Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2021-000335

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/50684/2020
IA/00349/2020

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 29 August 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE CANAVAN

Between

B A
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECREATRY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr A. Bandegani, counsel instructed by Wilson Solicitors LLP
For the Respondent: Mr K. Ojo, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 31 March 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity because the case involves a protection claim. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify him. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Upper Tribunal has been conscious of, and apologises for, the delay in issuing this decision. There has been an unavoidable delay in preparing some decisions arising from a bereavement which occurred at around the time this appeal was heard. The Upper Tribunal has referred to the recording of the hearing as well as its detailed contemporaneous note before finalising this decision.
Background
2. The appellant is an Iranian national of Kurdish ethnicity. He entered the UK illegally on 12 January 2020 and claimed asylum when encountered. A screening interview took place the same day. The appellant was interviewed in detail about his claim on 18 March 2020.
3. The appellant said that he began working as a smuggler (kolbar) in 2016. He supported the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI). He helped to distribute leaflets and to smuggle items for them for a period of time in 2016. The appellant said that in 2016 the authorities caught him on the border. He was detained for 1 week either for smuggling cigarettes or alternatively on suspicion of distributing leaflets. He was released without charge with a warning. The appellant also described 2 other incidents in which he was nearly caught while working as a kolbar. The appellant initially said that he was in a group of kolbars who were ambushed by the authorities on 20 December 2019. The main interview recorded the date given for this event in the Iranian and Gregorian calendars i.e. ‘29/09/1398 (20/12/2019)’ [qu.28]. His friend was caught and arrested but other people, including the appellant, managed to flee. The appellant went to stay with his uncle. He says that the authorities went to his home looking for him later that evening. The next day, his uncle arranged for an agent to smuggle him out of Iran. In the screening interview the appellant said that he left Iran about 25 days before he arrived in the UK i.e. circa 24 December 2019 [qu.3.3]. Separately, the main interview recorded that he left Iran on ‘1/10/1398 (22/12/2019)’ [qu.28]. The appellant claimed that he was tried and sentenced to 11 years imprisonment in his absence.
4. The respondent refused the protection and human rights claim in a decision dated 12 June 2020. She found that the appellant gave conflicting accounts of events. His account was not consistent with background evidence about the punishments usually given to those caught smuggling. The appellant’s chronology of events was also inconsistent with the fact that he was fingerprinted in Greece on 18 October 2019 i.e. 2 months before the claimed event which led him to leave Iran. The respondent concluded that the appellant had not given a consistent or credible account of events. For this reason, she rejected the appellant’s claim to be wanted by the Iranian authorities.
5. The appellant lodged an appeal to the First-tier Tribunal. The appeal was heard on 04 May 2021. First-tier Tribunal Judge Cruthers dismissed the appeal in a decision sent on 01 June 2021. In addition to his original claim, the appellant also raised an issue relating to risk on return in relation to sur place activities conducted in the UK. The judge found that the core of the appellant’s account of past events was inconsistent and unreliable. He rejected the credibility of the appellant’s claim to have been arrested on suspicion of KDPI activities or that he had been tried in his absence.
6. However, the judge accepted that there was some evidence to show that the appellant had attended 3 demonstrations in the UK in March, July, and September 2020 relating to ‘the Kurdish cause’. He noted that it was not suggested that the appellant had been involved in organising the demonstrations or had been a speaker at any of the events. The judge concluded that it was not reasonably likely that the Iranian state would identify the appellant as someone who has participated in pro-Kurdish activities in the UK. Nor was it likely that he would be at risk as a result of those activities if he returned to Iran. The judge went on to consider whether any risk arose from evidence on social media. He found that the appellant’s social media activity did not flow from a genuinely held belief or opinion. He concluded that it was more likely that he had conducted social media activity in bad faith in an effort to bolster his asylum claim. The judge concluded that, even taking into account the cumulative effect of various factors, including his ethnicity, it was not reasonably likely that the appellant would be at real risk of serious harm if he returned to Iran.
7. The appellant was granted permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal. In a decision sent on 10 March 2023 a panel of the Upper Tribunal found that the First-tier Tribunal’s decision involved the making of an error of law. The panel found that none of the grounds drafted by the appellant himself disclosed an error of law in the judge’s findings relating to the credibility of his account of past events. However, it seems that the Upper Tribunal Judge who granted permission did so of her own motion because it was obvious that the judge had not considered a supplementary bundle sent to the First-tier Tribunal on 29 April 2021, which contained evidence indicating that the appellant attended a further demonstration outside the Iranian Embassy in London on 04 April 2021. In one photograph he was shown burning a A4 paper copy of the Iranian flag.
8. The Upper Tribunal concluded that the judge failed to give adequate consideration to this evidence, which was also posted on social media. The judge’s findings relating to the credibility of past events in Iran were preserved. The part of his decision that considered political and social media activities in the UK was set aside. The decision on this aspect of the claim was due to be remade at a resumed hearing in the Upper Tribunal. Although there is a record of one adjournment, it is unclear why it took so long for the case to be listed for a resumed hearing.
9. The resumed hearing in the Upper Tribunal was listed on 31 March 2025. The issues for determination had been narrowed to the assessment of potential risk arising from the appellant’s activities in the UK at demonstrations and by way of social media activity.
