Tribunal decisions

The decision

IAC-FH-NL-V1

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: PA/12856/2016

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Field House
Decision & Reasons Promulgated
On 14 March 2017
On 20 March 2017

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE NORTON-TAYLOR

Between

t m
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION made)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms S Praisoody, Counsel, by Direct Access
For the Respondent: Mr E Tufan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is an appeal by the Appellant against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge R L Walker (the judge), promulgated on 4 January 2017, in which he purported to dismiss the appeal on all grounds. That appeal was against the Respondent’s decision of 6 November 2016, refusing the Appellant’s protection and human rights claims.
2. The Appellant is a national of Sri Lanka. He arrived in the United Kingdom in 2004 and has remained here ever since. After a number of unsuccessful applications the Appellant claimed asylum on 9 May 2016. In essence his claim was based upon a fear of non-state actors in Sri Lanka. This fear arose out of claimed difficulties in respect of two previous marriages in that country. It was said that as a result of these marriages influential members who were involved in a particular political party in Sri Lanka would seek to harm the Appellant if he returned.

The judge’s decision
3. The judge concluded at paragraph 32 that the Appellant’s claim did not engage a Convention reason. Between paragraphs 33 and 44 the judge makes numerous and significant adverse credibility findings, and at paragraph 45 he concludes that in any event the Appellant could relocate within Sri Lanka even if his claim were true.
4. The claimed difficulties in the judge’s decision arise in paragraphs 48 and 56. At paragraph 48 the judge states:
“I come to the conclusion that the Appellant’s removal would cause the United Kingdom to be in breach of its obligations under the 2006 Regulations” (those being the Qualification Regulations 2006).
5. At paragraph 56 he states:
“In the light of the above conclusions I find that the decision appealed against would cause the United Kingdom to be in breach of the law or its obligations under the 1950 Convention”.
6. These two conclusions would appear to be in conflict with the adverse credibility findings set out at paragraphs 33 and 44. Further, at paragraphs 49 and 50 the judge repeatedly states that the Appellant had “not established” that he was a refugee or a person entitled to humanitarian protection or indeed a person whose removal would expose him to Article 3 ill-treatment. Finally, and importantly, under subheading ‘Notice of Decision’ the judge clearly states that the appeal was being “dismissed” on all grounds.

The grounds of appeal and grant of permission
7. The grounds of appeal were drafted by the Appellant himself and are twofold: first, it is said that the judge erred in his conclusion that there was no Convention reason in this case; second, that there was a material inconsistency in the judge’s decision as between what is said in paragraphs 48 and 56 on the one hand, and 49, 50 and under the subheading ‘Notice of Decision’ on the other. None of the adverse findings in paragraphs 33-44 are challenged.
8. Permission to appeal was granted by First-tier Tribunal Judge Grant-Hutchison on 30 January 2013. Her decision refers only to the second ground of appeal. However the grant is not expressly limited thereto.

The hearing before me
9. Ms Praisoody very fairly acknowledged that reading the decision as a whole it was clear that the thrust of the judge’s conclusions were adverse to the Appellant, and she accepted that under the sub-heading ‘Notice of Decision’ he had indeed stated that he was dismissing the appeal on all grounds. However she still relied on ground 2, and submitted that the judge was wrong to have concluded that the Refugee Convention was not engaged in this case.
10. For his part Mr Tufan submitted that there were clear typographical errors in paragraphs 48 and 56 of the judge’s decision but they were immaterial in the context of the decision as a whole. In respect of ground 2 the factual findings were all against the Appellant and therefore any error in respect of the Convention reason was immaterial.

Decision on error of law
11. As I announced to the parties at the hearing, there are no material errors of law in the judge’s decision.
12. It is quite clear to me that there are indeed typographical errors in paragraphs 48 and 56. Reading the decision as a whole it is abundantly clear that all relevant findings of fact were wholly adverse to the Appellant’s claim. In addition, paragraphs 49 and 50 make it very clear that the judge was concluding that the Appellant had not established his protection claim and, most importantly, this what is said under the subheading ‘Notice of Decision’. In my view the Notice of Decision is in effect the operative part of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal having regard to, for example, Rule 29(2)(a) of the First-tier Tribunal Procedure Rules 2014 and paragraph 3 of Katsonga [2016] UKUT 228 (IAC). Under that sub-heading the judge has stated that the appeal was being dismissed on all four grounds put forward by the Appellant. Thus the whole thrust of the judge’s decision was in one direction only, namely that he was finding against the Appellant in all material respects and dismissing the appeal accordingly. The use of the word “would” in paragraphs 48 and 46 should clearly have been substituted by the words “would not”. In my view this is a case of the judge perhaps not proof-reading his decision as carefully as he might have done: nonetheless, the outcome of his decision is undeniable. In truth there is no inconsistency within his decision, at least no material inconsistency.
13. I would just add one comment. This whole matter might have been resolved more quickly if when considering the application for permission to appeal, the First-tier Tribunal had referred the matter back to the judge in order for him to re-read his decision and correct the typographical errors. The power to correct accidental slips is contained in Rule 31 of the First-tier Tribunal Procedure Rules 2014.
14. I turn to ground 2. There is no merit in this ground whatsoever. The judge found the whole of the factual basis for the Appellant’s claim was false and therefore any issue in relation to the Convention reason was quite beside the point. I would add that in any event I see no error in the judge’s approach to this particular issue.
15. In light of the above the First-tier Tribunal’s decision stands.

Notice of Decision
The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error on a point of law.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal stands.

Direction Regarding Anonymity – Rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008
Unless and until a Tribunal or court directs otherwise, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No report of these proceedings shall directly or indirectly identify him or any member of their family. This direction applies both to the Appellant and to the Respondent. Failure to comply with this direction could lead to contempt of court proceedings.

Signed Date: 20 March 2017
Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Norton-Taylor

TO THE RESPONDENT
FEE AWARD
No fee is paid or payable and therefore there can be no fee award.

Signed Date: 20 March 2017
Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Norton-Taylor