Tribunal decisions

The decision

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: PA/04171/2015

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Field House
Decision & Reasons Promulgated
On 23rd March 2017
On 28th March 2017

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE JACKSON

Between

NN
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr T D H Hodson of Elder Rahimi Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr P Armstrong, Home Office Presenting Officer

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant appeals against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Khawar promulgated on 1 August 2016, in which his appeal against the Respondent’s decision to refuse his asylum claim dated 17 December 2015 was dismissed. This was an asylum upgrade appeal as the Respondent had granted the Appellant leave to remain on the basis of her policy for unaccompanied asylum seeking minors.
2. The Appellant is a national of Afghanistan, born on 16 March 2001 who entered the United Kingdom at the age of 14 on 5 June 2015 and claimed asylum. The core of the Appellant’s claim is that his father worked for the Afghan army; his father was killed by the Taliban during a fight on duty and that the Taliban had tried to recruit the Appellant with a treat to kill him if he refused.
3. The Respondent refused the Appellant’s claim on the basis that it was not accepted that the Appellant’s claim was credible – specifically that it was not accepted that the Appellant’s father was in the Afghan army, that he had been killed by the Taliban, nor that the Taliban attempted to recruit or threaten the Appellant. As such it was not accepted that he was at risk on return to Afghanistan.
4. Judge Khawar dismissed the appeal on all grounds, primarily on the basis that he found that the Appellant was not a credible witness and that the core of the Appellant’s account as set out above was not established. Judge Khawar considered that issues of sufficiency of protection and internal relocation were therefore academic and the appeal was dismissed on asylum, humanitarian protection and human rights grounds.
The appeal
5. The Appellant appealed, permission to appeal being granted on 28 November 2016 by Judge Canavan. The appeal came before me initially on 19 January 2017 to determine whether there was an error of law in Judge Khawar’s decision. My decision on error of law is attached as an annex at the end of this decision. In summary, I found a material error of law in Judge Khawar’s decision on the first ground of appeal only, that he failed to consider the Appellant’s claims to be at risk on return to Afghanistan (in the alternative to his core claim being accepted as credible) on the basis that:
(i) he was a child from an area under AGE control/subject to struggle for control;
(ii) he would be perceived as having become “westernised”;
(iii) he would be at risk in Kabul as a child without family support following the Respondent’s acceptance that there would be no reception arrangements in place;
(iv) he would be at risk of indiscriminate violence.
6. For the reasons given in the error of law decision, Judge Khawar’s decision stands, as do the findings of fact he makes about the Appellant’s credibility and core of his claim. The issues to determine are those outstanding in paragraph 5 above, in the situation of a hypothetical removal (as the Appellant has extant leave as an unaccompanied asylum seeking minor) which were not considered by Judge Khawar and therefore this decision supplements the original.
7. The relevant facts for this appeal are that the Appellant is a national of Afghanistan, from Laghman province, who is in communication with his mother, who has family members in Afghanistan (including his mother, siblings, paternal uncles and, for the reasons set out below, his father) and who is now aged just 16. It is not accepted that the Appellant’s father was in the army, nor that his father was killed by the Taliban, nor that the Taliban had threatened or attempted to recruit the Appellant.
8. Mr Hodson for the Appellant raised a concern at the outset of the hearing as to whether the appeal would proceed on the basis of the Appellant’s father being alive or dead given that Judge Khawar found only that he had not been killed by the Taliban. There was no application to adduce further evidence from the Appellant himself about his father and no other evidence on his behalf dealing with the point. In the circumstances, where the only account from the Appellant is that his father was killed by the Taliban has been discredited, the only alternative is to proceed on the basis that his father is alive in Afghanistan. In any event, on the Appellant’s own account he has paternal uncles in Afghanistan and therefore senior male members of his family which is relevant to the issue of family support on return even if the Appellant’s father is no longer alive.
9. At the hearing, Mr Hodson submitted that in the event that it is not feasible or safe for any family member to meet the Appellant in Kabul to accompany him to his home area, then his return to his home area is not possible as travel as an unaccompanied minor would not be viable or safe even though there is a main road connection between Kabul and Laghman province which is better than some routes, it is still not safe for a child travelling alone in light of the evidence of kidnappings along the route. It was further submitted that as a lone female, it would not be viable or safe for the Appellant’s mother to meet him in Kabul or relocate there with him for the reasons set out in AK (Article 15(c)) Afghanistan CG [2012] UKUT 00163 (IAC). It remained the Appellant’s case that his father was dead and that there would be no male family member to meet him in Kabul or to relocate with him there. If returned to Kabul alone as a child, internal relocation there would be unduly harsh.
10. Further background evidence had been submitted on behalf of the Appellant to the effect that Laghman province, whilst not as bad as other areas in Afghanistan, had a considerable insurgent presence (both from the Taliban and from ISIS) and an ongoing power struggle. There are reports from 2017 of increasing levels of violence although the province remains relatively calm. Mr Hodson submitted that there was sufficient evidence to show that in his home area, the Appellant would be at real risk of indiscriminate violence contrary to Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive by virtue of his presence there.
