Tribunal decisions

The decision

IAC-FH-NL-V1

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: PA/02967/2015

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Field House
Decision & Reasons Promulgated
On 17th October 2016
On 3rd November 2016

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE FRANCES

Between

Ahmad [A]
(anonymity direction not made)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr R Jesurum, instructed by Lawrence & Co Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr D Clarke, Home Office Presenting Officer

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The Appellant is a Palestinian refugee who was formerly resident in Lebanon. He was born on 18th April 1992. His appeal against the Respondent's refusal of his protection claim was dismissed by First-tier Tribunal Judge Higgins in a decision dated 7th June 2016 and promulgated on 21st June 2016. The Respondent was not represented before the First-tier Tribunal.

2. The Appellant applied for permission to appeal on four grounds: the judge erred in law in his assessment of credibility; there was a delay of three months between the hearing and promulgation of the decision which amounted to an error of law following the decision of Sambasivan v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2000] Imm AR; the judge erred in law in relying on inconsistencies between the Appellant's screening interview and his substantive interview; and the judge erred in law in his assessment of Article 8 under the Immigration Rules in failing to take into account relevant evidence in concluding that there were no significant obstacles to reintegration.

3. Permission to appeal was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Gleeson on 30th August 2016 on the grounds that, although there was not a three month delay as far as the judge's work on the decision was concerned, the decision did not set out the Appellant's oral evidence coherently and it was at least arguable that in the judge's analysis of the Appellant's evidence and his core account the judge placed too much weight on the Respondent's view of his evidence rather than analysing the Appellant's evidence. The findings of fact in respect of the appeal of the Appellant's brother were not clear nor was it apparent that the judge took into account the decision as a starting point. There was no record of the submissions made by Mr Lee on behalf of the Appellant.

Submissions

4. Mr Jesurum relied on the four grounds of appeal and the recent authority of Kamara v SSHD [2016] EWCA Civ 813, which dealt with integration and was relevant to ground 4. In relation to ground 1, he submitted that this was an overarching challenge to the judge's credibility findings. The judge's decision fell short of anxious scrutiny. This was a case where the judge had found the Appellant's claim to be implausible in some respects which was an incorrect approach to the assessment of the evidence. The judge's findings at paragraph 37 that it was implausible that the Appellant did not make further enquiries as to the nature of the activity at the ten day scout camp, failed to take into account the Appellant's explanation even though it was recorded at paragraph 6 of the decision and it was clearly apparent from the Appellant's witness statement. Although this finding at paragraph 37 was not enough in itself, a similar approach to the evidence could be detected throughout.

5. Secondly, it was the Respondent's case that the ten day scout camp was supported by the government so there was no reason for why the Appellant would be targeted by the authorities. The Appellant made two points which were not considered by the judge. Firstly, the nature of the camp might have been misunderstood and, secondly, there were rival factions within Lebanon such that the intervention by the security forces might have been dictated by those supportive of the Syrian regime such as Hezbollah. What was lacking in the decision was an analysis of the points being put forward by the Appellant. The judge was dealing with a society ridden with flaws and Hezbollah may well control some security elements. The Appellant may well be targeted by elements supported by a different faction and this was supported by the objective evidence. The judge had failed to give the Appellant's case anxious scrutiny.

6. In relation to ground 3, Mr Jesurum submitted that in considering the inconsistencies in the Appellant's account the judge had failed to apply the lower standard of proof. The decision-maker should not put out of his mind an account given by the Appellant unless there was no doubt that the event did not occur. The Appellant stated that there had been a mistranslation and this should be approached as to whether there was a reasonable likelihood that it had in fact occurred. The judge stated that the mistranslation point was not made in the Appellant's statement. However, it was made in the Appellant's interview and therefore it did not make a difference to whether there was a reasonable degree of likelihood that this event had occurred.

