The decision

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: PA/10119/2017


Heard at North Shields Decision & Reasons Promulged
On 23rd April 2018 On 3rd June 2019






For the appellant: Mr Diwnycz, Home Office Presenting Officer
For the respondent: Mr Boyle of Halliday Reeves Law Firm



1. Although it is the Secretary of State who is appealing, for convenience I will continue hereinafter to refer to the parties as they were in the first Tier Tribunal.

2. The appellant is a Kurdish national of Iran, who claimed he was born in April 1999. The respondent believed he was 10 years older and he was treated as an adult for the purpose of consideration of his claim.

3. He made a claim for protection on the basis he is fearful of the Iranian authorities for imputing a political opinion to him. This is because his father had been involved with the KDPI and had asked the appellant to distribute parcels on behalf of the organisation. When his father was arrested he became fearful for his own safety and fled. He also claimed that having been exposed to Christianity in the United Kingdom he had converted and had been baptised. His conversion also placed him at risk.

4. The respondent was not satisfied he had established the claim as genuine and his application was refused in September 2017.

5. His appeal was allowed under the Refugee Convention by First tier Judge Head-Rapson in a decision promulgated on 30 November 2017. Regarding involvement with the KDPI the judge referred to some of his evidence as inconsistent but overall found it credible. The judge also found the appellant had genuinely converted to Christianity.

6. The respondent was granted permission to appeal on the basis the judge had not given adequate reasons for finding the claims made to be credible and had not set out what factors would put the appellant at risk on the basis of a conversion to Christianity.

7. The appellant's representatives have prepared a bundle for the Upper Tribunal which includes a skeleton argument. It makes reference to the judge indicating she had considered all of the documentary evidence provided, including the relevant case law and the respondent's background information in respect of both claims.

8. Mr Diwnycz, Home Office Presenting Officer, relied on the grounds which permission had been granted.


9. The appellant's credibility was in issue in relation to both aspects of his claim. With regard to his claim. His father asked him to deliver parcels to people involved with the KTP. I the appellant was unable to give details of the deliveries despite having claimed to make 4-5 deliveries over a 5 to 6 month period. He claimed his father had been arrested on several occasions yet his family had not suffered any mistreatment from the authorities and that his father was simply released. This was at odds with the country information which indicated the harsh treatment given to those involved with Kurdish parties. His account of Christianity was considered to be vague and there was no supportive documentation despite claiming to go to church twice a week. At the hearing, the judge heard from a lay minister. He said the appellant attended twice a week and a baptismal certificate was produced.

10. In the decision the judge sets out briefly the claim involving the KDPI and at paragraph 21 acknowledged inconsistencies but overall found his account to be coherent and credible. Because of this he would be of interest on return to the Iranian authorities. It is my conclusion the judge needed to set out more fully the assessment of the evidence. For instance, the judge does not indicate the level of inconsistencies described and how this reflected upon his credibility. The respondent's stance was that if the appellant's father were involved as claimed then it was improbable the family would have not met was greater difficulties. The judge does not have deal with this point.

11. Regarding the claimed conversion, the judge stated at para 33 that based mainly to the weight attached to the evidence of the lay minister the conversion was accepted as genuine. The judge referred to looking at all of the evidence in the round but was non-specific. The judge did not state the factors which supported this conclusion and the applicable case law is not set out.

12. It is my conclusion the judge failed to give adequate reasons for allowing the two limbs of the claim. The respondent is entitled to know how the evidence was evaluated and why it was that the appeal succeeded. It is not sufficient to resort to generalities. The decision of MK (duty to give reasons) Pakistan [2013] UKUT 00641 states the decision must clearly disclose the reasons behind it and bare statements are not sufficient.

13. The decision of First tier Judge Head-Rapson, allowing the appeal materially errs in law. The error was the failure to give adequate reasons for the conclusion. Consequently, that decision cannot stand and will have to be remade de novo.


The Secretary of State's appeal is allowed. The decision of First tier Judge Head-Rapson, allowing the appeal, is set aside. The decision is to be remade in the First Tier Tribunal de novo.

Francis J Farrelly 11/06/2018
Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge