Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2022-000385

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/51391/2020
IA/00718/2021

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 16th February 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KEBEDE

Between

BTT
(Anonymity Order made)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr C Holmes, instructed by Shawstone Associates
For the Respondent: Ms J Isherwood, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 2 February 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

1. This is the re-making of the decision in the appellant’s appeal, following the setting aside of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal which had dismissed the appeal on asylum, humanitarian protection and human rights grounds.

2. Following an Order of the Upper Tribunal issued on 3 July 2025 setting aside, upon a Rule 46 Review, a previous decision of the Upper Tribunal dismissing the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s decision to refuse his asylum and human rights claim, which in turn followed the setting aside of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal, this case has been re-listed in the Upper Tribunal for the decision in the appellant’s appeal to be re-made.

Background

3. The background to this case is as follows. The appellant claims to be a national of Eritrea, born on 1 January 1994, but is considered by the respondent to be an Ethiopian national. He claims to have been born in Eritrea and to have moved with his family to Ethiopia in 1995 but to have then been deported back to Eritrea in 2000. He claims that he left Eritrea in 2002 after the arrest of his parents in September 2002 and travelled to Sudan, where he spent three years, before returning to Ethiopia in 2005, and that he remained in Ethiopia until 2013. He then travelled to Sudan, Libya, Italy and France and travelled to the UK in a lorry, arriving on 6 February 2014. He claimed asylum on 6 February 2014, but his claim was refused on 4 April 2014. His appeal against that decision was dismissed in the First-tier Tribunal on 3 June 2014 and that decision was upheld in the Upper Tribunal on 11 November 2014. The appellant became appeal rights exhausted on 25 November 2014.

4. On 8 December 2018 the appellant made an application for ILR/ Settlement Protection, but his application was rejected on 23 May 2019. He then lodged further submissions on 17 February 2020 which were treated as a fresh claim. In a decision of 26 August 2020 the appellant’s asylum, humanitarian protection and Articles 2 and 3 claims were refused, but the respondent decided to granted him limited leave to remain outside the immigration rules on the basis of his family/ private life. The appellant’s appeal against the decision to refuse his asylum claim was heard in the First-tier Tribunal on 17 November 2021 and was dismissed in a decision dated 19 November 2021.

5. Permission was granted to appeal to the Upper Tribunal on 21 March 2022 and, in a decision promulgated on 15 July 2022, Upper Tribunal Judge Rintoul found an error of law in the First-tier Tribunal’s decision and set it aside. The appeal then came before Upper Tribunal Judge Perkins for the decision to be re-made and, in a decision promulgated on 27 June 2024, he dismissed the appeal. However, following an application for a Review under Rules 45 and 46 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, Upper Tribunal Judge Perkins’ decision was set aside.

6. The appeal then came before me for the decision to be re-made again.

Earlier Decisions

7. The appellant’s claim was that he was at risk on return to Eritrea due to his Pentecostal religion and his illegal exit. He claimed that he was born in Assab in Eritrea and that he and his parents moved to Ethiopia in 1995 for a better life, but were caught there living illegally and deported back to Eritrea where they resumed life in Assab. He claimed that he left Eritrea when his parents were imprisoned because of their faith in 2002, following the banning of their religion, and that he left the country two months later. He claimed to have lived with his uncle in Ethiopia and then by himself and to have left Ethiopia with the assistance of an agent after an issue in his job where he was suspected of theft and feared being investigated by the police. He claimed that his parents both died whilst he was living in Ethiopia – his father in 2004 and his mother in 2008. The respondent, in refusing the appellant’s claim in April 2014, did not accept that he was from Eritrea but considered that he was from Ethiopia, noting that he did not speak Tigrinya but only Amharic, and did not accept that he was Pentecostal Christian or that his parents were detained.