7. In his witness statement the Appellant stated that he had provided all relevant evidence in his initial interview, but it was not recorded that there was a mistranslation. The Appellant had asked for his interview to be taped because otherwise he was deprived of a means of proof. The Appellant had provided details of how the mistakes had arisen. The Appellant stated that the interpreter in the screening interview had incorrectly translated 'accused' with 'charged' and 'arrest warrant'. The Appellant had in fact been accused of a crime and not actually charged with a crime. These matters were dealt with in the Appellant's witness statement and the judge had failed to apply the lower standard of proof to his assessment of these explanations.

8. At paragraph 15 of the grounds the Appellant relied on the case of JA (Afghanistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] EWCA Civ 540:

"That is particularly important when considering the significance to be attached to answers given in the course of an interview and recorded only by the person asking questions on behalf of the Secretary of State. Such evidence may be entirely reliable, but there is obviously room for mistakes and misunderstandings, even when the person being questioned speaks English fluently. The possibility of error becomes greater when the person being interviewed requires the services of an interpreter, particularly if the interpreter is not physically present. It becomes greater still if the person being interviewed is vulnerable by reason of age or infirmity. The written word acquires a degree of certainly which the spoken word may not command. The 'anxious scrutiny' which all claimants for asylum are entitled to expect begins with a careful consideration of the weight that should properly be attached to the answers given in their interviews. In the present case the decision-maker would need to bear in mind the age and background of the applicant, his limited command of English and the circumstances under which the initial interview and screening interview took place."

9. The judge had given inadequate consideration to the explanations and the application of the appropriate standard. Further, the decision-maker had failed to keep an open mind. The case of Karanakaran suggested that, although the assessment of evidence was approached serially, the decision could not be made in the same way. A reasonable degree of likelihood applied to each piece of evidence and to the evidence as a whole. The test was whether there was a reasonable degree of likelihood that the Appellant's account was a true one.

10. In respect of the Appellant there was evidence for and against. The judge should have assessed each piece of the Appellant's evidence and formed a provisional view, but not made specific conclusions on each part of evidence because different pieces of evidence supported each other. It was possible that the explanations given by the Appellant were reasonably likely to be correct. The lower standard demanded that the decision should not exclude matters from consideration of future matters unless there was no real doubt that they could not have occurred. The conclusion set out at paragraph 16 of the grounds demonstrated that the judge had failed to apply the appropriate standard of proof to the evidence as a whole.

11. In relation to ground 2, Mr Jerusum submitted that the decision had been promulgated three months after the hearing. Nexus was a flexible term, not a strict causal relationship. There had to be some connection. In the case of RK (Algeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] EWCA Civ 868, the court found that in order to show that delay has led to an error of law it had to be shown that the judgment was not safe and therefore unlawful. In RK, the court said that a nexus had to be shown between the delay and the safety of the decision. However, the present case could be distinguished from RK because in that case credibility was not in issue. Accordingly, there was no requirement for a direct causal connection. The Appellant need not point to evidence which had not been considered.

12. If a direct causal connection was required, the rule in Sambasivan was unnecessary. Sambasivan protected the perception of the process. A substantial delay tended to undermine the loser's confidence in the correctness of the decision. Promulgating after three months where credibility was the essential issue tended to undermine the confidence in the administration of justice.

13. In relation to ground 4, Mr Jesurum submitted that the Appellant was permitted to rely on the black letter Immigration Rules. The Rules made the factors considered in Strasbourg jurisprudence a test and not only one of the factors to be considered. Very significant obstacles to integration was a test in the Immigration Rules and if they were present the Appellant was entitled to succeed. In the case of Kamara, Lord Justice Sales at paragraph 14 stated:

"In my view, the concept of a foreign criminal's "integration" into the country to which it is proposed that he be deported, as set out in section 117C(4)(c) and paragraph 399A, is a broad one. It is not confined to the mere ability to find a job or to sustain life while living in the other country. It is not appropriate to treat the statutory language as subject to some gloss and it will usually be sufficient for a court or tribunal simply to direct itself in the terms that Parliament has chosen to use. The idea of "integration" calls for a broad evaluative judgment to be made as to whether the individual will be enough of an insider in terms of understanding how life in the society in that other country is carried on and a capacity to participate in it, so as to have a reasonable opportunity to be accepted there, to be able to operate on a day-to-day basis in that society and to build up within a reasonable time a variety of human relationships to give substance to the individual's private or family life."

14. In the Appellant's case the background material showed that there were very significant obstacles to participation in life in the Lebanon for Palestinians. The judge had given inadequate consideration to the test in this particular case. He stated there was no reason to suppose that the Appellant would be unable to resume his former life, but the Appellant's former life was not an integrated one because of the widespread discrimination against Palestinians. The judge had failed to analyse what integration was in the Appellant's case. He had no capacity to live a full life or operate within society with equal opportunity. It was arguable that the judge had failed to address the test set out in Kamara.

15. For the Respondent, Mr Clarke submitted that there were three issues on credibility. The Appellant submitted in grounds 1 and 3 that the judge took matters in an artificial and separate way and this was incorrect. However, the approach of the First-tier Judge was to set out the standard of proof at paragraph 33; to set out the substance of the Appellant's claim at paragraph 34; and then at paragraphs 35 to 43 to look at all the factors without being determinative. The judge then properly directed himself to consider the evidence in the round at paragraph 44 in concluding that the Appellant's claim was not genuine.

16. The first point advanced by the Appellant is that the judge ignored key factors, namely that the Appellant's friends were going along to the scout camp and had invited him to come along and the judge had assessed this evidence on plausibility grounds. It was clear from paragraph 37 that the judge took into account the Appellant's explanation that he went because his friends were going and it would not cost him any money to go to the scout camp. This was also apparent from his statement of the Appellant's case and from what he set out at paragraph 18. Accordingly, it could not be said that the judge had ignored the reasons put forward by the Appellant.

17. The judge went on to identify countervailing factors in the Appellant's evidence which went against his explanation. The judge, from his findings at paragraph 13, was clearly aware of the background evidence and, at paragraph 19, of the political history of the Future Movement which was part of the legislature. There was clear integration of this movement within the government. In considering the background evidence and taking into account the Appellant's own personal situation, it was open to the judge to find that his explanation raised suspicion and that he would have asked for more information. The judge was entitled to address that.

18. At paragraph 41, the judge found that the Appellant had embellished his account. He was saying that, although this may be an incidental issue which was not credible, it detracted from the essential issue. There was no evidence that other participants in the camp had been pursued by the authorities in the Appellant's statement. However, the Appellant had developed his claim in interview and had put a gloss on his account. It was not incidental to the main claim whether others were pursued. It went to the core of the Appellant's claim.

19. The Appellant's claim was that the authorities had considered the camp of adverse interest. It was specific to risk at the core of the Appellant's claim. The judge stated what the Respondent claimed and what the Appellant said in response. The judge then concluded why he accepted the Appellant's rebuttal. He identified where he drew no adverse interest and his assessment was a fair and balanced appraisal of the evidence. In his assessment the judge considered everything in the round and his findings were open to him. The Appellant's grounds amount simply to disagreements.

20. The judge dealt with the two reasons from the Appellant for why there was an adverse interest at paragraph 42. The judge summarised both points and after looking at both points concluded that the Appellant leaned towards the latter possibility. The judge looked at the case advanced at the hearing, but concluded that there was no background evidence that the security forces operated against the government. The judge accepted that the Appellant was not required to corroborate his claim, but the background evidence did not support the Appellant's case. If it existed the Appellant's representative should have put it before the Tribunal. The judge noted that there was no background evidence to support the Appellant's claim and also that the Future Movement was part of the government.

21. The Appellant submitted that there was no evidence that the authorities would not act other than in accordance with their employment and therefore it was not open to the judge to make such a finding. However, the Appellant had to identify that the security forces were working against the government and that there was rivalry between Hezbollah and the Future Movement. In the absence of such evidence, the judge's findings at paragraph 42 could not be impugned.

22. In relation to ground 2, it was clear from the grant of permission that the decision was signed on 7th June 2016 which was under three months from the date of hearing. There was a nexus which must stand or fall with the substance of the grounds. The Appellant had not identified evidence to show that the findings were not open to judge. There was no nexus and the date of promulgation was irrelevant.

