Tribunal decisions

The decision

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: PA/02884/2015

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard in Birmingham
Decision & Reasons Promulgated
On 6 March 2017
On 15 March 2017

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SMITH

Between

MR E G
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr R Sharif, Solicitor, Fountain solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr D Mills, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Anonymity
Rule 14: The Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008
Anonymity was granted at an earlier stage of the proceedings. As the case involves protection issues, it is appropriate to continue the order for anonymity. Unless and until a tribunal or court directs otherwise, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No report of these proceedings shall directly or indirectly identify him or any member of his family. This direction applies both to the Appellant and to the Respondent. Failure to comply with this direction could lead to contempt of court proceedings.

DECISION AND REASONS
Background
1. The Appellant appeals against a decision of First-Tier Tribunal Judge Butler promulgated on 9 September 2016 (“the Decision”) dismissing the Appellant’s appeal against the Secretary of State’s decision dated 29 October 2015 refusing his protection and human rights claims.
2. The Appellant claims to be a national of Eritrea. He claims that he was born there but that his family moved to Ethiopia in 1993 when he would have been aged seven or eight years and remained there until 2000 when he claims they were deported back to Eritrea and again settled in their home area of Assab. He claims that his father was targeted by the authorities in Eritrea as he was a Pentecostal Christian. He claims that his father was arrested by the authorities in 2002 and detained. The Appellant claims to have been struck on the head with the butt of a gun during the raid. He claims that he was taken by his uncle to Sudan where he lived for twelve years and married. He left Sudan alone in 2014 and travelled to Libya where he remained for one year before arriving in the UK clandestinely via France and Italy. He claimed asylum on arrival.
3. The Respondent does not accept the Appellant’s nationality. She asserts that he is Ethiopian. She also does not accept that the Appellant is a Pentecostal Christian. Those were therefore the two central issues for the Judge to determine in relation to the credibility of the Appellant’s claim. The Judge did not believe the Appellant in relation to either issue and therefore agreed with the Respondent that the Appellant is not at risk on return as he will be returned to Ethiopia and will not be persecuted on account of his religion (even if he is a Pentecostal Christian) in that country.
4. The Appellant raises a number of grounds of challenge to the Decision with which I deal more fully below. Permission was granted by First-tier Tribunal Judge Pullig on 27 September 2016 in the following terms:-
“[2] The grounds seeking permission complain first that the Judge had failed to consider, as he was obliged to do, the decision in FA (Eritrea – nationality) Eritrea CG [2005] UKIAT 00047. This remains country guidance. Given the appellant’s evidence regarding his parents’ nationality as Eritrean, then notwithstanding his apparent lack of knowledge of Eritrea and its language and other issues relating thereto, the judge should have done so and made findings accordingly. This would have affected his findings in other respects. It is unnecessary to consider the other grounds, which, in the light of the above, appear to be arguable. There is no need to rehearse them.
[3] I find that the Judge’s decision is arguable [sic] flawed by errors of law and I grant permission. All grounds are arguable.”
5. The appeal comes before me to decide whether the Decision discloses any material error of law and, if I so find, either to re-make the Decision or remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal to do so.
Grounds and Submissions
6. Mr Sharif adopted the Appellant’s grounds. The stated reason for the grant of permission is the Judge’s failure to consider the country guidance case of FA (Eritrea – nationality) Eritrea CG [2005] UKIAT 00047 (“FA (Eritrea)”). I therefore asked Mr Sharif to point me to where the Judge was asked to consider that decision. He frankly admitted that there was no reference to it in either the Appellant’s skeleton argument for the hearing before the First-tier Tribunal or in oral submissions. I deal below with the import of that decision in this case. However, at this stage, I also note Mr Sharif’s frank acceptance that there is no evidence in the Appellant’s statement or bundle more generally as to the issue which arises from that decision.
7. Mr Mills directed my attention to the list of cases relied upon by the Appellant which consists of four separate country guidance cases relating to Eritrea. Whilst he accepted that FA (Eritrea) remains valid country guidance in the sense that it has not been overruled by later country guidance, he submitted that it is notable that none of the later country guidance cases have thought the issue arising in FA (Eritrea) to be of sufficient importance to warrant repetition. He also pointed out that the issue relied upon by the Appellant is one on which some evidence would be required and the Appellant has put forward no evidence about it. The Respondent rejected the Appellant’s nationality because he knew nothing about Eritrea. The Judge accepted that as adverse to the Appellant’s credibility. This issue could therefore make no material difference, because of the lack of any evidential basis.
