PA/11954/2019

• Status of case: Unreported
• Hearing date: 12 Jul 2021
• Promulgation date: 30 Mar 2022
• Publication date: 26 Jan 2023
• Last updated on: 26 Jan 2023

The decision

IAC-AH-SAR-V4

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: PA/11954/2019


THE IMMIGRATION ACTS


Heard at Field House
Decision & Reasons Promulgated
On the 12 July 2021
On the 30 March 2022



Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE McWILLIAM
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BLUM


Between

was
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION made)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent


Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr E Fripp, Counsel instructed by Morden Solicitors LLP
For the Respondent: Mr J Holborn, Counsel instructed by the Government Legal Department


DECISION AND REASONS

Table of Contents

A
Introduction including a Brief Overview if MQM
B
The Evidence
C
Submissions
D
Assessment
E
The Appellant
Appendices
Appendix A

Summary of Documents
Appendix B
Error of Law Decision

A. Introduction
1. The appeal involves the determination of the protection claim of the Appellant, WAS. The Appellant’s application on protection grounds was refused by the Secretary of State on 18 November 2019. The Appellant’s appeal was dismissed by the First-tier Tribunal (F-tT) (Judge Skehan) on 27 June 2018 and by the Upper Tribunal on 14 May 2019. The Appellant lodged further submissions on 16 September 2019 which were considered by the Secretary of State as a fresh claim under paragraph 353 of the Immigration Rules (IRs) and refused on 18 November 2019. The Appellant appealed. The F-tT (Judge Henderson) dismissed the Appellant’s appeal in a decision dated 5 February 2020. The Appellant was granted permission to appeal against the decision of the F-tT. The matter came before Upper Tribunal Judge Blum who found a material error in the decision of the F-tT and set aside the decision of Judge Henderson to dismiss the Appellant’s appeal against the decision of the SSHD on 18 November 2019 on protection grounds (Appendix B).
2. The Appellant’s claim is based on his actual or perceived political opinion as a member of Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), an opposition Pakistani political organisation. MQM has split into two organisations; MQM-London and MQM-Pakistan. Judge Skehan found that the Appellant was not as integrated with MQM-London (MQM-L) as he claimed to be. The judge accepted that he was a member of MQM and would continue to support MQM-Pakistan (MQM-P) in the event of his return to Pakistan. However, the judge was not satisfied that this would expose him to a real risk of persecution. Adverse inferences were drawn from the Appellant having delayed claiming asylum. Judge Skehan rejected the Appellant’s account that his father had been attacked in Pakistan on account of the Appellant’s political activities. The judge did not accept the Appellant’s Facebook profile was known to the Pakistani authorities.
3. The further submissions amounted to a claim that he had been disinherited by his family. He produced evidence that he was part of a new committee of the North London unit of MQM–L. The Appellant provided further background evidence in respect of MQM -L and evidence of social media links and posts.
4. Judge Henderson did not find the Appellant credible. She rejected the Appellant’s claim that he did not have contact or financial support from his family. She was not satisfied that he had been disinherited. She found that no evidence had been presented to change the findings of the earlier appeal decision that the Appellant was a low level MQM member in London and would not be at risk on return.
5. Before Judge Henderson there was a report by Dr Bennett-Jones, a journalist and country expert on Pakistan. UT Judge Blum found that although the judge read and considered paragraphs of the expert evidence, she failed to adequately consider the risk as detailed in parts of the report which were capable of supporting that a person who aligns himself with the MQM–L may face a risk from the Pakistani authorities. Judge Blum found as follows: -
“20. It is correct that the judge did not find that the Appellant was ‘active politically in MQM–London’ [51] because he had not made any political speeches or public statements on behalf of MQM–London, because he did not have any significant role within the organisation, and because of the absence of any political content in his Facebook account. The judge did however find that the Appellant was ‘an active member in the sense of administration and organisational activities’ and that he attended ‘meetings and some demonstrations.’ The judge also accepted that the Appellant was a member of MQM–London and a committee member of the North London unit. Although the judge found some aspects of the Appellant’s account incredible, he did not make any express finding that the Appellant’s involvement in MQM–London was not genuine. The judge failed to consider whether the Appellant would be exposed to a real risk of persecution if he maintained his support for and involvement with MQM–London on return to Pakistan in accordance with the HJ (Iran) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 31 principles. Nor was there any consideration of the availability of internal relocation to a part of Pakistan where the MQM did not have a significant presence. I am satisfied that this error was material and requires the decision to be set aside.
21. There has however been no challenge to the judge’s adverse credibility findings. The judge’s findings of fact relating to threats to his family in Pakistan, detailed at [29] to [32] and [53] are preserved, as is the finding of fact at [39] relating to the Appellant’s receipt of financial support. The judge’s factual findings in respect of the Appellant’s level of involvement with the MQM–London and his Facebook account, as detailed in [33] to [37] and [51] to [52] are also preserved so far as they relate to the appellant’s sur place activities up the date of the First-tier Tribunal hearing”.
6. As part of the introduction we will give a brief overview of the MQM from the Country Policy Information Note Pakistan: Political parties and affiliation, version 1.0, December 2020 (CPIN December 2020) and the background evidence before us generally.1 MQM was founded in 1984 as the party of Urdu speaking Muslims who migrated from India at the time of the 1947 partition, known as Muhajirs. It is a Karachi based secular political party which advocates the rights of Muhajirs. It also has power bases in Hyderabad and Nawabshah districts in Sindh province. Before the 2018 general election MQM exercised political influence in Sindh holding 50 seats in the 167-seat provincial assembly. In 2019 it held 21 seats in the provincial assembly. It is a political force; however, it has been affected by leadership and faction conflicts. In 2016 MQM split into two factions; MQM–L led by Altaf Hussain (AH) living in self-imposed exile (he fled to London in 1992 where he has remained since) in the UK, and MQM–P initially led by Farooq Sattar who was succeeded by Khalid Maqbool Siddiqui in February 2018. The split followed a 2016 speech by AH containing anti-Pakistan rhetoric and causing political violence in Karachi.
7. AH faces a number of charges in Pakistan although 31 of them were the subject of an amnesty in 2009. On 18 June 2020 an anti-terrorism court in Pakistan ruled that AH ordered the killing of fellow MQM leader, Dr Imran Farooq, in London in September 2010. Three members of MQM were sentenced to life imprisonment for Farooq’s murder. On 11 November 2020 it was reported that the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) included AH on its, “most wanted terrorists” list. Although the Pakistani authorities consider AH a terrorist, MQM–L is not a proscribed organisation in the United Kingdom or Pakistan.
8. MQM–L boycotted the 2018 general election citing repression of Muhajirs. MQM–P won 7 National Assembly seats and became a member of Pakistan’s governing coalition. MQM–P is the main opposition to the Peoples’ Party of Pakistan (PPP)–led Sindh provincial government.
9. AH was arrested in London in June 2019 on charges of encouraging terrorism in Pakistan (from London) through hate speech. We take judicial notice of newspaper reports stating that he has recently been acquitted of all charges. There were two previous criminal investigations in the United Kingdom against AH. Neither resulted in criminal charges being brought against him.
10. In this decision we consider the position for those involved with MQM-L. We summarise the evidence at part B of our decision and the parties submissions at part C. We assess the evidence at part D and make findings about the general position of those involved with MQM-L returning to Pakistan. We then go onto consider the position in relation to the Appellant and explain why we dismiss his appeal against the decision of the SSHD.
B. The Evidence
11. The Appellant relied on a main bundle (AB) consisting 641 pages and a subjective bundle (SB) consisting of 101 pages. The SSHD relied on the Response to an information request Pakistan: Muttahida Quami Movement -London (RTIR) of 14 June 20212 and the CPIN December 2020.3 There is a Respondent’s bundle (RB) which was before the Ft-T. Both parties relied on skeleton arguments.
The Appellant’s Evidence
12. The Appellant relied on three witness statements of 12 September 2019, 10 January 2020 and 25 June 2021. He gave oral evidence adopting the statements as his evidence. His evidence can be summarised:
13. The Appellant was born in Hyderabad into a Muhajir family in 1993. His family is from Kashmir in India. He came to the UK in 2012. Before coming to the United Kingdom in 2012 he was studying in Pakistan. He lived in Karachi between 2010 and 2012.
14. In 1988 there was a massacre in Hyderabad against the Muhajirs by Sindh nationalists. The Appellant’s aunt and her young old son were killed. In cross-examination he was asked why he had not raised this before in his evidence. He said he was not born at the time. He also said that he had not had time to raise it and that it was, in any event, only one factor.
15. He has been a member of MQM since 2009. He became “more heavily” involved in 2016 after seeing the news and watching AH give a speech on 22 August of that year. He described this as including “being part of North London Committee Unit, organising events and having a good presence on social media.” 4 In this role he is the social media co-ordinator and oversees social media activities. He is in charge of the organisation of regional events. He receives direct orders from headquarters to organise national or international events. He actions orders and instructions that he receives from headquarters which range from organising protests and ensuring party members attend. He informs all members of any future activities and runs a successful attendance campaign. He ensures literature and banners are printed and ready for meetings and demonstrations. He publicises events on social media. He tries to gain as much coverage as possible on a majority of social media platforms. He has continued these activities regardless of the restrictions due to the pandemic. The majority of meetings were held online through various electronic means. In the UK the Appellant has responsibility to, “actively highlight the abuses that are being committed by the establishment, intelligence agencies and the government of Pakistan”.5 He taken to the streets and posted on social media. He uses Facebook and Twitter. He said that as party members “we” have lots of roles and jobs to do. He makes sure people attend. He spreads the message on social media and gets others to spread the message.
16. He does not organise events himself, but he has responsibility to organise properly to make sure people attend the events. The party organises the date and place of events. Some people are sympathetic to the cause, and they are asked for donations. The Appellant gave an example of approaching a restaurant owner in Hendon and asking him to donate money. He said when “we call supporters we ask for their help when we can”. He distinguished between sympathisers and members and said whenever there are events “we ask people to help us”. He does not do fundraising on social media.
17. He has used Facebook since 2009. The Appellant gave evidence concerning the derivation of the name of the account. It is an amalgam of his nickname and his ex-wife’s surname whom he met in 2015 or maybe 2014. He is now divorced. He has not got any evidence of posting on Facebook before 2013. Posts that pre-date his relationship with his ex-wife show the name of the account as it is now. He is not able to change the name of the existing account.
18. The Appellant gave evidence concerning screenshots of his social media accounts. His evidence is that he uses Facebook and a Twitter accounts, in particular he identified a Facebook post dated Jan 12, 2020 as relating to Dr Zafar, a 70-year-old who was abducted by the Rangers (a paramilitary federal law enforcement organization in Pakistan operating under the authority of the Interior Secretary of Pakistan) and tortured.6 His dead body was found in Karachi in a car. He said that the police issued a post-mortem report saying that he died of a heart attack, however, there was clear evidence that he was brutally tortured by the Rangers.
19. In respect of the screenshots of his Facebook accounts, he identified a birthday message dated September 16 2019, to AH and translated the message as ‘happy birthday brother – my leader’.7 In respect of the screenshot dated Jun 10, the Appellant identified APMSO as the student wing of MQM which was founded by AH.8 (We were not told what the acronym stands for).
20. The Appellant identified his Twitter account from a screenshot dated 19 June 2021.9 He has had a Twitter account for two months. Hitherto he was not a fan of Twitter; however, he now finds it better than Facebook. He will continue to use Twitter because it is the fastest way to spread the message and to get people to know about his opinions. He justified his recent conversion to Twitter on the basis that a lot of people are using it and it looks better than Facebook.
21. There are particular dates that MQM members mark, for example, Martyrs’ Day on 9 December. These events cannot be organised in Pakistan because participants will be arrested by the Rangers.
22. He will never join MQM–P. He will continue to fight for the rights of the Muhajir community. His life is at risk should he be returned to Pakistan on account of his political activities. He does not wish to hide his political identity. In the absence of fear in Pakistan he would try to engage people and spread the message.
23. The Appellant has a current passport which is valid until 2023. It is presently with the Home Office.
24. The Appellant was referred to paragraph 15 of the decision of Judge Skehan who set out his evidence that he would continue to be a supporter of MQM–P. However, he said at that time there was not a clear difference (between L and P); however, he did not say “MQM–Pakistan” because he has always supported MQM–L. He said he might have said MQM or MQM–L, but not P or Pakistan.
The Evidence of Dr Owen Bennett-Jones
25. Dr Owen Bennett -Jones is a freelance journalist and writer. He is a former BBC correspondent and presenter. He published: ‘Pakistan: Eye of the Storm’ which is now in its third edition. He has written many articles published by the BBC and the London Review of Books concerning Pakistan. He has extensively published and broadcast on Pakistan. He was the BBC Islamabad correspondent from 1998-2001 and more recently in 2011 he was BBC TV, radio and online correspondent in the Middle East. Between 2013 and 2017 he was a columnist for Pakistani newspapers “The News” and “Dawn”. He has made a particular study of MQM and reported on it for the BBC, Guardian and Dawn. We have not detailed all of his extensive experience. However, there has been no challenge to Dr Bennett -Jones’ expertise, experience or ability as an expert. Dr Bennett-Jones attended the hearing and gave oral evidence. He adopted his report of 2 January 2020 and supplementary report of 17 February 2021. His evidence can be summarised as follows.
26. MQM represents the interests of Urdu speakers and their descendants who moved to Pakistan during partition in 1947. Initially the party gave voice to the grievances of these refugees or Muhajirs. However, the party turned to violence and in turn suffered violence. It was able to survive in part because it instilled fear. It also had a solid political base. It generally wins between 20 and 25 seats in the National Assembly. Because most refugees from India settled in the province of Sindh, MQM is strongest there, especially in the cities of Karachi and Hyderabad. Successive governments needed MQM to form a governing coalition in the centre.
27. Sometimes the army has worked with MQM so as to weaken democratically elected governments, however, over the last few years the army and security agencies have moved against MQM.
28. The estrangement between the state and AH became irreversibly entrenched in August 2016 when he made a speech in which he denounced the army and the very idea of Pakistan. He described Pakistan as a cancer. After the speech MQM supporters rampaged through Karachi and ransacked pro-military TV stations leaving at least one person dead and over half a dozen injured. The army/state decided to break the organisation relying on the Rangers.
