Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2021-001942

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/50259/2020

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 11th of March 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE STEPHEN SMITH
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SOLANKI

Between

ANDI SHOSHARI
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Lynes (Counsel, Instructed by Turpin Miller LLP)
For the Respondent: Ms McKenzie, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 7 January 2025

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction
1. This is the decision of the tribunal to which we have both contributed.
2. The appellant is a national of Kosovo, date of birth 10 April 1990 (34 years old).
3. This is an appeal by the appellant against the decision of the Secretary of State for the Home Department (‘Respondent’) dated 24 July 2020. That decision revoked the Appellant’s refugee status, refused his human rights claim and issued a deportation order. This appeal concerns only the Respondent’s decision to refuse the appellant’s human rights claim.
4. This appeal was heard in the Upper Tribunal under s12(2)(b)(ii) of the Tribunal, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007. The appeal was originally brought before the First-tier Tribunal under section 82(1) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (“NIAA 2002”).
Factual Background
5. The appellant arrived in the UK at the age of 9 in 1999. He was granted refugee status in line with his parents on the grounds that as a Kosovan citizen of Albanian ethnicity they would be at real risk from the Serbian authorities, who were then in control of Kosovo. The Respondent had refused their claims, but following an appeal he and his family were granted refugee status in August 2000. In October 2000 the appellant and his family were granted indefinite leave to remain.
6. The appellant attended primary school from age 9 in the UK. He also attended secondary school here. The appellant has worked in the UK from 2006 onwards in various roles.
7. The appellant has accrued eleven convictions for seventeen offences. The most serious conviction is the offence for which the Respondent pursues his deportation. On 21 December 2018 the appellant pleaded guilty to a conspiracy to supply class A drugs, cocaine, (between August and November 2018) for which, reflecting full credit for his plea of guilty, the appellant was sentenced to three years and eight months’ imprisonment. For that offence, the Respondent was obliged by the UK Borders Act 2007 to make a deportation order. Before she was able to do so, it was necessary for the Secretary of State to address the status as a refugee that the appellant then held. She decided that the circumstances in connection with which he and his family were recognised as refugees no longer continued to exist. Following an exchange of correspondence in 2019 and the involvement of the UNHCR, the Respondent decided that she was going to revoke the appellant’s refugee status under the Immigration Rules in a decision dated 24 July 2020. The Secretary of State also in that decision certified that the provision of section 72 NIAA 2002 applied to the appellant. She further refused his human rights claim made on the basis of his private life links to the United Kingdom and the difficulties that he claimed he would face upon being returned to Kosovo and took a decision to deport him to Kosovo.
8. The appellant appealed the decision of the Respondent to the FTT on 18 August 2020 under s82(1) NIAA 2002.
9. The appellant was released on immigration bail on 29 September 2020. He has been in the community since this point. He received a twelfth conviction on 3 September 2021 for harassment between 10 and 18 March 2021. He was given a community order, an unpaid work order and a restraining order.
10. First-Tier Tribunal (‘FTT’) Judge Seelhoff (“the judge”) heard the appellant’s appeal against the decision dated 24 July 2020 in the FTT. The judge dismissed the appeal on all grounds in a decision dated 18 October 2021. He found that the criterion for revocation of the appellant’s refugee status were satisfied and that he had not rebutted the presumption under section 72 of NIAA 2002. These findings have not been the subject of any challenge.
11. The judge also dismissed the appeal under Article 8 ECHR (with only s117C(4) and s117C(6) NIAA 2002 being raised by the appellant in the FTT proceedings). It was accepted by the respondent that the appellant has been lawfully resident in the UK for most of his life (s117C(4)(a) – see para. 72 FTT Decision). The judge further accepted that the appellant was socially and culturally integrated into the UK having been here since the age of 9, having lived here for most of his formative years, that he spoke English as though it were his first language, he had studied and worked here and all of his family resided in the UK (s117C(4)(b) – see para.72 FTT decision). However, the judge found that s117C(4)(c) NIAA 2002 was not met, and that s117C(6) NIAA 2002 was also not met, and dismissed the appeal.
12. The appellant sought permission to appeal the decision the judge on 1 November 2021. Three grounds of appeal were advanced (all related to findings made under s117C(4)(c) NIAA 2002). The appellant was granted permission to appeal by First-tier Tribunal Judge I D Boyes on 1 December 2021 on all grounds.
13. The matter came before the Upper Tribunal on 11 May 2023 at an error of law hearing before a panel (consisting of Upper Tribunal Judge Stephen Smith and Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Froom).
14. In an extempore decision delivered at the hearing (in respect of which the approved transcript was circulated on 28 June 2023, which we refer to as the ‘EOL Decision’), an error of law was found on one of the three grounds of appeal. This was that there had been a material misdirection in law by the judge in relation to the test of “very significant obstacles to integration” under s.117C(4)(c) of NIAA 2002. In determining whether the test of very significant obstacles to integration was made out, the judge had impermissibly taken into account the seriousness of the appellant’s offending and whether the appellant would reoffend (para. 85 of the FTT Decision; see also para. 25 of the EOL Decision) and these were not matters that were relevant to s117C(4)(c) NIAA 2002. A copy of the EOL decision is annexed to this decision.
15. The EOL decision set the decision of the judge aside. All findings of fact made by the judge were preserved, save for the particular finding made at para. 85 which had regard to the seriousness of the appellant’s offending and the appellant’s risk of reoffending when assessing the claim to “very significant obstacles” under s117C(4) NIAA 2002. Given the limited scope of the matters to be considered in remaking this appeal (namely s117C(4)(c) and s117C(6), given the impact the erroneous finding would have had on the proportionality assessment), the appeal was retained in the Upper Tribunal. Directions were made accordingly.
16. On 18 July 2023 the appellant served his skeleton argument. On 12 September 2023 the Respondent served her skeleton argument in this appeal. At that stage the only issue before this Court was whether there were very significant obstacles to the appellant’s integration on return to Kosovo. The skeleton arguments as such only addressed that issue. Since then there have been a number of developments which the Secretary of State granted her consent for the Upper Tribunal to consider. We set them out below.
17. The resumed hearing was first listed on 31 August 2023 but it was adjourned by the duty judge as the appellant had not been able to secure legal representation, having represented himself at the error of law hearing. The matter was listed again for hearing on 6 March 2024, but this hearing had to adjourned because the appellant’s British partner, AB, had been admitted to hospital following complications with her pregnancy. Regrettably, it took a considerable period of time for the matter to be re-listed in the Upper Tribunal, and the hearing in the appeal was listed to be heard before us on 7 January 2025. We reserved our decision, which we now give.
Developments post-dating the hearing before the First-tier Tribunal
18. The appellant is now in a relationship with AB. She is a British national. They have known each other for 15 years. They were friends until 2021 when they commenced a relationship. On 1 March 2024, the appellant and his partner had a child together, AS, date of birth 1 March 2024. Unfortunately, they have had two previous miscarriages. AB was monitored in pregnancy with AS owing to this history, and her pregnancy was treated as high risk. AB worked as a care assistant in a care home prior to having AS. The appellant and his partner are currently expecting their second child. Their due date is 24 June 2025.
19. The appellant served a consolidated bundle in December 2024. This included an updated statement from the appellant which discussed his relationship with AB, his child, AB’s current pregnancy and his recent promotion at work to team leader. It also included an updated statement from AB which set out AS’s relationship with the appellant, her current pregnancy, and their financial dependency on the appellant.
New Matter
20. The appellant’s representatives raised a new matter in writing prior to the hearing on 31 December 2024, namely the appellant’s relationship with his partner, AB, and his relationship with his child, AS, under s117C(5) of the NIAA 2002.
21. At the outset of the hearing on 7 January 2024, Ms McKenzie gave consent for the new matter to be considered by the Tribunal under s85(5) of the NIAA 2002.
22. We heard oral evidence from the appellant and his partner, AB. This was followed by submissions from Ms McKenzie and Ms Lynes, which we refer to below.
Issues to be Determined
23. The matters in this appeal which need to be determined are:
i. Whether Exception 1 under s117C(4) of the NIAA 2002 applies to the appellant, which concerns the appellant’s private life;
ii. Whether Exception 2 under s117C(5) of the NIAA 2002 applies to the appellant on the basis that he has a genuine and subsisting relationship with a qualifying partner or child and the effect of his deportation on his partner or child would be unduly harsh;
iii. Whether s117C(6) of the NIAA 2002 applies to the appellant, in that there are very compelling circumstances over and above those set out in s117C(4) and s117C(5).
24. We set out s117C NIAA 2002 here for ease of reference:
117C Article 8: additional considerations in cases involving foreign criminals
(1) The deportation of foreign criminals is in the public interest.
(2) The more serious the offence committed by a foreign criminal, the greater is the public interest in deportation of the criminal.
(3) In the case of a foreign criminal (“C”) who has not been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of four years or more, the public interest requires C's deportation unless Exception 1 or Exception 2 applies.
(4) Exception 1 applies where—
(a) C has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of C's life,
(b) C is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom, and
(c) there would be very significant obstacles to C's integration into the country to which C is proposed to be deported.
(5) Exception 2 applies where C has a genuine and subsisting relationship with a qualifying partner, or a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a qualifying child, and the effect of C's deportation on the partner or child would be unduly harsh.
(6) In the case of a foreign criminal who has been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least four years, the public interest requires deportation unless there are very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2.
(7) The considerations in subsections (1) to (6) are to be taken into account where a court or tribunal is considering a decision to deport a foreign criminal only to the extent that the reason for the decision was the offence or offences for which the criminal has been convicted