8. First-tier Tribunal Judge Woolley heard the appellant’s appeal in May 2014. He did not accept that the appellant was Eritrean but concluded that he was an Ethiopian national and did not find him to be credible, did not accept that he was a Pentecostal Christian, and found that he was at no risk on return to Ethiopia. In so doing, the judge gave weight to a SPRAKAB report which concluded that the likelihood was that the appellant’s linguistic background was Ethiopian to a very high degree of certainty and that it was very unlikely that his background was Assab in Eritrea. The judge did not accept the submission made as to how the appellant learnt Amharic and considered that the detailed recall of place names of Assab was not gained from personal experience but had been learnt by the appellant. The judge found that the appellant’s account of why he fled Eritrea was not credible in the light of the country evidence and that if he had left Eritrea when he claimed, that was because he was regarded as an Ethiopian and was a result of the expulsions of Ethiopians from Eritrea, and was not due to his religion. The judge did not accept the appellant’s account of why or how he left Ethiopia and considered that he had not given a credible account of his journey to the UK. The judge, in conclusion, did not accept that the appellant was Eritrean or that he had ever been in Eritrea, and found that he was an Ethiopian national who had come to the UK for economic reasons and not as a result of any fear of persecution. The appeal was dismissed on asylum and human rights grounds.

9. In his further submissions of February 2020 the appellant produced various additional documents including his birth certificate from Assab Public Registration Office, his parents’ death certificates from the Assab Administration Office and a letter from his uncle confirming that he had sent the documents to him from Eritrea, as well as a letter in support of his claimed Pentecostal religion, a letter of support from the Eritrean Community in Lambeth and a letter from the Ethiopian Embassy rejecting his application for an Ethiopian passport. A statement from the appellant was also included which referred to his relationship with RE and the birth of his two children, on 14 April 2016 and 2 February 2019.

10. The respondent, in refusing the appellant’s claim on 26 August 2020, took Judge Woolley’s decision of 3 June 2014 as the starting point and gave reasons for according little weight to the documents from Eritrea and the other documents submitted. The respondent maintained the view that the appellant was not an Eritrean national and considered that he had not shown that he would be at risk on return to Ethiopia.

Current Appeal

11. The appellant’s appeal against that decision was heard on 2 November 2021 in the First-tier Tribunal, by Judge Wilding. For the appeal, in addition to the documents provided previously, the appellant relied upon an expert report from Dr David Seddon in which the expert concluded that the birth certificate and death certificates were authentic. The judge did not give any weight to the expert report, however, finding there to be no evidence to show that the author was an expert in document verification. The judge did not give weight to the documents and concluded that the appellant had not adduced any evidence capable of leading to a different conclusion to the previous Tribunal.

12. Judge Wilding’s decision was set aside by Upper Tribunal Judge Rintoul in a decision of 15 July 2022, following a hearing that day. Judge Rintoul found that the First-tier Tribunal Judge was entitled to conclude that little or no weight should be attached to the expert report in relation to the document verification. However he found that the judge had erred by failing to take into account other evidence which was material to the core issue in the claim, namely the appellant’s explanation as to why the documents were in English and the letter from the Eritrean Community.

13. The decision in the appellant’s appeal was then re-made by Upper Tribunal Judge Perkins in a decision promulgated on 27 June 2024. At the hearing, there was live evidence from the appellant and a friend, as well as a statement from the appellant’s wife, and the judge also had before him an expert report from Mr John Birchall testifying as to the authenticity of the birth and death certificates. Judge Perkins dismissed the appellant’s appeal.

14. The appellant then sought a Rule 46 Review or permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal in respect of Judge Perkins’ decision on the grounds that the decision lacked clarity, that it failed to state a clear conclusion as to whether or not the appellant’s nationality was accepted, and that it failed to deal with a material limb of the appellant’s appeal, namely the risk arising from his illegal exit / draft evasion and the application of MST (national service – risk categories) CG [2016] UKUT 443 (IAC).

