehow a coded message that his appeal should succeed. I am simply saying the reasons given are wrong and the case needs to be looked at again, entirely afresh.

Notice of Decision

The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is set aside. The appeal is allowed to the extent that it must be determined again in the First-tier Tribunal.

Signed

Jonathan Perkins
Judge of the Upper Tribunal

Dated 7 March 2017