Conclusions
Section 117C(4) – Exception 1
25. In Secretary of State for the Home Department v Kamara [2016] EWCA Civ 813 (SSHD v Kamara), the Court of Appeal held that "integration" in this context is a broad concept:
‘[Integration] is not confined to the mere ability to find a job or to sustain life while living in the other country. It is not appropriate to treat the statutory language as subject to some gloss and it will usually be sufficient for a Court or Tribunal simply to direct itself in the terms that Parliament has chosen to use. The idea of 'integration' calls for a broad evaluative judgment to be made as to whether the individual will be enough of an insider in terms of understanding how life in the society in that other country is carried on and a capacity to participate in it, so as to have a reasonable opportunity to be accepted there, to be able to operate on a day to day basis in that society and to build up within a reasonable time a variety of human relationships to give substance to the individual's private or family life’ (§14).
26. This test was confirmed by the Supreme Court in Sanambar v SSHD [2021] UKSC 30 (‘Sanambar v SSHD’).
27. In Parveen v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] EWCA Civ 932 the Court of Appeal said at §9:
“that the words ‘very significant’ connote an ‘elevated’ threshold, and I have no difficulty with the observation that the test will not be met by ‘mere inconvenience or upheaval’. But I am not sure that saying that ‘mere’ hardship or difficulty or hurdles, even if multiplied, will not ‘generally’ suffice adds anything of substance. The task of the Secretary of State, or the Tribunal, in any given case is simply to assess the obstacles to integration relied on, whether characterised as hardship or difficulty or anything else, and to decide whether they regard them as ‘very significant’.”
28. Ms McKenzie relied on the skeleton argument for the respondent and the preserved findings of the judge in arguing that s117C(4)(c) was not met. She also drew comparisons between the facts of the appellant’s case and that of the appellant in the case of Sanambar v SSHD. She highlighted that the appellant had extended family in Kosovo and that he would have skills from the UK. She relied upon Joseph Grant v. The United Kingdom (Application no. 10606/07), 8 January 2009.
29. Ms Lynes relied on the appellant’s skeleton argument and the preserved findings of the judge in arguing that s117(C)(4) was met. She argued that his deportation without his partner and child would be an obstacle to him setting up a new life and integrating there as he would not be able to meet a new partner or have children there, and that we should be cautious in comparing the facts of the case to Sanambar v SSHD and that the appellant’s case was different as none of his family had ever visited Kosovo.
30. We agree with Ms Lynes that we should not draw factual comparisons between this case and Sanambar v SSHD or indeed any other case. This case must be decided on its own facts.
31. Most of the findings of the judge have been preserved in this appeal. We as such set out preserved findings here insofar as relevant to the issues:
“49. The evidence of all of the witnesses as to whether or not the Appellant spoke Albanian seemed to have in effect been agreed between them beforehand. It is fundamentally implausible that the Appellant has forgotten every word of Albanian given that it was the only language he spoke up until the age of nine and given that his parents still require an interpreter to communicate in English. Whilst I accept is Albanian is likely to be far less than fluent now I am satisfied that he must speak it to a degree.
50. Similarly I found the evidence of the Appellant and his brother and sister regarding the family in Kosovo to be implausible. I do not believe that their mother has never told them that she has a brother living in Kosovo who has five children. The fact that all three claimed to not know about family in Kosovo lacked plausibility and am satisfied again that the evidence was agreed to suggest that the connections were less strong than is in fact the truth.”
“63. I agree that the burden is on the Respondent to show that the conditions in article 1C (5) of the refugee Convention are met. The Appellant and his family were recognised as refugees on account of their Albanian ethnicity and because they were at risk from the Serbian authorities who controlled Kosovo at the time they left. At the time they fled Kosovo it was part of Yugoslavia, but it subsequently became part of Serbia and Kosovo declared its independence in 2008. The population is majority Albanian ethnicity and has an elected government which has now had control the territory for 13 years. It is hard to think of a more obvious example of a significant and non- temporary change in the circumstances in a country for the purposes of Article 1C (5). It appears obvious on first glance that there is no risk to an ethnic Albanians like the Appellant from the Serbian authorities who no longer exist in the country and who have not controlled the territory in 13 years.”
“75. As a starting point it is important to recognise that the Appellant has been away from Kosovo for almost the entirety of his formative years including the years from 9-18. The Appellant has not been back to Kosovo in over 20 years and indeed has been specifically barred from visiting that country due to endorsements on his travel document and the fact that his status in the UK would be revoked if he did. That in my assessment is a very important point to note because when contrasting these provisions with the Immigration Rules and paragraph 276 ADE (1) (iii) and (vi) once an individual has spent 20 years in the UK they are in effect deemed to demonstrate very significant obstacles to their return or to have such weighty private life that it does not matter. I do note that I am required to focus on the statutory test and that there is a distinction between the statutory requirements I am obliged to consider and the requirements of the Immigration Rules at paragraph 276ADE (1) (vi). However, there is an argument that there needs to be a degree of consistency especially when exactly the same words are used across the relevant provisions.”
76. I remind myself of the line of authorities following Maslov and the relevance of growing up in the UK albeit this is a factor and not necessarily determinative of the outcome of the appeal.
77. The Appellant is young, fit, healthy and capable of working but this does not mean he could work or support himself in Kosovo. Whilst I do not accept the Appellant’s claim that he does not speak Albanian I am satisfied that he is not likely to speak Albanian fluently. I have considered the expert report and whilst I have reservations about it and the expert’s approach, I do accept that there would be a significant cultural change for the Appellant on moving to Kosovo and that he would lack much of the street smarts and understanding of the ways to behave in that country given that he has not been there since he was nine years old. It also accepted that the Appellant does not read and write in Albanian which is likely to present an obstacle to his securing work, opening bank accounts, engaging with the authorities, paying taxes and for countless other basic activities.
78. I do not believe that moving to Kosovo would represent a complete cultural shock for the Appellant as he has been raised by Kosovan parents in a family which does largely speak Albanian but this would not be enough to overcome all the challenges above.
79. I do not believe that it is likely that the Appellant has no material family connections in Kosovo. I believe it is likely that he is more aware of his mother’s brother in that country and his cousins than he claims, however the presence of some extended family does not alleviate all challenges to integration in a country and it does not mean they would want to take significant responsibility for him. It is also important to note that none of the Appellant’s immediate family is likely in the UK to be able to facilitate integration in Kosovo because, due to their status, they cannot visit that country and equally he would not be able to visit them back in the UK and I consider that this would present a significant challenge in building a private life and integrating in Kosovo in the future.
80. Against this I bear in mind that the Appellant has shown considerable resourcefulness in pursuing financial gain in the past. The Appellant is clearly prepared to take risks to make money. The Appellant also has a background as a ventilation engineer and this is likely to give him a large number of transferable skills which would help him find work in the future.
81. Whilst I have reservations about the expert’s report he does list a large number of practical problems including noting that the Appellant would not be eligible for government loans and support.
82. Whilst I do not accept that the Appellant or his family’s problems continue to exist in Kosovo, I do have to acknowledge extensive references in the UNHCR correspondence and in the expert report to ongoing security concerns and instability in the country. I note that UNHCR for example noted that there are tensions in Serb areas in particular and that the state institutions remain weak and that there is “rampant corruption”. There is a large population of displaced people in the country and the UNHCR reports that “some of the returnees still face significant protection and socio-economic problems, leading in some cases to departure shortly after return. Security incidents targeting returnees continue to be reported mainly in the returning isolated areas and uninhabited houses.