8. The other issues raised in the grounds as challenging the Decision in relation to the Appellant’s nationality are the burden of proof relating to the nationality issue and the weight given to the report of Dr Callaway dated 26 July 2016.
9. Dealing with the first of those issues and as Mr Mills accepted, it is not entirely clear what standard of proof the Judge applied at [43] of the Decision when dealing with the issue of nationality. Mr Mills submitted that since the Respondent has made a positive assessment of the Appellant’s nationality (which is not always possible in such cases) the Judge should apply the balance of probabilities standard to the question whether the Appellant is Ethiopian. The Appellant himself is only required to establish that he is Eritrean to the lower standard. However, although [43] is not entirely clear, Mr Mills directed my attention to the use of the words “more likely than not” which, albeit referring to the Appellant’s age, nonetheless carry through to the remainder of the paragraph where the Judge concludes that the Appellant is Ethiopian.
10. In relation to Dr Callaway’s report, Mr Sharif drew my attention to the Judge’s reference at [41] of the Decision first to not giving “any weight” to the report and then giving it “little weight”. The materiality of that report, he submitted, relates to the events which the Appellant said occurred when he was in Eritrea and his father was arrested. I pointed out to Mr Sharif that the Judge found as he did because the injuries on which the Appellant seemingly relied when discussing the events with the GP were inconsistent with what he said in his own evidence. Leaving aside that he did not apparently know prior to these discussions what type of gun was used to cause the injury to his head, the Appellant also appears to have said to the GP that he had a cut on his thigh caused during the raid but this had never been referred to in his evidence. Mr Sharif appeared at first to dispute this (as do the grounds) but was unable to direct my attention to any reference to this in the Appellant’s witness statements or answers at interview.
11. Mr Mills submitted that the Judge was entitled to give little or no weight to the report for the reasons set out at [36] to [41] of the Decision. He noted that Dr Calloway had not apparently been shown the Appellant’s witness statements and asylum interview notes and could not therefore be aware when expressing a view on the consistency of the injuries with the Appellant’s account of events that those were also to some extent inconsistent with his own evidence. He submitted that whether the Judge attached little or no weight to the report was immaterial. The fact remained that the Judge was entitled to reject the Appellant’s account as not credible even taking into account that report.
12. The Appellant also argues in his grounds that it was incumbent on the Judge to consider the risk on return to the Appellant if he is removed to Ethiopia. Mr Sharif was however unable to direct my attention to anything in the skeleton argument, submissions or the Appellant’s evidence that he would be at risk in Ethiopia if he is an Ethiopian national. The submission appears to be founded on the Appellant being an ethnic Eritrean. Mr Sharif accepted though that if the findings at [43] and [48] of the Decision cannot be undermined, the Judge has found the Appellant to be an Ethiopian national and not Eritrean. In relation to the case of ST (Ethnic Eritrean – nationality – return) Ethiopia CG [2011] UKUT 252 (IAC) (“ST (Eritrea)”), on which the Appellant’s grounds rely in this regard, Mr Mills submitted that the reliance is misplaced. ST (Eritrea) is concerned with Eritrean nationals who seek to be returned to Ethiopia. If the finding that the Appellant is Ethiopian stands, then that is not this case.
13. Other than in relation to Article 8 ECHR, the remainder of the Appellant’s grounds are directed at the Judge’s findings about the Appellant’s religion. Mr Sharif submitted that the Judge failed to give reasons or gave inadequate reasons for rejecting the Appellant’s evidence that he is a Pentecostal Christian. The Appellant’s case in that regard is based on evidence provided by others that he attends church in the UK and that he holds that faith. Mr Sharif pointed out that Coventry where the Appellant lives and Birmingham where he is said to attend church twice weekly are geographically proximate. In response to a question from me whether the Judge’s conclusions were not based on distance but the Appellant’s ability to fund that journey, Mr Sharif submitted that the Judge did not have sufficient evidence to reject the Appellant’s account on that basis. It may be the case, for example, that he takes the bus or is given a lift by others who attend. He did not though direct my attention to evidence before the Judge that this is the case.
14. Mr Sharif also submitted that it was not open to the Judge, as he appeared to have done, to give little weight to the letter from the Appellant’s pastor in relation to the Appellant’s religion. He was constrained to accept that the letter is very vague in its content (as the Judge found at [44] of the Decision) but submitted that the Judge’s findings in this regard were tainted by the error in relation to the (lack of) likelihood that the Appellant would attend church in Birmingham when he lives in Coventry.
