Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2020-000023

First-tier Tribunal No : HU/02982/2019

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
17th June 2025
Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE McWILLIAM
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE DAVIES

Between

NIRAVKUMAR VISHNUBHAI PAREKH
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr D Bazini, counsel, instructed by JJ Law Chambers
For the Respondent: Mr E Tufan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 27 March 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is an appeal by Mr Parekh (“the Appellant”) against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Manyarara (“the Judge”) heard at Hatton Cross on 5 August 2019.
2. The Appellant appeals against the Judge’s decision to dismiss the Appellant’s appeal under the Immigration Rules and on human rights grounds.
3. Permission was granted by First Tier Tribunal Judge F O’Brien on 23 December 2019 on all grounds. The reasons for granting permission were a mistaken recording in the decision that none of the Appellant’s family had attended the hearing to give oral evidence, and failure properly to consider the best interests of relevant children. Permission was also granted to challenge the Judge’s calculation of the Appellant’s tax payments.
4. We find there to be an inaccuracy in the decision regarding attendance at the hearing on 5 August 2019 by the Appellant’s brother. Paragraph 15 records that the Appellant’s brother attended and gave evidence, whereas paragraph 84 states that:
The Appellant’s family members have not attended the hearing to give evidence
5. It is the agreed position of the parties that the Appellant’s wife [14] and brother [15] attended the hearing and gave evidence. Neither was cross-examined. The Appellant’s brother is recorded as having adopted the contents of his letter dated 25 July 2019 as his evidence in chief.
6. This amounted to a material error of law by virtue of:
(a) A failure to give reasons: the decision is inconsistent as to the brother’s attendance, and the issue of whether he attended and gave oral evidence would be relevant to the weight to be given to his written evidence. The brother’s evidence, and therefore the weight to be placed upon it, was material to the Judge’s analysis of the claim under article 8 ECHR;
(b) A failure to take into account relevant evidence, namely, that the Appellant’s brother (and also his wife) had attended the hearing and given oral evidence.
7. This error in relation to analysis of family life enjoyed by the Appellant in the UK contributed materially to an error in the Judge’s approach to s.55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009.
8. We also find there to be a material error of law in relation to the Judge’s approach to the issue of dishonesty alleged against the Appellant by the Respondent in relation to the application of the long residence provisions of paragraph 276B of the Immigration Rules.
9. The Respondent relied upon an alleged discrepancy between the amount of income the Appellant had declared within his Tier 1 application to the Respondent, and the amount of income he declared to HMRC in tax returns spanning 2009 – 2013 in support of an allegation of dishonesty.
10. There is complexity in relation to the figures, as the amounts provided by the Appellant relate to different time periods. It is accepted by the Appellant that he under-declared his income to HMRC in the tax years 2009-10, 2010-11 and 2011-12. The extent to which there was a misrepresentation either to the Secretary of State or to HMRC, is not clear.
11. Insofar as the Judge has attempted to identify the correct amounts (and therefore to calculate any difference between the correct amounts and those stated by the Appellant) on the basis of a cumulative assessment, we are satisfied that there was a misunderstanding regarding the interplay between declarations to HMRC for specific tax years, and the periods for which income was declared in applications to the Secretary of State by the Appellant which did not correlate to tax years.
12. The Respondent, upon whom the burden of establishing dishonesty lay before the Judge, was not able to clarify the matters referred to above.
13. This is material to the Judge’s assessment of whether the Appellant had been dishonest and therefore to the application of the Immigration Rules and the wider Article 8 assessment.
Disposal
14. We were invited by the Appellant to remit to the First tier Tribunal. We have considered AEB v SSHD [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 and regard has been had to the overriding objective (Rule 2 of the Tribunal Upper Tribunal) Procedure Rules 2008). Our reason for not remitting the matter to the First-tier Tribunal is that, having heard submissions from the parties in respect of the allegation of dishonesty, it was clear to us that there is a degree of complexity involved. Mr Bazini made lengthy submissions on the issue for which we are grateful. Unfortunately, Mr Tufan was not in a position to assist us. By retaining the matter in the Upper Tribunal, directions can be given to assist the Tribunal. Moreover, having heard Mr Bazini’s submissions on the calculations we are of the view that remittal would not be an efficient use of court time. We indicated that our intention was to re-hear the matter ourselves.
Decision
15. We find there to be a material error of law. We set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal to dismiss the Appellant’s appeal
Directions
(1) The Appellant and Respondent are to use their best endeavours to agree the figures given by the Appellant to the Respondent for the relevant period and the figures given by the Appellant to HMRC for the relevant tax years, and the figure in relation to any discrepancy in tax liability for the relevant periods.
(2) The extent of any agreement between the parties shall be communicated to the Upper Tribunal no later than 5 working days before the hearing.
(3) If there is a dispute as to the figures directed above, the extent of, and explanation for, such dispute is to be explained in full by each party in a skeleton argument which shall be filed and served no later than 5 working days before the hearing.
(4) If it is expected that the Appellant or any other witness is to give oral evidence, a witness statement must be filed and served within 21 days of this hearing.
(5) Mr Bazini indicated that the Appellant intends to instruct an expert independent social worker before the next hearing in respect of the Appellant’s brother’s children. An expert had not been instructed by the time of the hearing before us let alone identified. If there is an application made to adjourn a hearing date issued by the Tribunal, the Appellant is expected to explain to the Tribunal the necessity for such an expert and how it would assist the Tribunal.
(6) The parties have liberty to apply to vary these directions.

Siân Davies

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber