Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2021-001502

First-tier Tribunal Nos: HU/50175/2021
IA/00762/2021

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 5th of September 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PERKINS
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE ZUCKER

Between

Abdul Hakkeem Kadir Bux
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

The Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Z Malik, KC instructed by Vision Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms A Ahmed, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 15 December 2023

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This decision is the remaking of a decision in an appeal against the decision of the respondent on 13 January 2021 refusing the appellant indefinite leave to remain under the Tier 1 (General) route.
2. Before us the appellant relied on a bundle of evidence including matters that had not come directly to Ms Ahmed’s attention. She was aware of the general nature of the additional documents and was not disadvantaged by them being admitted before us and they were.
3. We begin by summarising Mr Malik’s skeleton argument because this explains what this appeal is really about.
4. He said there were two issues in the appeal. They are, first, whether the appellant had been dishonest in his earlier dealings with the Secretary of State and/or HMRC and, second, whether the appellant’s removal would be a proportionate or disproportionate interference with his private and family life.
5. The respondent refused an application for further leave made 2 July 2013. It was refused on 3 November 2015 mainly because of the disparity between income declared to HMRC and sums declared to the Secretary of State was so great that the appellant was found to have been dishonest. Following the decision of the Court of Appeal in Balajigari v SSHD [2019] EWCA Civ 673 the respondent accepted that there was, or at least may have been, more to consider and asked for further details and agreed to reconsider the application. This led to the decision complained of on 13 January 2021.
6. There was no doubt that the appellant had lived in the United Kingdom for over ten years and was able to satisfy some of the requirements for indefinite leave to remain. Indeed, he first arrived in the United Kingdom in 2007 and his daughters were born in 2005 and 2010 respectively.
7. However, the Secretary of State decided that, because of concerns about the appellant’s earlier claimed income and discrepancies between the income declared to the HMRC and the income declared to the Secretary of State, it was undesirable for the appellant to be given indefinite leave to remain. Obviously, finding against the appellant on the first issue does not determine the second but if the appellant was not properly found to have been dishonest it is hard to see how refusal was proportionate to any proper purpose.
8. We find it appropriate to look very carefully on how the Secretary of State justified the decision dated 13 January 2021. As we have been reminded several times, and it is an important point, it is for the Secretary of State to prove dishonesty, and we want to look carefully at how she intended to do it. We appreciate the importance of brevity and have not commented expressly on all of the evidence before us, but if this decision is to be understood it cannot be short.
9. The decision letter dated 13 January 2021 (page 1385 of the bundle) includes the heading “Reasons you do not qualify for a grant of indefinite leave to remain”. The key point was that the Secretary of State found refusing the application to be proportionate.
10. As is probably apparent to any informed reader, in order to qualify for further leave to remain in the United Kingdom the appellant had to achieve a minimum level of legitimate income during his previous leave. The required income would ordinarily be enough to attract a tax liability and so HRMC would have a record. In an ideal world the income declared to HMRC and relied upon in an application to the Secretary of State for further leave would be exactly same. That may not always be possible. There may, for example, be some disparity in the necessary accounting periods. Nevertheless, differences for such reasons should, ordinarily, be easy to explain.
11. In the Refusal Letter dated 3 November 2015 the Respondent said (page 1380 of the bundle), possibly subject to slight variations because of poor photocopying:
In your previous application for leave to remain as a Tier I (General) Migrant submitted on 2 July 2012, you claimed £41,126 from salaried and self-employment earning; this consisted of £21,574 from salaried employment and £17,522 from self-employment and earnings for the period 1 June 2011 to 31 May 2012. The Secretary of State has conducted further enquiries with HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) to establish what you declared to them in each of the following tax years
• Tax Year 2010-2011, pay from all employment in that year was £41,309
• Tax year 2011-2012, pay from all employment for that year was £20,767
• Tax Year 2012-2013, Pay from all employment for that year was £24,474
• Tax Year 2013-2014 pa) merit from all employers for that year was £15,823

The Secretary of State is satisfied that your declared earnings of £41.126 in the application submitted on July 2012 is not consistent with your declarations made to HMRC in the relevant tax period. The fact that your declared earnings to the Home Office in 2012 compared to what you declared to HMRC for a similar period differ significantly does not demonstrate that your declaration of earnings to both the Home Office and HMRC is consistent. The discrepancy between your declarations cast doubts over your declared earnings in your September 2015 application. The Secretary of State notes that you would have needed to provide similar sorts of evidence of your earnings to prove your self-employed income to HMRC as you did in your previous application for leave to remain. Had you declared earnings which were consistent with your declaration to HMRC you would not have scored sufficient points under the Immigration Rules for leave to remain to be granted. In view of the above, the Secretary of State is satisfied that you made false representations in your application for leave to remain in July 2012.
