Tribunal decisions

The decision

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: PA/03420/2015

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Glasgow
Decision & Reasons Promulgated
On 7 February 2017
On 20 February 2017

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MACLEMAN

Between

SANGEETA KHANWANI
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

For the Appellant: Mr S Martin, of Jain, Neil & Ruddy, Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr M Matthews, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

DETERMINATION AND REASONS
1. The appellant is a citizen of Pakistan, born on 30 June 1977. She entered the UK as a student in 2011 and extended her leave as such until 5 October 2015. Her husband and 2 children are her dependants in these proceedings.
2. The appellant returned to Pakistan three times during the period of her leave. She last left there on 4 June 2014, having been back for a family funeral. She says that during her last visit, she was waiting for a taxi when an unknown man threatened her and the lives of her children because she had twice refused to convert from Hinduism to Islam.
3. On 22 July 2015, she sought asylum.
The respondent's reasons for refusing the claim - letter dated 20 November 2015.
4. The appellant and her family are Hindu, and faced some discrimination, but not persecution. Her account of threats from Islamic extremists was not credible, and there was no real risk of kidnap and forced conversion (paragraphs 13 - 30).
5. Alternatively, "even if it had been accepted you had been persecuted by Islamic extremists? you ? could relocate within Pakistan e.g. to Jacobabad, to avoid localised risk in Karachi ? it would not be unduly harsh for you to do so" (paragraphs 28, 31, 33, 49 - 58).
6. Further in the alternative, and despite deficiencies in the protection of minorities in Pakistan, there is legal sufficiency of protection (paragraphs 34 - 48).
7. The appellant had no case on grounds of humanitarian protection, or of family and private life, including the best interests of the children (paragraphs 59 - 102).
The FtT decision.
8. FtT Judge Fox dismissed the appellant's appeal by decision promulgated on 14 September 2015.
9. Such discrimination as the family experienced had been exaggerated, and did not amount to persecution. Regarding the final incident in June 2014, the judge did not see how anyone could have been motivated to approach the appellant as she claimed, out of the blue, when she had been in the country for only 2 days; and even taking this aspect of the claim at its height, there was no evidence to suggest that the threat could have followed through. The appellant's reaction was "? extreme. I believe that she has taken full advantage of a minor incident, if it occurred as she claims, to enhance a claim for asylum status" (paragraph 21).
10. The core account lacked credibility and was a fabrication designed to gain access to the United Kingdom (paragraphs 13 - 34).
11. There is a system of protection to the legal standard in Pakistan (paragraphs 37 - 45).
12. The children would be properly taken care of by their parents were they to return to Pakistan, and their best interests did not require leave to be granted (paragraphs 49 - 58).
The grounds of appeal to the UT.
13. The grounds (much shortened) are as follows.
14. Ground 1. The finding at paragraph 19 that an incident "did not amount to a threat or assault" was irrational, given what the judge accepted to have happened. At paragraph 21 the judge accepted there had been a threat to the lives of the appellant and her children. This was a significant incident of past persecution which under paragraph 339K of the immigration rules was an indicator of future risk. It was irrational to accept that this incident occurred but to consider it insignificant.
15. Ground 2. The onus was not on the appellant to test the sufficiency of protection, but to establish that it would not be available to her, which she did, by background evidence and country guidance.
16. Ground 3. The proposed area of relocation, Jacobabad, was within the appellant's home province of Sindh. It was unreasonable to expect her to relocate within her own province. Religious intolerance was such that she could not be expected to relocate anywhere else.
17. Ground 4. The judge failed to consider the best interests of the children in the light of the past problems they were accepted to have experienced. Removal would be disproportionate.
Submissions for appellant.
18. The judge's findings at paragraph 19 were self-contradictory.
19. It was accepted that the case did not turn on that incident, but rather on the incident in June 2014. Although the respondent had not accepted that it occurred, the judge appeared to do so at paragraph 21. A threat to life and limb amounted to persecution. In finding that the incident happened at all, the judge was bound to follow through to that conclusion, and to consider past persecution as an indicator of future risk.
20. If ground 1 was established, then grounds 2 and 3 appeared in a very different light. Protection did not have to be absolute, but in Pakistan the protection of religious minorities did not meet even the minimum standard. Risk in the home area should have been found to exist, and it was not reasonable to expect an appellant to relocate within her own province.
21. The judge failed to carry out an assessment of the best interests of the children, being brought up as Hindus in Pakistan.
Submissions for respondent.
22. There was an odd sentence in paragraph 19, but it did not amount to a legal or material error. It could be struck out, leaving good sense.
23. The judge had not found the crucial incident in 2014 proved. He went on to consider that even if there was some incident, it had been much exaggerated. There was no irrationality in that.
24. Even if the appellant established that the incident took place, she still faced the obstacles of internal relocation and sufficiency of protection. There was no rule against expecting relocation to take place within the same province. The judge's findings on those alternatives were well within his scope and not shown to be subject to any legal error.
25. The children were not "qualifying children" and were members of a well-educated family which had business interests in Pakistan and thrived there relatively well. The judge made no error on article 8.
Conclusions.
26. In paragraph 19 the sentence, "This does not amount to a threat, or assault" conflicts with the prior description of the incident, which the judge appears to accept as having happened. There may have been some error of expression or of proof-reading.
27. If the sentence is excised, the paragraph reads sensibly. The next sentence is a finding that the incident does not equate to discrimination let alone persecution. That is sustainable.
28. Nothing turns on the flaw in paragraph 19. The appellant correctly accepts that a case cannot be built on the incident.
29. Paragraph 21 is not deficient. The judge was just about persuaded that some incident took place, but was clear that even if so it was isolated, minor, not part of any scheme of persecution, and the appellant embellished upon it to improve her claim. See also paragraph 39, where he described this as "? a random act by an individual ? that is the best that can be said".
30. That was a view of the evidence he was entitled to take. His reasoning is not shown to be subject to any factual or legal error. The possibility that anything occurred at all did not require him to elevate it into proof of past persecution and future risk.
31. There is no rule that internal relocation cannot be expected within the same province of a country. Such questions turn on the individual facts. The appellant did not show that Jacobabad is not a suitable location for her and her family, if they had any need to move from Karachi.
32. The appellant did not attempt to demonstrate that Jacobabad is too close to home by reference to any geographical facts.
33. Materials commonly referred to in this tribunal, and within public and judicial knowledge, show that Sindh has a population of over 55 million and extends to 54, 410 square miles (larger and more populous than many countries) and that the distance from Karachi to Jacobabad is 273 miles. Those facts demonstrate no error in the judge's conclusion on internal relocation.
34. The level of protection in Pakistan is plainly less than ideal, but the judge recognised that. The appellant has stated again her side of this argument, but she has not shown that the judge's conclusion was not properly open to him, or is underpinned by reasoning which is less than legally adequate.
35. Sufficiency of protection is one of three alternatives, any one of which defeats the claim: lack of credibility and internal relocation are equally decisive.
36. The grounds regarding the best interests of the children are only reassertion and disagreement. The judge's assessment was firmly grounded in the facts, and did not involve the making of any error on a point of law.
37. The determination of the First-tier Tribunal shall stand.
38. No anonymity direction has been requested or made.

17 February 2017
Upper Tribunal Judge Macleman