The decision


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The Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: PA/07256/2016


THE IMMIGRATION ACTS


Heard at North Shields
Decision & Reasons Promulgated
On 31st March 2017
On 4th April 2017


Before

DEPUTY JUDGE OF THE UPPER TRIBUNAL FARRELLY


Between

A Z M
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellant
And

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent


Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Weatherall, Counsel, instructed by Halliday Reeves.
For the Respondent: Mrs. R. Pettersen, Home Office Presenting Officer.


DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction

1. The appellant is a national of Iran born in 1994. She arrived at Gatwick airport in February 2016 and claimed protection on the basis she was at risk if returned for having converted from Islam to Christianity.

2. Her account was that she was introduced to Christianity by a friend in September 2015. She started to attend a church. She was to attend this church on 21st January 2016 but was delayed. When she arrived she saw people being taken away. She decided to go to her grandmother's home. The Iranian authorities went to her home that night and arrested her husband. He was released the following day. She left Iran on 23 January 2016, arrangements having been made by her maternal uncle.

3. The respondent refused the claim on the basis her claimed conversion was not believed and the index event did not occur. The respondent had obtained a fingerprint match to show that she was in Greece in November 2015. It was accepted that if the claim were true she would be at risk.

The First tier Tribunal

4. Her appeal was heard by First-tier Judge Bradshaw. The appellant was represented by Counsel and there was a presenting officer in attendance. The appeal was dismissed, with the judge not accepting she had converted to Christianity or that she had come to the attention of the authorities. Reliance was placed on the country guidance decision of SB( risk on return -illegal exit) Iran CG 2009 UK AIT 00053 for the conclusion that there was no risk simply as a failed asylum seeker being returned.

5. In refusing the claim the judge referred to a number of credibility points as significantly damaging her claim at paragraphs 30 to 40 of the decision. At paragraph 30 the judge found her to be evasive in her oral evidence.

6. In the refusal letter the respondent did not believe it credible a friend would invite her to a church so soon given the risk. The judge at paragraph 32 said the appellant did not explain why her friend invited her at that particular time and referred to the lack of detail about her visits or about other persons in attendance.

7. The respondent said she only displayed a superficial knowledge about Christianity at interview. At paragraph 31 of the decision the judge referred to her limited knowledge, referring to her talking about `peace and calm missing from her life and she talked of religion meaning being kind to others’.

8. The respondent referred to alternative answers she gave about her husband’s religion. The judge recorded that she was asked three times what his religion was and yet could not explain satisfactorily.

9. The respondent referred to the appellant claiming to have left Iran on 23 January 2016 after a raid on the church a few days earlier. It was put to her at interview that she had been fingerprinted in Greece on the 30th November 2015 which he denied. The respondent relied upon section 8(4) of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants) Act 2004. The judge recorded at paragraph 36 that the appellant was educated and did not accept he did not know she could claim protection in Greece. Regarding her claim of being under the control of an agent the judge pointed out that she had the opportunity to correct matters when she made her claim in the United Kingdom.

10. The judge was provided with various references about the appellant's practice of Christianity after her arrival in the United Kingdom. There were letters dated 10 June 2016 and 17 November 2016 from a Mr Bailey from the Stockton Parish Church. He states this is an Anglican church with a typical Sunday congregation of 150 and that the Sunday service is translated into Farsi. He states that one third of the congregation are from Iran and he has experience of working with converts. He states the church does not offer letters of support to everyone who asks but seeks to match their lifestyle and practice as evidence of a genuine conversion. He referred to the appellant's attendance and her preparation for baptism.

11. At paragraph 38 the judge said that no one had attended from the church to give evidence and no explanation was offered. The judge commented that the appellant had been given adequate notice of the date of hearing and that no adjournment request had been made. The judge acknowledged that Mr Bailey’s was sincere and circumspect in accepting a convert for baptism. However, the judge pointed out that it was the appellant’s credibility that must be examined by the court.

The Upper Tribunal

12. Permission to appeal was sought on the basis the judge in the circumstance erred in drawing adverse inferences from the absence of church members. There was an explanation as to why no one had attended. Mr Bailey was only advised of the hearing the day before and his mother had died and he was engaged in making funeral arrangements. It was also stated that the Minister, Rev Miller, was on a mission trip to India.