15. Following directions made by Upper Tribunal Judge Sheridan on 3 April 2025 setting out his preliminary view that the decision should be set aside and inviting a response from the parties, the respondent advised the Tribunal on 8 April 2025 that the appellant had been granted further leave to remain as a family member from 10 September 2024 to 10 March 2027, and that accordingly the appeal should be treated as abandoned under section 104(4A) of the Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 in the absence of an application under rule 17A(3) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 to pursue the appeal. The appellant’s representatives made submissions in response, noting that the appellant had originally been granted leave to remain on 26 August 2020 and that an application had been made to extend that leave which was successful, leading to the extension of his leave on 10 September 2024, and submitting that it was therefore not the case that leave had been “granted” on that date for the purposes of section 104(4A) and that accordingly section 104(4A) did not bite. In the alternative, notice was given the same day, on 15 April 2025, of the continuation of the appeal pursuant to section 104(4B) (b) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 and Rule 17A (3) of the Upper Tribunal Procedure Rules 2008 and an application was made for time to be extended to permit the appellant to file his notice of continuance.

16. In a decision of 3 July 2025 Upper Tribunal Judge Sheridan set aside Judge Perkins’ decision, following a Review under Rules 45 and 46, on the grounds that the re-making decision had failed to address the country guidance decision in MST. He also directed that, before the substantive issues in respect of the protection claim were considered, a decision would need to be made on whether the appeal was to be treated as abandoned under section 104(4A) of the 2002 Act.

17. The appeal was then listed for the matter of abandonment to be considered and came before Upper Tribunal Judge Norton-Taylor on 13 August 2025. The respondent at that hearing accepted that an extension of time to provide a notice of continuance under section 104(4B) was appropriate, and accordingly, in a decision issued on 14 August 2025, Judge Norton-Taylor extended time and accepted the appellant’s notice of continuance.

Re-making of the appeal in the Upper Tribunal

18. The appeal then came before me on 2 February 2026, following an adjourned hearing on 8 December 2025 (adjourned due to interpreter issues), to re-make the decision in the appeal following UTJ Rintoul’s set aside decision. The appellant gave oral evidence before me through an interpreter in the Amharic language. The interpreter confirmed that they understood one another and I was satisfied that that was the case. There were no issues regarding interpretation during the hearing.

19. The scope of the appeal is set out in Upper Tribunal Judge Norton-Taylor’s decision of 14 August 2025 at [12] and [13], namely that the resumed hearing would deal with three core issues: firstly, the appellant’s nationality; secondly, whether his claimed religious beliefs and any past problems related thereto were credible and, if they were, whether there would be a risk on return by virtue of that; thirdly, further or alternatively, whether MST provided a basis for the appellant to succeed. That was agreed by the parties.

20. Mr Holmes advised me that the appellant was not relying upon his statement of 19 November 2025 which appeared in the appeal bundle submitted for the adjourned December 2025 hearing, but instead relied upon the earlier statements in his appeal bundle. The appellant adopted his statement of 22 December 2022 as part of his evidence, confirming that the contents were true, and he was then cross-examined by Ms Isherwood.

21. The appellant confirmed that he was a Pentecostal Christian. When asked by Ms Isherwood why there was no up-to-date evidence confirming his religion, he said that he had asked people from his church to write a letter of support or come to give evidence and they told him that they would let him know but did not get back to him. When asked why he had not mentioned his faith in his statements, he said that he was a practising Pentecostal Christian and he thought that he could explain that in his evidence at the hearing. When asked why he had not sought to obtain evidence from the Ethiopian Embassy since his previous attempt in 2020, the appellant said that they had told him that he needed to produce documents to show that he was Ethiopian and his ID, and if he did not then they could not help him. Ms Isherwood pointed out to the appellant that in his statement, at paragraph 11, he had said that he continued to attempt to contact the Ethiopian Embassy for an appointment to confirm his nationality, yet he was now saying that he had not, to which the appellant replied that he did not attend again because he could not get any ID or documents showing he was Ethiopian, as he was Eritrean, and so there was no point returning again and again.