29. After the speech at least nine Karachi based MQM leaders were detained while the party’s headquarters were searched and sealed. When they were released, they said they no longer supported AH and would be forming a breakaway faction. Two main factions came into existence, MQM–P and MQM–L. The MQM–P leadership said it wanted AH tried for high treason.
30. Since AH’s speech in 2016, members of MQM–L face risks in Pakistan and have been the subject of extrajudicial killings. MQM–L members tend to end up in military not civilian courts. Many political activists in Pakistan are held without charge. This is particularly true in cases where individuals have been held by the army as opposed to the police. His own sources in Karachi say that MQM–L members are being targeted by the state; however, it is difficult to provide open sources.
31. Since Imran Khan became prime minister in 2018 there have been ever greater restrictions on the press. In relation to the lack of press coverage in the UK he referred to fifteen or twenty UK journalists writing for Pakistani TV channels or newspapers and he stated that if they give prominence to AH their editors will not like it. His instinct is that there are unreported cases.
32. The United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) has tried to monitor the situation. In 2016 it reported that it had made urgent appeals to the Pakistan authorities in 97 cases of enforced disappearances in the country. Nearly all those cases concerned individuals picked up by the security forces in Karachi. The UN Report on the issue stated that:
“The working group remains concerned at the large number of cases it has transmitted to the government of Pakistan under its urgent action procedure. Many of the cases concerned individuals in the Sindh province and reportedly affiliated with the Muttahida Quami Movement.”
33. Since the state does not have a dispute with MQM–P, it is not unreasonable to conclude that the disappearances the UNHRC were concerned with were of those affiliated with MQM–L. The UNHRC returned to the issue in 2019. It reported that it now believed that in 2016 there had been 300 enforced disappearances. There were 86 in 2017, eleven in 2018 and fourteen in 2019. The true figures are probably significantly higher than those given by the UN. The UN 2019 Report said it had information that the authorities have exerted pressure on relatives of victims of enforced disappearances not to pursue their cases. Not all disappearances are of MQM–L activists. Violent jihadists have also been disappeared in Pakistan. However, the state struggle against violent jihadists was at its height in the years 2007–2010. By 2016 and in subsequent years enforced disappearances were of MQM activists. The sharp decline in disappearances in the last two years should not be taken to mean that the security agencies have relaxed their campaign. It can be explained by the campaign having been effective. Few MQM members in urban Sindh dare declare allegiance to AH. It is not possible for MQM–L to have an open presence in Pakistan. Anyone who expresses support for them faces prison or worse.
34. The policies of MQM–P and MQM–L are no different, however, the attitude to the Pakistani state to them is. MQM–P’s leader is in Pakistan and the authorities can control the party and the leader. MQM is not a proscribed organisation, but if it were MQM–P would not be able to put up parliamentary candidates. He does not know how many members there are of MQM–P or L. However, MQM–P has broken from AH and effectively accepted a degree of state control in exchange for their lives.
35. The authorities have become much better at monitoring social media through the Inter-Services Public Relation (ISPR), which is an organisation of the military. If an article comes to its adverse attention from a Pakistani journalist, the matter will be handed to the Pakistani Intelligence Services (Inter–Services Intelligence or “ISI”) to deal with. In respect of Facebook posts or social media posts from a foreign source the organisation has capacity to identify these. ISPR is primarily aimed at journalists in Pakistan or outside of the country. If a pro-AH tweet is posted and the person responsible cannot be identified, the state would ask an informer in MQM–L. Dr Bennett-Jones explained how he made an error in a post for which he was responsible which was picked up by ISPR.
36. There is no evidence that the authorities have membership lists for MQM–L. However, they have people working inside the organisation. If you regularly attends demonstrations outside the High Commission, you are probably known by the authorities but not if you attend as a one-off. If there is, for example, a seminar organised by MQM–L, the High Commission would definitely know about that. They probably would not know everyone who attends. They would know those who regularly attend.
37. Risk to a member of MQM-L is dependent on whether he has come to the attention of ISI. The expert agreed that risk of having come to the attention of ISI is dependent on a person’s level of activity with MQM–L rather than seniority within the organisation.
38. The Appellant’s evidence that his family is from Hyderabad and that he joined MQM is all quite normal. It is possible that his family has been the victim of state violence. It is quite plausible that he would have made contact with MQM-L in the UK. Even though the Appellant was not very senior in MQM–L that does not mean he would not be at risk in Pakistan. Someone with the Appellant’s profile; namely, a member of a committee with his media profile probably has come to the attention of ISI. If not by now, someone inside MQM–L is likely to pass on information. There could be someone inside MQM–L who would pass on information to the authorities about the Appellant and alert them to his return in order to curry favour or call in a favour with ISI. As a result of this, Dr Bennett-Jones would expect the authorities to be waiting for him at the airport. He would not expect the absence of an arrest warrant to stop the state detaining the Appellant on return.
39. In respect of the passing of information to the authorities by members of MQM–L and in response to questions from the bench, Dr Bennett-Jones said that he knows this happens. He said that he has spent twenty years talking to people in intelligence, in MQM and people in leadership (including prime ministers). He does not know how many people suspected of MQM-L involvement have been returned to Pakistan.
40. If he is not detained at the airport, the Appellant would have to relocate to another city. This would reduce, not alleviate the risk. In Pakistani society people protect themselves by knowing who everyone is. He would have to go to Lahore and start again. However, he would have to be careful. No one who is not a Muhajir would employ him. He would be picked up later by ISI. Once in the hands of ISI, the Appellant would be expected to give information about MQM–L and to denounce AH and effectively switch allegiance to MQM-P. If he did this, he could probably save himself. If not, he could be tortured or become the victim of an extrajudicial killing. The Appellant might be accused of being a ‘target killer’ (a description used throughout the background evidence to MQM-L members/supporters arrested by the authorities) if identified as someone connected with AH. If the Appellant continued on return to post messages in support of MQM–L it would be (in the words of Dr Bennett-Jones), “game over” for him.
41. All MQM supporters or members known to Dr Bennett-Jones have switched allegiance. He knows one person who he met once who had been detained by the authorities because of his involvement in international money laundering for MQM–L. This person became an MQM–P supporter to save himself. Dr Bennett-Jones could not tell us anything more about this person. However, he opined that no one in their right mind would say they were pro-AH in Pakistan and that very hard-core members only would now admit support.
42. The Pakistan High Commission in London review passport applications to identify those of interest to them. Applications from MQM–L members would definitely be of interest. Although, “No one can be sure what would happen, and the matter cannot be proven”, it is the expert’s view that if the Appellant needed, to apply for a passport he would come to the attention of the authorities at this point.
43. In response to the use of the expression “target killers” in the RTIR, (describing those who are arrested/prosecuted by the authorities) the Appellant could face a claim of being a target killer even if it was not true. It is, often with justification, part of the state narrative. Information about the number of MQM–L target killers arrested would not be in the public domain. Most of those arrested are processed by military courts. Some are tortured and “bumped off”. The ones referred to in the RTIR are those who have been subject to police arrests. Suspects arrested by the Rangers are normally processed through military courts and will come to the attention of the public only if those concerned have a high profile. However, the situation is chaotic, inconsistent and the procedures unclear. It is plausible that those individuals who have been arrested and identified in the RTIR were associated with the killings with which they were charged. It is hard to say whether “target killer” is an accurate description.
D. The Respondent’s Submissions
44. The Secretary of State relied on Mr Holborn’s skeleton argument. The SSHD expanded on this in oral submissions. We were referred to the preserved findings of fact made by the F-tT including adverse credibility findings.
45. What is being reopened is whether the level of involvement with MQM–L found by the F-tT and any evidence of subsequent involvement, is such that the Appellant would face a risk of persecution if removed to Pakistan and whether internal relocation is available. There is substantial additional background evidence since the F-tT hearing in 2020, in particular the RTIR.
46. The SSHD submits that the RTIR shows the following:
1. That political violence has diminished since the Appellant left Pakistan in 2012, and that very few incidents occurred in 2019 (paragraph 2.2.7).
2. That arrests by the security forces of potential members of MQM–L appear restricted to those perceived to be involved with violent action by MQM–L (section 3).
3. That conviction of MQM–L members for crimes appears very rare, and there is at least once instance of an acquittal (section 4).
4. That only one recent instance of an alleged extrajudicial killing of an MQM–L member could be identified (section 5).
5. Limited evidence from the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) of enforced disappearances of persons in Sindh, which is not specifically linked to MQM–L.
47. In Iftaker Ahmed v SSHD [2000] INLR 1, Simon Brown LJ said: - “In all asylum cases there is ultimately but one single question to be asked: is there a serious risk that on return the applicant would be persecuted for a Convention reason?” Convention reasons included political opinion. The Supreme Court provided further guidance of the approach in HJ (Iran) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] 1 AC 596.
48. It is not in dispute that the Appellant’s motivation for taking part in sur place activities is not determinative of whether he faces a risk of persecution. It is the risk of persecution as a result of such activities that matters, not why they were undertaken. However, the Secretary of State submits that it will, of course, be relevant to whether the Appellant will actually face persecution in Pakistan. The less genuine his support the less likely it is that he will choose to actively pursue such activities on return.
49. The Appellant’s evidence is that he was an active member of MQM in Pakistan for approximately three years before he arrived in the UK in 2012. He experienced no detrimental treatment due to his affiliation. He has taken part in limited MQM activities in London since 2016. There is no evidence that he has come to the attention of the Pakistani authorities. The Appellant’s evidence that he was not in contact with his family or receiving financial support is not credible. He describes his family as “well-off”. The Secretary of State submits that it follows that he is able to obtain financial support from his family.
50. The objective evidence suggests that political violence in Karachi has substantially decreased since the Appellant left Pakistan. There is no evidence of specific risk to MQM–L members of enforced disappearances. The chief source for such a direct allegation appears to be from MQM–L itself. There is very little to suggest a real risk to any member of MQM–L who is not perceived by the Pakistani authorities as being involved with violent action.
51. The evidence establishes that the Appellant is a low level MQM–L member involved in administrative activities and that he has taken part in some mass protests. There is no evidence he has come to the attention of the Pakistani authorities. There is no evidence that he planned to continue his political activities in Pakistan. Even if he did wish to continue to support MQM–L the objective evidence, at most, suggests the risk is to those the security forces believe to be involved in violent terrorism, mostly those accused of murder on behalf of MQM–L. There is nothing to suggest that the Appellant will be identified as being involved in violence.
52. In any event, internal relocation is an option. There is no reason why the Appellant could not relocate to another part of Pakistan where the threat of persecution by agents of the state would, even on Dr Bennett-Jones’ account, be diminished.
53. On his own account the Appellant comes from a well-off family. The F-tT did not accept in 2020 that he did not receive financial support from his family. This can be expected to continue on his return to assist him with relocation. Dr Bennett-Jones suggests that he would have to inform people he lived with of his family background. There is no evidence at all to suggest this means he will be identified as an MQM supporter, still less (in the event he wishes to profess his political allegiances) targeted as one.
54. Mr Holborn submitted that the Appellant does not have a genuine political belief. He is a low level member of MQM-L. Moreover, it is not accepted that ISI may become aware of the Appellant’s presence in the country. On this issue, Mr Holborn submitted that Mr Bennett- Jones’ evidence is speculative.
55. Mr Holborn stated that the Appellant’s answer about why he became more involved in MQM–L in 2016 was not “particularly convincing”. If the Facebook account belongs to the Appellant the question is what he will do when he returns.
56. Re-examination of Dr Bennett-Jones illustrated a lot of his view is based on speculation. There are problems in Pakistan about the judicial process. However, there is very little evidence to support the Appellant’s case. There is evidence that those alleged to be “target killers” are picked up and brought before the courts and that they may have suffered ill-treatment. There is no evidence that the Appellant will be perceived as such. He was a very young man before he came to the UK. There is a possibility of him being accused falsely of violence. However, the background evidence indicates cases of acquittals. There is no real evidence of a risk of persecution to low level members as the Appellant claims that he is, however, that is putting the Appellant’s case at its highest. He is very unlikely to pursue his support when he returns. The only way of support would be online because there is not really an organisation of MQM–L remaining in Pakistan. There would be no modification of his political belief should he switch allegiance because his commitment is not genuine.
57. Mr Holborn asked us to take into account the timing of the claim, the limited nature of his involvement and the lack of distinction between the two organisations. The real difference is AH. The case cannot really be described as a relocation case because the threat comes from the state, however, if he is not on their radar there is no threat and relocation to Islamabad would be sufficient.
58. The point being made about the security forces being informed of the Appellant’s return is speculative, however, that is on the basis that he has a profile and genuine commitment. The SSHD’s case is that he is not as wedded to the organisation as he says. There is very little evidence about what his membership of the committee amounts to and what his role entails.
The Appellant’s Submissions
59. Mr Fripp adopted his skeleton argument of 23 February 2021. He identifies the issue left unaddressed or insufficiently addressed as being whether relevant risk arose to the Appellant given unchallenged expert evidence of Dr Bennett-Jones that “anyone who declared support for AH or align themselves with MQM–L may be targeted because of their actual or imputed political views”.