12. It is the appellant’s case that the money that he declared to the Secretary of State was genuine and reflected income from his employment and also his self-employed activity and the money he declared to HMRC was wrong. He underdeclared to HMRC by a significant amount. He denies that he acted dishonestly. He trusted the bookkeeper working from a firm of accountants and the bookkeeper got it wrong.
13. The refusal letter (page 1392 of the bundle) refers to a “genuine earnings test”. It concludes:
“The Secretary of State for the Home Department (SSHD) is not satisfied that the earnings claimed are from genuine employment and therefore the points for these earnings will not be awarded”.
14. Obviously, a declaration to the revenue is not conclusive proof of income and the appellant, partly in response to questions from the Secretary of State, endeavoured to show that his late declared higher income was correct. There was evidence from the appellant to the Secretary of State that purported to show how he had legitimately earned undeclared sums from his self-employment, and this was considered in great detail by the Secretary of State. We outline below the points that we consider to be particularly significant.
15. One of the strands of evidence concerned a business identified as “Ganges”. The appellant had produced a letter dated 26 September 2020 from the purported owner of the Ganges Restaurant, but the letter was not on company business notepaper. The letter said that a Mr Sibi Kumar took over the restaurant in March 2012. The appellant had also produced a copy of the invoice with a total of £4,000 and a “company presentation” for Ganges Restaurant. The invoice was dated 1 March 2012 and the mileage record stated that the initial meeting took place on 6 January 2012 and there were eleven trips to visit Mr Sibi Kumar as part of the project including an overnight stay. He raised an invoice for £4,000; the following were consequential to a meeting on 1 March 2012.
16. The Secretary of State said that “we found that Ganges Restaurant is not on Companies House”. That is hardly surprising. It is not a company, and it is slightly troubling that the Secretary of State thought there was any point looking there. However, the business was owned by R & S Food and Wine Limited; a Mr Sibi Kumar is the director of the company. Something described as an “open-source search” showed the Ganges Restaurant had been trading at the expected location since 2006 and that Mr Sibi Kumar “was in fact taking over an established restaurant and continued to trade as such”. The Secretary of State found it a matter of concern. The presentation provided in response to the Minded To Refuse letter confirmed that the Ganges Restaurant was created in 2006. It was a matter of concern to the Secretary of State that the appellant produced documentation indicating the restaurant was created when the Secretary of State’s research has indicated the restaurant was trading and had been for some time. The Secretary of State was not satisfied that a presentation dealing with recruitment was offered to a business that was a going concern. It was also noted the presentation lacked details about the source of information, about expenses and sales forecasts.
17. The Secretary of State then looked at the Darjeeling Heights. He complained that the only evidence for the Darjeeling Heights was a mileage record showing a claimed mileage from 17 March 2012 to 20 March 2012, a deposit on the 20 March 2012 of £2,250 on the redacted Lloyds TSB bank statement that the appellant had provided. The Secretary of State was doubtful that the restaurant actually existed. The trading name was owned by Kent Catering Restaurants Limited. There was a website address and a mention on a Tripadvisor website but “no other evidence of this restaurant exists”. An open-source check confirmed that Kent Catering Restaurants Limited was incorporated on 11 March 2011 and dissolved on 20 March 2018. The Secretary of State suspected that this was a shell company. It was described as a part of actions “merely to build the façade of existing business”.
18. The appellant denied that he had provided no evidence about his links with the Darjeeling Heights Restaurant other than mileage records. He said Darjeeling Heights was owned by Kent Catering Limited. Darjeeling Heights was a trading name and benefitted from reviews from Tripadvisor. Tripadvisor had standards and were not easily fooled and the fact that Darjeeling Heights was known to Tripadvisor supported his claim that it was real restaurant.
19. The Secretary of State then drew attention to an invoice relating to Subway in 2014. Subway was billed for £5,250 on 17 September 2014. The total was reduced to give a discount of £250 for no given reason. The work was described airily as “Consultancy services in relation to setting up Subway in Embankment Place …”. There were two letters but the named contact on the invoice had not signed them. It was said that the letter did nothing to “authenticate” the invoice. It confirmed the appellant’s employment in some way, which was not in question. The second letter was not on headed paper and purported to be from the former director dated 22 September 2020. Again, the Secretary of State found the details of work carried out vague. The example was given, and it was in very general terms. The Secretary of State said:
“Whilst we agree that you have detailed most of the information expected of a genuine invoice, we note that you have listed NatWest Bank as payment method; this bank account and bank statements have not been provided as part of your response and was not accompanied with this invoice, and therefore the SSHD is unable to corroborate these earnings.”
20. The appellant gave evidence before us. He adopted his witness statements dated 14 Oct 2020 (page 166 to 178 of bundle), 19 April 2021 (pages 179 to 196) and 30 November 2023 (pages 48 to 50). Given that the most recent statement was made very shortly before the hearing there were no supplementary questions.
21. We summarise the important parts of the statements and, where appropriate, we make findings on the evidence. For the avoidance of doubt, we confirm that we made no findings on disputed evidence until after the hearing and our findings have regard to the cross examination and the submissions of both advocates.
22. In his first statement the appellant explained that on 30 September 2015 he applied for indefinite leave to remain under the Tier 1 (General) route after completing five years lawful residence.
23. He said that he had applied for leave to remain on 2 July 2013 and his application was refused on 3 November 2015, mainly because the earnings declared in the application submitted on 2 July 2012 were inconsistent with the earnings declared to HMRC in the same tax period. The Secretary of State was satisfied that false representations had been made. We have considered evidence relating expressly to this earlier decision and to the further details that followed the decision to withdraw the decision of 3 November 2015.
24. It was the appellant’s case that he had not made false representations.
25. The respondent refused the application on 13 January 2021.
26. The appellant said that in his application dated 2 July 2012 he told the Secretary of State that his total income for the period 1 June 2011 to 31 May 2012 was £41,126. This was made up of PAYE income of £23,574 and earnings from self-employment of £17,552. He supported this claimed income with payslips from various restaurants where he had worked and bank statements, invoices, a certificate of income, an accountant’s letter and an employment letter.
27. In his statement the appellant gave more details about his income.
28. At paragraph 10 of his first statement, the appellant noted that the Secretary of State had alleged that he had only declared £20,767 to HMRC for the tax year 2011/12 and there was a “discrepancy” of £20,359. We find that word “discrepancy”, although correct, must not be allowed to disguise the fact that the appellant declared to HMRC only just over half of what he said that he earned.
29. The appellant said that the Secretary of State had misunderstood the evidence because a further £3,200, being salaried earnings from Kent Catering Ltd, was also taken into account but that was not enough to balance the sums declared to HMRC and the Secretary of State. A copy of the letter is at page 1359 in the bundle. Clearly the letter indicates that the sum was known to an HRMC, but the letter is of limited value, being expressed to be “for intelligence purposes only”. Importantly, it does not change the fact that the discrepancy between the income declared to HMRC, and the Secretary of State is significant.
30. The appellant said that the period of assessment for the application in July 2012 was 1 June 2011 to 31 May 2012, which incorporated two tax years. He said the letter from HMRC letter of 22 October 2015 showed £19,956 from employment and self-employment declarations of £2,500 from self-employment and £19,956 from employment and then for the period 6 April 2012 to 31 May 2013 his self-employed earnings were £2,500 and for other employment £3,073.84. This was to be taken with the income from Cambridge Subway Limited for the period 6 April 2012 to 5 April 2013 is the sum of £19,956 and from self-employment with standard consultancy of £2,500.
31. He then compared that with his tax return saying that he accepted that his original tax return, the self-employed gross income for business consultancy was declared as nil and it should have been £15,052, creating a discrepancy. However, he said his tax affairs were handled by an accountant, he identified as a Mr Khalid. He said he gave all his financial information, including his self-employed income to the accountant to file and signed a form of authority for him to act as his agent. He said that he gave Mr Khalid all the necessary documents. Mr Khalid completed the paper tax return which the appellant signed. He said at paragraph 14:
“I checked the details on the form and on finding it to be accurate I signed the form and asked him to file the return.”
32. Importantly he said at paragraph 15 that there was a family tragedy. His mother was killed in an accident, and he found it necessary to go to India. He said he asked Mr Khalid to submit the tax return and pay the required tax. He said:
“I distinctly remember telling him that I may not have access to my online banking due to the severeness of the incident. I borrowed money from my friends, and I gave him the amount in cash to be paid towards my tax liability. He assured me that he will do the same and make sure that the tax return is filed on time. I trusted him totally as I was panicking given my situation.”
