Tribunal decisions

The decision

IAC-AH-SAR-V1

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Numbers: PA/03746/2015
PA/03827/2015

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Bradford
Decision & Reasons Promulgated
On 20 October 2016
On 09 November 2016

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HANBURY

Between

MIMOZA DEDJA
(and one dependent - InI DEDJA)
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION NOT MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellants: Mr Saleem, a Solicitor
For the Respondent: Mr McVeety, a Home Office Presenting Officer

DECISION AND REASONS FOR FINDING NO MATERIAL ERROR OF LAW
Introduction
1. The appellant is an Albanian national, born on 6 February 1970. She came to the UK on 1 April 2014 through a number of other countries, arriving on 4 April 2014. It seems that her son Imi came here with her. She claimed asylum on the same day. A decision was made to refuse to grant her asylum and human rights protection under paragraphs 336 and 339M/339F of HC 395 as amended. The respondent set out her reasons for refusal in a letter dated 30 November 2015.
2. On 14 December 2015 the appellant appealed the decision to refuse asylum/human rights protection/humanitarian protection to the First-tier Tribunal (FtT). Her appeal came before Judge of the First-tier Tribunal Hillis (the Immigration Judge). The Immigration Judge concluded that whilst the appellant was an Albanian national as claimed, and whilst there was a feud affecting the Dedja family from the Kola family, nevertheless, the Immigration Judge did not accept that the appellant would be at risk on return and in any event, having reviewed the evidence, concluded that she could safely live in Tirana or another area away from Burrell where the family feud is centred.
The Upper Tribunal Proceedings
3. By a notice of appeal settled by Counsel on 14 July 2016, the appellant sought to appeal the decision of the FtT which was promulgated on 31 August 2016. In her grounds, she states that:
(1) The Immigration Judge had accepted that there was an extant blood feud between the Kola and Dedja families, he misdirected himself by concluding that there had been no submission that the appellant was a member of a particular social group. She was, in fact, obviously a member of a particular social group.
(2) The Immigration Judge had failed to consider a material matter in that the appellant's son, Ini, whose claim was dependent on the appellant's, had received threats via Facebook. The Immigration Judge had wrongly concluded that because the appellant's son had maintained his Facebook account, which he had used in Albania, did not mean that it could be assumed that it was the same account or that there had been no subsequent threats.
(3) There was a failure to consider a material matter in the extent of domestic protection available. The existence of blood feuds in Albania was well recognised and had been recognised by the French authorities in relation to a claim by the appellant's stepdaughter, Klotilda. The response of the authorities was inadequate and would not deter a future attack here.
(4) In assessing internal relocation and the threat to the appellant's son, he had not long been an adult at the date of the hearing. Once he reached adulthood a threat of greater magnitude was present. The appellant and her son might be traced to their location wherever they lived. Albania is a small country with an aggressive clan network. In the circumstances, the Immigration Judge had overestimated the availability of domestic protection and the availability of internal relocation as well as the ability of the appellant to safely return to Albania.
4. Judge of the First-tier Tribunal Kimnell thought these grounds were at least arguable in that other family members appeared to have been killed in a continuing blood feud in Tirana. Immigration Judge Kimnell regarded the error with regard to the reference to a "particular social group" to be "academic" because the judge had gone on to consider whether or not the appellant could safely relocate and concluded that she could.
5. At the hearing I heard submissions by both representatives at length. It was noted that the grant of internal protection in France had been granted to a family member but paragraph 23 of the decision records that the appellant fears that she will be "next in line" to be targeted. The crucial evidence was summarised at paragraphs 23 and 24 of the decision where it states that the appellant's stepdaughter had been given international protection. The same threat would be faced by the appellant's son. The Immigration Judge should have accepted this evidence, it was argued. It was contended that the blood feud was ongoing and it was not accepted that the Immigration Judge had been live to all the evidence.