10. The Upper Tribunal has considered a composite bundle of documents of 284 pages prepared for the hearing, which was uploaded to the Upper Tribunal’s case management system after lunch on the last working day before the hearing. A skeleton argument and a further 280 page bundle containing an up to date statement and a comprehensive amount of social media evidence was not produced until the morning of the hearing. It seemed that neither bundle had been served on the respondent. Mr Ojo was given time to consider whether the late service of such a large amount of material might cause him difficulty. After a break to consider the documents he confirmed that he could proceed. Most of the documents contained in the consolidated bundle would have been available to the respondent before the hearing. However, most (but not all) of the social media evidence contained in the supplementary bundle was new evidence that had not been produced before. Inevitably, Mr Ojo did not have as much time to consider the papers as he would have had if the evidence had been served by 14 March 2025, as directed by the Upper Tribunal.
11. The appellant gave evidence with the assistance of a Kurdish Sorani speaking interpreter. Both representatives made submissions. The oral evidence and submissions are a matter of record and do not need to be set out in any detail. However, I will refer to any relevant evidence or submissions in my decision.
Decision and reasons
Assessment of activities in the UK
12. In assessing the overall credibility of the evidence relating to the appellant’s activities in the UK the starting point is the preserved findings made by First-tier Tribunal Judge Cruthers: see Devaseelan v SSHD [2002] UKIAT 702. Although I am remaking the decision on a narrow issue, the previous findings relating to the credibility of other aspects of the appellant’s account are still relevant to my overall assessment of his reliability as a witness. Nevertheless, I bear in mind that just because some aspects of a person’s account have been found to be incredible or unreliable does not mean that the whole account should be rejected. Each aspect will be considered in light of the relevant evidence before conducting a holistic assessment.
13. Judge Cruthers found that the appellant gave an inconsistent and incredible account of past events. I have had the opportunity to speak to the appellant about this aspect of his claim and to assess his evidence. The appellant’s evidence as to how many times he has demonstrated outside the Iranian Embassy in the UK has also been presented in a rather unclear way.
14. Nothing in the appellant’s witness statements or in the documentary evidence suggests that he is a member of a particular organisation or political party. He says that he supports the KDPI. He does not claim to hold a particular position or organising role in the events that he has attended. Judge Cruthers described the activities as demonstrations relating to the ‘the Kurdish cause’. I agree that the evidence suggests that the appellant has occasionally attended events outside the Iranian Embassy to protest about the treatment of Kurds in Iran and possibly one demonstration in Trafalgar Square. Save for posts on social media, which I will come to in more detail, there is no evidence of the appellant having carried out any other activities of a political nature while in the UK.
15. The appellant’s witness statement dated 04 January 2021 said that he took part in ‘three KDPI demonstrations in London, opposite the Iranian Embassy on 01 March 2020, 29 July 2020 and 08 September 2020.’ The first and third of these demonstrations protested against the treatment of demonstrators in Iran and the killing of Kurds. The second demonstration was in response to the sentencing of a woman called Zaraye Mohammedi, who was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment for teaching the Kurdish language.
16. The appellant prepared a second witness statement dated 29 April 2021. This was contained in the supplementary bundle produced for the First-Tier Tribunal hearing. In that statement the appellant said that he attended a fourth demonstration on 04 April 2021, a month before the First-tier Tribunal hearing. The appellant said that the demonstration protested against the killing of kolbars and Kurdish political activists in Iran. The appellant said that the demonstration lasted for about 2 hours. He said: ‘We were raising banners and chanting for the Iranian authorities to stop killing Kolbars and political activists. I also burnt down the Iranian flag.’. He said that they took many photographs of demonstrations for the people who were not able to attend and to show support for Kurds who were still living in Iran.
17. The appellant’s third witness statement was signed on 31 March 2025 i.e. on the morning of the hearing before the Upper Tribunal. This was a more detailed statement describing a number of posts in 2 Facebook accounts. The electronic statement contains the full addresses for the Facebook accounts. The document is hyperlinked directly to the accounts so that they can be accessed in Facebook itself. Copies of many of the posts are contained in the 280 page supplementary bundle filed and served for the first time on the morning of the hearing.
18. The appellant’s most recent witness statement lists a number of dates on which it is said that he posted pictures of his attendance at demonstrations [4]. Unfortunately, the large number of posts referred to in the appellant’s witness statement are not cross-referenced to the bundle, which has made it difficult to consider the evidence. For this reason, it has been easier to consider the evidence directly from the accounts through the links provided in the statement.
19. On a closer inspection of the underlying Facebook posts, the number of posts of photographs of the appellant needs to be distinguished from the number of demonstrations that he might have attended. The appellant himself made this distinction at the hearing.
20. Some posts appear to re-post pictures from earlier demonstrations. For example, a post dated 20 December 2020 shows a photograph of the appellant holding a flag with another man, which states ‘Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan’ (pg.199). It is reasonable to infer that this was not taken in December 2020 because it depicts a sunny day and all of those seen in the photograph are in shirt sleeves rather than coats. When considered alongside earlier posts it becomes clear that this photograph is the same as one posted on 29 July 2020 (pg.205). The Facebook translation of the text of that post states that a demonstration took place on ‘04/04/2019’ but this is not a certified translation. The interpreter at the hearing translated the Farsi text and confirmed that it said 29 July 2020 in the Gregorian calendar. The content of the text, and placards shown in the photographs, indicates that the demonstration related to the sentencing of Kurdish language teacher ‘Zara Mohammed’. This is broadly consistent with the appellant’s first witness statement, which said that this demonstration took place on 29 July 2020.