83. The US State Department report also notes; “human rights issues include reform and; endemic government corruption; crimes involving violence or threats of violence against journalists; and attacks against members of ethnic minorities or other marginalised communities, including by security forces.
84. In short it appears that the Appellant is not facing return to a balanced and stable country but one that is still very much in the development phase following prolonged periods of conflict and unrest.”
32. In light of the above, we are of the view that the appellant would face hurdles in integrating into Kosovo. However, his familiarity with Kosovan culture, through growing up in a Kosovan family and having spent his first nine years there, his ability to speak the language, having some extended family in Kosovo, having some virtual support from family in the UK, having obtained significant skills and experience through his work and time in the UK, and the resilience and adaptability he has shown here will allow him within a reasonable time to be able to operate in Kosovo on a day-to-day basis. This is despite the length of time he has been absent from the country and despite the differences between the UK and Kosovo. We acknowledge things will be difficult for him, particularly at the outset, but that this is not the test.
33. We have considered Ms Lynes’ submission, that having a partner and child in the UK will prevent his integration into Kosovo as he would not be able to start a new family. It is our view that he would be able to establish new friendships over a reasonable period of time through work and extended family, and that this would give substance to his private life. It will be a source of loss to the appellant that he will be alone in Kosovo for the time being, but that does not merit a finding that he faces “very significant obstacles” to his integration.
34. Whilst we accept that the appellant would face hardship on return, having regard to the preserved findings and evidence that we have heard and read, we are not of the view that this meets the test of ‘very significant obstacles’ to integration applying the test in SSHD v Kamara.
Section 117C(5) – Exception 2
35. HA (Iraq) v SSHD (Rev 1) [2020] EWCA Civ 1176 held at §§44-52,
“The underlying question for tribunals is whether the harshness which the deportation will cause for the partner and/or child is of a sufficiently elevated degree to outweigh that public interest’.1 Underhill LJ said at §56, ‘There is no reason in principle why cases of "undue" harshness may not occur quite commonly. Secondly, if tribunals treat the essential question as being ‘is this level of harshness out of the ordinary?’ they may be tempted to find that Exception 2 does not apply simply on the basis that the situation fits into some commonly-encountered pattern. That would be dangerous. How a child will be affected by a parent's deportation will depend on an almost infinitely variable range of circumstances and it is not possible to identify a baseline of ‘ordinariness’. Simply by way of example, the degree of harshness of the impact may be affected by the child's age; by whether the parent lives with them (NB that a divorced or separated father may still have a genuine and subsisting relationship with a child who lives with the mother); by the degree of the child's emotional dependence on the parent; by the financial consequences of his deportation; by the availability of emotional and financial support from a remaining parent and other family members; by the practicability of maintaining a relationship with the deported parent; and of course by all the individual characteristics of the child.”
36. AB is a British citizen and as such a qualifying partner. The couple have been together since 2021. They are cohabiting. They have a child together, AB, and are expecting another child. It was accepted by Ms McKenzie that they have a genuine and subsisting relationship.
37. AS is a British citizen and as such is a qualifying child. Ms McKenzie accepted that the appellant has a genuine and subsisting relationship with his daughter.
38. Ms McKenzie submitted that deportation would not be unduly harsh if the appellant and his family left together for Kosovo or alternatively if just the appellant left. She submitted that the effect of deportation would not be unduly harsh as AB had not yet had her second child, Kosovo had changed, the appellant had some family in Kosovo, there was no expert evidence before us which addressed the impact of deportation upon AB and AS. Further, the impact on AS would be minimal as she was 10 months of age, in the UK she had family on both sides, she would be able to receive all rights and services that she was entitled to as a British national, she could remain in contact with the appellant by modern means of communication. Ms McKenzie reminded us that the best interests of the child was not a trump card.
39. Ms Lynes submitted that the effect of deportation would be unduly harsh on AB owing to her family ties, her lack of connection to Kosovo, having a young child, being pregnant with a unfortunate history of miscarriages, being under close observation in pregnancy, she would be left with two small children without financial support from the appellant. In respect of AS she argued that she had extended family in the UK and contact with them was important, she had rights and entitlements as a British national, psychical contact with her father was important owing to the child’s age, Kosovo was in a phase of development.
40. AB was a credible witness and we accept the evidence that we heard from her. There was no challenge by Ms McKenzie to the credibility of her evidence as such; the focus of Ms McKenzie’s cross-examination lay in exploring the practical impact of the appellant’s deportation on her, whether in the “go with” or “stay without” scenarios.
41. AB is British, has close family in the UK that she sees regularly, she has never been to Kosovo, and does not speak the language. Her most recent work experience is in care and she would not have the ability to communicate with patients there. Learning a language as an adult is of course possible, but it is much harder with significant caring responsibilities and whilst adjusting to a new and very different country.
42. In her statements AB has explained that during her pregnancy with AB she had scans every two weeks, she was put on progesterone, and she had to be induced. AB has an unfortunate history of miscarriages (in May 2022 and January 2023). As a British national, who has worked and paid national insurance, she is entitled to use of the NHS in her current pregnancy and the regular monitoring and additional support that she received during her pregnancy with AB We highlight that AB is only just 1 years old.
43. We are mindful that the judge found, and the expert and UNHCR evidence, shows that Kosovo is in a development phase, there are ongoing security concerns and instability in the country, as well as tensions in certain areas and socio-economic problems. The objective evidence before us shows that expatriate communities can be targets of crime and, significantly, that the quality of medical services in Kosovo is highly variable and does not always meet international standards, budget shortfalls can compromise medication stocks (US OSAC Crime and Safety Report Kosovo 2020).
44. Navigating a new country and its health system, whilst pregnant, would be tough. Once one adds to this AB’s complex and unfortunate medical history in pregnancy, having a very young child, her lack of familiarity with the culture, and the real instability and problems in the country this becomes extremely stressful and a highly bleak scenario.
45. Against that background, we remind ourselves that AS’s best interests are a primary consideration. We have regard to AS’s nationality, the impact on her mother and her other family ties to the UK. We accept that her nationality is not a trump card. However, her best interests are a primary consideration.
46. Firstly, AS has both sets of grandparents and extended family in the UK. We were told in oral evidence that AS lives 20 minutes away from her maternal grandmother and she does see her with AB often, and AS also sees a great aunt. The appellant’s parents see AS on the weekends and sometimes during the week. The appellant has explained, and we accept, that his mother is unwell. It has been found by the FTT that the paternal grandparents cannot go to Kosovo owing to their status as refugees in the United Kingdom; the Secretary of State has not sought to challenge that finding, or otherwise contend that their status should cease. Having regard to these factors, it is clear that AS will lose her current relationships and contact with extended family (in particular her paternal extended family/grandparents) if she had to leave the country.
47. Secondly, AS has rights and entitlements as a British national which includes for example, growing up in her country of nationality, access to health care, educational and social opportunities here, isolation and/or separation from extended family that she sees often; see ZH (Tanzania) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKSC 4 at §32.