60. Security forces have continued a campaign against members of MQM who professed support to AH after the split in 2016. Whilst publicly accessible information was very limited, UNHRC in 2016 made urgent appeals to the Pakistan authorities in 97 cases. By 2019 UNHRC believed that there had been enforced disappearances of 300 persons by security forces many of whom would have been MQM–L supporters. According to Dr Bennett-Jones the campaign against MQM–L members has continued. He reported that the UN figures likely substantially understated the degree of enforced disappearance of MQM–L members.
61. What matters to the Appellant is the political leadership. He cannot be required to shut up. It is not necessary that his feelings are particularly important with reference to RT (Zimbabwe) & Ors [2012] UKSC 38; [2013] 1 AC 152. No one could be expected to lie or deny his allegiance to AH and MQM–L in order to reduce risk. As is well-known in HJ (Iran and HT (Cameroon) [2010] UKSC 31; [2011] 1 AC 596 the Supreme Court established that an individual cannot be denied refugee protection on the basis that she may be expected to hide a protected characteristic such as race or religion or on the particular facts of that case sexual orientation in order to avoid persecution.
62. In oral submissions Mr Fripp referred us to the decision of F-tT Judge Henderson and the photographic evidence purporting to show the Appellant sitting around a table with AH. It is dangerous to use the phrase “low level” to characterise rather than describe. (Mr Fripp did not expand on what he meant by this). The Appellant is a member of MQM–L. There is no policy difference. The main difference is loyalty to the leadership. The Appellant started his membership in Pakistan. There is no preserved finding on this issue, but Mr Fripp asked us to find that he has been a member since 2009. The Appellant is committed to AH. There is no sign of fakery or deceit in his evidence. If he is a member of MQM–L he is then loyal to someone viewed by the Pakistani authorities as a terrorist. The focus of the case is whether the Appellant has a well-founded fear of persecution as a member of MQM–L and because of his loyalty to AH. His role includes not negligible responsibility.
D. Assessment
63. As we understand it, the SSHD’s primary submission is that low level members of MQM -L would not be at risk on return. However, it is also the SSHD’s case that claims that the authorities would be aware of the Appellant’s low-level activities and his return to Pakistan are unduly speculative. Moreover, the Appellant’s limited activities would not have come to the attention of the authorities via social media/surveillance. Furthermore, as the Appellant is not a genuine supporter and he would switch allegiance without engaging HJ (Iran), in any event.
64. Mr Holborn did not address us at any length about the evidence of Dr Bennett-Jones. He submitted aspects of it were speculative and expressed concern about the lack of sources. We are concerned about the lack of sources. We consider the reasons for this and for the anonymising of sources when deciding what weight to attach to the evidence.
65. We take cognisance of the approach set out by the ECtHR in Sufi and Elmi v UK (Application nos. 8319/07 and 11449/07) at paragraph [234]. However, we note that the Court of Appeal in CM (Zimbabwe) v SSHD [2013] EWCA Civ 1303 has expressly approved the Upper Tribunal’s stated reasons in CM (EM Country Guidance: disclosure) Zimbabwe [2013] UKUT 59 (IAC) for differing from this judgment in some respects. Laws LJ said at paragraph [16]:
“…I have to say that I deprecate what I see as an attempt to persuade this court to treat the meaning of Sufi & Elmi as if it established something not far removed from a rule of evidence. I would endorse what the Upper Tribunal said at paras 163-165.”
66. The paragraphs in CM which were endorsed by the Court of Appeal are as follows:-
“163. Our legal duty is to take account of Strasbourg decisions rather than invariably apply every last conclusion, and this is particularly so where the subject matter of the decision is weight to assigned to evidence rather than the formulation of general principles of approach. We note the concerns expressed by another constitution of this Tribunal in AMM and others (conflict; humanitarian crisis; returnees; FGM) Somalia CG [2011] UKUT 445 (IAC) and recognise that an over-prescriptive approach may undermine developing state practice in the European Union, where cooperation with informants in places of potential danger is likely to require assurances of anonymity.
164. We accept that where reliance is placed on informants from anonymous organisations and an undertaking of confidentiality is not sufficient to give assurance to the informant to cooperate with the investigation, the respondent should normally give all reasonable assistance to the appellant and the Tribunal in evaluating the nature, size, capacity and independence of the source in question, and the extent to which its opinions are supported or contradicted by others.
165. Where there is a breach of recognised guidelines and best practice it is open to the judge deciding an asylum appeal to afford no weight to unsupported anonymous material because no realistic assessment can be made of its reliability. However, this is a fact sensitive case by case assessment and not the application of a general exclusionary rule: see by analogy the observations of Elias LJ with respect to the admissibility of a child's asylum interview in AN and FA v SSHD [2012] EWCA Civ 1636 at [160] to [173], with which Maurice Kay and Black LJJ agreed at [184] and [124] respectively”.
67. We continue to endorse what the Upper Tribunal said in CM at paragraphs [157]-[158]:
“Anonymous material is not infrequently relied on by appellants as indicative of deteriorating conditions or general risk. The Tribunal should be free to accept such material but will do its best to evaluate by reference to what if anything is known about the source, the circumstances in which information was given and the overall context of the issues it relates to and the rest of the evidence available.
The problem is not one of admissibility of such material as forming part of the background data from which risk assessments are made, but the weight to be attached to such data. It is common sense and common justice that the less that is known about a source and its means of acquiring information, the more hesitant should a Tribunal judge be to afford anonymous unsupported assessment substantial weight, particularly where it conflicts with assessment from sources known to be reliable. In our judgment it is neither possible nor desirable to be more prescriptive than this, and the task of evaluation of weight is a matter for the judgment of an expert Tribunal that is regularly asked to take into account unsourced data whether submitted by claimants or respondents.”
68. Dr Bennett-Jones stated that it is difficult to provide open-source information on what is currently happening to MQM–L members because of greater restrictions on the press since Imran Khan became the prime minister in 2018. His evidence is that there is a lack of press coverage, and this reflects the fear felt by journalists.
69. We find that the background evidence including the CPIN December 2020 generally indicates there is censorship of political dissent.10 According to a newspaper report by ANI News, the International Federation of Journalists in a White Paper on Global Journalism listed Pakistan as one of the five most dangerous countries for practising journalism, noting that 138 journalists have been killed since 1990.11 Further support for this is found in a Human Rights Watch (HRW) Report.12 There is support for there having been a recent curtailment of media freedom by the civil authorities and the military and the targeting of individual journalists in a report from Freedom House.13
70. We heard evidence from Dr Bennett-Jones about ISPR which is the arm of the military identifying social media posts. He said that while it is aimed at journalists, this includes “citizen” journalists. He gave an example of having been identified himself as having made an error in an article that he wrote. The level of control the military has over the media described by Dr Bennett-Jones is consistent with the background evidence concerning the steps that the government took in August 2016, after AH’s speech. It banned websites operated by MQM and said that it would take steps to remove affiliated social media accounts after AH delivered his “anti-Pakistan” speech and that the party’s official website remained blocked as of July 2020.14
71. A US State Department (USSD) Human Rights Report 2020 states that threats, harassment, abductions, violence, and killings led journalists and editors to, “practice self-censorship” and that, “Government failure to investigate and prosecute attacks on human rights defenders and peaceful protesters led to de facto restrictions on freedom of assembly and association”.15 According to the same report, “Both the military, through the director general of the Inter-Services Public Relation, and government oversight bodies, such as the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMBRA) has enforced censorship”.16 The report states that there is censorship of the media and limited internet freedom following the 2016 Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act and that authorities, particularly the military increasingly sought to restrict online space to silence dissidents and curtail content deemed critical of the military.
72. Having considered the background evidence, we accept that there is a legitimate reason why Dr Bennett Jones’ sources would not wish to be identified and why he, a journalist, does not wish to and should not disclose their identities, at least in a public hearing. There is significant evidence before us that freedom of speech/expression is curtailed by the civil and military authorities. While Mr Holborn expressed concern about Dr Bennett-Jones’ evidence being largely unsourced, he did not challenge the expert on the substance of the evidence about media and press restriction, nor did he ask the witness to explain the lack of sources. The height of the challenge to Dr Bennett-Jones’ evidence was that parts of it are speculative. This is a matter which we will engage with.
73. The sources that Dr Bennett-Jones has disclosed (mostly newspaper articles) have in the main been produced. Those sources were not challenged. However, we take into account that one of them is an article written by the Dr Bennet Jones. However, a number of the sources are the same as those cited in the RTIR and relied on by the SSHD. (When considering the background evidence, we note that some of the same sources have been referred to throughout. We are mindful of this, when deciding the weight to attach to the evidence.)
74. Because Dr Bennett-Jones’ evidence is largely unsourced, we have carefully considered whether any of the evidence before us that is sourced is capable of supporting his evidence. We find that the overall picture presented by the background evidence supports significant aspects of his evidence.
75. We will go on to explain and give reasons why we have reached this conclusion. We will explain why we have decided to attach weight to Dr Bennett-Jones’ evidence, to which there was, in any event, no significant challenge by way of cross-examination.
76. The point taken by Mr Holborn is that reference in the background evidence to arrests and other treatment of MQM members is not exclusively connected with MQM–L but includes members of MQM–P too. Furthermore, there is reference in the background evidence to “target killers” in the MQM–L, not low- level members of the organisation. Reliance was placed upon the absence of significant reporting of instances of arrests, convictions and violence towards MQM–L members and supporters. According to Mr Holborn, the evidence does not show a pattern of targeting MQM–L members/supporters.
77. As always, context is essential. A report from Dawn newspaper on 19 July 2019 states that in 2015 the AH lead party’s fortunes began to dwindle. It reports that the army’s paramilitary force, the Rangers, raided the party’s then headquarters (Nine Zero) and arrested several MQM members. They recovered weapons and ammunition. AH fell out of favour with those wielding power in Pakistan.17 Consideration of the background evidence tends to suggest that at that time, before the split, MQM members generally were targeted. We accept that after AH’s speech the background evidence supports a general and effective indiscriminatory clamp down on MQM activity. It was reported that “the violence brought the full force of the Pakistani state crashing on the MQM’s head “and that “In Karachi the Rangers, Army, and Pakistani intelligence agencies began another “anti crime” operation to end its political dominance over the city.”18
78. The background evidence supports that post the 2016 speech the army (through the Rangers) and ISI began an operation to weaken MQM. We accept that the army was tasked with this. There was no challenge to this aspect of Mr Bennett-Jones’ evidence. It is consistent with the background evidence. It is credible considering the evidence of the power of the military in Pakistan. We have taken into account the report from Freedom House in which it is stated that “the military is currently considered more powerful than elected politicians and the judiciary has shown a willingness to engage in politically targeted accountability”.19 In the same report it is stated that,
“Although Sindhi, Pashtun, and Baloch figures all play visible roles in national political life – alongside the largest ethno-linguistic group, Punjabis – the military works to marginalize figures from minority groups it suspects of harboring antistate sentiments, as exemplified by the treatment of PTM [Pashtun Protection Movement]”.20
79. The party effectively split into those who supported AH and those who did not. Dawn newspaper reported on 19 July 2019 that MQM–P emerged, “when the sun set on Altaf Hussain’s political fortunes following his anti-Pakistan speeches from the then party’s headquarters in London,” and that the senior party leader Farooq Sattar announced that MQM no longer had anything to do with AH.21 In an article for the Herald in 2017, Dr Bennett -Jones stated as follows:-
“This time the party really was split into two. The few of its leaders who were willing to defend [AH] in public were promptly put behind bars, as they tried to address a press conference. With the army also denouncing him and arresting his loyalists under all kinds of charges – including that of terrorism and links with Indian intelligence agencies – it seemed that Altaf Hussain’s demise, at last, had become both inevitable and irreversible.”22
80. There is no evidence of a policy split. Neither the Appellant nor Dr Bennett-Jones was able to identify different policies between the MQM–L and MQM–P.
81. What emerges from the background evidence is that there were a number of arrests and killings by the authorities of MQM–L members described as “hitmen” or “target killers” and those holding positions of significance within the organisation in 2019, 2020 and 2021.23 There are a number of newspaper articles supporting this some of which the expert has identified as his sources. According to the reports most of those arrested, if not shot and killed by the authorities, confessed to having committed very serious offences.
82. There was an acquittal of a MQM worker reported by Dawn newspaper on 18 May 2021.24 Having considered the source report, this relates to a police prosecution, and a First Instance Report (FIR) was lodged.25 The RTIR cites the case of 2 MQM–L “workers” in August 2019 being sentenced to 11 years by a Karachi Anti-terrorism Court (ATC). It is noted that a FIR was lodged against the accused at a police station. The RTIR refers to a former MQM “worker” sentenced to life imprisonment on 19 March 2020. His co-accused was acquitted. On 25 July 2020 an ATC sentenced an MQM–L “worker” to 5 years under terrorist legislation. There is a news report from Ary news reporting the acquittal of MQM–P leaders in 21 hate speech cases on 24 June 2021.26
83. The overall picture from the newspaper reports suggests that those perceived as criminals and described as “workers” within MQM–L are being targeted by the authorities and prosecuted. We did not hear evidence on the frequent use of the word “worker” in the background material. While it implies a significant role within the organisation, we are satisfied that the word “worker” in the background evidence is synonymous with the word member. We take into account that word is used frequently in a context where it is not clear that an individual was anything more than a member who has been arrested for criminal offences. Dr Bennett-Jones did not use the word worker. His evidence was that members of MQM-L are at risk. There are reports of criminal cases resulting in convictions and acquittals. While the evidence supports arrests of members of MQM–L, on the face of it they relate to hitmen/killers and there is no corresponding evidence in the RTIR of arrests resulting in convictions or generally between 2019 and 2020. In the light of the evidence concerning arrests, we may have expected to see more evidence of convictions. The evidence on the face of it suggests a decrease in disappearances and violent conflict. We accept that the situation in respect arrests, prosecutions, convictions, violence and disappearances is far more nuanced than the RTIR on first glance would suggest.
