PA/03809/2016

• Status of case: Unreported
• Hearing date: 21 Feb 2017
• Promulgation date: 3 Mar 2017
• Publication date: 18 Jan 2022
• Last updated on: 18 Jan 2022

The decision

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: PA/03809/2016

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Glasgow
Decision and Reasons Promulgated
on 21 February 2017
On 03 March 2017


Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MACLEMAN

Between

MEHRAN ALIPOUR
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT

Respondent

For the Appellant: Mr S Winter, Advocate, instructed by Katani & Co, Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mrs M O’Brien, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

DETERMINATION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals against a determination by First-tier Tribunal Judge Bradshaw, promulgated on 24 August 2016, dismissing his appeal against refusal of protection.
2. The first ground of appeal refers to Mibanga v SSHD [2005] INLR 377 and complains that the judge “reached a conclusion on the case before surveying all the evidence”, in particular by saying at paragraph 86 that the appellant was not a genuine convert “prior to assessing the evidence of the witnesses at paragraph 88” and “without assessing the documentary evidence referred to at paragraph 86”.
3. There is nothing in this ground. Judges have to deal with points in some order. Decisions are to be read fairly and as a whole. It has not been shown that the judge decided any particular point in isolation or to the prejudice of the appellant’s overall case.
4. The second ground of appeal is that the judge failed to consider that even if the religious conversion claim had been manufactured in bad faith, that did not bar a protection claim; the appellant would be questioned on return, and could not be expected to lie; the appellant said he would evangelize in Iran, which the judge “did not disbelieve”; and there was accordingly a real risk on return.
5. This ground seeks to stretch the case law on sur place claims, country information and guidance on questioning of returnees, and legal dicta on when returnees may be expected to lie, beyond their capacity.
6. The appellant was found for sound reasons to be an unreliable witness on the essential aspects of his claim.
7. The appellant would be at risk if he were to evangelise in Iran; but on the findings of fact, there was no reason to think it remotely likely that he might do so.
8. It is far from clear that on the judge’s findings it should be assumed that the appellant may return only as an identifiable failed asylum seeker, or that if he does, he is likely to be questioned about the basis on which he sought and failed to obtain asylum.
9. Even if questioned, there is no reason to infer from the judge’s conclusions that in fact the appellant might divulge to the Iranian authorities that he had been observing Christian practices in the UK.
10. If such a situation is never going to arise, it is difficult to construct a protection claim from it.
11. The case law does not show that it should be presumed in the appellant’s favour, contrary to the fact, that if questioned by the Iranian authorities he would answer by confessing his falsely manufactured claim.
12. The judge did not err on any point of law by failing to allow the appeal on the basis of the second ground now advanced.
13. The determination of the First-tier Tribunal shall stand.
14. No anonymity direction has been requested or made.




2 March 2017
Upper Tribunal Judge Macleman