48. Thirdly, we have already set out what the evidence reflects in respect of the country conditions in Kosovo (see §41 of this decision). In our view, it is not in her best interests to live in a country with evidenced security and socio-economic concerns, where there is rampant corruption and instability. We consider it is plainly in AS’s best interests to remain in the UK, with the appellant.
49. Fourthly, as we have concluded that the impact of leaving for Kosovo for AB would be unduly harsh, for the reasons we have set our above, we believe the stresses AB would face would inevitably impact upon AS.
50. Having regard to all of these factors and the evidence before us, we conclude it would be unduly harsh to expect AB and AS to relocate to Kosovo. The appellant’s presence with AB and AS would not overcome the issues they would face. He himself would face hardship and whilst we consider he could navigate this as a single man, the reality of the situation would be very different with a young family and the additional and very real complexities that this adds. Further, this would not address the significant impact of the loss of relationships and rights and entitlements for AB and AS.
51. For AB, we consider that it would be unduly harsh for her to relocate to Kosovo, a country which is developing and with which she has no familiarity, while in the late stages of a pregnancy, in circumstances in which her earlier pregnancy with AS was characterised by complications. For AS, we consider that the significant impact upon her mother, the loss of relationships, the loss of rights and entitlements and the country situation in Kosovo would be unduly harsh.
52. In the alternative, we have considered the impact of deportation should the appellant leave with AB and AS remaining in the UK without him.
53. We accept that the appellant is involved and present partner and father whom AB and AS rely upon significantly to meet their physical, financial and emotional needs.
54. AB and the appellant have been in a relationship since 2021. Their long term genuine and subsisting relationship would be severed by the appellant’s deportation.
55. If AB remained here, she will be left with a high risk pregnancy, and a very young child to manage alone. Whilst we note she sees her mother, an aunt and the appellant’s parents often, they do not offer her any practical support. It is clear from AB’s witness statement dated 31 July 2023 that emotionally she is dependent on the appellant. AB would inevitably be left in a single parent household. We consider that the stress that the situation would create for AB, which would inevitably impact upon AS, would expose her to the bleak harshness which characterises what amounts to “unduly harsh”.
56. AB and AS are reliant on the appellant’s income to manage the household. AB cannot work currently as AS is just aged 1 and she is on a waiting list for nursery. Of course as AB is currently pregnant and expecting her second child she is unlikely to be able to work for some time. AB’s father is not is a position to help her as he lives in Leeds and has a family there, which includes two children from a new relationship. AB says her mother could not afford to assist her financially and we accept that evidence. It is clear from the evidence that AB and AS would be impacted financially by the appellant’s removal. AB explained in oral evidence that she has at present put AS’s child benefits into a Junior ISA account, but these can only be accessed by AS when she is 18 years old. AB states that she and AS would not be able to go and visit the appellant in Kosovo owing to the cost of this. She highlighted that the costs of passports alone would be difficult for her to meet.
57. The reality is that by the appellant’s deportation AB would be left without her long term partner, as a heavily pregnant single mother of a very young child with little money (most likely on benefits), with little practical or emotional support, with precarious housing owing to the financial situation she would be left with, unable to work owing to childcare issues and in a high risk pregnancy with a history of two miscarriages, and an emergency hospital admission for her pregnancy with AS. AB would be highly vulnerable.
58. AB’s vulnerability in the absence of the appellant throws the impact for AS of remaining in the United Kingdom without him into sharp relief.
59. Turning to AS, she would be left without her father with whom, despite her young age, we accept she has built a close bond. AS would be left in a single parent household, with her only present parent facing significant stresses in all aspects of her life. The impact upon AS financially, practically, emotionally, and in terms of her health would inevitably impact upon AB significantly on a day to day basis and cause her real detriment. This would plainly not be AS’s best interests. It is in her best interests for her father to remain in the UK with her and her mother.
60. We note that the “Every Children Matters – Change for Children Statutory Guidance to the UK Border Agency on Making Arrangements to Safeguard and Promote the Welfare of Children” states that safeguarding and promoting the welfare of children includes preventing impairment of children’s health and development and ensuring that children are growing up in circumstances consistent with the provision of safe and effective care (see 1.4 of the Statutory Guidance). While that guidance is for the Secretary of State’s officials and does not apply to the Upper Tribunal, we accept that in this respect it accurately summarises the relevant principles applicable to determining the best interests of children in the immigration context.
61. We have considered Ms McKenzie’s submission that the relationships can be maintained by modern means of communication. As was held in Mansoor v SSHD [2011] EWHC 832 (Admin) at para. 16,
“If members of a family enjoy family life in an inter-dependent household of partners and minor and dependent children it is no comfort to say that they can continue to enjoy that family life by telephoning each other, emailing, video conferencing or any of the other forms of electronic technology that may be in existence.”
62. We accept the submission of Ms Lynes that a very young child is unlikely to be able to hold attention via modern methods of communication and that physical contact is very important for her. We also are of the view that this would not overcome the difficulties we refer to above.
63. For AS, we consider that the loss of her father and significant impact upon her mother and as such her household would be unduly harsh and cause her serious detriment.
64. Having regard to all of these factors cumulatively and the evidence before us, we conclude that the impact of the appellant’s deportation would be unduly harsh for AS were she and AB to remain in the UK in the absence of the appellant. We also find that it would be unduly harsh for AB to remain here in the absence of the appellant, in those circumstances. The appellant meets the requirements of Exception 2, and therefore has met the criteria which Parliament has decided outweigh the public interest in the deportation of foreign criminals who have been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of less than four years.
Section 117C(6): very compelling circumstances over and above
65. Although we have found that the appellant meets the requirements of Exception 2, we consider that it is necessary to consider whether there are, in any event, very compelling circumstances over and above the statutory exceptions to deportation.
66. In HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22 the following was said in respect of the test under s117C(6):
“51. When considering whether there are very compelling circumstances over and above Exceptions 1 and 2, all the relevant circumstances of the case will be considered and weighed against the very strong public interest in deportation. As explained by Lord Reed in Hesham Ali at paras 24 to 35, relevant factors will include those identified by the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) as being relevant to the article 8 proportionality assessment. In Unuane v United Kingdom (2021) 72 EHRR 24 the ECtHR, having referred to its earlier decisions in Boultif v Switzerland (2001) 33 EHRR 50 and Üner v The Netherlands (2006) 45 EHRR 14, summarised the relevant factors at paras 72-73 as comprising the following:
‘•        the nature and seriousness of the offence committed by the applicant;
•        the length of the applicant’s stay in the country from which he or she is to be expelled;
•        the time elapsed since the offence was committed and the applicant’s conduct during that period;
•        the nationalities of the various persons concerned;
•        the applicant’s family situation, such as the length of the marriage, and other factors expressing the effectiveness of a couple’s family life;
•        whether the spouse knew about the offence at the time when he or she entered into a family relationship;
•        whether there are children of the marriage, and if so, their age; and
•        the seriousness of the difficulties which the spouse is likely to encounter in the country to which the applicant is to be expelled …
•        the best interests and well-being of the children, in particular the seriousness of the difficulties which any children of the applicant are likely to encounter in the country to which the applicant is to be expelled; and