84. Our starting point is that we are satisfied that Pakistani law enforcement agencies including the security forces are responsible for human rights abuses, including detention without charge, extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. There is much evidence before us to support this and we did not understand the SSHD to challenge this. We also find that corruption is a problem in Pakistan. The CPIN Pakistan: Actors of Protection Version 1.0 June 2020 (CPIN June 2020) paints a picture of prevalent corruption within the criminal justice system.27 Corruption is described by Freedom House as “endemic in practice” and the use of accountability mechanisms is often selective and politically driven.28 The USSD Pakistan Human Rights Report states that “corruption was pervasive in politics and government, and various politicians and public office holders faced allegations of corruption” and that “ reports of corruption in the judicial system persisted”. 29
85. One possible reason for the lack of evidence of convictions, according to Dr Bennett-Jones, is that there is a significant backlog in cases. This is supported by the RTIR.30 We accept the expert’s evidence that this is only part of the explanation. We asked him about why he thought there is limited evidence of convictions. He stated that many arrests are made by the Rangers and prosecutions are conducted by the military in military courts. There are no trials because people confess to crimes. Arrests and prosecutions take place behind closed doors in the absence of a FIR. Only high-profile cases get reported. He was not asked to expand on this by either representative.
86. The background evidence supports the use of military courts in addition to criminal courts and ATCs. Their use had been extended to try civilians up until January 2019, “ostensibly due to the backlog of cases in the anti-terrorism courts…..”31 In this context we consider the power of the military with reference to the background evidence including the country report by Freedom House in 2021;-
“The military – which controls large parts of government functioning under the guise of national security concerns–is deeply opaque in its affairs. Military officials’ ability to influence policies, politics, and legislation is formidable, and military intelligence agencies act without oversight and often without the public knowing of their involvement. Intelligence agencies abduct, detain, interrogate, and torture individuals for extended periods without publicizing information of their whereabouts or the purpose of their detention. The military is also able to censor media and information published about its activity by means of vaguely worded regulation that empower officials to monitor and manage content deemed harmful to “national security interests”. 32
87. The USSD Human Rights 2020 report states that a FIR is the legal basis for an arrest, and it allows for detainees to be arrested by the police.33 However, the same report states that there is evidence of people being arrested without judicial authorisation, arbitrary arrest and people being held in pre-trial detention without charge. The security forces may restrict the activities of terrorism suspects, seize their assets for up to 48 hours, and detain them for as long as one year without charges. Human rights and international organizations reported security forces held an unknown number of individuals allegedly affiliated with terrorist organisations indefinitely in preventative detention, where they were often tortured and abused. The same report states that antiterrorism legislation allows the government to use ATCs to try persons charged with terrorist activities and sectarian violence (this is supported by what is stated at section 4 of the RTIR34). The same reports states that other courts suspects must appear within 7 working days of arrest; however, the period can be extended in ATCs. The system is reported as being vulnerable to political manipulation and ATCs often failed to meet speedy trial standards.
88. While the evidence in the RTIR concerning enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings cites the USSD Human Rights 2020 report as stating that that MQM–L alleges that the security forces abducted its members and others expressing support for AH (a point made by the SSHD to support a lack of impartiality), the quote is to be found in the source report under the heading “Political Parties and Political Participation.”35 We note that in section 1 of the same report arbitrary deprivation of life and unlawful or politically motivated killings/disappearances are dealt with and it is reported that,“ human rights organisations reported some authorities disappeared or arrested Pashtun, Sindhi, and Balock human rights activists as well as Sindhi and Baloch nationalists without cause or warrant.”36 It is also stated that on June 17 Asif Husain Siddiqui, a “worker” for the MQM–L was found dead (shot) having been missing for several days. 37
89. The RTIR refers to a missing MQM–P member found dead in 2020 having been missing for four years; the death of a missing MQM–L worker whose body was found riddled with bullets in June 2020 on the outskirts of Karachi (we agree with the comments in the RTIR that this person is likely to have been Asif Husain Siddiqui). ANI reported on 7 December 2020 that MQM worker Shaid Kaleem was extrajudicially killed by paramilitary rangers in Karachi having been “disappeared” in 2016. His “mutilated body “was found on 6 December 2020.38 ANI reported on June 17 2021 that MQM activist Shahid Aziz was tortured to death in a Karachi prison, having been in prison for four years. The Express Tribune reported a MQM–L “worker” (Azam) having been shot in an encounter with counter-terrorism police in March 2021.39 There is a Dawn newspaper report that two men stated to be missing “workers” of MQM -L were found dead.40 There is a news report that officials of Sindh’s Counter Terrorism Department (CTD) claimed to have arrested three MQM–L activists for murders.41ARY news reported on January 15 2018 that Dr Hasan Zafar was found “under controversial circumstances on the backseat of his car” – he was described as “ the Pakistan head of pro Altaf Hussain MQM–London that faces a blanket ban in the country.”42 (We accept the SSHD’s point about this that there is no suggestion in the report that he was subject to human rights abuses/targeted, but the controversial circumstances are not made clear and we take into account the evidence concerning freedom of the press.)
90. The extract from the HRCP annual report 2019 cited in the RTIR states that the problem of missing persons in Sindh persists with reports that those that disappeared were “mostly linked to nationalist mainstream political parties like MQM–Pakistan, religious groups and human rights defenders”.43 The same source report states that, “People continued to be reported ‘missing’ during the year—either forheir political or religious affiliations, or for their defence of human
rights”. We note that MQM–L is not specifically named in the report in respect of disappearances. However, it is not a recognised nationalist mainstream party, it is a faction of MQM, towards which the state is particularly hostile. We read “MQM–Pakistan” in this context to include MQM–L. We also accept Dr Bennett-Jones’ point that since the split of the party, there is little evidence of hostility towards MQM–P and therefore reference to the disappearance of affiliates of MQM, is reasonably likely to relate to (or at least include) affiliates of MQM–L. We have taken into account the sourced evidence of Dr Bennett-Jones that the UNHRC has raised concern about disappearances of people affiliated to MQM.44 Again, we read MQM to mean (or at least include) MQM–L. We are satisfied that the evidence supports that people linked to the MQM–L in Sindh province are “disappeared.” However, it is difficult to extricate from the figures relating to disappearances how many relate to MQM–L members/supporters as distinct from say jihadists/insurgents or other groups out of favour with the authorities/military. We take into account that the evidence is that reported disappearances peaked in 2016 (312) and they have decreased quite dramatically. Only 2 were reported in 2020.45 The evidence shows a decrease in disappearances overall. For reasons we go onto explain, we do not find that this indicates a lack of adverse interest by the authorities in those who openly support MQM–L.
91. The background evidence is not that the authorities want to eliminate MQM: the clear intention is to eliminate AH and his power base as a spent force and to maintain MQM–P. It was reported in February 2021 that the MQM-L election office in Karachi was shut down by the security forces after it played MQM-L anthem which was reportedly played during a soundcheck.46 According to the authorities AH is a terrorist. The military have a mandate to eliminate his power base. The background evidence supports that in tracking down and eliminating support for AH the military has used the same methods they use to track down and eliminate jihadists and insurgents. The Daily Times reported in June 2021 that Sindh Rangers made “remarkable achievements in 2019 in the ongoing Karachi operation to root out crime and terrorism from different parts of the city” and that since the launch of the operation in September 2014 incidents of crime, violence and terrorism are at an all time low.47
92. The background evidence describes the arrest/detention of MQM–L members and supporters or “workers”. They are described as criminals (“target killers”). We find that they may be perceived as such because they maintain support for AH who is, according to the Pakistani authorities, a terrorist. They may have been genuinely suspected of having committed serious crimes. The cases that are reported (arrests and convictions) relate to very serious offences and tend to support the expert’s evidence that high profile cases only are reported. The background evidence mainly identifies convictions connected with a police investigation, and the identification of an FIR, implying legitimacy and accountability.
93. Our attention was not drawn to any background evidence supporting the expert’s evidence of the use of military courts. The SSHD did not raise this, but we should engage with it. The use of military courts was disclosed by Dr Bennett-Jones in oral evidence only when specifically asked about the lack of reporting of convictions disclosed in the RTIR. The evidence supports that military courts were used up until 2019.48 The military is behind the elimination of AH’s power base. In the light of the background evidence about the power of and human rights abuses committed by the military (and ISI), corruption, the criminal justice system, control of the media and that the evidence suggests that people are often convicted under anti-terrorism legislation, we are satisfied that military courts are likely to have been involved in processing some of those charged with offences relating to MQM–L. We also cannot rule out that people are arrested without the filing of a FIR, and we accept that there may be arrests by the police that are not always reported. We are satisfied that the RTIR does not reflect a true picture of arrests and convictions.
94. However, while there are likely to have been more arrests and convictions than reported, there are also reasons which we find explain why, in the light of the targeting of MQM–L supporters and members by the authorities, there is a lack of evidence of widespread reporting of arrests and convictions and why the evidence focuses on target killers/serious criminals.
95. We accept that many supporters of MQM have aligned themselves with MQM–P (or other factions disassociated with AH). Despite the inference from the evidence of the Appellant that MQM–P is a puppet of the state (he said that there is one MQM which is MQM–L), MQM–P is a legitimate political party with the same policies as MQM–L and since its emergence supporters of MQM have been able to support these policies without fear of violence and be part of the democratic process. Since the split, the evidence supports that the authorities are intentionally not hostile to MQM–P. Its members have been acquitted of offences and have themselves been targets of MQM–L.49 Dr Bennett-Jones stated that no one in their right mind would now openly support MQM–L in Pakistan. His unchallenged evidence is that MQM supporters in Pakistan recognise MQM–P as the MQM or are prepared to say they do to protect themselves. His evidence is that they are effectively given a way out of trouble if they renounce AH and switch allegiance to MQM–P. There are, from what we can see, legitimate reasons for wanting to distance from AH. However, we accept that in some circumstances the sole motivation is self-preservation. The evidence generally supports that the Pakistani armed forces have been involved in serious human rights violations as part of their counter-terrorism operations to clamp down on supporters of AH. However, we find that it is reasonably likely that the threat has led to a decrease in those who are willing to admit allegiance to MQM–L and as a consequence a decrease in those identified by the authorities as a threat. We find that this would account for a decrease in reported violence, a matter which was relied on by the SSHD, to support that there is no risk to MQM- L supporters in Pakistan
96. There was no challenge Dr Bennett-Jones’ evidence concerning the ability to save oneself by switching allegiance. While there is no direct support for it in the background evidence this is not very surprising because of the nature of the evidence and tight control over the media. We find that the evidence about switching allegiance is logical because the authorities do not want to crush MQM’s power base, it seeks to eliminate AH and his power base.
97. There has been a reported downturn in political violence in Karachi since 2013, according to PIPS.50 We take into account that political violence is significant in Pakistan and pre 2013 included significant jihadi /insurgent attacks. Taking all of the above into account, we find the evidence shows that there has generally been a reduction in violence because of counter terrorism strategies.51 Between 2013 and 2018 the CRSS recorded the deaths of 346 MQM-affiliated political party activists during that period which showed a year on year decrease in fatalities.52 We accept that fear of openly supporting MQM–L would account for a decrease in political violence, disappearances and extrajudicial killings.
98. We have considered why the Pakistani authorities have not proscribed MQM–L as a terrorist organisation: a point not specifically raised by the parties; however, the expert pointed out the legitimacy of MQM–P in the parliamentary process. It is not a point made by the SSHD, but we do not find that the absence of proscription reflects a lack of or waning interest in eliminating AH’s power base. Indeed in a report in Dawn newspaper of 30 June 2021, Imran Khan made a speech considering Pakistan’s relationship with the US and raised as a hypothetical question, “A terrorist is sitting in London since 30 years. Will they give us permission to attack him?” with reference to AH.53 In a news article dated 7 July 2021 it is reported that MQM appealed to the United Kingdom government to provide security for its leader following a threat by Pakistan to kill him by way of a drone attack. There has reportedly been a direct order made by the ISI chief Lt Gen Faiz Hameed to assassinate AH in London.54 There is clear evidence of an ongoing interest by the authorities in MQM–L.
99. We find that proscribing MQM–L would recognise it as a separate entity with the potential of raising AH’s profile and the question of which party is the real MQM. MQM was a recognised political party with legitimate members and supporters (now MQM–P). While the party under the leadership of AH has caused violence and destruction, it has played an important role in forming coalition governments. It is not the intention of the authorities to destroy MQM’s power base. This adds support to Dr Bennett-Jones’ evidence that risk turns entirely on whether an individual is a supporter of AH and his evidence of supporters/members having switched allegiance to save themselves.
100. There is no evidence from either party about returned MQM–L supporters or members. This initially caused us concern. However, the absence of information on returnees may be explained by what Dr Bennett-Jones said about being able to avoid detention/prosecution by renouncing support for AH and giving information to the authorities. It accords with the state’s intention to eliminate AH’s power base while maintaining MQM–P. Having considered all the evidence we accept that there is an option available to some members or supporters of MQM–L who come to the attention of the authorities to avoid ill-treatment by renouncing AH and giving information to the authorities. However, we are not suggesting that this is an option available to those who genuinely support AH, as this would breach the HJ (Iran) v SSHD [2010] UKSC 31 principles, but rather a practical option which may, nevertheless, entitle a genuine supporter to refugee protection.
