Tribunal decisions

The decision

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: PA/09929/2016

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Field House
Decision & Reasons Promulgated
On 31 March 2017
On 25 April 2017

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE ESHUN

Between

STM
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION made)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr J Kirk (Counsel)
For the Respondent: Mr E Tufan (HOPO)

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant is a citizen of Iran born on 29 May 1987. He has been granted permission to appeal the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Widdup dismissing his appeal against the refusal of the respondent to grant him asylum in the United Kingdom. The appellant’s claim to asylum was that he was at risk on return to Iran because he had converted to Christianity. The judge dismissed the appellant’s appeal because he did not believe the appellant’s evidence.

2. The appellant entered the UK on 5 March 2016 on a flight from Germany. He had not claimed asylum in any of the countries he had passed through because he did not know where he was travelling to or where he was. The agent had agreed with his uncle to take him and he did not know if his uncle knew where he was going.

3. The appellant’s evidence was that he had been to technical college where he had studied marine navigation. He had converted to Christianity in Iran because he was lonely and had work problems. He saw a TV channel “Kindness and Race” and he did some investigation on YouTube and read books. It was very soothing. His work problems related to a work supervisor who shouted at him. His work was not related to his qualification. It was the first job he could find after his military service.

4. He was baptised the first day he went to the house church. He was not forced to do so. He had been studying Christianity for about two years. An Armenian woman called Ana had given him a Bible.

5. He was married in November 2011. His wife had been baptised and she was still in Iran. She was not at risk because she was not at the church when it was raided. She had received suspicious phone calls. When the house church was raided, he left his phone and ID card in his jacket and ran away. The authorities had information about him and visited his work and his home. His wife did not come with him because there was no opportunity. It had taken his uncle about nine days to make arrangements for him to leave. He did not have his phone and could not tell his wife what had happened. His wife had left their home three days after the raid on his house.

6. The appellant said he attended the church in Cardiff every Sunday. He goes there because he cannot speak English properly. It takes him six hours and he pays for the journey from his benefits. The service is in Farsi.

7. The judge’s findings on the appellant’s claimed conversion are to be found at paragraphs 45 to 64. The appellant’s grounds upon which permission was granted challenged all the judge’s findings.

8. The first ground challenged the judge’s findings at paragraphs 45 and 46 of the determination. In those paragraphs the judge said as follows:

“45. I attach little weight to the recent email from the wife. I have several concerns about the email. The email was sent two days before the hearing of the appeal. It says that officers and soldiers came to the house looking for him. They ransacked the place and took, among other things, religious books. No dates are given about this raid or when the wife moved to live with his parents.

46. However, on the Appellant’s own account this was not new information and the Appellant accepted that his wife had told him of this over the phone. However, he then said that calls are under control and so his wife sent an email. If this is right and calls are under control that does not provide an explanation why an email should be sent repeating what the Appellant already knew, nor does it explain why his wife had been willing to speak to him about such things over the phone. I find therefore that the letter is not some spontaneous communication from the wife describing her experiences but was an attempt by the Appellant to provide further evidence in support of his claim and to answer a suggestion by the Respondent that he had not claimed that his house was raided in October 2015”

9. Mr Kirk argued that the way the judge dealt with the email from the appellant’s wife was irrational and inadequately reasoned. He argued that the judge declined to attach any weight to the evidence which corroborated the appellant’s claim. Nevertheless, the judge considered that the production of the email close to the hearing undermined the appellant’s claim. Mr Kirk relied on what Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Symes said when he granted permission which was this that it was difficult to see why the provision of information in writing, a prudent step by any litigant in legal proceedings should have diminished the credibility of this aspect of his account.

10. Mr Tufan submitted that irrationality sets a high test. He submitted that the judge’s findings on this issue were open to him.

11. I find that the email arriving two days before the hearing was only one of several reasons given by the judge for not believing the appellant’s evidence. The judge found at paragraph 45 that no dates were given about this raid or when the wife moved to live with her parents. I find that paragraph 46 contained further reasons why the judge did not attach weight to the email sent from the appellant’s wife. I find that the judge’s findings were open to the judge.

12. The second ground challenged the judge’s findings at paragraph 47. The judge said as follows:

“In the refusal letter the Respondent accepted that the Appellant showed some ‘basic knowledge’ of Christianity. I find that that concession was not an adequate reflection of the knowledge the Appellant displayed in the A1 but such knowledge could have been acquired without having been converted and without a commitment to Christianity. The real question in this case is whether such knowledge as the Appellant has is derived from a genuine interest and commitment to Christianity or is based on knowledge he has obtained in order to support his asylum claim.”