23. In response to ground 3, Mr Clark submitted that, at paragraph 40, the judge was critical of the Appellant developing his case. The Appellant's witness statement made no mention of the explanation for the inconsistencies between the screening interview and subsequent evidence. The explanations were only raised later in the substantive interview. It was not enough to say that there was an interpreter problem. It was open to the judge to take this into account and his approach was consistent with the reasoning in JA.

24. In relation to ground 4, at paragraph 47, the judge noted the background evidence in general. He found that the Appellant had been employed as a plumber for five or 6 six years after completing his education and his parents lived in an area whose population reflected the varied cultural and religious makeup of Lebanon generally. The judge's approach was consistent with Kamara. The judge found that the Appellant could go back to his former life and this finding was open to the judge on the evidence.

25. In response, Mr Jesurum submitted that the judge records the burden and standard of proof, but the test was whether he applied it correctly. The approach of the judge fell short of a correct analysis. At paragraphs 31 and 32 the judge was recording what someone said not demonstrating that he was bearing this in mind when making his findings. The repeated use of the term plausible suggested that rather than looking at the account given by the Appellant and the background evidence the judge was applying his knowledge of events in his own country. The issue is how the judge approached the pieces of evidence. Simply because the judge rejected the Respondent's point did not mean that he had approached the rest of the evidence correctly. The gradual emergence of an account was to apply the approach in a criminal prosecution. There was no caution in an asylum interview. To criticise an emerging case is to ignore the reason for having a lower standard of proof. The "what if I am wrong" approach was in essence the appropriate one.

26. In relation to ground 4, the judge could not see the wood for the trees. It was not sufficient to say that the Appellant could go back to his former life when, in his former life, he did not have true integration as he did not have the opportunities set out in Kamara at paragraph 14. He was not treated as an insider. The Appellant lived as an outsider. The Appellant's original life was not an integrated one and the judge's approach misses the larger picture.

27. I asked Mr Jesurum to show me evidence that Hezbollah was part of the security services. He referred me to page G10 of the Respondent's bundle and the paragraph which states:

"Hezbollah has been asked several times by the UN chief Ban Ki-Moon and the Lebanese Army leader to disarm. However, Hezbollah rejected these calls, stating that the weapons are the only guarantee to protection of Lebanon."

28. Mr Jesurum submitted that for the judge to suggest that Lebanon was a monolithic state and that the security services did as they were required by the government was unrealistic. Hezbollah, contrary to the wishes of the state, were fighting in Syria. Given those divisions there may be parts of the security forces who act contrary to the government. The judge could not disregard that there was a reasonable degree of likelihood. There was a clear inference, even though Mr Jesurum could not point to anything that was directly put before the judge.

Discussion and Conclusions

29. The judge set out the core of the Appellant's claim at paragraph 34 namely that he attended a scout camp organised by a body, apparently connected with the Future Movement, and he was wrongly suspected by the Lebanese authorities of having been trained to fight against the Syrian Government and its backers.

30. The Respondent in the refusal letter pointed to several reasons why she did not accept the Appellant's account. The judge set out each of the points made by the Respondent and the Appellant's response to those points. At paragraphs 35 and 36 he found that the Appellant had made a fair point and the Respondent's arguments were rejected. At paragraph 37 the judge concluded:

"More concerning is the fact that the Appellant would have been 22 when he signed up for the camp. He says he did so on the basis that his friends would be going and the camp would not have cost him anything. The Respondent thought it unlikely he would have done so without first enquiring who the camp's organisers were and satisfying himself what its organisers motivation was for providing him with a free holiday. I agree. The extent to which political and religious divisions dominate Lebanese society is apparent from its recent history and is evident from the background country materials to which the Appellant and the Respondent have referred me. Like the Respondent, I consider it unlikely the Appellant would have participated in a 10 day camp, paid for by someone else without making any effort to establish who his benefactors would be. The Appellant's curiosity about why he was being invited to attend a 10 day camp at no cost to himself is likely to have been increased given he was 22 and the scouts is an organisation whose focus is generally boys and adolescents. Why full grown men with jobs, such as the Appellant, were being invited to attend a scout camp is highly likely in my view to have aroused some interest on his art if not suspicion. The fact that his invitation to attend the camp did not, according to the Appellant, stimulate him to make further enquiries leads me to doubt whether this element of his account is true."