22. When asked if he was still in contact with his uncle, the appellant said that he was not, as his uncle had contacted him but he was not able to contact his uncle, since his uncle did not have his own contact telephone and used a public phone. The appellant said that he had two uncles, one maternal and one paternal, and he only knew about his paternal uncle, GT, who lived in Sudan and who had called him from there. That was the uncle who had sent him a letter in 2019. He had no idea how long his uncle had been living in Sudan. When asked how his uncle had sent him a letter from Eritrea in 2019, the appellant said that there was a lady who attended church who said that she knew how to get in contact with his uncle. She managed to make contact with his uncle and she told him to call him (the appellant). When asked by Ms Isherwood why his uncle had not provided any information in his letter about past events in Eritrea, Ethiopia and Sudan, the appellant said that he did not need to as he (the appellant) knew what had happened and what he had been through. He knew that his uncle was in Sudan because he told him when he last contacted him, but he could not remember when that was.

23. The appellant said he could not remember when his uncle requested his father’s death certificate, but he sent him all the documents in one go. It was his uncle who registered his father’s death. His uncle provided evidence of his father’s nationality and residence when he registered the death. Ms Isherwood asked the appellant why his uncle had not sent those documents to him, and the appellant replied that he had sent him what he did. When asked why his father’s death was not registered until 2010 when he had died in 2004, the appellant said that that was the date of issue of the certificate. The certificate was issued when it was requested. When asked why his mother’s death was registered in 2008 but stamped in 2018 the appellant said that he did not know. He did not know what evidence was produced to obtain the death certificate and agreed that he was asking the Tribunal to accept the document at face value. The appellant said that he could not remember who his birth certificate was issued to or where the document was when he left Eritrea. He confirmed that his uncle had sent it to him after he had managed to make contact with him through the lady at church. It was his uncle who sorted all the documents, paid the fee, and sent them to him, and the reference in his statement at paragraph 3 to him doing that himself was an error. His uncle told him that it was his father who had registered his birth in 2001.

24. Mr Holmes did not wish to re-examine the appellant.

25. I asked some further questions by way of clarification. I asked the appellant where his uncle was when he spoke to him, to which he replied that he did not know. He did not know which country his uncle was in at the time. I asked the appellant why he could not contact his uncle through his uncle’s neighbours which he done previously, according to his statement of 17 February 2021. He replied that he had tried but the neighbours told him that he could not get his uncle on that number. The appellant said that the envelope in his appeal bundle was one in which he received all the documents from his uncle. His uncle had sent it. I asked who was the person FG named on the envelope and he said that she was the lady from church who had assisted him. I referred the appellant to his evidence at paragraph 3 of his statement where he had named a person GA who had put him in touch with his uncle, and he replied that she was a friend of the lady who had assisted him. There were no questions arising out of my questions from Ms Isherwood or Mr Holmes.

