Tribunal decisions

The decision

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: PA/06033/2016

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Field House
Decision & Reasons Promulgated
On 20 January 2017
On 9 February 2017

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PERKINS

Between

A P
(anonymity direction made)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms S Bassiri-Dezfouli, Counsel, instructed by Apex Legal Services
For the Respondent: Mr P Singh, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
DECISION AND REASONS
1. Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 I make an order prohibiting the disclosure or publication of any matter likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Breach of this order can be punished as a contempt of court. I make this order because the Appellant claims to be the victim of domestic violence and publication of her identity might provoke at attack in the event of her return.
2. The appellant identifies herself as a citizen of Ghana born in February 1962. She appeals against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal on 7 November 2016 dismissing her appeal against the decision of the Secretary of State to refuse her asylum.
3. The thrust of the criticism is that the First-tier Tribunal judge made unjustified adverse credibility findings. These have distilled a little in the grant of permission. At paragraph 25 of his decision the judge noted the lack of corroborative evidence "either in the form of evidence from friends or relatives, medical evidence or complaints, or reports to the police or other domestic abuse agencies", whereas the appellant had given an explanation for not reporting domestic violence and had produced supportive documents in the bundle which appear to have been ignored and, arguably, the judge had misdirected himself by finding corroboration necessary which it is not in asylum cases.
4. The second ground is that the respondent appeared to have accepted the appellant's claim at its highest and therefore accepted that she had been the victim of domestic violence and refused the application because there was sufficiency of protection. The judge, wrongly, had decided that the appellant was not credible without giving her notice that the judge's analysis was different from that in the refusal letter and so had reached his decision for unlawful reasons.
5. The respondent gave a detailed reason for refusal. The respondent indicated clearly that in her view women in Ghana constituted a particular social group and then proceeded to consider the case at it's highest. The respondent explained that in her view there was sufficiency of protection in Ghana. Additionally or alternatively the appellant could relocate within Ghana to a place of safety. Particularly at paragraphs 26 and 27 of the decision the respondent noted that the appellant had two brothers and two sisters living in Ghana, that she was an English speaker and a healthy educated woman.
6. When the case came before the First-tier Tribunal Judge he found the appellant incredible for the reasons outlined in my summary of the grounds of appeal. He also found it significant that this appeal arose from the appellant's third application for permission to remain in the United Kingdom.
7. The judge did not believe that the Appellant had been the victim of domestic abuse and, at paragraph 29, said "accordingly, I am not satisfied that she forms a member of a particular social group".
8. The judge also found no evidence that she could not avail herself of the protection of the authorities in Ghana if that were needed and found that the appellant would not be forced to live alone because she had close relatives in Ghana.
9. I find it surprising that the judge made a finding that the appellant was not a member of a particular social group when the respondent had accepted the contrary and I do not understand at all why the judge's finding that her claims to have been the victim of domestic violence were not credible led the judge to decide that she was not a member of the particular social group recognised by the respondent as "women in Ghana".
10. The supporting letters are of limited value. They make much of the appellant's credibility without addressing the fact that she is an overstayer in the United Kingdom. Neither do they say much about the alleged matrimonial violence although this is picked up in at least one of the letters.
11. I do not see that very much turns on this. The reasons for refusal made it plain that the respondent had not accepted the appellant's credibility but had simply dealt with the case on the basis that she was telling the truth. It was, I find, unwise of the judge not to have made clear that he was going to make adverse credibility findings. Not the least of reasons for this is that the content of the supporting letters might have been influenced by what they thought the appellant had to prove and it might be that more would have been said if they had realised that it was going to be important to decide whether or not she had been a victim of domestic violence.
12. The difficulty I see in the appellant's case is there is no objective evidence to give any weight whatsoever to the appellant's concern that her husband will have any interest in her in the event of her return so that he would want to continue to show domestic violence towards her or, if he did, that the authorities would not be interested or, if it was necessary, she could not avoid any problem by internal relocation.
13. It is, I find, possible that very detailed analysis of the evidence about the influence of the appellant's partner might persuade a judge that she has a subjective fear of him, but I see no basis on which the judge could have concluded rationally that the appellant's husband was sufficiently important for that fear to be objectively justified either in the sense of his influence preventing the police from being interested in a complaint made against him or, more significantly still, of his preventing her re-establishing herself in a different part of Ghana. I have not found anything in the papers capable of belief that any such fear that the appellant might have is justified objectively.
14. The judge's finding that the appellant is an educated woman with a transferable skill (she is a nurse) and the wherewithal to establish herself in a part of Ghana where she would not be known or come to the attention of her former husband is, I find, not undermined by other deficiencies alleged in the decision.
15. It follows therefore that although there is much in this decision that the judge might want to have done differently I find nothing that undermines the safe finding that internal relocation is a viable option and it follows therefore that there is no material error in the decision and I dismiss the appeal.

Signed

Jonathan Perkins
Judge of the Upper Tribunal

Dated 9 February 2017