31. The judge concluded at paragraph 38 that the Appellant's account of what was said by the lecturers was not in fact inconsistent and it was unreasonable to draw any adverse inference from his inability to state the full names of the persons who allegedly lectured him.

32. At paragraph 39 the judge stated that he was not prepared to draw the inferences the Respondent did. Being connected with a discredited asylum seeker did not undermine the Appellant's credibility given that he had specifically mentioned his brother in his statements to his solicitors.

33. I find that it is apparent from these parts of the decision that the judge is assessing the points made by the Respondent, looking at the Appellant's explanation and concluding whether they were potentially damaging to the credibility of the Appellant's account.

34. At paragraph 37, the judge concluded that the Appellant's explanation in respect of the points raised there led him to doubt the truth of his account, but that in respect of the other points made by the Respondent he found in the Appellant's favour. It is clear from the judge's approach to the evidence that he is carrying out a balanced assessment of the Appellant's claim and that he is assessing each piece of evidence and deciding whether it has the potential to damage the Appellant's credibility. Accordingly, I am not persuaded by Mr Jesurum's point that the judge has failed to give anxious scrutiny to the account or indeed that he failed to approach the evidence and apply the lower standard of proof. The judge's assessment of the evidence was consistent with the approach in Karanakaran.

35. The judge then goes on to deal with the inconsistencies between the Appellant's account in his interview and what he said subsequently. The judge found that, in the Appellant's initial interview, the responses recorded at questions 3.2, 3.3 and 4.2 asserted that the offence of which the Appellant had been accused was training and preparing to fight in Syria and that he was subject to an arrest warrant. By the time the Appellant submitted a witness statement in July 2015, when he had had an opportunity to consider the initial interview, he took the opportunity to correct a number of the responses. In relation to question 3.2 he claimed that he had been accused of being trained to go to Syria to fight against the Syrian Government and Hezbollah. The Appellant explained that the word for 'being accused' and 'charged' was interchangeable in Arabic and that it was wrongly recorded that he had been 'charged' with the offence. He had not said an arrest warrant had been issued. Although he would have been arrested by the Lebanese authorities were they to discover where he was. The statement attributed to him that an arrest warrant had been issued appeared to be the result of incorrect interpretation.

36. At paragraph 40 the judge concluded:

"Although I can accept that the reference to an arrest warrant having been issued might have arisen as a result of faulty interpretation the same may not necessarily be said of the assertions he is recorded as having made in response to three different questions that his alleged offence was having trained others to go and fight in Syria. I note his explanation in the course of his substantive interview that the interpreter must have confused the words 'training' and 'trainer' but this was not a point which he chose to make in his intervening statement. The difference between training others and being trained is a fundamental one and I would have expected the Appellant to have directed attention to this particular inconsistency specifically when he made his witness statement had he had a reasonable explanation for it. The fact that (I am satisfied) he provided the answers about the nature of the offence of which [he] had allegedly been accused in the course of his initial interview which he is recorded as having given casts doubt on his subsequent claim to have been accused merely of undergoing training."

37. Mr Jesurum criticises the judge's finding in the following respect: the judge had failed to take into account the Court of Appeal decision of JA (Afghanistan) and to appreciate the potential for unfairness in relying on apparent discrepancies. The judge had failed to acknowledge in his decision the need to be cautious with regard to the screening interview.

38. I am of the view that the judge's findings at paragraph 40 demonstrate an analysis of the Appellant's account such that the judge was prepared to accept the misinterpretation in relation to 'accused' and 'charged', but was not prepared to accept a misinterpretation in relation to 'training' and 'trainer' and the judge gave adequate reasons for why he found that was the case. The fact that the Appellant had failed to mention in his statement that the interpreter had confused the two words was something the judge was entitled to take into account. The judge was also entitled to take into account the fact that the Appellant had given the same response to three questions in his initial interview and therefore it was unlikely that it was a misinterpretation on the part of the interpreter. Accordingly, I am not persuaded by ground 3 that the judge had erred in law in failing to apply JA (Afghanistan). The judge had given anxious scrutiny to the answers in interview and had given adequate reasons for why he found those discrepancies to be significant.