33. The appellant said that he had no reason to believe that it would not be done properly.
34. The appellant explained that when he returned from India he did not make enquires as he had no reason to think that the work had not been done. He was also experiencing a difficult phase in his life coming to terms with his mother’s death and the experience was particularly disturbing because his mother died as the result of a road traffic accident. His mother was struck by a car on 3 October 2012 and her condition deteriorated. He travelled to India on 15 October 2012; his mother died on 25 October 2012. He returned to the United Kingdom in November having served the customary morning rituals. He was admittedly vague about the precise dates. However, he said he returned to India not very long after his mother’s death, some time at the end of December 2012. His father was not finding it easy to cope and there was also a family property dispute which needed his attention.
35. He explained that when he returned to the United Kingdom he was not properly focused on his affairs. This led to him losing one of his jobs and to a period of unemployment.
36. He said that investors had put something of the order of £100,000 into his company and the business was struggling and expected him to do good work but he did not, and this made the investors worried and they wanted their money back. He resigned his directorship and paid back some of the investors and this put him into debt and added to his stress.
37. He managed to get another job with Subway thanks to his previous good employment record but was not able to cope and resigned and returned to London where he had friends and more family support.
38. At paragraph 22 of his statement, he commented that he was “not thinking about the 2010/11 Tax Return”.
39. He then said that he first became aware that the accountant had not accurately declared his self-employed earnings when he was gathering documents to support his indefinite leave to remain application. His solicitor suggested in September 2015 that he should get his tax affairs in order. He checked with the online HMCR portal with the help of an accountant and discovered that the return was wrong. He said he contacted HMRC by telephone and told them. However, he already booked an appointment for a same day service on his indefinite leave to remain application. As a result of a conversation with his lawyer, he was advised that there were no mandatory evidential requirements. He said that when he contacted HMRC the following week, on 8 October 2015, and he was advised to send a letter summarising what had gone wrong with his tax calculations, he was diligent in pursuing that. He had to find about £5,000 more in tax and entered into an arrangement to pay that off at a realistic rate.
40. He was told by his accountants that Mr Khalid was no longer working there, and that his files could not be located.
41. He then addressed the previous earnings on the 30 September 2015 application for ILR. He had provided appropriate documentation. He did not suggest that the tax return was correct but insisted that the failures were not the result of dishonesty, at least not on his part. He had tried to put matters right and had not been subject to any penalty imposed by HMRC. He emphasised that he had not given false information or documentation to the Home Office at any time.
42. He then explained that his business was important to him, and he endeavoured to be good at his job and truthful. He gave details about developing his career. He said that he had made strong contracts in the United Kingdom and would find it very difficult to reestablish himself in India after then a gap of thirteen years. He was adamant that he had not been dishonest. There was one area in his business records which was not his fault, and he had endeavoured to put right the error.
43. He then said how his business was developing. He said that apart from any other consideration his good name was necessary to attract investment.
44. There was a further statement dated 19 April 2021. That statement was made in response to a Minded To Refuse letter dated 17 September 2020. He said the statement should be read with his witness statement of 14 October 2020. It starts at page 179 in the bundle. Broadly the appellant was trying to allay concerns raised by the Secretary of State.
45. We remind ourselves that the appellant accepts, as is plainly the case, that his declaration to HMRC was wrong. However, it could be that the declaration first made for the purpose of assessing his tax liability was right and the later declaration told about pretended employment.
46. He did join Kent Catering as casual staff and did incorporate changes which attracted attention, and he built up his business.
47. He denied that there was adverse inference to draw from his reliance on a small number of redacted bank statement that he need not have disclosed at all.
48. The statements start at page 548 in our bundle. They are, or purport to be, the appellant’s personal bank statements for his account at Lloyd’s bank from 10 October 2011 to 18 January 2012. With one exception the redactions are on the “money out” side.
49. On 17 October 2011 there is a credit of £2,500 from “Spices of India”, one the appellant’s clients. The bank balance rosed to £2504.50 at the close of business. There is a redacted transfer on 20 October 2011, when the balance fell to £104.50.