13. The grant of permission accepted it was arguable the judge erred in stating at paragraph 38 that no reasonable explanation had been given as to why no member of the church was able to attend. The permission to appeal referred to the judge’s comment that Mr Bailey was sincere and circumspect in the acceptance of baptismal candidates and the appellant had produced letters of support and photographs of her baptism. The permission referred to a paucity of reasoning in rejecting the evidence from the church beyond the fact that no one had attended.

14. At hearing the appellant's representative relied upon the grant of leave and the skeleton argument submitted. She pointed out that the First-tier appeal had been listed in Bradford whereas the church members are in Stockton which made it difficult to arrange attendances.

15. The presenting officer referred to all the adverse credibility points taken by the judge. She pointed out that the appellant was represented at the First-tier Tribunal and there was no application for an adjournment if witnesses were unavailable.

Consideration

16. The central issue in the appeal was precisely put in the early case of Dorodian (para 2) : `Either he is a genuine Christian by conviction ,and would risk whatever converts do risk in Iran ;or he is a complete mountebank, and would risk nothing at all.’ The decision of the Immigration Appeal Tribunal Dorodian -v- SSHD suggested that no one should be regarded as a committed Christian who is not vouched for as such by a Minister of an established church. Any written evidence should be clear and capable of verification. It was expected that if the person's commitment is questioned the church Minister concerned should give oral evidence. There was no objection to the court testing the religious knowledge of the appellant.

17. It is exceedingly difficult to test the truth of a claimed conversion. A profession can be due to the ulterior motive of achieving status. Demonstrating knowledge and the supportive evidence of ministers can only take matters so far. A person may have a simplistic view of Christianity which can be genuinely held. On the other hand, a person could demonstrate a learned academic knowledge of Christianity which would not necessarily reflect their genuineness. Supportive evidence from church members are rarely decisive but must be considered in the round. Some churches are particularly welcoming and trusting of strangers. Others are more cautious and require a person to prove themselves before being accepted or vouched for. This could, for instance be by their showing commitment over an extended period of time; their way of life and works for the church and determination when faced with obstacles and inconvenience. Supportive evidence from Ministers cannot supplant the role of the tribunal as the fact finder.

18. In the present appeal there were a number of credibility issues raised by the respondent which were accepted by the judge. There was the credibility of the index event. Most damaging was the evidence produced that the appellant was in Greece at the time when she claimed the event occurred. She said she had left Iran two or three weeks before her screening. This took place in the first week of February .Consequently, the differences in calendars could not explain the contradiction. In her substantive interview she denied any earlier travel from Iran.

19. The judge did refer to the supportive documentary evidence from the church here about her profession of faith. The judge at paragraph 38 made the factually correct point that no one from the church had attended. The judge referred to the evidence of Mr Bailey and commented that whilst he had been given notification had a very late stage the appellant and her representatives had been aware of the hearing. Furthermore, the appellant was represented and there was no adjournment application.

20. The reference to no one attending from the church goes wider than the absence of Mr Bailey and the Minister whose absence had been explained. There were other church members who had submitted letters in support but had not attended. Counsel for the appellant at paragraph 28 suggested an explanation was that church members had limited resources and the location of the hearing presented as an obstacle. Undoubtedly the comment by the judge that no one has attended was not meant as a criticism of members of the church but rather a statement about the evidence available to the judge.

21. The judge did comment on the documentary evidence submitted. The photographs show the appellant has been baptised and there is a certificate to this effect. The judge referred to the presenting officer’s submission that the appellant had sought to enhance her profile by attending church here and that her motivation was questionable. The judge does refer at paragraph 38 to the letters of support and correctly comments that it is her credibility that is at issue. This is a matter for the judge.

Conclusion

22. It was open to the judge on the evidence presented to reach negative credibility findings. Adequate reasons for doing so are given at paragraph 29 onwards. It is my conclusion that no material error of law has been demonstrated. Consequently, the decision dismissing the appellant's appeal shall stand.


Decision

No material error of law has been demonstrated in the decision of First-tier Judge Bradshaw. That decision, dismissing the appellant's appeal, shall stand.



Deputy Judge Farrelly

31st March 2017