101. The description of “target killers” may represent genuine criminality. However, having considered the background evidence relating to the military and law enforcement agencies together with Dr Bennett-Jones’ evidence we accept that it may be used as a label to attach to those who refuse to renounce AH. We therefore do not view the reference to “ target-killers” implies that the authorities are not interested in those with what could be termed as a low-profile within the organisation. We accept Dr Bennett-Jones’ evidence, which is supported by the background evidence concerning Pakistani law enforcement agencies, that some of those referred to as “target killers” may be held on false charges. It may be that if someone has a criminal record or is suspected of criminal behaviour, or held a position of significance within the organisation, the option of renouncing support for AH may not be open to them or they may have refused to cooperate with the authorities. We did not hear evidence on this. We note however Dr Bennett-Jones’ evidence of someone who had been involved in international money laundering for the MQM–L who had agreed to switch allegiance and renounce support to avoid prosecution. It is not suggested that the Appellant has committed criminal offences.
102. We accept that individuals who are identified by the Pakistani authorities as being involved with MQM-L (described in the background evidence as members, supporters and “workers”) are targeted by the authorities.
103. To summarise, considering all the evidence, we find that the evidence of arrests, convictions and the decrease in violence and disappearances can be explained by the following:-
i The army through the Rangers are responsible for the elimination of AH’s power base. Some individuals are likely to have been prosecuted in military courts which lack accountability and scrutiny. Prosecutions in military courts are unlikely to be recorded.
ii Those who are prosecuted under terrorism legislation in ATC’s are not afforded the same rights as afforded to those in criminal courts. There is political manipulation of the system generally and people can be held for long periods without trial.
iii There is a backlog of criminal cases.
iv The violent oppression of supporters of AH has been very effective (as has the crackdown on terrorists generally including insurgents and jihadists).
v There is genuine fear of openly supporting the MQM–L.
vi It is reasonably likely that those who are suspected of membership of or support for MQM–L in Pakistan may be able to avoid ill -treatment by denouncing support for AH. It is reasonably likely this option has been taken up by many.
vii There is press/media censorship by the government and the military. It is risky for journalists to report matters which could be construed as pro-MQM–L (or pro-AH) or matters concerning the military and/authorities which would put them in a bad light.
104. Dr Bennett-Jones gave evidence about knowledge by the authorities of MQM–L activity in the United Kingdom to support his contention that the authorities would be aware of a person’s membership and activities within the MQM–L. We find that there is some indirect support for this. The evidence establishes that there is a campaign against MQM–L in Pakistan and a commitment by the authorities to eliminate AH and his power base. The evidence supports an awareness by the authorities of overseas activities. We take into account a Dawn newspaper report of 25 February 2019 concerning the arrest of MQM–L members responsible for attacks in Karachi who were reported to be operated by a South African based individual under the supervision of AH.55 Dawn newspaper reported in March 2021 that officials in Pakistan stated that a United States based female activist of MQM–L was planning assassinations to trigger sectarian violence and chaos in Karachi and that the Deputy Inspector General is reported as saying that the CTD had registered a case against the perpetrator and that spreading terrorism has always been a purpose of the MQM–L.56 The fact that AH is in London in our view makes it more likely that there is monitoring of activities here. It is entirely plausible that the security forces would invest resources in identifying genuine supporters/members overseas. It is reasonably likely in our view that the authorities would go to lengths to ensure that AH’s power base does not gain traction in Pakistan.
105. We also take into account the evidence of the military closely and effectively monitoring media activity which is supported by the background evidence. We have considered this when looking at freedom of the media earlier in our decision.
106. The Pakistani authorities are determined to prevent the re-emergence of AH’s power base. It is therefore reasonably likely that the security forces monitor activities of MQM–L on the ground. In addition, the ISPR effectively monitors media activity.
107. Considering the evidence in the round, we find that it is reasonably likely that if the authorities are aware that a person is (or perceived to be) involved in pro-MQM–L activity that person will be targeted and is at risk of persecution. It is reasonably likely that such a person returning from London will be expected to renounce support for MQM-L and to give information to the authorities. While a non-genuine supporter/member can reasonably be expected to renounce support without engaging HJ (Iran), it is not reasonable to expect a person (regardless of motivation) to give information (or have information to give) about others that may or may not satisfy the actor of persecution. There is no evidence of the extent or quality of information that the authorities would expect a person to give which is likely to be a matter in the discretion of the individual actor of persecution to whom rationality cannot be attributed. Neither party grappled with the issue, but we are in no doubt that any expectation that a genuine supporter or member of MQM-L should give information about others within the organisation would be contrary to HJ (Iran). The proposition that any person who is not a genuine supporter but perceived to be could give information about others to appease the authorities and obviate risk is entirely nebulous. What is very clear to us is that providing information in exchange for safety is fraught with risk and uncertainty. Moreover, there is no burden on the SSHD to establish that there is a viable protection option such as providing information to the authorities or an extra burden on the Appellant to establish that this is not a viable option. Furthermore, a person cannot be expected to avoid persecutory attention by giving information that may expose others to a real risk of such interest. Such an expectation would go against the spirit of both the Refugee Convention and the ECHR.
108. Whether or not a person will be of interest to the authorities does not depend on whether they are a member, supporter (or “worker”). What is critical is whether an individual is (or is perceived to be) pro-AH and/ or pro-MQM–L because they have engaged in activity which is reasonably likely to have come to the attention of the authorities (as a result of monitoring in the United Kingdom by the authorities and/or monitoring of media activity). We are not entirely sure we understand Mr Fripp’s submission that it is dangerous to use the phrase, “low level” to characterise rather than describe. However, we find that what is determinative of risk is whether pro- MQM–L/AH activity has come to the attention of the authorities rather than the categorisation of activity as “low” or “high”. However, the greater the level of activity the more likely it will have been detected by the authorities. A person may still be at risk even if they have no genuine political motivation, but a person’s motivation may be a consideration when assessing the level of activity engaged in by them where this is a contested issue.
109. There is no evidence that the authorities have a list of MQM–L members or supporters. If it were the case, we would reasonably have expected some support for this (either in the background material or evidence from other MQM–L supporters).
110. We do not accept that the expert’s evidence about members of MQM-L giving information to the Pakistani authorities in order to curry favour gives rise to a real risk of this happening. We find the expert’s evidence about those responsible for media posts being identified by informers to be similarly speculative and evidentially insufficient to discharge even the lower ‘real risk’ standard. While we do not rule out that this could happen, we accept that submission by the SSHD that the expert’s evidence is unduly speculative.  There is no evidence about or from returnees in respect of information provided by members of MQM-L to the Pakistani authorities. There is no support from media reports or from human rights organisations. In this regard we did not have the benefit of hearing evidence from members of MQM–L which may have been capable of supporting the expert’s evidence. Notwithstanding the low threshold, the evidence of the possibility of informers from within MQM–L is not sufficient to discharge the burden of proof, even to the lower standard. We do not accept that the evidence establishes that members/supporters of MQM–L are reasonably likely to pass information to the authorities to an extent and with sufficient consistency and regularity that it is reasonably likely that members and supporters who engage in activity in the United Kingdom would be at risk on return.  We take into account the Appellant’s evidence in his witness statement of 12 September 2019 with reference to photographs that the Appellant claims were shown to his father (this was not accepted by the F-tT). He stated that it was difficult to say exactly how they were obtained but, “there are many elements within my party which my leadership claims work for the government.” The letters and witness statements in support of the Appellant do not expand on this and there is no evidence from the leadership of MQM -L on this issue.
111. It is reasonably likely that the authorities intend to monitor MQM–L activity in London. We accept that members of the security services/High Commission attempt to monitor MQM–L activity and are reasonably likely to attend MQM–L meetings/ events when aware of such activity taking place and when able to attend covertly.  We have no evidence that establishes that all meetings/events would be known to the security services/High Commission. There was no evidence establishing the size of meetings/events or whether covert monitoring by an infiltrator would be possible at all meetings/events. There was no evidence that meetings/events are open to the public. There was no evidence that MQM–L attempts to control who attends meetings/events for security reasons.
112. We had insufficient evidence from which we could reasonably draw conclusions about the level of and the mechanics of monitoring in the United Kingdom. We would not have expected the expert to be able to comment on this. However, we would have expected evidence from senior members of MQM–L on this issue. We reasonably infer that the organisation would be extremely keen to protect its members and that senior members would be willing to attend a hearing to be cross-examined, in private if necessary, or at the very least provide witness statements giving a coherent and detailed account of a person’s role within the organisation clearly explaining how and why that person’s activities would likely come to the attention of the authorities.
113. We have no doubt that the security services are able to detect social media posts. The evidence does not however establish that it is reasonably likely that the authorities have the resources or capability to detect all posts which mention AH or MQM–L let alone identify the individuals responsible. According to the expert the monitoring that takes place is primarily aimed at journalists. The example that the expert gave us was of himself being detected through his work as a journalist. There is no evidence that the authorities have the capacity to identify all or most online activity especially those of non-journalists. Detection is more likely if the person responsible is posting in their professional capacity as a journalist and/or on behalf of the MQM–L.  At this point we engage with the submission of the SSHD that because there is effectively no MQM-L presence anymore, there is nothing a supporter could do other then use social media to voice support. We believe that there are a number of ways that one could manifest support for MQM-L if prepared to put oneself at risk. However, in some circumstances on-line/media posts may be sufficient activity to engage risk.
114. If a person has come to the adverse attention of the authorities as a result of MQM-L activity, notwithstanding their motivation, that person will be at risk from the state authorities. If the activities of a genuine member or supporter of MQM–L has not come to the attention of the authorities, they may still be at risk applying HJ (Iran). In either scenario, risk comes from actors of the state and there is no safe relocation option available. We have taken into account the expert’s response to the possibility of the Appellant relocating and that he would be able to reduce but not eliminate risk. However, Mr Holborn did not seek to argue that a person at risk on return in these circumstances could safely relocate.
115. We summarise our conclusions as follows:-
a. A person returning from London to Pakistan who has or who is perceived to have been engaged in activity supportive of MQM-L/AH and has come to the attention of the authorities is reasonably likely to be at risk on return.
b. A person may come to the adverse attention of the authorities through attendance at MQM–L meetings/events that have been monitored by the security services/High Commission. The Pakistani authorities are reasonably likely to monitor meetings/events if aware that they are taking place and monitoring is practicable.  It is reasonably likely that public demonstrations are monitored.
c. The security services monitor social media. A person may come to the adverse attention of the authorities if they can be identified as responsible for pro- AH/MQM–L social media posts. Not every post is reasonably likely to be detected.  The Tribunal will consider the frequency, content and nature of the posts, the duration of activity and whether that person can be identified as responsible for the post. A post is more likely to be detected if the person responsible for it is posting in their professional capacity as a journalist and/or on behalf of the MQM–L.  
d. A genuine supporter/member of MQM–L may be at risk on return even if their activity is not likely to have come to the attention of the Pakistani authorities. HJ (Iran) applies.
e. There is no safe relocation option available to those at risk on return.
116. If a person involved with MQM -L asserts that he has or is reasonably likely to come to the attention of the Pakistani authorities a Tribunal assessing risk should expect evidence addressing the following:-
1. Details of any role/position within the organisation and how it is asserted that this has come to the attention of the authorities.
2. The details of meetings/events a person has attended (how many over what period of time, the nature of the meeting/event, the duration and the number of those attending and relevant dates).
3. Whether the date/time/venue of meetings/events are in the public domain.
4. Whether meetings/events are open to the public or closed to non-members or supporters (whether there is any attempt by MQM–L to regulate attendance).
5. Whether the person played a role in a meeting or event that is reasonably likely to be monitored that would draw attention to himself e.g. a speaker.
117. One matter that was not canvassed by the parties is whether the support for/ membership of MQM–L is a political opinion giving rise to convention reason. There was no evidence of any divergence in political beliefs between the two factions. The only difference, on the face of it, is the identification of the party’s leader. Support for AH could be described as a cult following. However, the evidence presents a more subtle picture. As identified by the expert and supported generally in the background evidence, it is the party’s relationship with the state and balance of power within Pakistan’s political arena that separates the two factions. We are satisfied that support for MQM–L and AH can be properly characterised as political opinion.
118. We then go onto consider the position generally for those involved with MQM-L, summarising the evidence at Part C and the parties submissions at part D. Finally we assess the evidence at Part E. We explain in Part E of this decision why we dismiss this Appellant’s appeal against the decision of the SSHD.
E. The Appellant
119. We remind ourselves of the findings of the F-tT which have been preserved.
i. The Appellant is not a credible witness on key matters relating to his appeal.
ii. The Appellant is a member of MQM–L and is a committee member of the North London unit.
iii. The Appellant is an active member in the sense of administration and organisational activities. He attends meetings and some demonstrations.
iv. The photographs produced by the Appellant do not show that he has any significant political or activist role within MQM–L.
v. The Facebook account relied on by the Appellant as being his is associated with the Appellant but there was no evidence presented to the F-tT of any political content on the Facebook account.
vi. The Appellant’s evidence was not credible in respect of his lack of contacts and financial support from his family in Pakistan.
vii. The Appellant had not demonstrated on the lower standard of proof that he has been disinherited from his family because of adverse attention from the authorities.
120. The Appellant has been found to be a witness lacking in credibility. Aspects of his account were rejected by the Ft-T. We find that the Appellant has exaggerated his involvement with MQM–L. We are not satisfied that he was politically involved with MQM before coming to the United Kingdom in 2012. We do not accept that he became a member before 2016. We take into account that he may have supported MQM before the split in 2016. This is supported by the pre-2016 Facebook posts. However, the evidence does not support the kind of political commitment to the party suggested by the Appellant. We find that he joined the MQM–L in 2016 before he claimed asylum on 19 October 2017. We find that much of the Appellant’s evidence is exaggerated or unsupported and that he has used membership of MQM–L to bolster his claim. He raised at the hearing before us for the first time that his aunt and nephew were killed in 1988. We find that this is a recent fabrication designed to embellish his account.
The Appellant’s role
121. Our starting point is that the Appellant is a member of MQM–L and a committee member of the North London unit. He has been found by F-Tt to be an active member in the sense of administration and organisational activities. He attends meetings and some demonstrations.
122. We have analysed the evidence concerning the Appellant’s role in the context of the findings of the Ft-T and the evidence before us.
123. The Appellant has described his own role as follows;
a. Receiving direct orders from headquarters to organise national or international events.
b. Actioning orders and instructions that he receives from headquarters which rangers from organising protests and ensuring party members attend.
c. Informing members of any future activities.
d. Running a successful attendance campaign.
e. Ensuring literature and banners are printed and ready for meetings and demonstrations.
f. Publicising events on social media.
g. In charge of regional events organisation.
h. Social media coordinator (trying to gain as much coverage as possible on the majority of the social media platforms).
124. In oral evidence he said that he did not organise events; he makes sure people attend events. He also gave an example of asking for donations from “sympathisers;” however, there is no supporting evidence of this.
125. At the hearing before Judge Henderson, a member of MQM–United Kingdom Organising Committee (AF) attended and gave evidence and provided a witness statement.57 The judge recorded that his evidence was that he had no knowledge of the Appellant making political speeches or statements on behalf of MQM–L. He described the Appellant’s role (as recorded by Judge Henderson) as follows:-
“Engaging with different units in the UK to organise events; preparing banners for demonstrations; arranging donations; buying things for the meetings such as glasses and tissue paper”.
126. AF’s evidence does not accord with what the Appellant says about the extent of his own role. The Appellant denied in oral evidence responsibility for organising events.
127. There is a witness statement from SM of 7 January 2020.58 He is a courier driver. He describes himself as “the unit in charge of MQM North London Unit.” He states that there is a unit committee of which the Appellant is one of eight members. Of the Appellant’s activities, he states;-
“[the Appellant] is very Active in arranging people/Members for our party events and demonstrations. He does an excellent job on Social Media whereby he publish MQM welfare through MQM North London Social Media Pages and his Personal accounts. He is regular in funding his unit and always there to help when asked”.
128. SM goes on to state that in the last two-three years the Appellant has participated in demonstrations in different places and he has distributed leaflets outside 10 Downing Street. He regularly attends general meets and does voluntary work in the organisation. SM states; “I have seen him engaging in conversation about his Organisation to the members of the public to the best of his abilities.” This witness states that he was not able to attend the hearing before the F-tT because he was travelling abroad.
129. The description of the Appellant’s role by SM is not the same as the Appellant’s description or that of AF. Neither SM or AF attended the hearing before us. There was no further evidence from them.
130. There are a number of letters from MQM–L, the most recent of which is dated 13 June 2021.59 It states that the Appellant is very much engaged with the North London MQM committee and that he has been given various roles. The author states that he is an active member on social media. He “promotes the welfare of the MQM and highlights the abuses and victimisation being faced by MQM worker in Pakistan to worldwide human rights organisations, he regularly attends and organisers MQM events, and is vocal in spreading the ideology of MQM and Mr Hussain”. All the letters are written in similar terms.
131. We take into account the letters from MQM–L and the evidence of the witnesses; however, they do not assist us in assessing the extent of the Appellant’s activities. There is no explanation of what is meant by promoting the welfare of the MQM. There is no evidence of the Appellant bringing anything to the attention of “worldwide human rights organisations”. His social media activity comes from personal accounts. Moreover, there is no evidence explaining what is meant by organising events which is odd bearing in mind the Appellant in oral evidence stated that he does not organise events. The Appellant conceded in evidence that that he does not organise events despite what is said by the witnesses and in the letters from MQM–L.
132. There is further confusion arising from the Appellant’s own evidence about his role in his witness statement of 12 September 2019.60 He states that since 2012 he has been actively participating in the affairs of MQM and since 2014 he has attended events. We do not accept this. There is no cogent evidence of activities in 2014. In the same statement his evidence is that he has visited the MQM secretariat in London “to list the meetings and lectures held there.” It is not clear to us what this means. There is nothing listed as a similar activity in communication from MQM–L or by the witnesses. The Appellant in the same statement goes on to say, “on such visits I would also update myself with any new command from the higher officials especially those of my supreme leader Altaf Hussain.” Again, we are at a loss to understand what this means. As a “party office bearer” the Appellant states that he helps to raise funds. He states that there is a WhatsApp group with twenty-two dedicated members discussing different issues. No evidence of this Whatapp group was brought to our attention.
133. The Appellant does not explain in his witness statement how he helps to raise funds. He gave an account in evidence before us. However, it was wholly unsupported by any cogent evidence. We find it strange that MQM–L does not mention fundraising and yet this is mentioned by one of the witnesses. It may have helped to clarify matters had we heard evidence from a high-level member of the MQM–L who may have been able to provide more specific and coherent evidence about the Appellant’s role.
134. The Appellant in evidence listed a vast array of roles and responsibilities that he undertakes. There is some overlap in the evidence of the witnesses and the MQM–L letter; however, there are internal and external inconsistencies in the descriptions given. Much of what is said about his role by the Appellant and witnesses is unsupported. We find that the evidence of his role is nebulous. The lack of consistency, detail and coherence in the various descriptions given of the Appellant’s role within the organisation leads us to conclude that the evidence (of the witnesses and the letters from MQM) is not reliable. We are unable to properly ascertain the Appellant’s role as a member from the evidence before us.
135. We know that the Appellant sits on a committee with seven other members. There is no evidence concerning how often the meetings take place or where they take place. It may be that meetings are seldom, and the role of the committee is minimal. We note that there are eight members only of the committee. There is no evidence that any meetings are attended by members of the public or other members of MQM–L. Our attention was not drawn to evidence that would establish that it is reasonably likely that the details of forthcoming meetings of the committee are in the public domain. It may be that they are closed meetings which are attended by the members only. We do not find that the Appellant has established that his role as a committee member would bring him to the attention of the authorities. The Appellant’s evidence in his statement of September 2019 is that names of the members of the committee were issued by MQM–L in a press release which he has submitted along with a translation.61 There is no evidence that this document is in the public domain. It appears to be a page from MQM website and there is no evidence of who has access to it. In any event, it mentions the Appellant’s name which as he stated in evidence is a common name. There is no evidence of social media posts which are in the public domain identifying the Appellant as a member of the committee.
136. As a committee member the Appellant is likely to have some organisational and administrative duties including attending meetings; however, the evidence does not establish that any activity in the role is likely to have come to the attention of the authorities.
137. The Appellant has submitted links (YouTube and other platforms) concerning protests on 17 December 2017, 13 May 2018, his attendance at the 65th Birthday of AH on 19 September 2018, at meetings on 4 March 2019, 23 March 2019 (35th Foundation Day), attending a dinner in May 2019 and the anniversary of Imran Farook’s death in September 2018.62 He did not seek to play the links at the hearing before us. It is claimed that he appears on these platforms. However, he did not draw to our attention material which is in the public domain clearly identifying him as attending an MQM–L/pro-AH meeting.
Demonstrations attended by the Appellant
138. The Appellant has attended demonstrations here. In his witness statement of 12 September 2019, he stated that he attended five demonstrations from August 2017 to July 2019. Four of these were on Downing Street and one on 10 September 2017 was in front of the Pakistani High Commission. In his asylum interview he was asked about how many people attended the events and his answers ranged from 50–70 plus. His evidence about preparing banners, distributing leaflets and chanting slogans at these events is consistent and not unusual activity for someone attending a demonstration.
139. While we have no evidence that the occurrence of demonstrations is in the public domain (during the interview the Appellant was asked how he found out about the demonstrations, and he stated that he received an invitation from the party WhatsApp group) the events themselves are public and we accept that the authorities are able and do monitor these.63 However, the Appellant has not produced any evidence that he has done anything at the demonstrations that would single him out.
Photograph and social media
140. The photographic evidence is capable of supporting the Appellant’s attendance at meetings and some involvement with the organisation. We were shown a picture of the Appellant at what appears to be a meeting with AH. However, there is no cogent evidence that these are in the public domain.
141. The Appellant relies on evidence of social media.64 He has produced evidence of social media activity which he says the authorities will be aware of. It was accepted by Mr Holborn that the Facebook account belongs to the Appellant. The Appellant has given limited evidence on the specific posts other than in oral evidence when he explained a few of them. We have considered all the evidence. We have not been given or shown any evidence that the Facebook account is in the public domain or whether the Appellant has used privacy settings. In any event, we are not satisfied he would be identified from this account. There is nothing obvious linking the name of the account to the Appellant. There is a picture of the Appellant on the profile of the account. It is not clear when this was added. The posts are limited. Some are in 2013. These establish nothing more than the Appellant was at that time a supporter of MQM and AH (before the split). We cannot see any activity relating to the Facebook account from 2013 to 2019. The Appellant has not written articles or posted as a journalist. What concerns us is that whilst the media activity would support MQM–L/AH affiliation it does not reflect the Appellant’s role as described by him or the witnesses. The Appellant is not posting from an MQM–L account. The posts are from someone who clearly supports the organisation; however, in order for the posts to be picked up and for the Appellant to be identified as responsible for them one would require a level of investigative work which we do not believe is reasonably likely.
142. The Appellant in our view was aware of the evidential limitation of the Facebook evidence which explains why shortly before the hearing he opened a Twitter account, using his name and the name of the organisation. His explanation for switching to Twitter is not credible. In oral evidence he accepted that his name is common. Significantly, in our view, activity is limited. The account is relatively new. While we appreciate the name of the account, the evidence does not establish that the Appellant is communicating on behalf of the organisation/in his capacity as a committee member or as a journalist. Even applying the low standard of proof, we are not satisfied that he will be identified from the limited Twitter activity. He is not a person who is already known to the authorities which would make detection more likely.
143. We note the Appellant’s description of his role as regards social media is wholly unsupported. Our attention has not been drawn to evidence capable of establishing that the Appellant is active on the social media account of MQM–L or that he uses a number of social media platforms to gain coverage. He relied solely on a personal Facebook account until a recent conversion to Twitter.
144. Some of the correspondence from MQM–L discloses a belief by the organisation that there are members of the security services acting undercover from within. If this is the case, it would support that all members of MQM–L are potentially at risk, and we would have expected high level members to provide evidence on this point or for there to be some independent evidence of infiltration. This evidence, like the expert’s evidence of members currying favour with the security services, is not wholly implausible but it is too speculative for us to attach weight to. We take into account that during the Appellant’s interview he stated that agents within the MQM party saw his photographs on the MQM social media site.65 He was asked how he knew this and he answered, “Because I’ve seen on TV and anchor of the programme said the agents have infiltrated the party”. This is not an issue that the Appellant expanded upon in his evidence before us. He has not produced evidence in support of what he said during the interview.
145. We take into account that Judge Henderson did not accept that the Appellant’s father is of interest to the authorities on account of the Appellant’s activities.
146. The Appellant has exaggerated his evidence. He is not a credible witness. His evidence of pre-2016 involvement with MQM is unsupported. The letter from the MQM states that he has been a member since 2009; however, we place limited weight on the correspondence for the reasons we have explained.66 We find that he has not established genuine commitment to MQM–L. He has established activity post-2016. Any activity/role that he has undertaken in support of MQM–L has been to enhance his prospects on appeal. Moreover, he has not established that he has done anything in support of MQM–L that is reasonably likely to have come to the attention of the authorities.
147. We find that he is not genuinely committed to the MQM–L or AH so as to engage HJ (Iran). We are confident that if the Appellant was genuinely committed to the organisation so that he would be at risk as a result of sur place activity and/or applying HJ (Iran), that MQM–L would have provided better evidence in support from a senior high-ranking member or the organisation, keen to protect those genuinely committed to the organisation.
148. We conclude that the Appellant has not established that he is at risk on return to Pakistan. The appeal is dismissed on protection grounds.

Notice of Decision
The appeal is dismissed on asylum grounds.

Direction Regarding Anonymity – Rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008
Unless and until a Tribunal or court directs otherwise, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No report of these proceedings shall directly or indirectly identify him or any member of their family. This direction applies both to the Appellant and to the Respondent. Failure to comply with this direction could lead to contempt of court proceedings.



Signed Joanna McWilliam Date 23 March 2022

Upper Tribunal Judge McWilliam

APPENDIX A
SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS
Country Reports
Roots of Impunity Pakistan’s Endangered Press and the Perilous Web of Militancy, Security and Politics, Elizabeth Rubin, 2013
Pakistan 2016 Human Rights Report, Human Rights Watch (HRW)
Amnesty International Report 2016/7, The State of the World’s Human Rights
UN Committee against Torture – Pakistan review 2017
Residential segregation in Mithi and Karachi, Pakistan, Arif Hasan, 8 January 2019
Country Policy Information Note (CPIN): Security and humanitarian situation, including fear of militant groups, Pakistan, January 2019 (this was removed by the SSHD on 4th of November 2021 following the Taliban taking control of Afghanistan on the 5th of August 2021)
CPIN Pakistan : Prison conditions November 2019
Pakistan. Events of 2020, HRW
Pakistan 2020, Amnesty International Annual report
US State Department (USSD) Human Rights Watch Report 2020
CPIN Pakistan: actors of protection, version 1.0 June 2020
CPIN Pakistan: Background Information including internal relocation, June 2020
UNHRC Report 7th August 2020
CPIN: Political Parties and Affiliation, Pakistan, December 2020
End Pakistan’s Enforced Disappearances, 22 March 2021, HRW
Pakistan: Freedom in the World 2021 Country Report/Freedom House
Response to an Information Request Pakistan: MQM- London 14 June 2021
News Articles
CNN: 11th March 2015, Pakistani Paramilitary Raids Opposition Party Headquarters
BBC News: 11th March 2015, Pakistan Soldiers Raid MQM’s Karachi Headquarters
Dawn: 19th June 2015, Corps Commander Praises Rangers’ Action in Karachi
Reuters: 24th September 2015, Pakistan’s MQM Party Pressures Government, Army With List of Executed
The News International: 25th December 2015, Tortured MQM Activists Body Found
The News International: 22nd August 2016, Rangers Detain Farooq Sattar, Khawaja Izhar From Outside KPC
The Express Tribune: 23rd August 2016, Three MQM Leaders Remanded for Three Days in Rioting, Treason Cases
Dawn: 23rd August 2016, What Altaf Hussain said…
Dawn: 23rd August 2016, Why Pakistan’s Army is Targeting the MQM Party
The Wire: 31st August 2016, MQM and the Battle for Karachi
Dawn: 9th September 2016, British Government Dispels Impression Going Soft on MQM
The Express Tribune: 21st September 2016, MQM Nothing Without Altaf
Dawn: 22nd October 2016, Rangers Arrest MQM London Leaders Dr Hasan Zafar Arif and Khalid Younas
Business Standard: 11th May 2017, Pakistan Army, ISI Pushing Sindh Towards Civil War: Altaf Hussain
Yahoo News: 27th July 2017, MQM-L Founder Altaf Hussain’s Nephew Arrested in Karachi
Dawn: 25th August 2017, Rangers Present Dead MQM-L Activist Alive to Expose Party’s Anti-State Propaganda
Geo News: 6th September 2017, ATC Declares MQM Founder Absconder in August 22 Violence Case
ARY News: 15th January 2018, MQM-L leader Dr Hasan Zafar Arif Found Dead in Karachi
ICRC: 15th May 2018, Overcrowding: Pakistan Prisons Holding 57% More Inmates Than Capacity
Dawn: 26th July 2018, Prison Conditions
Dawn: 19th July 2018, Muttahida Quami Movement-Pakistan (MQM-P) is MQM minus founder Altaf Hussain. Its divorce with Altaf Hussain happened when Dr Farooq Sattar publicly distanced himself from the London-based-leader 2017.
Dawn: 9th January 2018, Musharraf & MQM
Dawn: February 25th 2019, Hitmen Allegedly Involved in Attacks on MQM-P, PSP Arrested: Sindh Rangers
Herald: 13th of June 2019, In depth – Is the Worst Over for Altaf Hussain?
BBC News: 10th October 2019 Altaf Hussain: Pakistan MQM Founder Charged Over Hate Speech in United Kingdom
Daily Times, Pakistan: 27th February 2020, Sindh Rangers Played Main Role in Eliminating Crimes Against Karachi
Dawn: June 18th 2020, Two “Missing” Workers of MQM-L and Jeay Sindh Qaumi Mahaz (Arisar Group) Found Shot Dead
Dawn: June 30th 2020, Can be Partners with US in Peace But Never in Conflict; Says PM Imran in Wide-Ranging NA Budget Speech
MQM Leader: Devdiscourse, 10th August 2020: Agenda of Pakistani Army is to Militarily Colonize Sindh
ANI: 7th December 2020, MQM Worker Shahid Kaleem Extrajudicially Killed by Paramilitary Rangers in Karachi
Asia News International (ANI) 12th December 2020, 138 Journalists Killed in Pakistan Since 1990
The Express Tribune: 7th March 2021, MQM-L Worker Shot Dead in Alleged Encounter
Dawn: 11th of March 2021, US-based MQM-L Activist Planning Killings to Trigger Sectarian Rift in Karachi: Officials
Geo News: 22nd May 2021, MQM Founder Altaf Hussain Terror Speech Trial Next Year in United Kingdom
The International News: 30th of May 2021, CTD Arrests Three MQM Activists for Murder
Radio Pakistan: 9 May 2021, CM Sindh Directs Pakistan Rangers to Expedite Ongoing Target Operation in Karachi
Dawn: 29 May 2021, Three MQM Suspects of Terror Network Held,
ANI: 17 June 2021, MQM Activist Shahid Tortured to Death in Karachi Jail
ARY News (a Pakistani news channel): 26th of June 2021, ATC Acquits MQM Leaders in Hate-Speech Case.
ANI: 7th July 2021, Muttahida Qaumi Movement Appeals to UK Government to Provide Security to Party Founder After Life Threat by Pakistan

Books
Owen Bennett-Jones, Eye of the Storm (Third Edition)

APPENDIX B



Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: PA/11954/2019 (P)


THE IMMIGRATION ACTS


Determined without a hearing pursuant to rule 34 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008
Decision & Reasons Promulgated

…………………………………


Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE blum


Between

WS
(anonymity direction MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent


Representation:
For the Appellant: written submissions provided by Mr E Fripp, Counsel, instructed by Morden Solicitors
For the Respondent: written submissions provided by Mr A McVeety, Home Office Presenting Officer