21. What has not been made particularly clear is exactly how many demonstrations the appellant says he has attended outside the Iranian Embassy since he entered the UK and when they took place. On the evidence contained in the appellant’s witness statements prepared for the First-tier Tribunal hearing on 04 May 2021 he had attended 4 demonstrations by that date. These took place on 01 March 2020, 29 July 2020, 08 September 2020 and 04 April 2021. The first took place before the protection claim was decided, the next two demonstrations took place after the protection claim was refused, the fourth took place one month before the First-tier Tribunal hearing.
22. The appellant’s most recent witness statement says that he made various posts about demonstrations on his first Facebook account (FB1) and in his second Facebook account (FB2). However, there is no clear summary of the number of demonstrations he attended after 04 April 2021.
23. Turning to consider FB1. The account gives the appellant’s name in English although it does not set out his full name. The account records 2,435 ‘friends’. There is no way to know whether these are genuine accounts or not. A large number of these ‘friends’ are said to be based in the UK. In many of their profile photographs the ‘friends’ linked to the account are also photographed at similar demonstrations of the kind the appellant has produced. The first post in FB1 is dated 03 March 2020. The last post is dated 11 February 2022. This contrasts with the appellant’s evidence at the hearing, when he told me that he had been on Facebook since 2015. The evidence shows that it is likely that both accounts were set up after the appellant entered the UK.
24. The first post in FB1 is of a demonstration in the UK, most likely outside the Embassy (although it is not identified in the text or photos) that took place on 01 March 2020. This is broadly consistent with the appellant’s evidence. The text to the post makes a generic reference to a demonstration outside the Iranian Embassy, but does not name the appellant or anyone else pictured in the photographs posted. The account states that the post attracted 187 ‘comments’. When the comments are considered, they show that many of the comments, in fact, are just emojis or symbols which are repeated multiple times by a much smaller number of ‘friends’.
25. FB1 then has a large number of general posts relating to Iranian news and political issues. The internal text of the posts are generic in nature and relate to human rights abuses in Iran. The although many of them attract over 100 comments, again, when analysed, the comments consistent primarily of emojis and symbols posted multiple times by a relatively small number of accounts.
26. The next post that appears to depict the appellant at a demonstration was posted on 11 April 2020. Again, the text is generic, stating that there was a demonstration on that date. However, the photograph of the appellant with another man is the same as one of the photographs posted on 5 March 2020. The 176 comments comprise of the same pattern of posts. For example, the first 16 comments are from the same account repeating 2 emojis/symbols multiple times. The rest of the comments follow the same vein. Although the appellant has not said that he attended a demonstration on this date, the tenor of the post is to suggest that the appellant did attend a demonstration. This is another example of a post where a previous photograph seems to have been reused to suggest attendance at a demonstration.
27. As already mentioned (at [20] above), there is a post dated 29 July 2020, which on the face of it supports the appellant’s claim to have attended a demonstration in protest of the sentencing of a Kurdish language teacher. The 147 comments are of the same nature as before. There appears to be no post on or around 08 September 2020 relating to the demonstration that the appellant said that he attended. The English translation of a post dated 15 November 2020 says that it depicted a protest on 08 September 2020. I bear in mind that the posts are translated by Facebook and that we had already discovered that one of the dates did not appear to be translated accurately. Photographs of the appellant are attached to the post. In one he is depicted in a crowd of other men wearing a blue shirt and a winter coat. In another he is wearing a black and white t-shirt along with other people in shirt sleeves, which appears to be taken at another time of year. It is unlikely that the photographs were taken on the same day. For this reason, it is difficult to tell whether any of these are photographs of attendance at a demonstration on 08 September 2020.
28. The post upon which most reliance was placed was one dated 15 April 2021, which is said to depict the appellant burning a copy of the Iranian flag at a demonstration outside the Iranian Embassy. It has all the similar hallmarks described in relation to the other posts. The text of the post does not suggest that it related to a demonstration although this evidence is produced to support the appellant’s claim to have attended a demonstration on 04 March 2021. The post shows the appellant standing with two other men by an iron railing fence burning an A4 print out of the Iranian flag. The photographs do not show the appellant outside the recognisable row of buildings in which the Iranian Embassy is situated.
29. Mr Bandegani argued that it was possible to infer that the appellant was outside the Embassy because similar fencing was seen in other photographs. I bear in mind that the Iranian Embassy is well known in the UK due to high profile events such as the siege that took place in 1980. Its position opposite Hyde Park in London is a matter of public record. Although I accept that the fence depicted in the pictures of the appellant burning the Iranian flag is likely to be same one shown in other photos, the fence covers a long section on the south side of Hyde Park. What the photographs do not show is whether the act of burning the flag took place outside the Embassy. It is also possible that such an incendiary act (in every meaning of the word) could have taken place further down the road out of sight of the Embassy. For these reasons, I find that the evidence fails to show, even on the low standard of proof, that the appellant burned a small copy of the Iranian flag at a demonstration directly outside the Embassy on 04 April 2021 or in a way that was likely to have come to the attention of the Iranian authorities.
30. The pattern of generic posts with repetitive ‘comments’ continues throughout FB1. The only other posts depicting the appellant at possible demonstrations appear to be dated 12 September 2021, 27 September 2021 (for a demonstration on 19 September 2021) and 19 January 2022.
31. FB2 follows the same pattern of generic posts interspersed with some posts depicting the appellant at demonstrations. FB2 also appear to follow the same pattern of repeated comments to boost the numbers of comments. The first post is dated 03 April 2022 and the last time anything was posted in FB2 was 19 June 2024. Between 03 April 2022 and 11 September 2023 FB2 only contained a series of generalised posts.