•        the solidity of social, cultural and family ties with the host country and with the country of destination.’”
67. In Maslov v Austria 1638/03 [2008] ECHR 546 the European Court reaffirmed the criteria, already established in its judgment in Üner, which are to be applied when assessing whether the expulsion of a foreign national on account of criminal offences is consistent with article 8. These include the need to have regard to "the special situation of aliens who have spent most, if not all, of their childhood in the host country, were brought up there and received their education there" (see §74 of the Maslov judgment). In Maslov the court further stated at §75, ‘In short, the court considers that for a settled migrant who has lawfully spent all or the major part of his or her childhood and youth in the host country, very serious reasons are required to justify expulsion.’
68. In Hesham Ali (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] UKSC 60 the Supreme Court said the following on public interest considerations:
“164.         The strength of the public interest in favour of deportation must depend on such matters as the nature and seriousness of the crime, the risk of re-offending, and the success of rehabilitation, etc. These factors are relevant to an assessment of the extent to which deportation of a particular individual will further the legitimate aim of preventing crime and disorder, and thus, as pointed out by Lord Reed at para 26, inform the strength of the public interest in deportation.
169.       Much has been said of the public interest in the deportation of foreign national criminals. But the public interest is multi-faceted, and there are other important factors which contribute to the positive development of our society and are thus matters in the general public interest. These factors may be a relevant consideration in the article 8 proportionality assessment, and have a free-standing value, independent of that which attaches to the individual facing deportation. For example, there is a public interest in families being kept together, in the welfare of children being given primacy, in valuing a person who makes a special contribution to their community, and in encouraging and respecting the rehabilitation of offenders. These factors all play a role in the construction of a strong and cohesive society. They are recognised outwith the immigration context, and certain factors are given statutory recognition. Where relevant they should be part of the proportionality equation.”
69. Considering the above, we find that there are very compelling circumstances in this case under s117C(6).
70. In looking at this test we start by looking at the factors against the appellant:
a. The deportation of foreign criminals is in the public interest. The more serious the offence committed, the greater the public interest.
b. The appellant received 10 convictions between 2006 and 2012; none of these offences resulted in a period of imprisonment but he received several fines and compensation orders, a community order for example.
c. The appellant was convicted in 2018 for a serious drug offence and sentenced to 3 years and 8 months. This offence led to a deportation action. The sentencing remarks, to which we have had full regard, show significant involvement and motivation for financial and other reasons.
d. The appellant was convicted of a further offence in 2021 for harassment which took place over a six day period in March 2021. He was sentenced to a community order, unpaid work and a fine.
e. He does not meet the test of very significant obstacles to his integration in Kosovo, albeit only by a fine margin.
71. We now turn to the factors for the appellant:
a. It has been found as a fact by the FTT that he is socially and culturally integrated into the UK having lived here since the age of 9 to the age of 34. This is for some 25 years. He has been educated here, he has all of his immediate family here which includes his parents, his siblings, his British partner and his minor British child. He has been employed here and is currently employed and in stable work. He has lived here with leave for over 20 years; so for more than half of his life.
b. The appellant has been in his current relationship since 2021. He is accepted to be in a genuine and subsisting relationship with both his partner and child. He is clearly the breadwinner in the family and his partner and child are dependent upon him financially and emotionally. His partner spoke highly of him and of his role as a father to their daughter. He is a responsible parent and supportive partner who takes his duties seriously. For the reasons we have set out above, we find that he has a very strong and committed relationships and that the impact of deportation upon his partner and child would be unduly harsh and not in the best interests of the minor child. The test in s117C(5) NIAA 2002 is met. For completeness, it is our view that the impact upon the appellant, of being separated from his pregnant long-term partner and child, would also be harsh. We take into account also the public interest which is served by stable family units whose membership includes a father and a mother.
c. We note that his offence from 2018 resulted in a sentence of less than four years. The appellant has been in the community and has committed no offences since 2021. This is for a period of almost four years. He has stable work and has been working to provide for his family and recently been promoted at work too. We find that he has worked hard to rehabilitate since 2021. We note his evidence and the evidence from his parents and siblings explained at length his previous drug use and addiction. The presence of his partner and child and the responsibilities that come with this, has clearly had a positive impact upon him, his lifestyle, associates and his conduct. It has not been suggested that he is still using, indeed the evidence shows he has been ‘clean’ for several years. Whilst the judge was of the view that his most recent offence showed a worrying attitude to women, we do not consider this is the case given his current relationships and the evidence we heard from both him and his partner. We consider that there is a low risk of reoffending on the current evidence.
d. The appellant’s mother, father, siblings, nieces and nephews are all in the UK with leave as refugees, in respect of the risk of being persecuted in Kosovo. They cannot travel to Kosovo owing to their status and have never done so. The appellant’s family have provided statements and some gave oral evidence at his FTT hearing. Reading their statements and hearing the oral evidence, he is evidently close to them (seeing his parents at least once a week). There would be an impact on him and his family members by his removal.
e. The appellant has not been to Kosovo since he was 9, and that was some 24 years ago. We have found that he will face difficulties on return owing to his length of absence, his inability to read and write in Albanian, the cultural differences, the country situation (as explained by UNHCR, the expert evidence and objective evidence) and the lack of immediate reliable support (extended family who have not seen him for some time will most likely provide limited support). We acknowledge the obstacles he will face securing work, opening a bank account, paying taxes and in basic activities and the cultural shock he would face. Whilst he does not meet the test of very significant obstacles, the hurdles and hardship he will face are a very relevant factor.
f. Having regard to the factors set out in s117B NIAA 2002 the appellant has shown an ability to maintain and accommodate himself and his family without recourse to public funds, he has established his private life here whilst he was in the UK lawfully having gained ILR in 2000, he has established his family life with his partner and child whilst awaiting this appeal, and he speaks English fluently (having given evidence before us in English).
72. Having carefully considered the competing interests, as set out above, we find the appellant has made out his case to the required standard that his deportation from the United Kingdom would be disproportionate. The facts and circumstances in this case, considered as a whole, have the quality of “very compelling” for the purposes of section 117C(6). That is to say, considering the family and private life rights of all individuals concerned, and balancing the factors against and for the appellant, those in favour of the appellant outweigh those on the Secretary of State’s side of the scales. While we take into account the seriousness of the appellant’s criminal history, including the primary offences for which the Secretary of State pursues his deportation, we consider that balancing act that we must perform demonstrates that that public interest is, in the circumstances of this case, outweighed. Parliament has provided for the ability for an individual in circumstances such as those of this appellant and his family to demonstrate that those circumstances are “very compelling”. We have taken the European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence into account, as we must, pursuant to the Human Rights Act 1998. Having done so, applying the law as it stands today, we conclude that there are very compelling circumstances over and above the exceptions to deportation, for the purposes of section 117C(6).
Conclusion
73. This appeal is therefore allowed on human rights grounds, pursuant to sections 117C(5) and 117C(6).