13. The grounds argued that while knowledge alone might not be sufficient, the judge failed to acknowledge that the appellant was also supported by evidence from his church. This confirmed the appellant’s church attendance and his baptism in the UK. Given the low standard applicable in asylum appeals, it was submitted that the appellant discharged the burden to show that it was reasonably likely that he was a genuine convert and consequently the judge’s findings to the contrary were materially flawed.

14. Mr Kirk relied on paragraph 24 of SA (Iran) [2012] EWHC 2575 (Admin). The Court of Appeal held therein:

“What appears to have impressed the Immigration Judge, and then the Home Secretary, is that the claimant’s conversion to Christianity was not regarded by him as genuine, and had been manufactured to assist her asylum claim. It is a dangerous thing for anyone, and perhaps especially a judge, to peer into what some call a man or woman’s soul to assess whether a professed faith is genuinely held, and especially not when it was and it is agreed that she was and is a frequent participant in church services …”

Mr Kirk submitted that the judge did not appear to factor in the evidence of the appellant’s regular attendance at church.

15. Mr Tufan submitted that SA (Iran) was a judicial review case on the certificate under Section 92 of the 2002 Immigration Act. He said it was not a country guidance case. He relied on paragraph 25 of SA (Iran) where the Court of Appeal said “nothing in this judgment is intended to reach any conclusion that an appeal by the claimant against the refusal of her claim will be bound to succeed. That will be a matter for the First-tier Tribunal …” Mr Tufan submitted that no evidence has been produced in this case of any proselytising activities by the appellant.

16. I fail to see the error of law the judge is said to have made at paragraph 47. I find that the judge was making an observation and directing himself as to what the real question in this case was.

17. The third ground challenged paragraphs 48 to 55 of the judge’s decision. The judge held as follows:

“48. It is particularly important therefore that I look with care at how and why the Appellant’s conversion is said to have occurred.

49. The Respondent relied on various perceived inconsistencies. Dr Moffat dealt with these in her submissions. I accept her submission relating to paragraph 25 of the refusal letter. The Appellant’s answers do appear to have been made in response to a question about ‘who else’ had converted him.

50. I also accept her submission that the claim that Ana, an Armenian, was involved in the house church is not a reason for questioning the Appellant’s credibility. The background evidence does show that some Armenian Christians do become involved in evangelising and attending house churches.

51. However, I find that the Appellant’s account of the process by which he came to be interested in Christianity and then converted, when read as a whole, is beset with significant inconsistencies.

52. In his screening interview and in his witness statement and oral evidence, the Appellant said that he became interested in Christianity about 2 years before he came to the UK. He watched documentaries and films on satellite TV and he read books (paragraph 6 witness statement). The background evidence at A133 shows that it is possible for Iranians to watch Iranian Diasporan Christian pastors on satellite TV and I therefore accept that that part of his account is consistent with the evidence. In his oral evidence the Appellant added that his interest began when he was flipping TV channels at a time when he was lonely and had problems at work.

53. In passing, I note that the problems at work appeared to be no more than a supervisor who had a bullying manner and his loneliness was at a time when he was already married. The opportunity to watch TV alone existed because his wife was not yet home. I do not regard his claim to have been lonely or to have had work problems to be an adequate explanation for taking the step of developing an interest in Christianity.

54. Thus his developing interest in Christianity started in 2014 through watching TV and reading books. In August 2015 he then discovered that his friend, Morteza Karimi, was also interested in Christianity and he was given more books to read. His conversion occurred on 7th October 2015 on his first attendance at the house church at which time he was also baptised. He was given a Bible by Ana who was one of the organisers of the house church.

55. However, in answer to AI 63 the Appellant said that he had read the Bible to find out about Christianity but, in contrast, at AI 75 and 76 he said that the Bible was given to him by Ana whom he first met on 7th October when he went to the house church. There is therefore a lack of clarity as to whether he was saying that he was given the Bible before 7th October or only on 7th October.”

18. It was argued that the judge’s credibility findings were based on what the judge considered to be a significant inconsistency in relation to the appellant’s evidence at his asylum interview, of when he obtained a Bible in Iran. The grounds submitted that there was no inconsistency. Over the course of his answers, the appellant clarified his evidence on this matter. At AIR Q62, Q63, Q75, Q76 and Q79, the appellant made clear that he received extracts from the Bible from his friend, Morteza, prior to being given a full copy of the Bible by Ana on his first attendance at the house church. The judge completely ignored the clarification in AIR Q79. Mr Kirk submitted that the judge misunderstood the evidence. It was clear from the interview that the appellant read extracts from the Bible before 7 October 2015 which was the day he was actually given the Bible by Ana.

