Tribunal decisions

The decision

IAC-AH-co-V1

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: pa/02818/2015

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Bradford
Decision & Reasons Promulgated
On 14 February 2017
On 13 March 2017

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE CLIVE LANE

Between

fa
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION made)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Chohan, instructed by Waterstone Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mrs Pettersen, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant, FA, claims to be a Rohingya Muslim and a citizen of Burma (Myanmar). The respondent considers that the appellant is a citizen of Bangladesh. The appellant appealed against the decision dated 5 November 2015 refusing him asylum. First-tier Tribunal (Judge Parkes) in a decision promulgated on 15 November 2016, dismissed the appeal. The appellant now appeals, with permission, to the Upper Tribunal.
2. There are three grounds of appeal. First, the appellant asserts that the judge incorrectly assessed a language analysis which was put in evidence. This analysis is relied upon by the Home Office recorded that the appellant spoke “a variety of Bengali-Chittagonian-Rohingyan language continuum at native level.” The report indicated that the appellant belonged to the “Bangali linguistic community.” Some of the syntax used by the appellant appeared to support his claim to be a Rohingyan and other aspects of the analysis did not support that claim. Quite correctly, the judge indicated [16] that he should consider the language analysis as part of the totality of the evidence. At [28], the judge stated that,
“The single feature with regards to the appellant’s syntax is the only reliable piece of evidence that could possibly suggest that he is Rohingyan but that has to be set against all the other findings set out in the report and the evidence that suggests that he has been exposed to a number of linguistic backgrounds. It is not enough to show that, to the lower standard, the appellant is from the background only that he has, in that one single respect, picked up the identified point. The Secretary of State believed the appellant is a national of Bangladesh.”
The judge found that the appellant was not a reliable or credible witness who had, in addition, sought to rely upon a false document “a pink form concerning the claimed registration as a refugee from Myanmar.” The judge also noted the appellant’s “clear preference to speak Bengali” [30].
3. The grounds of appeal are, in my opinion, no more than a disagreement with findings which are clearly available to the judge on the evidence. The grounds emphasise the fact that the appellant’s use of syntax appear to indicate that he was Rohingya and conveniently ignore the fact that the judge has considered that evidence in the context of all the evidence; he was not compelled to find that the appellant was Rohingyan simply on account of the finding in respect of syntax in the language analysis. The judge was given clear and cogent reasons to explain why he rejected the appellant’s claimed Rohingyan ethnicity notwithstanding the comments made in the language report.
4. The second ground of appeal concerns the pink form concerning the appellant’s claimed registration as a refugee. The judge found [24] that the pink form was not a reliable document and he attached no weight to it. The grounds submit that the pink form was replaced as the document of refugee registration by a “family book” thereby “making the pink form redundant.” The grounds assert that, if the pink form was not valid due to the family book being in place then it makes no difference what is found by the judge.”
5. It is not clear that the evidence regarding the “family book” was available to the judge at the hearing and, even if it had been available, the judge has again reached a finding which was available to him on the evidence. The judge was entitled to query why it was that the appellant claimed not to have any documents (such as the pink form) at the screening interview only to produce this later at the main asylum interview. Also, the judge has considered the pink form in context of all the evidence put before him. He was given a number of reasons for finding the appellant’s evidence unreliable. The grounds suggest that the judge’s assessment of the pink form evidence was “harsh and not reasonable”. The fact remains that the judge has made a finding in the support of this with a clear reason.
6. The final ground of appeal concerns a letter purportedly written by the Bangladesh High Commission in London and dated 19 October 2016. It was this letter and the judge’s apparent failure to deal with it which led Judge Hodgkinson to grant permission to appeal on 20 December 2016. The letter reads: “you have applied for a Bangladeshi passport on 19-10-2016. But your document reveals that you are a Myanmar national. As such, we are unable to provide you with Bangladeshi passports.” Mr Pettersen, the respondent, did not question the authenticity of the letter. However, whilst the judge has not referred to the letter in his decision, the question remains as to whether his failure to do so clearly affected the outcome of the appeal. It appears that the appellant applied for a Bangladeshi passport whilst in the United Kingdom and that his “document” referred to in the High Commission letter is his application form. In that form, the appellant maintained (not surprisingly, given the basis of his claim for asylum) that he is a citizen of Burma (Myanmar). It is, with respect, equally not surprising that the consular official reading that application form would reject it on the ground that the appellant is not Bangladeshi and, therefore, not entitled to a Bangladeshi passport. The grounds of appeal are disingenuous. The grounds assert that “the embassy [High Commission] had assessed the appellant and found him not to be a Bangladeshi national.” That “assessment” appears to have gone no further than reading the appellant’s application form in which he stated that he was a Myanmar national. The letter comes nowhere near constituting adequate corroboration of the appellant’s claim to be a citizen of Myanmar. As regards Judge Parkes, I have no reason to believe that he ignored the letter given that he said that he had reached his decision following an assessment of all the evidence. Secondly, even if the letter had been before him, I find that it is inconceivable that it would have reversed his other findings, based on assessment of all the evidence, which led him to conclude that the appellant had failed to prove that he was a citizen of Myanmar. In short, the probative value of the letter, which simply repeats the appellant’s own false assertion as to his nationality, is virtually nil.
7. For the reasons I have given, the appeal is dismissed.

Notice of Decision
This appeal is dismissed.

Direction Regarding Anonymity – Rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008
Unless and until a Tribunal or court directs otherwise, the appellant is granted anonymity. No report of these proceedings shall directly or indirectly identify him or any member of their family. This direction applies both to the appellant and to the respondent. Failure to comply with this direction could lead to contempt of court proceedings.

Signed Date 13 March 2017

Upper Tribunal Judge Clive Lane

TO THE RESPONDENT
FEE AWARD
No fee is payable because we have dismissed the appeal.

Signed Date 13 March 2017

Upper Tribunal Judge Clive Lane