Notice of Decision
The decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Seelhoff involved the making of an error of law and is set aside.
We remake the decision, allowing the appeal on human rights grounds.

P. Solanki

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

4 March 2025

Annex – EOL Decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2021-001942
Extempore decision
First-tier Tribunal Nos: HU/50259/2020
IA/00539/2020

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

…………………………………

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE STEPHEN SMITH
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE FROOM

Between

Andi Shoshari
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

The Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms E. Gunn, Counsel, instructed by Turpin Miller
For the Respondent: Mr A. Basra, Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 11 May 2023

DECISION AND REASONS
1. By a decision dated 18 October 2021 First-tier Tribunal Judge Seelhoff (“the judge”) dismissed an appeal brought by the appellant, a citizen of Kosovo born on 10 April 1990, against a decision of the Secretary of State dated 24 July 2020 that did three things. First, it revoked his refugee status. Secondly, it refused a human rights claim that he had made in an attempt to resist deportation and thirdly it made a decision to deport him. The appellant now appeals to this Tribunal against the decision of the judge.
2. The judge heard the appeal under section 82(1) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (“the 2002 Act”).
Factual background
3. The issues on appeal to this Tribunal are relatively narrow in scope. What follows will only be a summary of the essential facts. The appellant arrived in the United Kingdom in 1999, then aged 9. He was granted refugee status in line with that of his parents on the basis that, as citizens of Kosovo of Albanian ethnicity, they would be at risk from the Serbian authorities who then controlled Kosovo. Refugee status was granted to the appellant and his family in October 2000 following a successful appeal against earlier refusal decisions by the Secretary of State.
4. Since then, the appellant has accrued eleven convictions for seventeen offences. The most serious conviction is the offence for which the Secretary of State pursues his deportation. On 21 December 2018 the appellant pleaded guilty to a conspiracy to supply class A drugs, cocaine, for which, reflecting full credit for his plea of guilty, the appellant was sentenced to three years and eight months’ imprisonment. For that offence, the Secretary of State was obliged by the UK Borders Act 2007 to make a deportation order. Before she was able to do so, it was necessary for the Secretary of State to address the status as a refugee that the appellant then held. She decided that the circumstances in connection with which he and his family were recognised as refugees no longer continued to exist. Following an exchange of correspondence and the involvement of the UNHCR, the Secretary of State decided that she was going to revoke the appellant’s refugee status under the Immigration Rules. The Secretary of State also certified that the provision of section 72 of the 2002 Act applied to the appellant. She refused his human rights claim made on the basis of his private life links to the United Kingdom and the difficulties that he claimed he would face upon being returned to Kosovo and took a decision to deport him to Kosovo.
5. The appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal. The appeal was heard by the judge. In his decision, the judge found that the criteria for the revocation of the appellant’s refugee status were satisfied and that he had not rebutted the presumption under section 72 of the 2002 Act. There has been no challenge to those findings of the judge, and we say no more about them.
6. The operative reasoning of the judge which led him to dismiss the appeal related to his analysis and application of so-called Exception 1 to deportation, found in section 117C(4) of the 2002 Act. That exception applies where an appellant or an individual has, first, been lawfully resident for most of his life, secondly, is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom and, thirdly, would face very significant obstacles to his integration in the proposed country of return. It was common ground before the First-tier Tribunal that the first two criteria were met. The focus of the proceedings before the judge therefore was upon whether the appellant would face very significant obstacles to his integration in Kosovo.
7. In relation to the very significant obstacles issue, the judge heard evidence from the appellant and his family members, and also had an expert’s report detailing the appellant’s likely reception in Kosovo upon his return.
8. The judge found that the length of time for which the appellant had been absent from Kosovo would mean that he would be returning to a very different cultural and social context to that which he left as a young child. Since his family in the United Kingdom are present with refugee status in respect of Kosovo, it would not be possible for them to visit him there, and nor would it be possible for him to return to this country to make periodic return visits, in light of the deportation order that would be applicable. The judge found that there would therefore be significant challenges to the appellant upon his return in Kosovo and, although he had a degree of experience with the culture of Kosovo and spoke Albanian to an extent at home with his parents, those features of his circumstances would not be sufficient fully to overcome the challenges that he would face. The judge also found that it was not likely that the appellant had no material family connections in Kosovo, as he had claimed, and that he would be more aware of his mother’s brother in the country, and his cousins who are still there, than he claimed before the judge.
9. Against that, the judge noted that the presence of some extended family in Kosovo would not alleviate all the challenges to integration in the country the appellant would face, and nor would it mean that those family members would take significant responsibility for him. At paragraph 79 the judge said that the combined impact of those factors would “present a significant challenge in building a private life and integrating in Kosovo in the future”. The judge then said, at paragraph 80:
“Against this I bear in mind that the Appellant has shown considerable resourcefulness in pursuing financial gain in the past. The Appellant is clearly prepared to take risks to make money. The Appellant also has a background as a ventilation engineer and this is likely to give him a large number of transferable skills which would help him find work in the future.”
10. The judge referred then to the expert’s report. He accepted some of its conclusions, in particular that the appellant would not be eligible for a number of government loans that would otherwise be available to citizens of the country, and nor would he be eligible for certain government support that would otherwise be available.
11. The judge went on to note the general background evidence concerning the in-country conditions in Kosovo and observed at paragraph 82 that there remained a large population of displaced people in the country, and that the UNHCR had reported that “some of the returnees still face significant protection and socio-economic problems, leading in some cases to departure shortly after return. Security incidents targeting returnees continue to be reported mainly in the returning isolated areas and uninhabited houses.” The judge quoted from US State Department materials concerning the prevalence of human rights issues that continued to exist in the country and concluded, at paragraph 84, that “in short it appears that the appellant is not facing return to a balanced and stable country but one that is still very much in the development phase following prolonged periods of conflict and unrest.” The judge turned therefore to his global conclusions concerning the very significant obstacles issue in the following terms at [85]:
“I have reminded myself of the seriousness of the Appellant’s offending and of the fact that I do not have complete confidence that he will not stand [sic] in the future. Assessing all the factors in the round I am satisfied that whilst there are significant challenges to integration on return to Kosovo those d [sic] not meet the threshold of being ‘very significant obstacles’ provided for in statute.”
12. The judge proceeded to analyse whether there would nevertheless be very compelling circumstances over and above the exceptions for the purposes of section 117C(6) in line with NA (Pakistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] EWCA Civ 662. He concluded that there would not be. The judge dismissed the appeal.

