Tribunal decisions

The decision

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: PA/12114/2017

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Manchester Civil Justice Centre
Decision & Reasons Promulgated
On 29 July 2019
On 08 August 2019

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LANE

Between

A A
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION NOT MADE)
Appellant

and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Ms Johnrose, Lei Dat & Baig solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr Tan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant, a male citizen of Yemen, appeals against the decision of the Secretary of State did 27 October 2017 refuses claim for international protection. But decision promulgated on 25 March 2019, I found that the First-tier Tribunal had erred in law such that its decision fell to be set aside. My reasons were as follows:
1. The appellant is a citizen of Yemen and was born on 1 January 1983. He appealed against a decision dated 27 October 2017 to refuse his claim for international protection. The first-tier Tribunal (Judge Siddiqui), in a decision promulgated on 5 March 2018, dismissed the appeal. The appellant, with permission, now appeals to the upper Tribunal.
2. The only issue argued before the Upper Tribunal at the initial hearing was that of the internal flight alternative. The judge [40-41] found that it would not be unduly harsh for the appellant to live in Aden. However, as the grant of appeal states 'there is no reference to him being from the North with any potential associated risk factors or to him having no family or social ties in Aden.' Further, the judge also considered whether there would be quotes very significant obstacles quotes to the appellant reintegrating in Aden society, having no family or social ties in the north of that country. The level of violence in that part of Aden may not cross the threshold for humanitarian protection but was still a factor in assessing the existence of obstacles to the appellant's return under Article 8 ECHR.
3. Mr McVeety, who appeared for the Secretary of State, acknowledged that the decision of the judge in respect of the internal flight alternative was flawed. I agree. I find that the judge has carried out an insufficient analysis of factors which are highly relevant to the question of internal flight and also to reintegration. To that extent, but his decision but will the need to be reviewed in the Upper Tribunal.
4. It is fair to say that the first-tier Tribunal judge did not accept any part of the appellant's account as credible but proceeded to determine the appeal by reference to internal flight. At [37] he wrote that 'in the asylum decision, it appears to been accepted that the appellant could not return to his home area but it is suggested that he could relate relocate to Aden.' Before the Upper Tribunal, both representatives submitted that internal flight remains the only issue which requires determination. The resumed hearing in the Upper Tribunal will, in those circumstances, deal only with internal flight; the hearing will proceed on the basis that the appellant cannot return safely to his home area of Yemen. Both parties may add use fresh evidence provided they file that evidence at the Tribunal and serve it on the other party no less than 10 days prior to the resumed hearing.
Notice of Decision
5. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal promulgated on 5 March 2018 is set aside. The findings of fact are preserved save those concerning the internal flight alternative. The Upper Tribunal will remake the decision following a resumed hearing on a date to be fixed at Manchester before Upper Tribunal Judge Lane
2. At the resumed hearing, Mr Tan, who appeared for the Secretary of State, produced a copy of the CPIN for Yemen dated January 2019. He drew my attention to paragraph 2.3.12 which states that, 'humanitarian conditions in the country are likely, in most cases, to breach Article 15 (b) of the Qualification Directive.' In addition, at 2.4.3 one reads that 'it is not reasonable for a person to relocate to an area that engages Articles 15 (b) and (c) of the Qualification Directive.' The light of this background evidence, Mr Tan did not seek to oppose the appeal.
3. I am grateful to both Mr Tan and Ms Johnrose, who appeared for the appellant, for their assistance in this appeal.
Notice of Decision
The appellant's appeal against the decision of the Secretary of State dated 27 October 2017 is allowed on humanitarian protection grounds.

Signed Date 29 July 2019

Upper Tribunal Judge Lane