11. As to his personal characteristics, the Appellant is now of an age where he would be of greater interest to the Taliban for recruitment, in addition to which he is the eldest male child of the family. As such he would now be at increased risk of forcible recruitment by the Taliban based on a fact specific assessment rather than any country guidance to the effect that children are general at risk of forcible recruitment.
12. Further, and taken cumulatively, the Appellant would also be at increased risk due to being perceived as or having been westernised. He has been in the United Kingdom for almost two years and in his home area, he would be returned with his absence being noted and be questioned on his reappearance.
13. On behalf of the Respondent, the Home Office Presenting Officer reiterated that the Appellant had a paternal uncle in his home village, with whom he stayed for several months and where the Taliban never searched for him. This shows that even if the Appellant’s father is dead, there is a senior male relative who could meet him in Kabul or relocate to reside with him there. The objective evidence shows that there is a viable and safe route of travel between Kabul and the Appellant’s home area in Laghman province. Further, the Appellant was found to be in contact with his mother so arrangements could be made for his return to Kabul.
14. It was submitted that the Appellant would not be at risk on return from being westernised, if that was a general risk for those who had remained in the United Kingdom for two years then no failed asylum seekers could ever lawfully be returned to Afghanistan. Finally, for the reasons set out in KA, there is no risk of indiscriminate violence.
15. In reply, Mr Hodson for the Appellant queried whether it was reasonable, even if there was a senior male family member who could meet the Appellant in Kabul, of them relocating there given they are a rural farming family with no immediate means of support or subsistence in Kabul.
The Law in Relation to the Appellant’s Claim under the Refugee Convention
16. The Appellant claims under Section 82(1) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 that a return to home territory would be a breach of the United Kingdom’s obligations under the 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the later Protocol (“the Refugee Convention”).
17. It is for an Appellant to show that he is a refugee. By Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention, a refugee is a person who is out of the country of his or her nationality and who, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality or membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is unable or unwilling to avail him or herself of the protection of the country of origin.
18. The degree of likelihood of persecution needed to establish an entitlement to asylum is decided on a basis lower than the civil standard of the balance of probabilities. This was expressed as a “reasonable chance”, “a serious possibility” or “substantial grounds for thinking” in the various authorities. That basis of probability not only applies to the history of the matter and to the situation at the date of decision, but also to the question of persecution in the future if the Appellant were to be returned.
19. Under the Refugee or Person in Need of International Protection (Qualification) Regulations 2006, a person is to be regarded as a refugee if they fall within the definition set out in Article 1A of the Refugee Convention (see above) and are not excluded by Articles 1D, 1E or 1F of the Refugee Convention (Regulation 7 of the Qualification Regulations).
The Law in Relation to the Appellant’s Claim for Humanitarian Protection
20. Paragraph 339C of the Immigration Rules provide for a grant of humanitarian protection in circumstances where a person does not qualify as a refugee but can show substantial grounds for believing that they would, if returned to their country of return, face a real risk of suffering serious harm. The applicant must be unable or owing to such risk unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.
The Law in Relation to the Appellant’s Claim under the Human Rights Convention
21. This appeal is also brought under the 2002 Act because the Appellant alleges that the Respondent has in making her decision acted in breach of the Appellant’s human rights. The Appellant relies upon Articles 2 (Right to Life) and 3 (Prohibition of Torture). The burden of proof of demonstration that the Appellant’s removal would breach this country’s obligations under the Convention rests upon the Appellant and the standard of proof is the lower standard, that there is a reasonable chance or likelihood that harm will come to the Appellant if removed.
Findings and reasons
22. The first issue relevant to the determination of these remaining parts of the Appellant’s appeal is as to whether he would be returning to Afghanistan as an unaccompanied minor or whether he would have family support on return either in his home area or in Kabul. Given the findings of Judge Khawar that the Appellant is in contact with his family in Afghanistan and that even on the Appellant’s own claim he has paternal uncles who are supportive of him, I find that the Appellant would have family support on return. For the reasons set out in paragraph 8 above, this family support is also likely to include his father. In these circumstances, there would be no reliance on the Appellant seeking to travel to his home area from Kabul alone, nor that it would only be his mother attending him as a lone female.
23. The background evidence submitted by the Appellant shows that there is a main highway between Kabul and Laghman province which is ‘among the relatively peaceful highways in the country’ however there were insurgency activities particularly during the evenings and night time including kidnapping and in response an operation had been launched to secure it. This evidence does not support a finding that the route is not viable or is unsafe such that neither the Appellant nor family members could reasonably use it. I find therefore that the Appellant, being in contact with his family, could be met in Kabul by a senior male relative (either his father or one of his uncles) and return to his home area with them.