50. On 13 December 2011 there is credit of £2,500 from London Dharbar, another customer of the appellant’s, which raised the balance to £2,504.50 on 13 December but, by reason of a redacted payment in the “Money Out” column the balance fell to £54.50 on 15 December 2011.
51. These entries do nothing to show that the money received from alleged customers was truly for work done and not simply paid into the bank and returned, perhaps indirectly, to the payee.
52. In his additional witness statement, the appellant said his father died on 18 May 2021. His wife and their two minor daughters, then age 17 and 13 came to the United Kingdom in 2022. His wife is a Tier 2 skilled worker, and her daughters came as her dependants. They have all been living together at an address in Hounslow. His wife was in regular employment earning £29,000 per year and his daughters were studying, one at school and one at a local college. His whole family had now moved to the United Kingdom, and he wanted the family unit to stay there.
53. He was then cross-examined by Ms Ahmed.
54. Ms Ahmed challenged the appellant about his advertising. Certainly, there was an advertisement for a course in carving vegetables including the urging to “Follow your creative passion from our experienced chefs”. Ms Ahmed suggested this did not really promote a consultancy business. The appellant replied that it was a prop to bring in clients. Certainly, this could be a small, ancillary part of a business service but it is not good evidence on its own of a successful consultancy.
55. In the card attached to it he explained why he did not list the services that he offered in his consultancy. He said that he was not advertising the business there.
56. Ms Ahmed suggested there was no better advertising because there was no business. The appellant denied that. He accepted that he had, in response to the Minded To Refuse letter, been involved in promoting a restaurant.
57. He accepted that at page 998 in the bundle he had a letter entitled “Have a Heart” confirming that he was involved in raising money on behalf of that charity. The letter did not identify the alleged business in any way; it just confirmed the appellant had been involved in some fund raising. The appellant accepted, when pressed, that it was only of evidential value to confirm his claim to have raised some money for charity.
58. The appellant was then asked about his business, Sana Consultancy. There was little evidence that Sana Consultancy was a going concern, The website no longer exists. It was closed down in 2015, according to the appellant. He had helped to revive it when he stopped working.
59. The appellant was asked about “Ganges” which is said to be a business trading name owned by a company. Ms Ahmed asked bluntly why the appellant was needed if it was taken over by an experienced businessman. He gave no satisfactory answer although he insisted that he was telling the truth.
60. In order to support his evidence about his claimed income, the appellant relied on a letter from the owner of the Ganges Restaurant dated 26 September 2020. He said that it was not on headed notepaper because the person who wrote the letter, who had been his employer at the relevant time, was no longer the owner of the business.
61. The letter is at page 529 of the bundle. It is well written and expresses appreciation of the work done by the appellant but refers to his introducing some contractors and “Consultancy Services” in relation to setting up and managing Staff Planning and recruitment, costing and project management to a food retail establishment. If the work was indeed done this would identify it sufficiently on a promptly presented invoice but none of this gives any detailed explanation of what the appellant did that was worth £4,000. By the time the case came before us the appellant knew that the lack of detail may be criticised, but it was not improved.
62. The appellant said that most of his business came from word of mouth.
63. He did not agree with the Home Office assertion that £4,500 was a lot of money for initial work.
64. Ms Ahmed persisted with a series of similar questions relating to points that, she said, had been taken and not answered satisfactorily.
65. The appellant did not, at any point, give any explanation that we found persuasive.
66. He then asked about the tax returns. He denied making up the existence of Mr Khalid.
67. Mr Malik did not re-examine.
68. Ms Ahmed essentially relied on the refusal letter. Mr Malik relied substantially on his skeleton argument.
69. We first ask ourselves if the Secretary of State has proved the appellant was dishonest.
70. We have reminded ourselves of Mr Malik’s apt submissions. We record that we have, of course, considered all of the evidence before us including documents to which we had referred to expressly. We do accept that the appellant has some support in documentary form for his claims to have run a business and we have given such weight to that as we can.
71. We find that the discrepancy identified by the Secretary of State is very damaging to the appellant. On its own it is, we find, sufficient to support a finding that the appellant was dishonest. He seeks to explain it away by saying that the incriminating declaration was made incompetently on his behalf by another and he did not notice it because he was distracted by grief.
72. We accept that the appellant’s mother died in tragic circumstances, and we do not make light of how such a thing can distress people. However, it is no explanation at all for the rank incompetence of “Mr Khalid” and we find that the discrepancy is too great for it to have been unnoticed for so long. The appellant is an educated man with an interest in business matters. We do not accept that he really believed that he had no tax liability on his business earnings if, in fact there were any such earnings.