15. Mr Mills submitted that the findings in relation to the Appellant’s religion are in fact immaterial if the Appellant is Ethiopian. The Appellant has not adduced any evidence that there is a risk to Pentecostal Christians in Ethiopia. Further, if the Appellant is found to be Eritrean, the Respondent accepts that he would face a risk on return due to illegal exit. Accordingly, if he is found to be Eritrean, he would be entitled to asylum (based on the current situation in that country). In any event, Mr Mills submitted that the findings were open to the Judge on the evidence.
16. The final ground relied upon by the Appellant concerns the (lack of) findings by the Judge whether there are “very significant obstacles” to the Appellant’s integration in Ethiopia applying paragraph 276ADE(1)(vi) of the Immigration Rules. I directed Mr Sharif’s attention to [51] of the Decision which shows that Mr Sharif, who also represented the Appellant before Judge Butler, expressly disavowed reliance on Article 8 ECHR. The Judge had nonetheless referred to the lack of obstacles. Mr Mills submitted that there is no error in this regard because the Appellant did not rely on Article 8 ECHR and there is no evidence to show that there are any obstacles let alone any very significant ones preventing his integration in Ethiopia where, even on the Appellant’s own account, he lived for the first years of his life.
17. Both representatives agreed that if I found a material error of law, the appeal should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal. The challenge to the Decision turns entirely on issues of credibility.
Discussion and conclusions
18. I begin by addressing the last of the Appellant’s grounds concerning Article 8 ECHR. The Judge expressly refers at [51] of the Decision to Mr Sharif’s confirmation that he was not pursuing an argument under Article 8. The Judge nonetheless went on to deal with this. There is no challenge to the Judge’s finding that the Appellant does not claim to have a family life in the UK nor that his private life formed in the UK would be insufficient to outweigh the public interest. The challenge relates only to the issue of whether there are “very significant obstacles” to integration in Ethiopia. The Appellant has not put forward evidence of very significant obstacles other than the factors which form the basis of his protection claim. The question whether those factors amount to very significant obstacles does not therefore arise for decision. If the Appellant can make out a protection claim, he succeeds on that account and there would be no need to consider those factors also under Article 8 ECHR.
19. I therefore turn to consider the challenges to the Decision in relation to the protection claim. As Mr Mills submitted, and I accept, the central issue in the claim is the Appellant’s nationality. If he is Ethiopian (or more accurately, the Judge’s findings that he is are not open to challenge), then the issue of risk based on the Appellant’s religion simply does not arise.
20. I start by considering the issue on which permission was mainly granted, concerning the case of FA (Eritrea). It is common ground that the Judge was not referred to this case by either representative. As Mr Mills also pointed out, it is a country guidance case of some vintage, being promulgated in 2005. It is also a case which does not receive any mention in the later country guidance cases to which the Judge’s attention was drawn. It is nonetheless also common ground that it remains valid country guidance. It remains reported on the Upper Tribunal’s website. The issue therefore arises whether the Judge should have drawn attention to it and considered it against the Appellant’s claim notwithstanding the lack of any reference to it by the representatives.
21. The Appellant relies on FA (Eritrea) for what it says at [3] of that decision as follows:-
“[3] The respondent in the refusal letter had found the appellant to be a national of Eritrea who would be able to return there in safety. At the hearing the appellant disputed this. She relied on the terms of the 1992 Eritrean Nationality Proclamation (No. 21/1992) which sets out those who were entitled to Eritrean citizenship by birth. Although Article 2(1) of the Proclamation states that:
‘Any person born to a father or mother of Eritrean origin in Eritrea or abroad is an Eritrean national by birth’
Article 2(2) then defines Eritrean origin thus:
‘A person who has ‘Eritrean origin’ is any person who was resident in Eritrea in 1933’”
22. FA (Eritrea) is a country guidance case which pre-dates the practice of providing headnotes setting out the issue(s) which the case decides which has relevance to other cases. That appears though from the last sentence at [32] which states:
“…It is reported for what we say about nationality in general and Eritrean nationality in particular.”