24. The next issue is whether the Appellant is at risk in his home area either from forcible recruitment by the Taliban; as a person who has been westernised or because of the levels of indiscriminate violence in the area.
25. Judge Khawar found that prior to his leaving Afghanistan, the Taliban had not sought to recruit the Appellant. It is claimed now that there is an increased risk (or more correctly given the previous findings, a new risk) of forcible recruitment given that the Appellant is now 16 years old and at a more useful age to the Taliban. However, it was submitted that the risk arose primarily from an individual assessment of the Appellant’s circumstances rather than a general risk.
26. The most recent background evidence consistently states that Laghman province is among the relatively calm provinces in Afghanistan but there is some increased insurgency in parts of the province in recent years and anti-government elements (AGEs) operating in a number of remote districts. The background evidence does not support a finding that the province is one with significant activity or violence by AGEs; nor that AGEs have effective control in any part of it such that they would be in a strong position to undertake forcible recruitment. Although the background evidence documents the forcible recruitment of children by the Taliban, there is little if anything to suggest that this is a widespread or significant problem in Laghman province or for those who are with their family. The particular vulnerabilities identified are for those who are unaccompanied or in refugee or IDP camps, which do not apply to the Appellant. I do not find that, even to the lower standard of proof applicable in asylum cases, that the Appellant has established that he is at real risk of forced recruitment by the Taliban on return to his home area in Afghanistan. There is no general risk to him there, no history of this happening in the past and no factors specific to him which create or increases that risk now.
27. The Appellant claims that on return he would be perceived as having become westernised as a result of his time away from Afghanistan which would be an additional and aggravating risk factor over and above those relevant to him as a child. Again, the background evidence records that there are incidents against those perceived to have been westernised but I do not find that it supports a finding that this Appellant, who although a child would be returning to his family and who has no other specific risk factors, faces a real risk on return for this reason either alone or taken cumulatively. There is no country guidance which has established a particular risk category of being westernised and the Respondent’s submissions that if it were the case no failed asylum seekers could be returned has some force.
28. The final issue on return to Laghman province is whether there are levels of indiscriminate violence there such that returning the Appellant would be in breach of Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive.
29. Some 350 pages of additional background evidence was submitted on behalf of the Appellant as to the current situation in Afghanistan generally and in particular in Laghman province and in Kabul for this hearing alone; adding to over 1000 pages of background material submitted to the First-tier Tribunal. However, very little of this evidence was specifically referred to or relied upon by Mr Hodson at the hearing or in his skeleton argument and further, he expressly submitted that he was not suggesting any departure from the country guidance given in AK. For the avoidance of doubt I have considered the material that has been specifically referred to and relied upon but do not find that it is sufficient to warrant any departure from the findings in AK. Those findings are that the level of indiscriminate violence in Afghanistan as a whole is not at such a high level as to mean that, within the meaning of Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive, a civilian, solely by being present in the country, faces a real risk which threatens his life or person. As the Appellant would be returning to his family, there is no separate risk to him as a unaccompanied child as in LQ (Age: immutable characteristic) Afghanistan [2008] UKAIT 00005 and AA (unattended children) Afghanistan CG [2012] UKUT 00016 (IAC).
30. For these reasons, I do not find that the Appellant has established, to the lower standard applicable in asylum cases, a real risk of persecution or of suffering from indiscriminate violence on return to his home area in Laghman province such that his return would not be contrary to the Refugee Convention nor is he in need of Humanitarian Protection. For the same reasons, the Appellant’s return to Afghanistan would not be in breach of Articles 2 or 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
31. As I have found that the Appellant can and is likely to be met on return to Kabul and is not at risk in his home area, it is not strictly necessary to consider whether he could internally relocate to Kabul. However, for completeness, I do not find that it would be unduly harsh for the Appellant to relocate to Kabul. The Appellant would be returning with family support (which mitigates vulnerabilities linked to age) and without any further specific risk factors such as poor health such that the general finding in paragraph 243 of AK that a return to Kabul is not in general unsafe or unreasonable applies. There is nothing to suggest that none of the Appellant’s family members (father or uncle) could not reasonably relocate to Kabul with the Appellant if needed – the brief submission by Mr Hodson suggesting that it would be unreasonable as the family are rural farmers does not establish this. The Appellant’s appeal is also therefore dismissed on the basis that there would in any event be an option of internal relocation to Kabul.