73. We want to make it plain that although we do not believe the appellant and find the Secretary of State has proved the case, this is not a result of one particularly damning answer or a moment of insight but is the result of an overview formed by considering the evidence as a whole and finding there are so many things in the appellant’s case which individually might be explainable but which cumulatively compel us to the conclusion that it is at least probable that the appellant has just not told the truth. There has been no serious challenge at any stage to his declared income from his employment. That would have taken a considerable amount of his time and produced a steady income doing shop work, but this income was not enough to satisfy the requirements of the Rules. The appellant had to have a significant supplementary income. The Secretary of State wanted to know about that income.
74. Whilst the burden is on the Secretary of State we are perfectly entitled to draw adverse inferences from startling omissions, and we repeat that our conclusion is not based on one particular event but on the damaging effect of an accumulation of improbabilities.
75. First, we find the inconsistencies between the income declared to the Revenue and the income received according to the appellant to be very significant and insightful. We are well-aware that people are not always organised in their affairs and people who might be very good with money and have accountancy qualifications and able to advise other people do not necessarily heed their own advice. It is unhelpful to the appellant that he has to accept that although he has qualifications at master’s levels in aspects of business administration, his case depends on his being very bad at administering a business. That does not help him, but it does not compel a particular conclusion.
76. We do find the under declaring (on the appellant’s case) his income to be significant. It ought to be possible to get a complete match. If accounting years are different times the adjustments can be made, and it should be possible to reconcile the figures completely. When they are prepared professionally it ought to be straightforward. Far from happening here, there is an acceptance that the declaration to the income was wrong, and the declaration is supported by identifying somebody who now cannot be found. There had been no complaint to any kind of professional body although the size of the error is enormous if it is to be true and although we have reflected thoughtfully on the appellant’s explanation that he was distracted by family grief and reminded ourselves that grief is a variable factor and affects people differently and unexpectedly, we find it deeply improbable that a person would not notice that he had earned something like £18,000 more than he declared. He should have expected to pay tax on that money and should have noticed that he had not. We do not believe that the appellant did not notice that he had undeclared his income. We find the error on the part of the accountant getting it wrong in the first place to be surprising, whether it was a result of dishonesty or carelessness it is not the behaviour of an accountant to be that far out. We find the tolerance of the appellant by not making a complaint to a professional body and not producing more energetic evidence, such as oral evidence from the employers where they could be cross-examined on oath all tend to suggest that this is a weak explanation and we find it untruthful.
77. We then look at the points taken for the income that has been declared. This is a business which produced widely different incomes. There is no clear plan for attracting business. There is no clear list of customers who can be checked and identified. Customers that ought to have been regular customers seem to have disappeared. No-one came to support the appellant explaining how he had been a customer.
78. The lack of advertising and promotional material is something to which we give some weight. Clearly, practices differ from business to business but there was not a lot here to show that there was any real attempt to cultivate business although, as Ms Ahmed pointed out skilfully in cross-examination, the income varied greatly. It might be assumed that someone who could increase their income significantly would have continued to do that or at least would have been able to explain why they could not. The big differences in alleged income does not make sense. Neither does the appellant’s willingness to travel long distances without accounting separately for travel and other services provided. If a person really is running a consultancy and making significant sums of money it may be expected that there would be some clear documentary evidence to show it; some properly prepared accounts and clear evidence from established customers whose bona fides could be checked by showing they were still trading. It is just not there.
79. We reminded ourselves of the points taken in Mr Malik’s skeleton argument. Mr Malik says that the evidence meets the standard referred to the Tribunal in Abassi (rule 43; para 322(5): accountants’ evidence) [2020] UKUT 27 (IAC) and Ashfaq (Balajigari: appeals) [2020] UKUT 226 (IAC). I find that surprisingly bold. Paragraph 3 of the headnote in Abassi says:
“3. In cases involving a decision under paragraph 322(5) of the Immigration Rules, where an individual relies on an accountant’s letter admitting fault in the submission of incorrect tax returns to Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs, the First-tier or Upper Tribunal is unlikely to place any material weight on that letter if the accountant does not attend the hearing to give evidence, by reference to a Statement of Truth, that explains in detail the circumstances in which the error came to be made; the basis and nature of any compensation; and whether the firm’s insurers and/or any relevant regulatory body have been informed. This is particularly so where the letter is clearly perfunctory in nature.”