32. The appellant’s most recent witness statement says that he posted information about demonstrations on 17 April 2022, 21 June 2022, and 11 July 2022, but he does not claim to have attended demonstrations on or around those dates. In his witness statement he said that he posted details about demonstrations he attended on 16 September 2023, 24 March 2024, 29 March 2024 and 21 April 2024. This is broadly consistent with the posts in FB2, which show the appellant in similar group situations with other men at demonstrations that are said to be outside the Iranian Embassy. As before, the internal text to each post is generic and the comments are of a similar character.
33. Even if this evidence is taken at its highest there appears to have been a significant gap in attendance at demonstrations between 19 January 2022 to 11 September 2023. Attendance at the last 3 demonstrations appear to have taken place in quick succession in March and April 2024 at a time when this appeal was awaiting a hearing date for the decision to be remade. In oral evidence, the appellant told me that he had not been on any demonstrations since about May or June 2024. The last post in FB2 is dated 19 June 2024.
34. I note that a previous hearing listed on 02 July 2024 was adjourned. The notice of decision issued by Upper Tribunal Judge Hanson refers to the appellant being in prison at the time. Other correspondence making arrangements for the appellant’s attendance at a resumed hearing suggests that he was recalled to prison. It is notable that his witness statement does not mention spending time in prison before June 2024. The most recent statement makes a vague reference to being ‘arrested’ and sent to prison on 20 June 2024 (the reference to 2025 seems to be a typographical error) and then being released in October 2024. In the absence of any reference to a trial or conviction during that period, this limited information is consistent with a possible recall to prison. If the appellant did serve an earlier sentence of imprisonment, no details are given in his statement. As a result, the apparent gap in attendance at demonstrations between January 2022 and September 2023 is unexplained.
35. The appellant explained that he has had a difficult time financially since he was released from prison. In his witness statement he says that he was destitute, has had to apply for assistance, and has moved accommodation. For this reason, he has not been able to travel to London to attend demonstrations. No explanation is offered as to why he has not continued the pattern of regular postings since June 2024. Even if he was not permitted to access Facebook in prison, there have been no posts since he left in October 2024.
36. The First-tier Tribunal judge did not find the appellant to be a reliable witness in relation to his account of past events in Iran. The appellant’s overall credibility is damaged by these findings. This is the context in which I begin my assessment of the political activities that the appellant says that he has conducted in the UK.
37. I accept that there is some evidence to show that the appellant is likely to have attended 4 demonstrations in the period from March 2020 to April 2021. Other evidence of photographs of the appellant at demonstrations posted on Facebook suggest that he might have attended demonstrations in September 2021, January 2022, September 2023 and 3 further demonstrations in March and April 2024. However, the way in which the evidence has been presented has not made it easy to discern the exact number or the exact dates of those demonstrations. Overall, the evidence indicates that the appellant might have attended around 10-11 demonstrations in the 4 year period leading up to April 2024. However, given the lack of clarity and the pattern of repeat posting of pictures of demonstrations at different times, the actual figure might be lower. At the date of the hearing the appellant had not attended a demonstration for nearly a year and had not posted anything on Facebook for around 9 months.
38. The appellant’s claim to have been of interest to the Iranian authorities for supporting the KDPI was rejected by Judge Cruthers. Although he says that he supports the KDPI, the appellant does not claim to be an active member of a political party or to have taken any particular role in demonstrations. Nevertheless, I accept that the appellant might have felt freer to express his opinions about the treatment of Kurdish people in Iran while in the UK.
39. Turning to the Facebook evidence more generally. The appellant’s claim to have been on Facebook since 2015 is not supported by the evidence. The earliest evidence of a Facebook account is from March 2020, after the appellant arrived in the UK. In his first witness statement, the appellant said that he had no education and was illiterate. At the hearing he said that he had learned to read and write a little since he came to the UK. His evidence has vacillated between saying that friends helped him to post and then suggesting that he could do it himself. There is little explanation as to how or why the appellant has been able to upload quite so many posts on Facebook if he is unable to read and write well. Most of the posts appear to be generic ‘cut and pasted’ posts, but he would still need to read them to understand and choose whether to re-post them. While the appellant says that they represent his views, they do not appear to include his own original views. This is broadly consistent with his claim to be illiterate. Overall, the evidence suggests that the appellant’s level of literacy means that it is likely that he would need assistance to identify information and post on Facebook. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the appellant has not posted anything on Facebook in the last 9 months during a time when his financial situation and accommodation have been precarious.
40. The overall patterns observed in the Facebook accounts cast doubt on the appellant’s motivations for producing this evidence. The Facebook accounts do not show any personal or social contact with other account holders. The accounts are solely designed to post generic political posts interspersed with occasional pictures of the appellant at demonstrations. The number of ‘friends’, many of whom also appear to be based in the UK, and the unusual pattern of repeated ‘comments’ appear to be designed to suggest a wider readership of the appellant’s Facebook posts than might be the case in reality. The repeated comments from a small number of people appear to be deliberately designed to inflate the number of comments recorded on the post. Although I bear in mind that some of the appellant’s friends might also be illiterate, which might explain a greater use of emojis/symbols in response to a post, this does not explain why so many comments are repeated multiple times.