Notice of Decision
The appeal is dismissed on asylum grounds.
The appeal is dismissed on humanitarian protection grounds.
The appeal is dismissed on human rights grounds.

Direction Regarding Anonymity – Rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008
Unless and until a Tribunal or court directs otherwise, the appellant is granted anonymity. No report of these proceedings shall directly or indirectly identify him or any member of their family. This direction applies both to the appellant and to the respondent. Failure to comply with this direction could lead to contempt of court proceedings.

Signed Date 24th March 2017

Upper Tribunal Judge Jackson

ANNEX – ERROR OF LAW DECISION

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber)
Re: NN (Appeal Number: PA/04171/2015)

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr T Kirk of Counsel
For the Respondent: Mr S Withwell, Home Office Presenting Officer

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant appeals against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Khawar promulgated on 1 August 2016, in which his appeal against the Respondent’s decision to refuse his asylum claim dated 17 December 2015 was dismissed.
2. The Appellant is a national of Afghanistan, born on 16 March 2001 who arrived in the United Kingdom on 5 June 2015 and claimed asylum. He underwent an asylum screening interview on 22 June 2015; made a statement in relation to his claim on 3 August 2015; underwent a substantive asylum interview on 8 December 2015 and made representations further to that interview on 21 December 2015. In support of his appeal, he made a written statement dated 8 June 2016 and gave oral evidence in the First-tier Tribunal.
3. The Respondent refused the Appellant’s claim on the basis that although his nationality and identity were accepted, the remainder of the claim – that his father was in the Afghanistan National Army, that his father was killed by the Taliban and that the Taliban sought to recruit the Appellant following his father’s death, was not accepted. The Respondent considered that the Appellant had not been able to provide any detail about his father’s role in the army or as to his death and his account of visits and threats from the Taliban was inconsistent. Further, the Appellant was able to remain in Afghanistan for eight to nine months, in his home village (showing that he was not specifically at risk there) and it was considered that in any event there was a sufficiency of protection in Afghanistan against actions by the Taliban. The Respondent considered that the Appellant could relocate to his uncle’s house as he had done previously, or the Appellant could relocate elsewhere within Afghanistan with his family.
4. Although the Respondent refused the Appellant’s asylum claim, he was granted limited leave to remain in the United Kingdom further to the Respondent’s policy on Unaccompanied Asylum Seeking Minors on the basis that the Appellant’s family could not at present be traced and there would be no adequate reception arrangements for the Appellant’s return to Afghanistan.
5. Judge Khawar dismissed the Appellant’s appeal on asylum grounds, primarily on adverse credibility grounds that the entirety of the Appellant’s account was unreliable and consequently it had not been established that there was any real risk on return from the Taliban. The Appellant’s family remained in his home village so he could continue to reside with them there.
The appeal
6. The Appellant appeals the decision of Judge Khawar on three grounds. First, that he failed to consider the Appellant’s claims to be at risk on return to Afghanistan on the basis that:
(i) he was a child from an area under AGE control/subject to struggle for control;
(ii) he would be perceived as having become “westernised”;
(iii) he would be at risk in Kabul as a child without family support following the Respondent’s acceptance that there would be no reception arrangements in place;
(iv) he would be at risk of indiscriminate violence.
These claims were made irrespective of the credibility of the Appellant’s account in relation to his father’s death and efforts by the Taliban to recruit him.
7. Secondly, that Judge Khawar’s adverse credibility findings were based on a failure to consider and/or a misunderstanding of the Appellant’s evidence; and/or were irrational and failed to give adequate reasons. Finally, the Appellant appeals on the basis that Judge Khawar failed to follow the ‘Child, vulnerable adult and sensitive appellant guidance’.
8. Permission to appeal was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Canavan on all grounds.
9. At the appeal, Counsel for the Appellant relied on and made submissions in line with the written grounds of appeal. On behalf of the Respondent, her Rule 24 response was relied upon and it was submitted that there was no material error of law. In relation to the first ground of challenge, the Respondent submitted that there is no material error of law, relying on the Judge’s implicit rejection of risk on return to the Appellant on the basis that he would be able to reside with his family on return to Afghanistan.
10. In relation to the second ground of challenge, it was submitted that the decision and findings must be read as a whole. The weight to be given to the Appellant’s different accounts at different points in time was a matter for him and the findings made were open to the Judge based on the inconsistencies before him.
11. In relation to the third ground of challenge, it was submitted that Judge Khawar had properly directed himself as to the application of the relevant guidance at paragraph 48 and it was clear in paragraphs 53 and 61 that he had in fact applied it in this case.
Findings and Reasons
12. As to the first ground of challenge, Judge Khawar’s decision contains a material error of law in that he failed to make any findings at all on a significant part of the Appellant’s appeal, namely the claim that for four separate reasons, he would face a real risk on return to Afghanistan even if his primary claim for asylum was refused. The Appellant clearly raised these matters in his grounds of appeal and they were further set out in Counsel’s skeleton argument in paragraphs 18 to 23 and 31 to 40. The Judge has not set out these specific issues in his section on the grounds of appeal and deals with risk on return in paragraphs 64 and 65 of the decision without any reference to them. The only potential conclusion is that there is no reason why arrangements could not be made for the Appellant to return to continue to reside with his family, but even if, as suggested by the Respondent, this could be taken as implicitly finding there would be no risk on return for the additional reasons, there are no reasons given for that finding which is on its face contrary to Respondent’s acceptance that there would be no reception arrangements for the Appellant on return to Kabul and that his parents had not at the time of decision been traced.
13. The Appellant’s claim that he would be at risk on return to Afghanistan for the reasons set out above in paragraph 6 remains to be determined.
14. As to the second ground of appeal, the Appellant raises a number of distinct errors said to have been made by Judge Khawar in his assessment of credibility which I deal with in turn. First, it is said that the Judge has only taken the Appellant’s initial witness statement as the basis of his claim and failed to give consideration to his interview record and later statement or to the explanation in his appeal statement for the errors in his initial statement. However, apart from a difference in the sequence of events as to the Appellant’s claimed contact with the Taliban and one point of detail, the main substance of the claim has remained throughout and that has been set out by Judge Khawar in paragraphs 16 to 27 of his decision. Specific reference is made to the various documents which contain the Appellant’s case, including all statements and interview records as well as the oral evidence and throughout the decision reference is made to where specific claims have been made. I do not find that Judge Khawar has erred in setting out the Appellant’s claim (save for in relation to first ground above) or assessing it with reference to the various documents. Judge Khawar rejects the explanation for the discrepancies of being errors of recollection by a minor child in paragraph 59 with sufficient reasons for that conclusion.
15. Secondly, the Appellant has now offered a comprehensive explanation as to the process of how he gained and lost contact with his mother and why he can not at present regain contact and it is said that Judge Khawar misunderstood the evidence. However, the explanation now given is not one which was readily apparent from the evidence before Judge Khawar and I find that the finding of inconsistency on this point was one which was open to him on the evidence before the First-tier Tribunal.
16. Thirdly and fourthly, Judge Khawar found that it was not credible that Appellant, even as a 15 year old, had not asked his mother for information or evidence to support his claim and had not sought assistance from his foster family or social service. There was either no reason given by the Appellant or one which was not credible as it claimed a lack of knowledge how to seek help or the ability to communicate to do so. I find that those conclusions were open to Judge Khawar on the basis of evidence before him.
17. Finally, Judge Khawar found an inconsistency in the Appellant’s evidence about where his father was based with the army, whether it was a check post in the village or one very far away. Counsel for the Appellant seeks to argue that there is no inconsistency, that the check point was in the village but far from the Appellant’s home. However, I can find nothing in the evidence before the First-tier Tribunal to support that explanation and the answers highlighted in the Appellant’s asylum interview do not, even taken together, suggest that there is no inconcsistency nor explain it.. In these circumstances, I find that this conclusion was also open to Judge Khawar on the basis of evidence before him.
18. The adverse credibility findings set out in paragraphs 47 to 63 of the decision show that this was a cumulative finding, based on a number of discrete points, that the Appellant’s account could not be relied upon due to the contradictions in and vagueness of the account. The individual findings which made up that cumulative assessment were ones which were open to Judge Khawar based on the evidence before him and I do not find any failure to consider or understand the evidence, nor any irrationality, nor any failure to give reasons for the findings either individually or cumulatively. I do not find any material error of law under the second ground of challenge.
19. As to the final ground of appeal, I do not find that Judge Khawar’s decision contains any material error of law in relation to the application of the ‘Child, vulnerable adult and sensitive appellant guidance’. The Judge correctly directs himself to the applicability of this guidance at paragraph 48 and shows in paragraphs 53 and 59 in particular that he has applied it by making allowances for the Appellant’s age. The Judge has considered that the Appellant was a 15 year old minor but has also concluded that he knew the difference between right and wrong and between truth and lies based on the information and oral evidence before him.