6. I was then referred to the decision of the Court of Appeal in SX (Albania) [2008] EWCA Civ 1192. In that case the court held that criminal elements and gangs are well-known about in Albania and the Kola gang were particularly well-known. The decision also refers to the Dedja family, including Halit Dedja who has subsequently been murdered. I was also referred to the case of Fornah. It was contended that the family as a whole were members of a particular social group and entitled to protection in international law. Paragraph 28 of the decision was plainly incorrect when it referred to the appellant's fear of persecution as not being based on membership of a particular social group. That had clearly been the submission before the Immigration Judge, Mr Saleem said.
7. I was also taken to extensive objective evidence from 2015-2016 which suggested that there were pervasive human rights problems and corruption in all branches of the government including the judicial and health care systems. Domestic violence and discrimination against women was widespread. The prosecution and officials commit abuses. The police do not always enforce the law equally. Mr Saleem commended to me the numerous passages which had been highlighted in his bundle of objective evidence before the First-tier Tribunal. I would comment at this stage that I have numerous bundles rather than one paginated and indexed bundle of all the evidence, which would have been a great deal easier to use. It was contended that these documents had been drawn to the attention of the Immigration Judge but that he had failed to give adequate consideration to them. It was not accepted that the appellant could call on the police to protect her adequately. The Immigration Judge had not dealt adequately with Article 3 or humanitarian protection.
8. Mr McVeety accepted that the Dedja family were a particular social group but did not accept that the error in suggesting that there had been no argument about this was material. He argued that there was no risk on return/internal relocation was an alternative to the appellants. Furthermore, he pointed out that this was in fact the appellant's claim and not that of her son's. He was merely a dependant. He could have made a claim of his own and he certainly could have given evidence before the FtT but no such evidence was placed before that Tribunal. Given that he was now 20 years of age he could perfectly easily have given evidence. As far as the appellant's situation was concerned, she had received no threats and had no violence directed towards her by the Kola tribe. The documents demonstrated that far from turning a blind eye or collaborating with the feuding families, the police had not in fact done so. The certificate from the prosecutor's office in bundle AB2 (at page 48) suggests that criminal proceedings had begun in relation to the murder of a member of the Dedja family. That could also be the conclusion reached in relation to Adelina Dedja. These documents, therefore, suggested that the prosecuting authorities did take blood feuds seriously.
9. As far as the appellant's son was concerned, he had received no threats since the alleged threat on Facebook. The appellant apparently maintained the same Facebook account that he had at the time of the alleged threats. But, as far as Mr McVeety was aware, the only way to change that account would be for the appellant's son to change his name.
10. The respondent relied on one authority, the case of EH (blood feuds) Albania [2012] UKUT 00348. That case concerned a blood feud and a claim to international and humanitarian protection arising out of it. The Upper Tribunal observed that blood feuds have a number of common characteristics including a vendetta, and the whole question of honour is important. Males of a family, however, tend to be the ones who have to maintain honour by taking the next life or launching the next attack. It was contended that the Tribunal should look at the history of the feud. It was noteworthy that the appellant had not referred to any threat to herself in her witness statement, that she had lived in Tirana for four years without incident, and that the police did take such allegations seriously. The attitude of the authorities was far from complicit.
11. As far as the decision by the French authorities were concerned, we were not told the circumstances of the stepdaughter's claim. It would be wrong to conclude that it had any relevance to the outcome of this case.
12. Generally, as the appellant herself had stated in her witness statement dated 4 August 2016 at paragraphs 15-16, it was the male members of the family who were targeted. Therefore, it was perfectly proper of the judge to conclude that there was no material risk to the appellant. She had four years in Tirana without any incident other than a vague account of an attack on Facebook to her son. It was not accepted by the Immigration Judge (at paragraph 34) that the Kola family knew where she was.
13. The leading country guidance case of CG [2012] UKUT 348 was also referred to. It was suggested that the Tribunal should look at the background to the claim and how the police were involved. It was accepted that blood feuds exist but it was not accepted that they would not be adequately dealt with by the authorities.