Issues on appeal to the Upper Tribunal
13. There are three grounds of appeal. The first has two limbs. The first limb of ground 1 is that the judge’s reasoning was confused and inadequate. On the one hand, the judge had found in express terms that the appellant would face “significant challenges”. On the other he found that he would nevertheless not face “very significant obstacles”. Ms Gunn submits that the confusion inherent to the judge’s reasoning reveals a lack of clarify and an insufficient degree of reasons to merit the conclusion that he ultimately reached. The second limb of ground 1 is that on the judge’s findings of fact, it was not rationally open to the judge to conclude that the appellant would not face very significant obstacles in any event. In this respect Ms Gunn referred to the judge’s findings, for example at paragraphs 78 and 79 that there were challenges that could not be overcome, and that the family support available to the appellant in Kosovo would be limited. Ms Gunn essentially pursued a rationality challenge in respect of her second limb to ground 1.
14. Ground 2 is that the judge took into account an immaterial consideration in applying the very significant obstacles test for the purposes of section 117C(4) of the 2002 Act. That is because at paragraph 85, when the judge arrived at the global conclusion in relation to very significant obstacles, he impermissibly took into account the seriousness of the appellant’s offending, and the fact that he would not have complete confidence that he would not “stand” in the future. Those factors were irrelevant, Ms Gunn submitted, and thereby infected the judge’s overall analysis.
15. Ground 3 relates to the judge’s analysis of the expert report that was before the First-tier Tribunal. The expert had concluded at paragraphs 32 and 33 of his report that the circumstances relating to the socioeconomic conditions in Kosovo were such that the appellant would be likely to descend into a life of crime and would face potential exploitation from criminal networks on account of the vulnerability that he would experience through a lack of work. The judge did not refer to those extracts of the expert’s report anywhere in his decision, submitted Ms Gunn, such that it cannot be said that the judge properly took those factors into account.
16. On behalf of the Secretary of State, Mr Basra submitted that the judge properly directed himself in relation to the concept of “very significant obstacles to integration” by reference to the leading authority, namely Kamara v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] EWCA Civ 813. He was entitled to conclude that this appellant would not face very significant obstacles to his integration in Kosovo. The language used by the judge (“significant challenges”) was distinct from that which features in the statutory test (“very significant obstacles”) and, as such, the judge should not be assumed to have confused the statutory test which he should have applied. In relation to the expert’s report, Mr Basra submitted that the judge took it into account to the extent necessary and drew attention to the fact that, in his decision, the judge had referred to the expert as having strayed beyond his expertise and adopted a spirit of advocacy in places. See paragraph 68 where the judge said, “I am also persuaded by the Home Office submission that the report is not written as a truly independent report but engages in actively advocating for the Appellant.”
The law
17. The jurisdiction of the Upper Tribunal on an appeal from the First-tier Tribunal lies only in relation to an error of law, not a disagreement of fact. Certain findings of fact are capable of being infected by an error of law, as notably summarised in R (Iran) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 982 at paragraph 9. The criteria there summarised by the Court of Appeal include the following:
“i. Making perverse or irrational findings on a matter or matters that were material to the outcome.
ii. Failing to give reasons or any adequate reasons for findings on material matters.”
And:
“iv. Giving weight to immaterial matters.
v. Making a material misdirection of law on any material matter.”
18. It is important, as has been repeatedly emphasised in many authorities, not to construe disagreements of fact as errors of law. See paragraph 13 of the decision of the Presidential Panel in Joseph (permission to appeal requirements) [2022] UKUT 218 IAC.
The judge applied the correct statutory test
19. Against that background we now turn to the grounds of appeal. In our judgment, while the judge perhaps could have adopted clearer language, his use of the term “significant challenges” was distinct from the statutory concept of “very significant obstacles”, found in the statutory test contained in section 117C(4)(c) of the 2002 Act. The judge had correctly directed himself by reference to Kamara and had engaged in a realistic and frank analysis of the appellant’s prospective circumstances in Kosovo.
20. Ms Gunn submitted that, although the judge had found that the appellant had shown considerable resourcefulness in pursuing financial gain in the past and was clearly prepared to take risks to make money, he had not properly set those findings against his earlier analysis concerning the difficulties and significant challenges the appellant would face. In our judgment, this submission is without merit. On a purely textual basis, we note that paragraph 80 of the decision expressly commences with the words “against this I bear in mind that the appellant has shown considerable resourcefulness in pursuing financial gain …” The judge undertook the very analysis that Ms Gunn submitted he failed to perform by expressly considering all relevant factors, in the round, alongside each other. The terminology adopted by the judge reflected a realistic assessment of the appellant’s prospective circumstances, and a distinct and clear finding that he did not meet the statutory test for very significant obstacles.
21. Although the judge found at [78] that the appellant’s Kosovan cultural heritage would not be enough to overcome all the challenges that he set out above, that is a finding which must be viewed alongside his correct direction from Kamara. The emphasis in Kamara is not of instant cultural settlement but concerns whether the individual concerned will have a reasonable opportunity to be accepted there and to build up within a reasonable time the variety of human relationships to give substance to the individual’s private or family life. In our judgment, the judge’s references to the appellant’s cultural heritage and other supportive factors not being sufficient to overcome the challenges he would face, must be read in light of his correct self-direction concerning that aspect of the test and his reliance on Kamara. Nothing in the judge’s decision amounted to a finding that the appellant’s long term prospects of integration were anything other than to be able to integrate within a reasonable period of time.
