The decision



Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number UI-2021-001203
(PA/11468/2018)


THE IMMIGRATION ACTS


Heard at George House, Edinburgh
Decision & Reasons Promulgated
On the 23 March 2022
On the 03 May 2022



Before

UT JUDGE MACLEMAN


Between

A V T
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent


For the Appellant: no appearance or representation
For the Respondent: Mr M Diwyncz, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer


DETERMINATION AND REASONS
1. The appellant is a citizen of Vietnam, who gives his date of birth as 21 October 2001. FtT Judge Hutchinson dismissed his appeal by a decision dated 17 November 2021.
2. On 8 December 2021 FtT Judge Ford granted permission to appeal to the UT.
3. Permission was granted on one ground only, namely that the FtT might have erred “… in accepting the assertion by the respondent that it will be possible to ensure adequate prevention measures are in place on the appellant’s return to Vietnam to ensure that the risk of suicide will not be real. The evidence presented by the respondent … was arguably inadequate in that no specific enquiries appear to have been made of the Vietnamese authorities …”.
4. Notice was issued to the parties that the UT would hear the appeal on 23 March 2022 at 11.30 am. Parties were asked to arrive 15 minutes in advance.
5. The solicitors who had been acting for the appellant advised the UT in advance that they had withdrawn and would not be attending.
6. The appellant did not appear at the time specified (and did not attend later in the day). He had not communicated with the UT or with the respondent in any form since the notice of hearing was issued. Mr Diwnycz confirmed that the address on record with the UT is also the last address known to the SSHD. He was last known to be there on 8 December 2021, since when a former flatmate stated that he had “packed his bags and gone to London”. He is recorded as an ”absconder”.
7. It appears that the appellant had fair notice of the hearing, has not kept the SSHD and the tribunal up to date with his address, and there is no more which could or should be done to give him the chance to participate. I decided to proceed in his absence.
8. In a rule 24 response to the grant of permission, the SSHD argues that the grant of permission misunderstands the reasoning at [44] of the decision, where the Judge was clearly accepting, as she was entitled to do, that the SSHD would discharge her duties in safeguarding the appellant “before and during return to Vietnam”. Mr Diwyncz said that answered the point in the grant of permission.
9. The grounds on which permission was granted, 2 (ii), says that the SSHD’s position on measures to be taken “before and during return” was “not adequately supported by background evidence … lacked sufficient detail … and has therefore been attributed inappropriate weight …”. The lack of detail is contrasted with “the significant volume of clinical evidence … on behalf of the appellant”.
10. I note that at [44] the FtT did not accept that risk had been established, and the finding on measures to manage risk was only in the alternative. The outcome would have been the same.
11. The SSHD does not usually detail in a decision or at a hearing specific steps proposed to manage the removal process. It is in the public domain, and well known to practitioners, that the SSHD has policies and practices to manage such risks. The appellant made no case that the SSHD’s policies are inadequate or that they are not generally implemented. To say that the SSHD’s position was given “inappropriate weight” is a vague disagreement, rather than a proposition of error on a point of law.
12. I conclude that the FtT made no error, and that even if it did, it was immaterial to the outcome.
13. The FtT made an anonymity direction. Anonymity is preserved at this stage, as follows.
14. Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant without his express consent. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.


H Macleman

23 March 2022
UT Judge Macleman















NOTIFICATION OF APPEAL RIGHTS
1. A person seeking permission to appeal against this decision must make a written application to the Upper Tribunal. Any such application must be received by the Upper Tribunal within the appropriate period after this decision was sent to the person making the application. The appropriate period varies, as follows, according to the location of the individual and the way in which the Upper Tribunal’s decision was sent:
2. Where the person who appealed to the First-tier Tribunal is in the United Kingdom at the time that the application for permission to appeal is made, and is not in detention under the Immigration Acts, the appropriate period is 12 working days (10 working days, if the notice of decision is sent electronically).
3. Where the person making the application is in detention under the Immigration Acts, the appropriate period is 7 working days (5 working days, if the notice of decision is sent electronically).
4. Where the person who appealed to the First-tier Tribunal is outside the United Kingdom at the time that the application for permission to appeal is made, the appropriate period is 38 days (10 working days, if the notice of decision is sent electronically).
5. A “working day” means any day except a Saturday or a Sunday, Christmas Day, Good Friday or a bank holiday.
6. The date when the decision is “sent’ is that appearing on the covering letter or covering email.