DECISION AND REASONS (P)
1. Although the First-tier Tribunal’s decision was not anonymised, and although no request has been made for an anonymity direction, given that this is an asylum claim relying, inter alia, on sur place activities, I consider it appropriate to make an anonymity direction.
2. This is an ‘error of law’ decision determined without a hearing pursuant to rule 34 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, paragraph 4 of the Practice Direction made by the Senior President of Tribunals: Pilot Practice Direction: Contingency arrangements in the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal on 19 March 2020, and paragraphs 4 – 17 of the Presidential Guidance Note no 1 2020: Arrangements During the Covid-19 Pandemic, 23 March 2020.
3. The appellant appeals against the decision of Judge of the First-tier Tribunal Henderson (the judge) who, in a decision promulgated on 5 February 2020, dismissed his appeal against the respondent’s decision dated 18 November 2019 to refuse his protection and human rights claim and his claim for humanitarian protection.
4. Permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal was granted on a renewed application by Upper Tribunal Judge Coker in a decision sent on 30 June 2020. In the same decision Judge Coker issued directions to the parties expressing her provisional view that, in light of the pandemic, it was appropriate to determine the questions (i) whether the judge’s decision involved the making of an error of law and, if so, (ii) whether the decision should be set aside, without a hearing. On 24 July 2020 the Upper Tribunal received further submissions from the appellant in respect of the two questions. The submissions were received outside the time limits imposed in Judge Coker’s decision, but the delay, which was minor, was attributed to difficulties caused by the pandemic. Having regard to the overriding objective in rule 2 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 I consider it appropriate to extend time. The appellant ‘hoped’ that the written submissions would obviate the need for a hearing to determine the error of law question as this was considered a ‘clear case’. No request was made by the appellant for a hearing. Submissions from the respondent were received by the Upper Tribunal on 31 July 2020. The respondent agreed that the case was suitable to be decided without a hearing.
5. Having regard to the overriding interest in rule 2 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 to deal with cases justly and fairly, and having considered the nature of the appellant’s challenge to the judge’s decision (which does not involve the need for further evidence to be considered), and having regard to the relatively narrow focus of the legal challenge and the concise and clearly written submissions from both parties, and having satisfied itself that both parties have been given a fair opportunity of fully advancing their cases, the Upper Tribunal considers it appropriate, in light of the Covid-19 pandemic, to determine questions (i) and (ii) without a hearing pursuant to rule 34 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008.
Background
6. The appellant is a national of Pakistan. He was 26 years old at the date of the judge’s decision.
7. I summarise the appellant’s claim. He entered the UK on 19 June 2012 as a Tier 1 (General) Student. On 18 December 2015 he made and in time application for further leave to remain as the spouse of a British citizen. This application was refused. He claimed asylum on 19 October 2017 based on his actual or perceived political opinion as a member of the Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM), an opposition Pakistani political organisation. This application was refused on 18 April 2018 and an appeal dismissed on 27 June 2018 by Judge of the First-tier Tribunal Skehan. Judge Skehan accepted that the appellant was a member of the MQM and would continue to support the MQM in the event of his return to Pakistan. Judge Skehan was not however satisfied that this would expose the appellant to a real risk of persecution. Judge Skehan drew an adverse inference based on the appellant’s delay in claiming asylum and rejected the appellant’s claim that his father had been attacked in Pakistan on account of the appellant’s political activities. Judge Skehan did not accept that the appellant’s Facebook profile was known to the Pakistani authorities. Although the appellant was granted permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal found that the First-tier Tribunal’s decision did not contain a material error of law and the appeal was dismissed on 14 May 2019.
8. In his further submissions, which were accepted by the respondent as a fresh protection claim, the appellant claimed that he had been disinherited by his father who wanted to publicly distance the appellant from his family and Pakistan. The appellant produced evidence that he was now part of a new committee of the North London unit of the MQM-London and the appellant provided further background evidence in respect of MQM, further evidence from the MQM based in the UK, and further evidence of social media links and posts. The respondent rejected the appellant’s asylum claim but he was afforded a right of appeal to the First-tier Tribunal, which he exercised.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal
9. At the hearing the judge heard oral evidence from the appellant and from AH, a member of the MQM UK Organising Committee. At [25] of his decision the judge indicated that he had considered the documents placed before him, including the country expert report by Dr Owen Bennett-Jones dated 2 January 2020.
10. The judge considered the expert country report at [40] to [47]. The judge noted that the respondent did not challenge Dr Bennett-Jones’ qualifications or his status as an expert on political matters in Pakistan. At [43] the judge noted the expert’s confirmation that there were 2 main factions of the MQM: MQM-Pakistan and MQM-London, the latter being affiliated to Mr Altaf Hussain. The expert noted that the 2 factions were hostile to each other, and even the MQM-Pakistan leadership wanted Mr Hussain tried for high treason.
11. The judge did not find the appellant to be a credible witness in respect of several key matters [50]. The judge rejected the appellant’s claimed lack of contact and financial support from his family in Pakistan [53]. The judge was not satisfied that father’s Deed of Disinheritance was issued and publicised because of adverse attention from the authorities [53]. No challenge has been made to the judge’s adverse credibility findings. At [51] the judge stated,
In summary, I accept that the appellant has shown that he is a member of MQM-London and is a committee member of the North London unit. He is an active member in the sense of administration and organisational activities. He attends meetings and some demonstrations. However, I have not found on the lower standard of proof, that the appellant is active politically in MQM-London. This was confirmed by his own witness [AH], who was not aware of the appellant making any political speeches or public statements on behalf of MQM London.
12. At [54] the judge stated,
Further, I note that the objective evidence presented to the Tribunal suggests that because of the split in the MQM factions, MQM-London supporters would be at risk from MQM Pakistan and not necessarily from the authorities themselves. This is not consistent with the appellant’s case which is that he would be persecuted by the state authorities. In any event, I find that the appellant has not produced any evidence that he would be at risk from either the authorities or from MQM Pakistan supporters.
13. At [57] the judge found that the no evidence had been presented to change the findings of the earlier appeal decisions that the appellant was a low-level MQM member in London and would not be at risk on return to Pakistan. The appeal was dismissed.
The challenge to the judge’s decision
14. The grounds of appeal, as supplemented by the further written submissions dated 23 July 2020, contend that the judge, whilst providing a summary of Dr Bennett-Jones’ report, failed to consider key passages indicating that the Pakistan security forces had not relaxed their campaign against MQM-London and that the appellant would be at risk if removed to Pakistan. The appellant identifies 2 passages that, it is submitted, were not addressed by the judge. The grounds cite the last two sentences of paragraph 12 of the expert report where the expert stated,
The sharp decline [in recorded cases of enforced disappearance] in the last two years should not be taken to mean that the security agencies have relaxed their campaign. Rather, the campaign has been so effective that by this time few MQM members in urban Sindh dare declare allegiance to Altaf Hussain.
15. The grounds also refer paragraph 13 the expert report where he stated,
It is also worth mentioning that the figures given by the UN concern cases for which they have evidence. The true figures are probably significantly higher. The UN 2019 report said it had information that the authorities have exerted pressure on relatives of victims of enforced disappearances not to pursue their cases before the UN.
16. The appellant submits that, having found that the appellant was a member of MQM-London and a committee member of the North London unit, the judge failed to consider the content of the expert report outlined above. The expert report suggested that MQM-London members would be targeted in Pakistan if they “dare[d] declare allegiance to Altaf Hussain”. The judge’s conclusion at [54] that the appellant failed to produce any evidence that he would be at risk from either the authorities or from MQM-Pakistan supporters suggested that the expert report had not been fully appreciated or applied. If the judge imagined that the appellant would be able to avoid trouble by concealing his support for Mr Hussain this would breach the principles established in HJ(Iran) v SSHD [2010] UKSC 31 and RT (Zimbabwe) and ors [2012] UKSC 38. If the judge considered that the appellant could internally relocate, he did not engage possibility, as in this case the HJ(Iran) principles would still apply.
17. In her written submissions the respondent notes that the judge found that the appellant had not come to the attention of the authorities or any non-state actors in Pakistan. The grounds of appeal failed to identify what activities the appellant would undertake in Pakistan on behalf of the MQM party that would bring him to the attention of the authorities given the unchallenged findings of the judge [51] that the appellant was not active politically in the UK for MQM-London when it was clearly safe for him to do so. The respondent submits that the appellant support was at such a low level that the judge was entitled to find he would not be at risk on return if he was to continue his support at the level he currently does in the UK.
Discussion
18. It is apparent from reading the decision that the judge did consider the report by Dr Bennett-Jones in some detail. It is satisfactorily clear that the judge specifically considered paragraph 12 of the expert report because this was largely replicated in the determination at [44]. The judge did refer to the expert’s view that the true figure in respect of the number of enforced disappearances over 2018 and 2019 may be higher. This is a reflection of the content of the expert report at paragraph 13. Whilst I am satisfied that the judge did read and consider those paragraphs, I am persuaded that he failed to adequately consider the risk, as detailed in those paragraphs and the report as a whole, that a person who aligns himself with MQM-London may face from the Pakistani authorities (and MQM-Pakistan).
19. At paragraph 10 the expert referred to the view of his sources that the Pakistani state targeted MQM-London members. The thrust of paragraphs 12 and 13 of the expert report suggested that the sharp decline in the number enforced disappearances was due to the effectiveness of the campaign against, inter-alia, MQM-London members, and because the Pakistani authorities had exerted pressure on relatives of victims of enforced disappearances not to pursue their cases before the UN. The judge’s summary at [44] and his conclusion at [54] did not address these aspects of the expert report. Those unchallenged aspects of the report were capable of supporting a finding that anyone who declared support for Altaf Hussain or aligned themselves with MQM-London may be targeted because of their actual or imputed political views.
20. It is correct that the judge did not find that the appellant was “active politically in MQM-London” [51] because he had not made any political speeches or public statements on behalf of MQM-London, because he did not have any significant role within the organisation, and because of the absence of any political content in his Facebook account. The judge did however find that the appellant was “an active member in the sense of administration and organisational activities” and that he attended “meetings and some demonstrations”. The judge also accepted that the appellant was a member of MQM-London and a committee member of the North London unit. Although the judge found some aspects of the appellant’s account incredible, he did not make any express finding that the appellant’s involvement in MQM-London was not genuine. The judge failed to consider whether the appellant would be exposed to a real risk of persecution if he maintained his support for and involvement with MQM-London on return to Pakistan in accordance with the HJ(Iran) v SSHD [2010] UKSC 31 principles. Nor was there any consideration of the availability of internal relocation to a part of Pakistan where the MQM did not have a significant presence. I am satisfied that this error was material and requires the decision to be set aside.
21. There has however been no challenge to the judge’s adverse credibility findings. The judge’s findings of fact relating to threats to his family and Pakistan, detailed at [29] to [32] and [53] are preserved, as is the finding of fact at [39] relating to the appellant’s receipt of financial support. The judge’s factual findings in respect of the appellant’s level of involvement with the MQM-London and his Facebook account, as detailed in [33] to [37] and [51] to [52] are also preserved so far as they relate to the appellant’s sur plus activities up to the date of the First-tier Tribunal hearing. The appeal will be retained by the Upper Tribunal and will be remade to determine whether the appellant would face a real risk of persecution if removed to Pakistan on account of his actual or perceived involvement with MQM-London and in light of the principles established in HJ(Iran) v SSHD [2010] UKSC 31, and, if so, whether internal relocation is available.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal contains an error on a point of law relating to the issue of the appellant’s sur place activities only and is set aside.
Having regard to the Pilot Practice Direction and the UTIAC Guidance Note No 1 of 2020, the Upper Tribunal is provisionally of the view that the hearing to remake the decision in this appeal can and should be held remotely, by Skype for Business.
Directions
1. No later than 7 days after this decision and these directions are sent by the Upper Tribunal (the date of sending is on the covering letter or covering email):
(a) the parties shall file and serve by email any objection to the remaking hearing being a remote hearing at all/by the proposed means; in either case giving reasons; and
(b) without prejudice to the Tribunal’s consideration of any such objections, the parties shall also file and serve:
(i) Skype contact details and a contact telephone number for any person who wishes to attend the hearing remotely, which might include the advocates, the original appellant, a witness, or an instructing solicitor; and
(ii) dates to avoid.
2. If there is an objection to a remote hearing, the Upper Tribunal will consider the submissions and will make any further directions considered necessary.
3. If there is no objection to a remote hearing, the Tribunal will then give further directions, which will either be:
(i) to list the date and time of the remote hearing, confirming the join-in details etc and directing the electronic filing and service of documents in connection with the hearing; or
(ii) to give directions with respect to a face-to-face hearing.
4. The parties are at liberty to apply to amend these directions, giving reasons, if they face significant practical difficulties in complying.
5. Documents or submissions filed in response to these directions may be sent by, or attached to, an email to [email] using the Tribunal’s reference number (found at the top of these directions) as the subject line. Attachments must not exceed 15 MB. This address is not generally available for the filing of documents.
Direction Regarding Anonymity – Rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008
Unless and until a Tribunal or court directs otherwise, the appellant in this appeal is granted anonymity. No report of these proceedings shall directly or indirectly identify him or any member of his family. This direction applies both to the appellant and to the respondent. Failure to comply with this direction could lead to contempt of court proceedings.


D.Blum

Signed

Upper Tribunal Judge Blum