41. Although there is evidence to indicate that the appellant attended other demonstrations after April 2021, it is notable that the appellant attended demonstrations at convenient points in the asylum process. For example, there was only one demonstration before the Home Office decision, but several after he was refused asylum. The appellant attended another demonstration shortly before the First-tier Tribunal appeal was due to be heard in May 2021. Then there was an unexplained gap in attendance at demonstrations in between being granted permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal at the end of January 2022 until several months after the error of law decision was promulgated in March 2023. The appellant’s attendance at demonstrations resumed at a time when he was awaiting for a hearing in the Upper Tribunal to be listed to remake the decision. He attended a spate of 3 demonstrations in March and April 2024 shortly before a listed hearing date of 02 July 2024.
42. The appellant has not attended any demonstrations since April 2024 or posted on Facebook since June 2024. This might be explained to some extent by a recall to prison until October 2024 followed by an insecure living situation. However, the fact that there have been no posts since October 2024 suggests that the appellant may have needed help to post on Facebook, which was not forthcoming once his situation became more insecure. The overall impression created by the Facebook accounts is that they are not used as social media accounts in the normal way. It is more likely that they have been created with assistance solely as evidence to support an asylum claim based on sur place activity.
43. I accept that the appellant might have felt freer to express opinions about the treatment of Kurds since he has been in the UK. However, my overall assessment of the evidence is that most of his political activity in the UK, in attending demonstrations and posting on Facebook, is likely to be an opportunistic attempt to contrive evidence to form the foundation of an asylum claim rather due to any genuine political commitment.
Assessment of risk on return
44. I turn to consider whether opportunistic or cynical activities may nevertheless give rise to a real risk if the appellant returned to Iran. In doing so I have considered the legal principles first discussed in Danian v SSHD [1999] EWCA Civ 3000. I have also considered relevant country guidance decisions relating to Iran such as BA (Demonstrators in Britain – risk on return) Iran CG [2011] UKUT 36 (IAC), HB (Kurds) Iran CG [2018] UKUT 430 (IAC), and XX (PJAK, sur place activities, Facebook) Iran CG[ 2022] UKUT 23 (IAC).
45. I have also considered the limited background evidence that has been produced in this appeal. This seems to be confined to the evidence produced for the hearing before the First-tier Tribunal in May 2021. The background evidence includes Home Office Country Policy and Information Notes (CPIN) on Iran from 2019 and even more historic news articles from 2015 and 2018 discussing the extent that the Iranian state might control access to the internet and social media. It is notable that, despite more recent protests, the bundles produced for the hearing before the Upper Tribunal did not contain any up to date evidence relating to the current situation in Iran. The failure of both parties to produce any up to date evidence has made it difficult for the Upper Tribunal to assess the risk as it might stand at the date of the hearing.
46. In BA (Iran) the Upper Tribunal considered whether there was a risk to those who demonstrated outside the Iranian Embassy in the UK. The Upper Tribunal did not expressly consider the risk to Kurdish demonstrators. I bear in mind that, although the country guidance is still in force, the decision was made on evidence that is now nearly 15 years old. Some caution may need to be exercised in assessing risk on return at the date of the hearing in this case when evidence considered by the Upper Tribunal in BA (Iran) might be increasingly out of date.
47. The Upper Tribunal outlined a number of relevant factors that might need to be considered in assessing the risk on return based on sur place activities in the UK. These included the theme of the demonstrations, how they might be characterised by the state, the person’s role in the demonstrations, the extent of the person’s participation, and how much publicity the demonstrations might have attracted. Also relevant was whether there was any evidence relating to the nature and extent of surveillance of the demonstrations, whether the person is likely to have a ‘significant political profile’ that might have already come to the attention of the authorities, and the nature of the person’s immigration history e.g. did they leave the country illegally.
48. In terms of the evidence as it stood before the Upper Tribunal at the date when BA (Iran) was heard in October 2010, the Upper Tribunal found that it was likely that the Iranian authorities monitor and attempt to identify people participating in demonstrations outside the Iranian Embassy in London. The Upper Tribunal found that the there was insufficient evidence to show that facial recognition technology might be used in the UK although officials might try to identify protestors from photographs. The fact that a person might be conducting opportunistic activities was ‘not likely to be a major influence on the perception of the regime.’ The Upper Tribunal found that, although expressing dissent is sufficient in the eyes of the regime to give rise to a political profile, the level of activity was likely to ‘heighten the determination of the Iranian authorities to identify the demonstrator while in Britain and to identify him on return.’[65]. It concluded that ‘the infrequent demonstrator who plays no particular role in demonstrations and whose participation is not highlighted in the media there is not [at] real risk of identification and therefore not at real risk of ill-treatment.’ [66].
49. The Upper Tribunal went on to find that Iranians returning to Iran are likely to be screened on arrival. Those with a political profile or who have exited illegally might be questioned. However, there was no real risk of persecution for the sole reason of illegal exit [67]. There was insufficient evidence to show that facial recognition technology was likely to be used at the airport in Tehran although officials might try to compare faces from photographs. Security at the airport was haphazard so not all of those of interest might come to the attention of the authorities on arrival [66]. However, if information is already known about activities abroad, a person might well be stopped for questioning.
50. In HB (Iran), the Upper Tribunal considered evidence relating to the risk to Kurds in Iran. It concluded that Kurds were not at risk on return solely on grounds of ethnicity, or in combination with illegal exit, but it would depend on the particular profile of the person. It was common ground that Kurds who were members of political groups faced a real risk of treatment amounting to persecution in Iran [90]. The evidence showed that the Iranian authorities were likely to have a ‘hair trigger approach to those suspected of or perceived to be involved in Kurdish political activities or support for Kurdish rights.’ By this the Upper Tribunal meant that ‘the threshold for suspicion is low and the reaction of the authorities is likely to be extreme.’ [95].
51. Although the Upper Tribunal in HB (Iran) referred to the earlier country guidance decision in BA (Iran), it did not make any specific findings as to whether the risk for Kurds who demonstrate in the UK was any higher than other Iranians who conducted similar activities. The focus of the decision was on the evidence relating to the risk to Kurds in Iran. The Upper Tribunal did not appear to consider any specific evidence to indicate that Kurdish demonstrations in the UK were more closely monitored than any other. I observe that, similar to the ‘hair trigger’ response, BA (Iran) was decided in relation to events that took place at a time of heightened political tension following elections in in Iran in 2009.
52. In XX (Iran) the Upper Tribunal considered evidence relating to potential risks arising from social media activity. The tribunal found that there is a disparity between the claims made by the Iranian state about the extent to which it can control or monitor the electronic data of its citizens and its actual capabilities. The evidence failed to show that the Iranian state was capable of monitoring Facebook accounts on a large scale.
53. The Upper Tribunal found that, given the resources required to conduct surveillance, it is likely that only those who are of ‘significant adverse interest’ to the Iranian state will be targeted for surveillance on Facebook. In such cases, the closure of a Facebook account is unlikely to mitigate the risk because the person will have already come to the attention of the authorities. In other cases, the process of applying for an emergency travel document (ETS) might create a potential ‘pinch point’ where searches might be carried out by the Iranian authorities before a person is removed. However, the Upper Tribunal concluded that the timely closure of a Facebook account could neutralise the risk provided that it was not subject to targeted monitoring before it was closed. The Upper Tribunal found that a decision maker may legitimately consider whether it would be reasonable to expect a person to close a Facebook account and not volunteer the fact before applying for an ETD. There was no fundamental right to have access to a social media account [100].
54. In addition to these decisions I am also aware of more recent published decisions that touch on these issues albeit they were not referred to in submissions. In S v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 1482 found that there were no errors of law in a decision of the Upper Tribunal which dismissed an asylum appeal with similar facts to this case on the basis that the evidence did not show that the appellant had a significant profile arising from his attendance at demonstrations and could delete his social media account before applying for an ETD.
55. In MH (Bangladesh) v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 688 the Court of Appeal considered arguments about the assessment of evidence relating to surveillance and monitoring in the context of an asylum appeal involving a citizen of Bangladesh. I bear in mind that the judgment was handed down after the hearing in this case. In my assessment the discussion in MH (Bangladesh) focuses on general issues about the evaluation of evidence. It does not raises any particular issues that might require further submissions from the parties in this case.
56. The Court of Appeal found that a tribunal should not impose an unrealistic burden on asylum applicants who rely upon sur place activities. It is inherently unlikely that an applicant for asylum will be able to adduce direct evidence of covert surveillance and monitoring by a foreign state [37]. The Court made clear that a tribunal can and should take judicial notice of the ease with which people attending a demonstration can be photographed and filmed and the ease with which images and videos can be transmitted abroad. The tribunal can and should take judicial notice of the fact that publicly accessible websites and social media postings can be monitored. The Court noted that targeted monitoring might be easier (although more resource intensive) than bulk monitoring. However, the technical capabilities of methods of monitoring is a matter that requires expert evidence, not least because states differ in their capabilities and such capabilities might change over time [38].
57. The Court went on to say that the question of the capacity of a foreign state to carry out surveillance and monitoring cannot realistically be divorced from questions of whether a person is already of interest to a state, and if not, whether their activities are likely to make the person of interest. The Court gave the example of a large demonstration outside an embassy where a person standing at the front waving a placard with a slogan hostile to the government is more likely to come to attention than a person standing at the back with no placard [39]. What an asylum applicant can be expected to produce is evidence to put news media coverage, social media posts and the like into context [40].
58. Having set out relevant legal and evidential principles outlined in the case law and country guidance, I turn to assess whether it is reasonably likely that the appellant might have come to the adverse attention of the Iranian state and whether it is likely that he would be at risk if returned to Iran for reasons of his sur place activities in the UK.
59. On the facts found by Judge Cruthers, there was not enough reliable evidence to show that the appellant left Iran because he was suspected of supporting the KDPI. The credibility of the appellant’s claim to have been detained and convicted in his absence was rejected. For this reason, there is insufficient evidence to show that the appellant had already come to the attention of the Iranian state before he left Iran.
60. The appellant left Iran illegally. However, the country guidance makes clear that this fact in itself is insufficient reason, even if taken with the ‘hair trigger’ attitudes towards Kurds, to give rise to a real risk on return for those reasons alone.
61. The assessment of risk very much comes down to the quality of evidence relating to the appellant’s activities since he arrived in the UK. I have accepted that there is some evidence to indicate that the appellant might have attended 10-11 demonstrations in the UK over a 4 year period. Although this is not a negligible number of demonstrations, I have found that the pattern of attendance appears to be opportunistic for the purpose of benefitting his asylum claim rather than due to any genuine political commitment.
62. Most of these demonstrations were outside the Iranian Embassy in London, but at least one seems to have been held in Trafalgar Square. The only evidence about these demonstrations is what can be gleaned from the photographs posted on the appellant’s Facebook accounts. The appellant has not provided any meaningful contextual detail about the demonstrations either in his witness statements or in oral evidence. For example, there is little or no detail about the numbers of people who might have attended the demonstrations, whether he took any particular role in the demonstrations, or whether the appellant noticed any obvious monitoring during the demonstrations that he could reasonably be expected to mention e.g. people in the embassy taking photographs from the windows. The photographs of the demonstrations tend to be close up shots of the appellant with several other men, nearly all of whom have signs or placards of varying sizes. It is not possible to know how many people might have attended the demonstrations from the photographs. There is no evidence of any surrounding media attention or reports relating to the demonstrations beyond the appellant’s self-posted photographs on Facebook.
63. The appellant is not a member of a political party although he says that he supports the aims of the KDPI and the Kurdish cause generally. Beyond those generalised statements there is little detail about his political views. He does not claim to have played any significant role in organising the demonstrations beyond occasionally advertising the date in his Facebook account. However, most of the posts relating to the demonstrations are dated on or after the stated demonstration. Nor do the photos appear to show the appellant playing any leading or significant role in organising the demonstrations on the day. I have already explained why the photograph of the appellant burning an A4 copy of the Iranian flag is insufficient to show that it is reasonably likely that this act was observed or monitored by embassy officials at the time (see [28][29] above).
64. I have already found that it is likely that the appellant requires assistance to post on Facebook. Most of the posts are generic in nature and are likely to be ‘cut and pasted’ rather than a direct reflection of his views in his own words. Nevertheless, the large number of posts relating to human rights abuses by the Iranian state against Kurds and the content of many of the posts are likely to be matters that would attract the adverse attention of the Iranian state. Many of the posts are overtly anti-regime and the pictures of the appellant burning the Iranian flag are also likely to be seen as inflammatory if they did come to the attention of the Iranian state.
65. I bear in mind what was recently said by the Court of Appeal in MH (Bangladesh). It would be unreasonable to expect the appellant to produce evidence of actual monitoring of his activities in the UK given that such surveillance, almost by definition, is likely to be covert and inaccessible to the appellant. It is trite that photographs and videos can easily be made and conveyed around the world and that publicly available sites can easily be accessed from anywhere in the world.
66. In my assessment, the appellant has failed to produce sufficient contextual evidence that might assist in evaluating whether his activities have been such that they are likely to have come to the attention of the Iranian authorities in a way that might attract targeted surveillance. The country guidance is that there is no evidence to show that the Iranian state uses facial recognition technology and that security procedures can sometimes be haphazard. While it is plausible that facial recognition software is more widely available than it was in 2010 when the Upper Tribunal heard BA (Iran), there is no up to date or expert evidence to indicate that it is likely to be used to identify those who might be of adverse interest to the Iranian state either in the UK or on arrival at the airport in Iran. Even if photographs were taken at demonstrations I have not been pointed to any evidence to indicate how the Iranian authorities might identify the appellant in a crowd of many other people.
67. The appellant’s Facebook accounts are not closed and are likely to be accessible on a search of his name. He has used his name for each account and the content clearly identifies him as Kurdish. However, beyond his name and ethnicity the accounts do not provide much other personal detail which would make it easier to identify the appellant e.g. date of birth or where he is from in Iran. Nevertheless, I accept that if a targeted search were to be carried out then it is reasonably likely that the Iranian state might still be able to identify the appellant from his name, photograph, and knowledge of his ethnicity.
68. The next consideration is whether the Iranian authorities are reasonably likely to conduct a targeted search in light of what is said in XX (Iran) (see [52][53] above). In light of the findings I have made about the appellant’s level of activity in the UK, I conclude that the appellant is an infrequent demonstrator who played no particular role in demonstrations. At the date of the hearing, he had not attended a demonstration for nearly a year. There is no evidence to suggest that his activities have been reported in wider media outlets beyond his own Facebook account. He does not carry out any political activities beyond occasional attendance at demonstrations and posting generic material on Facebook. There are findings that he has not come to the attention of the Iranian authorities in the past. I conclude that he does not have a significant political profile beyond opportunistic attendance at demonstrations and the evidence he has created on Facebook.
69. In principle, I accept that it would be possible for Iranian officials, either in Iran or the UK, to check Facebook accounts of Iranians living in the UK. However, the country guidance states that the capacity of the Iranian state to carry out large scale monitoring of Facebook is limited. There is a contrast between statements made by the Iranian state and their actual capacity to carry out mass surveillance. To some extent this is born out by the dated articles in the appellant’ bundle, which report that the Iranian state commonly blocks or restricts access to the internet and various social media outlets to prevent mobilisation. However, the only evidence suggesting wider surveillance capabilities seems to come from sources within the Iranian state. For example, the article from www.mei.edu (this source is unclear) dated 18 April 2018 quotes the Deputy Attorney General’s claim that 18,000 members of the Basij were monitoring cyber space. It is claims such as this that the Upper Tribunal in XX (Iran) found did not accord with the actual capabilities of the Iranian state.
70. Although the appellant’s open Facebook account could in principle be accessed, the evidence suggests that the Iranian state does not have the capability to carry out large scale monitoring of social media. It is more common to simply block access to social media to prevent mobilisation during periods of protest in Iran. I have considered the fact that it might be possible to narrow down the focus to activities carried out by Iranians in the UK. However, while bearing in mind what was said in MH (Bangladesh), I have not been pointed to any expert or other evidence that has been considered either in country guidance or that is otherwise available to suggest that there might be systematic surveillance of the Facebook accounts of Iranians in the UK. In light of the more recent findings made by the Upper Tribunal in XX (Iran), there is no evidence to indicate that such surveillance is likely to take place.
71. As an expert immigration judge, it is reasonable for me to take judicial notice of the fact that there are likely to be many thousands of Iranians in the UK. For many years it has been one of the most common nationalities giving rise to asylum applications. Even if the pool of Iranians living in the UK is smaller than in Iran, it is still likely to be too big for the embassy or the Iranian authorities to monitor on a large scale. It is still likely that targeted surveillance will only be focussed on those with profiles that have either already come to the attention of the Iranian authorities or who have played more prominent roles in protests or dissident activity in the UK. The appellant does not come within either of these two categories.
72. At the hearing, the appellant told me that he was in contact with his family in Iran. He suggested that he contacted his family through third parties but it was unclear whether he spoke directly with his family or not. Initially he said that the third party spoke to his family but then he said that he had spoken to his father the week before the hearing. He later went back to saying that he did not speak directly to his parents. Nevertheless, when asked if his family had encountered any problems in Iran, he said: ‘I didn’t hear anything, no’.
73. The only piece of background evidence that seems to be before the Upper Tribunal about the treatment of family members is the CPIN on ‘Kurds and Kurdish political groups (Version 3.0)(January 2019). Section 10.5 summarises various reports relating to the treatment of family members of Kurdish activists. That evidence indicates that if a person is identified as a Kurdish political activist then family members are also likely to be seen as oppositional and put under pressure. As a result, family members an be at risk and might face arrest and interrogation by the authorities.
74. In light of this additional evidence, I find that the fact that the appellant’s family does not appear to have had any problems since he arrived in the UK. This also indicates that it is not reasonably likely that his activities in attending occasional demonstrations and posting on Facebook have come to the attention of the Iranian authorities or that his profile is such that it might attract targeted surveillance.
75. The last issue that I must consider is whether, in light of the above, the appellant is likely to extinguish any risk arising from his activities in the UK by deleting his Facebook accounts before any steps could be taken to apply for an ETD. Despite this being a feature of the decision in XX (Iran), it was not dealt with in the appellant’s statement nor was he asked about it by either representative. Because it is a relevant issue, I told the appellant that I would need to consider whether he would delete the accounts to eliminate any potential risk. In response, he said: ‘If you can delete it for me and send me back without any risk for my life then send me back.’. This was not an issue covered in his witness statement. For this reason, it might not have been discussed with his legal representative before the hearing. In view of this, I bear in mind that the appellant might have had limited understanding of the question when asked at the hearing.
76. Although the appellant is likely to support the Kurdish cause in general terms, I have already found that he has no past history of political activities in Iran. The activities that he has carried out in the UK are likely to be opportunistic and do not reflect a genuine commitment to political activity. The evidence fails to show, even to the low standard of proof, that the appellant has a significant profile that is likely to have come to the attention of the Iranian authorities. In the circumstances, I conclude that it is likely that the appellant would delete the Facebook accounts that have been crafted to support this asylum claim if faced with potential removal to Iran. Although his witness statement seeks to provide an explanation as to why he was unable to access certain data, on the face of it, nothing in that evidence outlines any specific obstacles to deleting an account that could not be overcome with the assistance or advice from Facebook itself.
77. Bringing all of these factors together, the appellant is an Iranian Kurd who left the country illegally. On the findings made by Judge Cruthers he does not have a history of political activity that is likely to have come to the adverse attention of the Iranian authorities before he left the country. The appellant’s activities in the UK are as an infrequent demonstrator who has not played a prominent role in demonstrations. Although it is reasonable to infer that some monitoring of demonstrations might take place, the appellant has produced insufficient contextual evidence to show that it is likely that he might have been identified by the Iranian authorities as a result of his infrequent attendance at demonstrations.
78. An open Facebook account can in principle be accessed by the Iranian authorities. There is no way to know for sure whether the appellant’s account have been monitored or not. However, the country guidance suggests that, as a person who is not likely to be of ‘significant adverse interest’, it is unlikely that the appellant has been identified for targeted surveillance. While not determinative, the fact that the appellant’s family have not had any problems, despite his activities in the UK, also suggests that he is not likely to be the subject of targeted surveillance. For the reasons given above, it is likely that the appellant’s Facebook accounts were set up solely to create an evidential foundation for his asylum claim. In the circumstances, I find that it is also likely that the appellant would delete them to avoid the self-created risk that those accounts might pose before he reached the first potential ‘pinch point’ if he needed to apply for an ETD.
79. Even if photographs of the appellant might have been taken at the infrequent demonstrations he has attended, the country guidance indicates that there is insufficient evidence to show that the Iranian authorities use facial recognition technology. The process of comparing photographs and identifying individuals is likely to be haphazard. The Upper Tribunal in BA (Iran) concluded that infrequent demonstrators who did not play any particular role in demonstrations, and whose participation is not highlighted in the media, are not likely to be at risk of identification or ill-treatment on return. The fact that the appellant would return as a Kurd who exited Iran illegally might lead to questioning on return. The Upper Tribunal in XX (Iran) found that a decision maker could legitimately consider whether a person will close a Facebook account and not volunteer the fact that there had been an account when questioned. The findings made in this case indicate that the appellant has been willing to fabricate an account of past events and to curate evidence to create the basis for an asylum claim. In these circumstances, it also seems likely that he would be willing to delete the accounts and to fail to mention them when asked if that also served his ends.
80. For the reasons given above, I conclude that the appellant has failed to produce sufficient reliable evidence to show that he has a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of political opinion if returned to Iran. The decision does not breach the United Kingdom’s obligations under the Refugee Convention. It follows that any human rights claim based on risk on return also fails. No separate arguments relating to family or private life under Article 8 are relied upon.
Notice of Decision
The appeal is dismissed on Refugee Convention and Human Rights grounds.

M. Canavan
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

28 August 2025