That does not take matters any further. However, the context of the case is evident from the passage at [3] which I cite above at [21]. The case concerned an appellant who said that she would not be at risk in Eritrea; her argument though was that she could not be returned there as she said that the Eritrean authorities would not accept her as being Eritrean. On her case, her father was not born until 1940 and she therefore said, based on the terms of the Proclamation, she would not be permitted to enter Eritrea. The facts of that case are therefore the complete opposite to those in this appeal where the Appellant actively seeks not to return to Eritrea, says he is in fact Eritrean and that both the Eritrean and Ethiopian authorities would judge him to be such. I note also that there was some dispute in FA (Eritrea) about the interpretation of the Proclamation when compared with the practice of the Eritrean authorities in relation to recognition of Eritrean nationality. However, the issue whether the Eritrean authorities would, on the facts of FA’s case, recognise her as Eritrean is of no relevance to the question whether this Appellant is Eritrean based on his parentage nor what the effect would be if his parents were recognised as Eritrean nationals.
23. On its own, therefore, FA (Eritrea) cannot help with the question in this case which is the nationality of the Appellant, whether he is Ethiopian and whether he is returnable and is to be returned to Ethiopia where he does not claim to be at risk per se. His only claim as to risk based on FA (Eritrea) if Ethiopia is his destination is that, as his parents would be considered by the Ethiopian authorities to be Eritrean nationals, he would (on his case) be deported by the Ethiopian authorities to Eritrea. The case of FA (Eritrea) does not assist on that issue. Certainly, it cannot be said that the case is of such obvious relevance to this case that the Judge was bound to take it into account notwithstanding the failure of the Appellant’s representative to refer to it, particularly in circumstances where the Judge found the Appellant to be Ethiopian.
24. The second difficulty standing in the way of the Appellant in the submission that the Judge was bound to take FA (Eritrea) into account is the complete lack of any evidence relating to the issue which the Appellant says is material namely whether either or both of his parents would be considered to be of Eritrean origin because they were born in Eritrea before 1933. There is no reference to the date or place of birth of either of his parents. In short, there was nothing in the evidence or submissions which should have given the Judge cause to consider whether the Appellant’s parents were of Eritrean origin nor indeed any evidence on which the Judge could have determined that issue.
25. It is convenient at this point to consider also ground [4.1] as the Appellant also there asserts that the Judge failed to have regard to another country guidance case relevant to his appeal. That is the case of ST (Eritrea). The Appellant relies on what is said at [127] of that decision as follows:-
“[127] Such, I find, is the state of affairs that the appellant would face, if returned today to Ethiopia in the circumstances I have described. Does that state of affairs constitute persecution? It is common ground that, at the present time, a person in the appellant’s position would not face a real risk of physical ill-treatment, whether from the authorities or non-state elements, such as to constitute Article 3 ill-treatment or persecution. Nevertheless, looking at matters overall and acknowledging that the threshold for persecution is a high one, I have concluded that the state of affairs would be persecutory for this appellant. Notwithstanding that he is relatively young and apparently able-bodied, the accumulated difficulties he would face, arising from what ex hypothesi is an arbitrary deprivation of citizenship/refusal to recognise citizenship, based on the discriminatory grounds of the appellant’s ethnicity, crosses the persecution threshold by some margin, applying Article 9 of the Qualification Directive…
[Appellant’s emphasis]
26. There are several reasons why ST (Eritrea) cannot assist the Appellant. First, the passage cited in the grounds is not part of the stated country guidance in the headnote. Second, as that headnote makes clear, the issue of deprivation of (Ethiopian) nationality which arose in that case, turns on the factual background of each case. Third, as Mr Mills points out, the issues in that case are very different to those in this appeal. ST (Eritrea) was concerned with persons who claimed to be of Ethiopian nationality but said that they were being arbitrarily deprived of that nationality because of their Eritrean connections. I should in fairness to the Appellant note that one of the ways in which the Tribunal suggested that the deprivation of nationality issue should be resolved (by approach by the appellant to the Ethiopian Embassy) is something which the Appellant says that he has done. However, the Judge was not satisfied that the Appellant had in fact taken those steps ([49] of the Decision) for the reasons there stated. Although ST (Eritrea) was a country guidance case to which the Judge’s attention was drawn, no reference was made to it in the skeleton argument or submissions. The findings of the Judge as to the Appellant’s nationality are that he is Ethiopian and not Eritrean. Although Mr Sharif submitted that the Appellant is accepted to be ethnic Eritrean, I can discern no such acceptance by the Judge.
27. I turn then to the basis on which the Judge found the Appellant to be Ethiopian and not Eritrean. His findings are set out at [34] to [43] of the Decision as follows:-
“[34] The principal issues in this case are the Appellant’s nationality and his religion. These issues will be decided by reference to the Appellant’s credibility.