39. The judge also found that the Appellant had failed to mention, in his statement of July 2015, that others who had attended the camp had been arrested. He found that the Appellant first mentioned this fact in his substantive interview when he was asked the question directly. The judge stated: "Only when he was asked at question 73 if anyone else who had been at the camp with him had suffered problems similar to his did the Appellant say he had a friend who was in prison and had not been allowed to see his family. When he was subsequently asked at question 80 the names of his friends who were allegedly in prison he provided the names of three persons not one. Had it been the case that the Appellant was aware that three of his friends who had attended the camp were now in prison I would not have expected him to have mentioned it for the first time in response to a direct question in the course of a substantive interview six months after he had left Lebanon. His claim that three friends who attended the camp were in October 2015 in prison has all the hallmarks of a gloss on his account calculated to highlight the risk to which he would be exposed were he removed to Lebanon, and I regard it as such. The fact that he was prepared to embellish his account in the way that he did also calls into question the extent to which I may rely on his evidence in relation to the core elements of his account." The judge makes a clear finding that the Appellant has embellished his account.

40. Mr Jesurum submitted that it was irrelevant whether the Appellant first mentioned this in his statement or his interview and that a developing account was not a reason, applying the lower standard, to find that the Appellant's account was not credible. I find that the judge approached the Appellant's account by deciding whether each element had the potential to damage his credibility and he found that this particular point was one which was adverse to the Appellant's credibility. This finding was open to the judge on the evidence and he gave adequate reasons for why he came to such a finding.

41. At paragraph 42 the judge stated: "A more fundamental difficulty with his account is understanding why the Lebanese security forces might have been interested in arresting and interrogating him, or indeed any of the others who allegedly attended the scout camp in April 2015. According to the Appellant the camp was organised and led by a scout association aligned with, or at least sympathetic to, the Future Movement. The advice given to the participants that they should not think of going to Syria to fight against the government there reflected what it is evident from the material the Respondent found on the internet was the position adopted publicly by Saad al-Hariri and the Future Movement. For the Appellant to have been sought by the security forces on the basis that he had taken part in military training with a view to fighting against the Syrian regime and its Shi'a backers, there must have been a fundamental misunderstanding about what had occurred at the camp or the intervention by the security forces might have been dictated by political interests supportive of the Syrian regime such as Hezbollah. The Appellant appeared to lean towards this latter possibility when he gave his evidence, telling me that Hezbollah is the real power in Lebanon but there is no suggestion in the background country materials relied on by either party that the Lebanese security forces generally act contrary to the will of the government, and the Minister of the Interior was, I accept, a member of the Future Movement. The Future Movement was opposed to Sunni Muslims going to Syria to fight against the government there, if only out of fear that the influence of Islamic jihadists would be increased and Lebanon would disintegrate still further. What I consider a fundamental implausibility in the Appellant's claim to have been sought by the Lebanese authorities in such circumstances goes to the heart of his appeal."

42. Mr Jesurum submitted that the judge had failed to take into account the two reasons given by the Appellant as to why he was of interest to the authorities. However, it is clear from what the judge stated at paragraph 42 that he considered both of these explanations: firstly whether there was a misunderstanding and secondly that the security forces might have been dictated by political interests supportive of the Syrian regime such as Hezbollah.

43. The judge also considered that the Appellant favoured the latter reason in his oral evidence. He concluded that this position put forward by the Appellant in explanation was not supported by the background material and the judge pointed out evidence which did not support the position claimed by the Appellant, which he specifically set out. Mr Jesurum could not point to evidence to the contrary. His submission was that, given that Hezbollah had rejected calls to disarm, then the judge could not make the finding that there was no reasonable likelihood, on the lower standard, that Hezbollah had not in some way infiltrated the security forces. I do not agree. The judge assessed the evidence of the Appellant in light of the background material and was entitled to conclude that his explanation or reasons for why he would be of interest in the authorities was not supported by such evidence.