26. Both parties then made submissions before me.

27. Ms Isherwood relied upon the refusal letter and asked me to note that there was no up to date statement from the appellant and that he had not provided a credible explanation for that and had failed properly to answers questions put to him. She submitted that he had adopted his statement as his evidence yet in his oral evidence had said that it contained errors. He had given contradictory evidence about who obtained the certificates and his evidence about his uncle had changed. He had failed to provide evidence and had given inconsistent evidence on core issues. His evidence about his visit to the Ethiopian Embassy was inconsistent, as was his evidence about contact with his family. Ms Isherwood submitted that Judge Woolley’s decision was to be taken as the starting point and she asked me to note that the judge’s findings on the SPRAKAB report had not been addressed in these proceedings at all. Neither had there been further evidence produced to address the other adverse credibility findings made by Judge Woolley. The appellant was relying upon new evidence since Judge Woolley’s decision, but his evidence about the birth and death certificates and who obtained them was inconsistent. The differences in the dates in the certificates and the fact that the same person signed all three certificates went to the issue of the reliability of the documents. As for the expert reports, Ms Isherwood pointed out various reasons for not being able to rely on them as evidence of the appellant’s nationality. Ms Isherwood submitted that the appellant was not a credible witness and that he had failed to show that he was an Eritrean national. She relied upon the case of MA (Ethiopia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] EWCA Civ 289 in submitting that the appellant had failed to give credible evidence about his attempts to obtain evidence from the Ethiopian Embassy. She submitted that the appellant’s claim in regard to his faith was not credible and he had failed to provide any up to date evidence, which ought to have been easy to obtain. Ms Isherwood submitted that even if the appellant was found to be an Eritrean national, he was still not at risk on return as he had provided evidence which was not credible and it could not, therefore, be accepted that he left Eritrea illegally or that he would be perceived as a draft evader. He therefore did not fall within the risk categories in MST and Others (national service – risk categories) Eritrea CG [2016] UKUT 443.

28. Mr Holmes submitted that the sole issue was essentially the appellant’s nationality, and it was for that reason that there was no further about his faith. If it was accepted that he was Eritrean, then the appeal had to succeed, in accordance with the guidance in MST. It could not be assumed that he left Eritrea legally. With regard to the issue of nationality, Mr Holmes submitted that the features of the appellant’s narrative as to when he left Eritrea and Ethiopia were all consistent with events taking place at the relevant time, and with the mass displacements taking place in the early 2000s. Amharic was a language spoke in Assab. On its face, therefore, the appellant’s claim was plausible. The new evidence he had submitted ought to be accepted, as it was reasonably likely that it was reliable. There was nothing inherently implausible about the appellant’s evidence in relation to the birth and death certificates and the dates on the certificates. The issue as to the difference in the year 2008/2018 in the appellant’s mother’s death certificate was likely to be a simple error. The appellant had not lied in his statement, as suggested by Ms Isherwood, when saying that he continued to make attempts to contact the Ethiopian Embassy, as that was correct at the time the statement was prepared. It was therefore reasonably likely that the appellant was Eritrean and, as such, the appeal ought to be allowed. Mr Holmes accepted that the appeal would fail if it was found that he was not Eritrean.

Analysis

29. I agree with Mr Holmes that the main issue upon which this appeal stands or falls is the appellant’s nationality, although Ms Isherwood made brief submissions asserting that even if the appellant was found to be Eritrean the appeal still failed.

30. In accordance with the guidance in Devaseelan [2002] UKIAT 00702, the decision made by First-tier Tribunal Judge Woolley in 2014 is to be taken as the starting point in determining this appeal. In that decision, as explained at [8] above, the judge rejected the appellant’s claim to be an Eritrean national, finding instead that he was Ethiopian, giving weight to a report from SPRAKAB which concluded that it was very unlikely that his background was Assab in Eritrea. The appellant’s account of his reasons for leaving Eritrea was not accepted and neither was his account of his reasons for leaving Ethiopia, or his claim to have been involved in the Pentecostal faith.

31. It is now some 11 years since Judge Woolley made that decision. Although the situation in Eritrea has not changed in any material respect since that time, there has been additional evidence provided by the appellant in regard to his own circumstances. Following the guidance in Devaseelan, I have had full regard to that evidence in order to assess whether I am able to depart from Judge Woolley’s negative decision and his adverse credibility findings. I have considered that evidence, both oral and documentary, from the appellant himself and from country experts, from community members and from others seeking to support his case, in the round in accordance with the guidance in Tanveer Ahmed [2002] IAT 00439. For the reasons set out below, I am not persuaded that a different decision can be reached.