[35] I did not find the Appellant’s narrative to be credible or plausible. His accounts of events as stated in his witness statements, asylum interview and the medical report are inconsistent.
[36] I have reviewed the medical report of Dr Calloway in detail. I note that the account the Appellant gave her of his injuries is inconsistent with his other statements and his interview record. For example, when his home was raided by the security forces, Dr Calloway notes at paragraph 2 of her report that the Appellant said he was hit on the head with the butt of an AK47. He does not identify the weapon with which he was beaten anywhere else and I do not find it likely that someone as young as the Appellant claimed to be at the time would recognise such a weapon and be able to name it.
[37] Dr Calloway also notes that the Appellant ‘heard that his mother died in Ethiopia His father was in prison a long time. He was eventually told his father had died in prison’. In the Appellant’s statement of 20 October 2015, however, he states at paragraph 4 that his mother died whilst he, his mother and father were in Ethiopia and at paragraph 11 states that, since the raid on his home by security forces, ‘I have not seen or heard of my father since the day of the raid and I do not know what became of him’. In response to question 133 in his asylum interview, the Appellant confirmed he did not know what had become of his father whereas in response to question 78 he said his father had been killed because of his religion.
[38] The Appellant has also been inconsistent regarding his date of birth. I note that Dr Calloway’s medical report states his date of birth to be 1 January 1985 whereas the Appellant states in his witness statement that he was born on 20 November 1992 and in his screening interview 1 January 1985.
[39] Dr Calloway notes at paragraph 20 of her report that the Appellant has a scar across the back of his upper thigh and this is consistent with his account of one of the security personnel cutting him the night they raided his house and took his father. I note, however, that nowhere else does the Appellant state that he was cut by one of the security force, only that he was hit with a weapon. Dr Calloway states that the scar on his head is consistent with an injury due to a ‘forceful blow to the head…’. She notes, however, that other causations are also possible including a heavy fall against a hard/sharp surface.
[40] Dr Calloway also concludes that the Appellant is ‘not very well psychologically’ and that he suffers from nightmares and low mood. She also states at paragraph 30 that he was detained and tortured in Ethiopia but this is not mentioned anywhere else in his statements or asylum interview.
[41] I do not attach any weight to Dr Calloway’s report. Whilst she has indicated she has made reference to the Istanbul Protocol, there is no indication she has seen the Appellant’s statements, his Asylum Interview Record or the refusal letter. Accordingly, I am of the view that, due to the inconsistencies in the narrative given to her by the Appellant, her conclusions must carry little weight.
[42] In relation to the Appellant’s age the evidence is so inconsistent as not to be credible. The Appellant has given two different dates of birth. His GP surgery states he was born in 1985, Rehoboth Elim Church states his date of birth as 1 January 1985 as do his solicitors in correspondence with the Tribunal. I conclude that the Appellant has given 1 January 1985 as his date of birth on sufficient occasions for it to be more reliable than the later date given by him and this does, of course, throw doubt on the chronology of his account.
[43] The Appellant showed little evidence of having knowledge of Eritrea in general and Assad in particular. Given that it is more likely than not he was born in 1985, he would have spent more time in Eritrea and his explanation that he was young and did not live there very long is not credible. Add this to the fact that he does not speak Tigrinyan, allegedly the language of his parents and I conclude he is Ethiopian.”
28. Dealing first with the standard of proof to be applied to the issue of nationality, I accept Mr Mills’ submission as to the appropriate standard, that is to say that the Respondent has to show on the balance of probabilities that the Appellant is Ethiopian whereas the Appellant only has to show on the lower standard that he is Eritrean. Whilst I readily accept that [43] is not as clear as it might be and that the Judge has not referred to the relevant standard to be applied on this issue elsewhere, he does refer at [32] and [33] to the lower standard in relation to the standard of proof placed on the Appellant.
29. The Judge has provided reasons at [43] for rejecting the Appellant’s account to be Eritrean. Those reasons follow more general reasons for finding the Appellant not credible. Having refused to accept that the Appellant is credible as to his assertion that he is Eritrean, there is in fact no need for the Judge to go further in relation to alternative nationalities (see reference to the case of Hamza v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] UKIAT 05185 at [1.6] of the Appellant’s grounds). The Judge here did so because the Respondent had offered an alternative nationality. As Mr Mills submitted, in the case of some countries, it is not possible for the Respondent to offer an alternative but in the case of those asserting that they are Eritrean, there is only generally one other option if they are not believed as to that nationality. However, the issue for the Judge was whether the Appellant has made out a protection claim in relation to return to Eritrea. Having concluded that the Appellant is not returnable to Eritrea because he is not Eritrean, that was as far as the Judge needed to go. Any error, if there is one, therefore, in relation to the standard of proof as to the Appellant’s nationality as Ethiopian is not material.