80. In Asfaq the headnote, again headnote 3 reads:
“3. The explanation by any accountant said to have made or contributed to an error is essential because the allegation of error goes to the accountant’s professional standing. Without evidence from the accountant, the Tribunal may consider that the facts laid by the Secretary of State establish the appellant's dishonesty.”
81. We are also very concerned about the redacted evidence. Clearly a person making money from self-employment could be expected to show how that money was received and processed. That means that there are likely to be signs in the personal accounts of profits being spent or saved. This has not happened here. We appreciate that in a sense it is arguing from a negative but we do find it surprising that large sums of money are paid into a bank account and then the bank balance diminishes very soon afterwards by reason after redacted payments have been identified. What we cannot do is look into the bank accounts and see how the appellant has benefited from income he is supposed to have received. He knows that this is of fundamental importance; the omission is again something we find striking.
82. We sit back at this point and just consider what the Secretary of State has done. The Secretary of State has produced uncontested evidence that the appellant has not given true information to both the Revenue and the Secretary of State. Of that there is no doubt and is of itself something that requires comment from the appellant. The appellant has commented before the Secretary of State made the decision and has given an explanation which we find unbelievable. It is his case that an accountant acting on his behalf made totally wrong declarations which substantially diminished his tax bill, but he did not notice because he was not paying attention to his affairs because of grief. This might have been an acceptable explanation for not noticing immediately but that is not his case. It was his case that he did not notice at all. We do not believe that a person with an education sufficient to have studied business practices at master’s level would not notice that he had not paid income tax on incomes going into five figures.
83. We do not dismiss lightly the effects of grief and particularly the effects of a mother dying in particularly horrible circumstances, but we still do not accept the underlying premise on the appellant’s argument that he was just too distressed to notice. Further, we do not accept that the business trading in the way the appellant says he has traded would have had so little to confirm it. The lack of proper business accounts is telling. The lack of promotional material is telling. The lack of clear confirmation from a customer prepared to be cross-examined is telling. The variation in income for no obvious reason other than it not always being necessary for revenue purposes is telling.
84. The Secretary of State has to prove the case on the balance of probabilities, and we find the Secretary of State has shown that it is very improbable that the appellant ever had a proper job as a self-employed consultant. Essentially there are three strands to the Secretary of State’s case. First, it is improbable that a man such as the appellant would not notice that he had been “under taxed” by a substantial amount. Second it is improbable that a professional advisor would make the kind of error that is alleged here. Third it is improbable that a genuine business could not produce better, testable, evidence of business activity. We agree and, taking these thins cumulatively, have no hesitation in finding that the Secretary of State has proved her case.
85. We therefore find that the appellant has been dishonest and dishonest in a material way.
86. If he had told the truth he probably would not have been given leave. We then have to consider if he should be refused further leave in this application because of that. We find that he should.
87. It brings the whole system of immigration control into contempt and is so very unfair to honest people who would like to live in the United Kingdom but are not prepared to disregard the Rules to see people who do disregard the Rules rewarded for their conduct. As far as the Rules are concerned, we have no hesitation in saying that the appellant is not a suitable person in this application.
88. We do accept that the appellant is living in the United Kingdom for some time. There is nothing to go against his assertion that he has no family left in India. He has close family in the United Kingdom, particularly his wife and children.
89. Looking at the Article 8 balancing exercise we have to balance the fact he does not only qualify the Rules but is disqualified from satisfying the Rules because of his bad behaviour against the fact that he has family settled in the United Kingdom but his wife and daughter, are entitled to be in the United Kingdom.
90. It is probably in the best interests of the children that he remains. It is not suggested by any source that the appellant is a bad influence on his children although he is a man prepared to be dishonest to improve his financial circumstances. However, the best interests of the children do not determine an Article 8 balancing exercise. Clearly removal would be an interference with his private and family life and with theirs. The appellant has not been convicted or any offences. We have to ask ourselves if, for the sake of his wife and children, he has a right to remain in the United Kingdom and we find that he does not. His wife and children and can continue to live in the United Kingdom without him. If his wife earns sufficient money he may want to consider applying to enter as a dependant husband but there is no strong reason to allow him to remain as a result of this application and there a clear reasons for him to leave the United Kingdom. Our consideration of section 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 has no material impact upon our decision in this matter.
Notice of Decision
91. This appeal is dismissed.

Jonathan Perkins

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
16 August 2025