32. I accept, as Mr Holmes submitted, that the appellant has maintained, throughout his various presentations of his evidence in both written and oral form, in the 11 years since Judge Woolley’s decision, the same account of his reasons for his movements between Eritrea and Ethiopia. I accept that those are to some extent consistent with events happening at the relevant times – Mr Holmes referred to the mass displacement and deportations of Eritrean nationals from Ethiopia which took place in the early 2000’s. However I also note the findings made by Judge Woolley at [29] in relation to the expulsions of Ethiopian nationals from Eritrea from June 2002, whereby he found the appellant’s account to be inconsistent with that background history, but rather consistent with him being Ethiopian. In any event, even if those matters lent plausibility to the appellant’s account, that does not in itself mean that the account is a genuine and credible one. It would not be difficult for the background and history to be taken from country reports as opposed to being a reflection of genuine events in the appellant’s life.

33. The evidence upon which the appellant relied at the hearing in relation to his nationality, aside from his own oral evidence and witness statements, consists of the death certificates for his parents and his own birth certificate, two expert reports, a letter from his uncle dated 14 December 2019 with the envelope in which his uncle is said to have sent the letter and the birth/death certificates to him, and a note from the Ethiopian Embassy dated 15 May 2014 on an application form refusing to issue him with an Ethiopian passport.

34. Although not in the current appeal bundle, the appellant previously submitted a letter from the Eritrean Community in Lambeth dated 13 February 2020 which appears in the respondent’s bundle, and which was not considered by First-tier Tribunal Judge Wilding, one of the errors leading to his decision being set aside by Upper Tribunal Judge Rintoul. Mr Holmes did not refer to that letter at any point, but neither was it said that the appellant no longer relied upon it. I shall therefore address that document first. I do not consider that any material weight can be accorded to the letter, for several reasons. The letter appears to be incomplete, as page G2 of the respondent’s bundle does not clearly run on from page G1. Further, it purports to confirm the appellant’s Eritrean nationality as a result of answers he gave to questions put to him by the author of the letter and the elders from the community, but there is no recording of the questions and answers. Rather, there is a summary of the types of questions asked and a confirmation that the appellant answered them correctly. There is no evidence of who the elders are (aside from two names given), no identity documents, no evidence of the nature and level of their expertise, or the extent to which their evidence can be considered as independent and objective. There is no direct evidence from the elders but rather their evidence has been relayed through the author of the letter and is no more than hearsay. The appellant’s answers appear to have been accepted as truthful on face value. The letter suggests that the elders went away to make enquiries on the basis of the information provided to them by the appellant but does not explain how, where or to whom they made their enquiries. In the circumstances I do not consider that the letter offers much by way of support for the appellant’s claim, particularly when considered with the concerns about the other documentary evidence upon which he relies. Nothing further or more recent has been produced from the Eritrean community.

35. I turn next to the birth and death certificates, which are essentially the main documents now relied upon by the appellant as evidence of his claimed Eritrean nationality. The fact that they are in English is not a matter which causes me particular concern, given that they are official documents. However there are various other issues arising from the documents, including the dates and signatures therein, and how and by whom they were obtained, which lead me to conclude that they cannot be relied upon to provide support to the appellant’s claim. Concerns were expressed about the reliability of the documents over five years ago in the respondent’s refusal decision, yet those concerns remain largely unanswered. The respondent noted a lack of evidence to show that the documents were indeed issued by the municipality of Assab, but no such documentary evidence has been forthcoming. The respondent was concerned about the dates in the certificates, as there was a delay between the birth/death and the registration of the birth/death. Those concerns have also not been satisfactorily explained.