19. In the light of the evidence set out above, I find that what the judge said at paragraph 54 correctly reflected the appellant’s evidence. The appellant said at question 79 that Morteza had given him extracts from the Bible after he had first spoken to him about Christianity in August 2015. At question 61 he said he converted to Christianity on 7 October 2015. At 76 he said he met Ana for the first time when he went to the house church and at 75 said that it was Ana who had given him the Bible. However, what the judge said at paragraph 55 was wrong because there was no inconsistency in the appellant’s evidence as to when he was given the Bible by Ana. I do not however find that this error undermines the judge’s credibility findings.

20. At paragraph 56 the judge considering the core part of the appellant’s evidence and his developing interest in Christianity accepted the conclusions drawn by the respondent in paragraph 26 of the refusal letter that the entire process was completed with remarkable speed. The grounds submitted that this finding was perverse arguing that the appellant’s evidence was that he became interested in Christianity after watching programmes on television in 2014. In August 2015 the appellant was given Christian materials by his friend, Morteza. In October 2015 the appellant was baptised at the house church. There was nothing remarkably speedy about this. The grounds rely on they claim to be the accepted doctrine of Damascene conversions to argue that there was no undue haste in the development of the appellant’s Christian faith.

21. I have looked at paragraphs 26 and 25 of the respondent’s refusal letter. The inference that can be drawn from these two paragraphs is that according to his interview the appellant said he was approached by his colleague on 23 August 2015, who introduced him to Christianity. He was invited by his colleague to a house church, which he attended on 7 October 2015. He claimed to have been baptised on this date. It was this period that the Secretary of State considered in reaching the conclusion that the entire process was completed with remarkable speed. In the light of the timeline, I find that the judge’s finding at paragraph 56 was open to him.

22. There was a challenge to the judge’s findings at paragraphs 57 to 58. The grounds argued that given the size of the congregation at the Tredegarville Church, it was plausible that, as the appellant suggested, Reverend Rees was not aware of his subsequent attendance. It was further argued that the judge placed no weight on the fact that the appellant has been re-baptised in the UK and that the Tredegarville Church would not have carried out this baptism if unconvinced of the genuineness of the appellant’s faith.

23. I find no error of law in the judge’s findings at 57 and 58. I find no error in the judge’s interpretation of the letter from Reverend Rees. At the hearing before me, the appellant produced a further letter from Reverend Rees which posted the judge’s decision. I do not accept Mr. Tufan’s submission that the duplicated signature of Reverend Rees meant that the letter was a forgery. I however accept Mr. Tufan’s submission that there was a complete failure of the appellant to bring himself within paragraph 8(c) of the guidelines in Darodian v SSHD decided by an Immigration Tribunal on 23 August 2001. The appellant failed to call a minister to attend the hearing and give evidence as to the genuineness of his Christianity. On the evidence that was before the judge, I find that his findings at paragraphs 57 and 58 were open to him.

24. There was a challenge to the judge’s finding at paragraph 62 where the judge found as follows:

“62. The Appellant’s case is that his wife also attended the house church and was baptised. She continues to live in Iran. The email she sent focuses on the interest the authorities are said to have in the Appellant. She did not say, and neither has the Appellant, that she has been at risk because of her own Christian beliefs. If she were a convert who had also been baptised and who also attended the house church there was no clear explanation why his uncle did not arrange for them both to leave Iran together.”

25. I accept that the appellant and not his wife was at the house church when it was raided. His evidence was that he escaped but left his jacket containing his identity documents behind and that was how he came to the attention of the Iranian authorities. Nevertheless, the grounds do not deal with the judge’s finding that there was no clear explanation why the appellant’s uncle did not arrange for him and his wife to leave Iran together if she was also a convert who had been baptised and who had also attended the house church.

26. On the totality of the evidence, I do not find that the judge’s decision is irrational or inadequately reasoned. The judge’s decision dismissing the appellant’s appeal shall stand.

Direction Regarding Anonymity – Rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008

Unless and until a Tribunal or court directs otherwise, the appellant is granted anonymity. No report of these proceedings shall directly or indirectly identify him or any member of their family. This direction applies both to the appellant and to the respondent. Failure to comply with this direction could lead to contempt of court proceedings.

Signed Date: 24 April 2017

Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Eshun