14. The appellant's representative responded to say that the appellant accepted that males are more at risk than females but it was not accepted that there was no risk to the appellant. Her own son Halit had been killed. The Immigration Judge appeared to accept at paragraph 15 that the appellant's son might attract attention. It was clear that they were as a clan entitled to protection. There was a gap between the last killing in June 2016 and the date of the hearing but this was not a long period of time.
15. Mr Saleem relied on EH and said that blood feuds were widespread and well documented that they were a continuing threat both to the appellant and her son. The suggestion that only men are targeted is not correct. However, Mr Saleem appeared to accept that Ini had not been targeted when the first appellant and he had been living in Albania. Mr Saleem acknowledged that Ini was over 18 by the date of the hearing.
16. The Immigration Judge was criticised for failing to find that there was a need to afford the appellants humanitarian protection by failing to attach adequate weight to the fact that Halit had been killed. It was submitted that the entire decision needed to be set aside and that the case be remitted to the FtT for a rehearing.
17. At the end of the hearing I announced that the grounds have not been made out. Having regard to the appellant's case that it was her son that was principally at risk on return and the judge's clear findings on the evidence presented before him, I did not consider that there was a material error of law. I will now summarise my reasons for reaching that decision.
My Reasons for Finding no Material Error of Law
18. The appellant clearly stated in her witness statement that it was her that was at risk rather than her son. Her son had not advanced an independent claim (although he is listed in the heading above). Furthermore, the appellant had relocated successfully to Tirana for as long as four years. It seems that the Immigration Judge fully took account of this internal flight alternative, stating that four years of residence at Tirana had not resulted in any honour-based killings or attacks. The fact that her son had not received any response to his raising of the blood feud tended to suggest that there was no evidence of continuing threat. Furthermore, the Immigration Judge was entitled to attach little weight to this piece of evidence given that the appellant's son had not given evidence, had not produced the actual wording of the threats by, for example, printing out the Facebook page, and had not confirmed any of his evidence in court. I do not believe there was any confusion over which Facebook account the appellant's son was using. He still maintained that account at the date of the hearing. There was no evidence that the appellant's son changed his Facebook identity to reflect the threats that he claims to have received, indeed, as the Immigration Judge found at paragraph 35 of his decision, no threats had been made to him since he came to the UK whether via his Facebook account or otherwise.
19. I have considered whether the absence of any reference to a particular social group might be a material error of law but concluded that the appellant's claim had been fully considered on every basis put before the FtT. As a physically fit young man, the appellant's son would be able to safely return to Tirana and gain employment. In any event, as Mr McVeety submitted, no claim had been made by the son.
20. The Immigration Judge plainly dealt adequately with the issue of internal flight and the facts of the case were at the forefront of his mind when he decided that there was nothing to prevent the appellant and her son living in another part of Albania other than Burrell and, for example, Tirana.
21. Therefore, although the Immigration Judge had found the existence of a blood feud he concluded that the appellant had been able to avoid it herself. The evidence pointed to the prosecuting authorities taking blood feuds seriously and therefore, even if the appellant did come to the attention of the feuding family, the Kolas, she could avail herself of the protection of the Albanian police before claiming international protection. In addition, the appellant has a sister and mother living there and the Country of Origin Report suggests that there is an effective police force and judiciary within Albania.
22. For these reasons the Immigration Judge was entitled to come to the conclusion he came to.

Notice of Decision
The appellant's appeal against the decision of the FtT to dismiss her appeal on all grounds argued before it is dismissed.
Anonymity
I lift the anonymity direction as there are frequent references to the Kolas family and the Dedja family throughout the decision of the FtT.

Signed Date

Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Hanbury

TO THE RESPONDENT
FEE AWARD
There is no fee award in this case as no fee was payable.

Signed Date

Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Hanbury