36. The two experts, Dr Seddon and Mr Birchall, considered the certificates to be authentic and genuine. Both found the delay in the dates to be plausible. However neither Dr Seddon nor Mr Birchall appears to be an expert in document verification and neither of their reports, in my view, carries much weight. Indeed that was the view of First-tier Tribunal Judge Wilding in relation to Dr Seddon’s report in his decision which, although set aside by Upper Tribunal Judge Rintoul, was not found to be erroneous in that particular respect. Dr Seddon referred to the different dates in the appellant’s mother’s death certificate, 16 August 2008 as recorded in the certificate, but what appears to be 2 or 3 December 2018 in the stamp, and said that he believed it was likely to be a slip. However there is no proper reason given for that view, which is simply an assumption, particularly since it was not just a matter of a difference in the year, but rather the day, month and year were all different. As Judge Wilding found in his decision (and accepted by UTJ Rintoul when setting aside the decision for other reasons), I note that Dr Seddon appears to step outside his role as an expert and appears rather to be making attempts at advocacy, such as offering explanations for the delays in registration without any objective support, in the appellant’s birth certificate and his father’s death certificate (paragraphs 5.5 and 5.8). I rely on the comments made by Judge Rintoul in his decision at [14] to [18] where he supported that specific part of Judge Wilding’s findings, and need not say anything further.

37. As for the report of Mr Birchall, although he refers, in his methodology, to the process by which he verified the documents, there is nothing in the report to show that he is in fact an expert in document verification, and neither is there any detailed assessment of the documents. His report is short, lacks details and is not what would one would expect of an expert report on verification of documents. It is of note that Mr Birchall states in his report that concluding that a document has the “main characteristics of a reliable document” means that simply it is similar to a reliable document without a 100% guaranteed level and indeed as low as “at least 51% certain of the validity”, which is somewhat concerning. He also comments on the fact that the officials signing all the documents are the same despite the different dates of the documents, but offers a view that officials remain in post for long periods of time, a view which is simply his own and is not supported by any objective evidence. I do not consider that he has offered anything near a reliable explanation for the fact that the three documents, although apparently registered and issued several years apart, have all been signed by the same official. In the circumstances I do not consider that Mr Birchall’s report can be accorded any material weight in assessing the reliability of the documents.

38. Aside from the concerns arising from the signatures and dates in the three documents, the appellant’s evidence as to how the documents were obtained and sent to him has been wholly inconsistent. He was a particularly unimpressive witness, providing inconsistent answers to questions put to him and failing to provide answers to questions which he ought reasonably to have been able to provide. His oral evidence before me was that it was his uncle who sent all the documents to him in the envelope appearing in the appeal bundle, and that that occurred after he managed to make contact with his uncle in August 2019. In his statement of 28 January 2020 he stated that his uncle was in Asmara at the time, whereas in his oral evidence he said at one point that his uncle was in Sudan, but at another that he did not know where his uncle was, whether in Eritrea or Sudan. In his statement of 17 February 2021, he stated that he managed to make contact with his uncle with the help of an Eritrean community member GA, whose uncle was able to contact his uncle in Eritrea, following which his uncle called him, and then sent him the documents. However, when shown the envelope which bore a different name as the sender, FG, who was not his uncle, he said that that was the person who helped him make contact with his uncle. When reminded that he had said that GA was the person who helped him make contact, he said that FG was a friend of GA.

39. Further, as Ms Isherwood pointed out, the appellant’s evidence about his uncle obtaining his birth certificate was contradicted by the evidence in his statement of 22 December 2022, that he was himself present in Eritrea when his birth certificate was issued and that he had asked for two versions, one in English and one in Tigrinya, and had paid 75 Nakfa for each certificate. Not only was the evidence in the statement inconsistent with the date on the certificate, 24 May 2001, at which time the appellant would have been only 7 years of age, but it was also inconsistent with his oral evidence where he stated that he could not remember who the birth certificate was issued to and that he could not remember where it was when he left Eritrea. It was also inconsistent with his evidence before me that it was his uncle who sorted out the document and sent it to him together with the death certificates. The appellant said that he did not know why the evidence was as stated in the statement of 22 December 2022 and believed it to be a mistake.