44. Accordingly, dealing with each of the grounds in turn, the judge took into account the explanations given by the Appellant and gave cogent reasons for why he rejected those accounts. The judge properly assessed the Appellant's credibility in accordance with Karanakaran. He was not merely assessing the plausibility of the Appellant's account but looking at each piece of the Appellant's evidence and deciding whether it had potential to damage his credibility. After considering each individual piece of evidence, some in favour of the Appellant and some against, the judge properly concluded, on the basis of all the evidence, that his account was not a credible one. This was clearly demonstrated from the judge's finding at paragraph 44: For the reasons given the Appellant has failed to show, even to the lower standard, that the core elements of his account are true.

45. The judge found that the Appellant had embellished his account and that his claim to be of adverse interest to the authorities was not supported by the background material. These findings were open to the judge on the evidence and he gave cogent reasons for his conclusions. The judge clearly took into account both of the reasons given by the Appellant and assessed them against the background materials.

46. The delay in promulgation did not amount to three months (Ground 2). The judge made his decision on 7th June 2016. The fact that it was not promulgated for a further two weeks was outside the judge's control. Further, I do not agree with Mr Jesurum's submission that there does not need to be a nexus or some connection with the delay in cases where credibility is being assessed. Mr Jesurum has not satisfied me that the judge's credibility findings were not open to him on the evidence or that the judge's approach to the assessment of credibility was fundamentally flawed. Given that the threshold of three months set out in Sambasivan was not in fact reached and that there was no nexus established then, whichever way one looks at it, the delay in promulgation does not amount to a material error of law on the particular facts of this case.

47. In relation to ground 3, the judge's findings were consistent with JA (Afghanistan). He did apply anxious scrutiny and he gave reasons why he accepted one of the Appellant's explanations, but not the other. His findings were open to him given that the Appellant was asked on three separate occasions and the account he gave was the same. It was only later in his substantive interview that he sought to give an explanation for the discrepancies and his explanation of mistranslation was not a credible one in the circumstances. The judge gave adequate reasons for coming to this conclusion.

48. Ground 4 - Article 8, very significant obstacles to integration: The judge concluded at paragraph 47 that the Appellant was integrated into wider Lebanese society before he came to the UK and he would be able to resume his former life. In coming to this conclusion the judge took into account the US State Department Report 2015 Country Report on Human Rights Practices in Lebanon; Palestinian refugees experience significant discrimination both at the hands of the government and in wider society.

49. The Appellant worked as a plumber for five or six years after completing secondary education and his evidence was that he and his parents lived in an area whose population reflected the varied cultural and religious makeup of Lebanon generally. The judge found there was no reason to suppose that the Appellant would be unable to resume his former life. He was integrated into Lebanon when he left and there were no significant obstacles to him being integrated to the same extent as before were he to return here.

50. It was submitted that, relying on the background material, no Palestinian refugee in Lebanon could be integrated or could be considered to be an insider in accordance with what is set out in Kamara. However, it is clear from the Appellant's own evidence that he had achieved a level of integration such that he could not meet the test set out in the Immigration Rules. The judge's finding was consistent with Kamara and there was no error of law in relation to the judge's assessment of Article 8.

51. In summary, I conclude that none of the four grounds establish an error of law in the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Higgins. The judge's approach to the evidence was a balanced and fair one and he applied the lower standard of proof. He gave adequate reasons for his findings and those findings were open to him on the evidence before him. I therefore conclude that there was no error of law in the judge's decision dated 7th June 2016 and I dismiss the Appellant's appeal.

Notice of Decision

The appeal is dismissed

No anonymity direction is made.

J Frances
Signed Date: 31st October 2016

Upper Tribunal Judge Frances

TO THE RESPONDENT
FEE AWARD

I have dismissed the appeal and therefore there can be no fee award.

J Frances
Signed Date: 31st October 2016

Upper Tribunal Judge Frances