Judge’s findings of fact were rational
22. We turn therefore to the second limb of ground 1, namely that the judge’s finding or conclusion that the appellant would not face very significant obstacles was irrational in light of the findings which we have already outlined, which were in favour of the appellant. Again, there is no merit to this analysis.
23. The judge was entitled to conclude, in light of the analysis at paragraph 80 to which we have already referred, that the appellant had shown considerable resourcefulness in the past and was prepared to take risks to make money. Those were conclusions that the judge was entitled to reach. The analysis conducted by the judge was a paradigm example in this respect of a First-tier Tribunal Judge assessing all the evidence before him and reaching measured conclusions on the evidence. While the appellant may well disagree with the reasons given by the judge, it does not follow that the reasoning in the judge’s decision in this respect was irrational. It was a balanced assessment which took account of all reasonable and relevant factors.
The judge’s assessment of the expert’s report was legally sound
24. We turn at this juncture to ground 3. The allegation in this respect is that the judge failed fully to take into account the following extracts from the report (at paragraphs 32 and 33), in which the expert said as follows:
“Mr Andi Shoshari without support may fall prey to the criminal gangs.”
And:
“As soon as he speaks even in Albanian, he will be noticed that he is not a native Albanian speaker, and the suspicion would be that either he is a foreign or a Serb which will make him more vulnerable.”
It is right that the judge did not expressly refer to those conclusions reached by the expert. However, we recall that, at paragraph 68, the judge had said:
“… much of what the expert talks about are economic problems and challenges of integration but not about the key issue which I am required to consider in the context of the revocation of refugee status.”
The extracts from the expert’s report which we quoted earlier are to be found at the conclusion of the paragraphs discussing the prevalence of unemployment in Kosovo and the impact of the COVID pandemic. As Ms Gunn very fairly accepted during submissions, the conclusions which we have quoted from those two paragraphs were not referenced or anchored in any other background materials by the author of the report. The expert’s conclusions appear to be extrapolations from his summary of unemployment in Kosovo and broad difficulties that the appellant is likely to face on account of his lack of recent cultural experience in the country. The expert appears to have concluded that general socio-economic challenges would render this appellant vulnerable to criminal exploitation. Reading the report, it is difficult to see the expert could have reached those conclusions on the basis of such evidence. In our judgment, it was open to the judge not expressly to refer to those conclusions; they appeared to feature minimal reasoning and drew stark conclusions from sources and evidence not addressing those conclusions. The judge had, as we have noted, already referred to some elements of the expert’s report which, in his view, lacked weight. He must have had these extracts of the report in mind when raising those concerns. Bearing in mind the fact that there is no obligation on a judge expressly to refer to all items of evidence or repeat back to the parties all the documents they have relied upon, there is no error in this part of the judge’s decision. We therefore dismiss the appeal insofar as ground 3 is concerned.
“Very significant obstacles” not relative to the seriousness of offending
25. We turn finally to ground 2. We find this ground is made out. The concept of very significant obstacles does not feature any comparative analysis of the extent to which an individual had offended. It may be, of course, that what the judge meant was that the appellant’s offending history meant that he would have a degree of resourcefulness that would place him in good stead upon his relocation to Kosovo. However, we think that would be an overly benevolent reading of the judge’s reasons, and we prefer to take them at their face value. The judge did not, for example, remind himself of the conduct of the appellant in committing the offences for which his deportation was pursued, but rather “the seriousness” of the appellant’s offending. We assume that the judge’s reference to the appellant not being able to “stand” in the future is a typographical error and that what the judge in fact meant was that the appellant would not reoffend in the future. That being so, the seriousness of an offence and an individual’s propensity to reoffend are factors that are not relevant to an assessment of very significant obstacles.
26. It follows, therefore, that the judge took into account an immaterial consideration and thereby engaged in a material misdirection of law in relation to the concept of very significant obstacles. This appeal therefore succeeds to that limited extent.
27. There are a number of findings of fact which have not been successfully challenged by the appellant in these proceedings. Indeed, the only successful challenge to the judge’s decision was to his application of the very significant obstacles test by reference to the findings of fact that we have found he was entitled to reach. For that reason, we set aside the judge’s decision, while preserving all findings of fact that he reached, save for the judge’s conclusion that the “very significant obstacles” test is informed by the relative seriousness of an individual’s offending.
28. In light of the limited scope of the findings of fact that remain to be made in any remaking of the decision, in our judgment it is appropriate for these proceedings to be retained in the Upper Tribunal.

NOTICE OF DECISION
The decision of Judge Seelhoff involved the making of an error of law and is set aside, subject to the findings of fact referred to at paragraph 27 being preserved.
The decision will be remade in the Upper Tribunal with a time estimate of three hours. No interpreter is required.
1. Within 21 days of being sent this decision, the appellant:
a. May file and serve an application to rely on additional evidence to be considered at the resumed hearing, together with the additional evidence;
b. Must file and serve a skeleton argument; and
c. Inform the tribunal if, in fact, an interpreter will be required and, if so, in which language.
2. Within 35 days of being sent this decision, the Secretary of State must file and serve a skeleton argument (responding, if appropriate, to the further evidence provided by the claimant pursuant to paragraph (1)).

Stephen H Smith

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

11 May 2023