Notice of Decision
The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of a material error of law in the adverse credibility findings or in the treatment of the Appellant as a minor. As such, it is not necessary to set aside the decision.
The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did involve the making of a material error of law in that the First-tier Tribunal failed to determine the Appellant’s four alternative claims to be at risk on return to Afghanistan. This part of the Appellant’s claim remains outstanding to determine.

Directions to the parties
1. This appeal is adjourned to an oral hearing, to be relisted before UTJ Jackson to determine the remaining issues.
2. Any further evidence relied upon by the parties shall be filed with the Upper Tribunal and served upon the other party no later than 14 days prior to the hearing of the appeals;
3. The Appellant is to file with the Upper Tribunal and serve upon the Respondent a skeleton argument setting out the relevant issues, with reference to evidence and case-law no later than 14 days prior to the hearing of appeals.

Directions to Administration
1. The appeal is adjourned, to be relisted for an oral hearing before UTJ Jackson on the first available date after 6 February 2017.
2. The time estimate for the hearing is 3 hours.

Direction Regarding Anonymity – Rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008
Unless and until a Tribunal or court directs otherwise, the appellant is granted anonymity. No report of these proceedings shall directly or indirectly identify him or any member of their family. This direction applies both to the appellant and to the respondent. Failure to comply with this direction could lead to contempt of court proceedings.

Signed Date 20 January 2017

Upper Tribunal Judge Jackson