30. Finally, in relation to the nationality issue, the Appellant challenges the Judge’s treatment of the medical report of Dr Calloway. The Judge makes valid criticisms of the way in which this report has been prepared as Dr Calloway has failed to consider the Appellant’s version of events in the context of other evidence he has given as to those events. Furthermore, far from strengthening the Appellant’s credibility, the report undermines it. As I have noted at [10] above and as the Judge notes at [39] of the Decision, the Appellant had never previously said that he was cut on his thigh during the raid. Neither had he previously stated that he was detained and tortured in Ethiopia ([40] of the Decision). The Judge was required to consider the impact of the medical report on the credibility of the Appellant’s account. Whether he gave that report little or no weight is immaterial; the fact remains that it did not assist the Appellant’s case.
31. For the reasons Mr Mills stated (as recorded at [15] above), strictly, I do not need to refer to the credibility findings in relation to the Appellant’s religion because there is no material adduced by the Appellant that the Ethiopian authorities target Pentecostal Christians. Further even on the Appellant’s own case, he and his family were able to live in Ethiopia for a number of years undisturbed. As Mr Mills also accepts, the Appellant would be entitled to asylum if he were found to be Eritrean because of illegal exit and the country guidance on that issue. However, for the sake of completeness, I deal with the last of the Appellant’s grounds concerning the Judge’s treatment of the Pastor’s letter and the point about the Appellant’s attendance at church in Birmingham when he lives in Coventry. The Judge deals with those issues at [44] as follows:-
“[44] In relation to his religion, the Appellant has, as noted in the refusal letter, shown a lack of detailed accurate knowledge of Pentecostalism. The letter from Rhema Faith Ministries, which was adopted by its author, Pastor Sami Asgodom, gives no indication of how it was concluded the Appellant is a genuine Pentecostal Christian. Further, it does not specify what church programmes the Appellant is continually attending. The letter from Rehoboth Elim Church does not even state that the Appellant is a Pentecostal Christian but said he attended church twice each week. I note that both of these churches are in Birmingham whereas the Appellant resides in Coventry and I consider it unlikely that he would be in a position to travel from Coventry to Birmingham twice each week to attend church services. Accordingly, I attach little weight to the evidence from the two churches.”
32. The letter from the Pastor is in the following terms:-
“I have known Mr [EG] he joined our church in 08/01/2016.
He has been attending our church programmes continually.
At all times I have found him to be spiritual, reliable, honest, peace-loving and courteous individual and he is a genuine Pentecostal Christian. For your information I am a pastor at Rhema Faith Ministries is a Pentecostal church Birmingham which is established thirteen years ago and now has a congregation of more than 200 believers…”
33. Whilst it might reasonably be inferred that the pastor of a Pentecostal church would himself be a Pentecostal Christian, the letter does not state that in terms. Further, the other criticisms of the letter are clear from its face. Whilst the reasons given for disbelieving the Appellant’s attendance at church are less cogent, there was no evidence before the Judge as to how the Appellant travelled from Coventry to Birmingham twice weekly and whilst clearly that is not a long geographical distance, it is not walking distance, and the Judge was entitled to note what I infer to be a lack of financial means available to the Appellant given that he is an asylum seeker. In any event, I am not persuaded that any error in that regard is material to the question of whether the Pastor’s letter can be relied upon. Further, as I have noted, the issue of the Appellant’s religion only becomes relevant if he is believed as to his nationality and for the reasons I have given at [19] to [30] above, there is no material error in the Judge’s findings in that regard.
34. For those reasons, the Judge was entitled to conclude as he did at [48] of the Decision that “…the Appellant’s account is a fabrication designed to bolster his claim. I find he is an Ethiopian national and not a Pentecostal Christian….”.
35. For the reasons given above, I am satisfied that the Decision does not disclose any error of law. I therefore uphold the Decision.

DECISION
I am satisfied that the Decision does not contain a material error of law. The decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Butler promulgated on 9 September 2016 is maintained.

Signed Dated: 15 March 2017
Upper Tribunal Judge Smith