40. The appellant, in my view, was simply making up explanations as he went along in order to fit the evidence to his narrative when the contradictions were put to him. He gave different accounts about making contact with his uncle and the nature of that contact, and he was unable to say in which country his uncle was when he spoke to him, whether Eritrea or Sudan, or how long his uncle had been living in Sudan. I reject any suggestion that the significant inconsistencies could be explained by any medical or memory issues – I note that some historical medical evidence appears in the appeal bundle referring to headaches. I do not accept the appellant’s account of how he obtained the certificates and I do not accept that they can be relied upon as evidence of his Eritrean nationality. I give no weight to the letter purporting to be from his uncle which provides limited information and, for the reasons already given, is not supported by credible evidence of its provenance. I do not accept that the appellant has an uncle of Eritrean nationality or that he has lost contact with his uncle, if indeed that uncle does in fact exist, and consider that that is a claim made solely to excuse his inability to obtain further supporting documentation rather than it reflecting the genuine circumstances.

41. In so far as the appellant relies upon historical evidence of efforts to obtain confirmation from the Ethiopian Embassy of their refusal to acknowledge him as an Ethiopian national, it is clear from the note on the application form of 15 May 2014 that the application was rejected simply because of an absence of supporting documents. That is certainly not sufficient to suggest a denial of Ethiopian nationality and does not assist the appellant in his claim. The same can be said of the witness statements from AD who claimed to have accompanied the appellant to the Embassy in 2020, but found it shut, and to have then attended again in December 2022 where he was unsuccessful as a result of an absence of supporting documents. As Ms Isherwood submitted, there has been no further attempt by the appellant to obtain any useful evidence from the Ethiopian Embassy. His only reason for not having done so was that there was no point, as he claims that he has no documentation proving him to be Ethiopian, but of course it is in his own interests to make such a claim.

42. In addition to the above, further concerns as to the reliability of the appellant’s claim arise from other matters. One such matter is the appellant’s failure to provide any expert evidence about his linguistic background. He has had several years to provide such evidence, in response to the SPRAKAB report which was before Judge Woolley. That is a matter which is rather striking given that his spoken Amharic and his lack of knowledge of Tigrinya was a particular factor leading to Judge Woolley’s conclusion on his nationality. Another matter is the lack of current evidence from the appellant about his Pentecostal faith which, as Ms Isherwood pointed out, was probably the easiest supporting evidence to obtain.

43. Turning to the appellant’s claim in regard to his faith, I have regard to the adverse findings made by Judge Woolley at [33] of his decision, whereby he did not accept the appellant’s account of his faith. As already stated, the appellant has provided no further evidence since that time, other than a letter dated 17 February 2021 from the Bread of Life Church International. That letter is particularly unhelpful since, whilst referring to him attending services broadcast on Sundays, it does not provide any further information and goes on to state that they did not get to know him in person due to lockdown. There is nothing to suggest that the appellant had any strong beliefs in the faith or indeed that he had any genuine belief in the faith. I cannot accord any weight to that letter, and certainly not any material weight. The appellant was asked repeatedly by Ms Isherwood why he had not sought to obtain further evidence and the appellant said that he had asked members of the church who had said they would attend the hearing or send him statements but then did not do so. Other than his repeated assertions at the hearing that he was a practising Pentecostal Christian there is accordingly no evidence of his faith. There is nothing in the evidence before me which is capable of supporting the appellant’s claim. I do not accept his account of his parents’ detention owing to their faith or of him having fled Eritrea as a result of his faith and their detention.

44. Taking the evidence as a whole, I find the appellant’s account to be lacking in credibility in every respect. I do not accept that there is any reliable evidence of his claimed Eritrean nationality. I do not accept that he and his parents were deported from Ethiopia as Eritrean nationals and I do not accept that he fled Eritrea owing to his religion. I do not accept that he has provided a credible account of when or why he left Ethiopia. His oral evidence was inherently inconsistent and was inconsistent with the documentary evidence. The documentary evidence lacks reliability for the reasons given and the expert reports are accorded little weight and do not materially assist the appellant’s case. I do not accept that the appellant was born in Eritrea and I do not accept that he is, or that his parents were, Eritrean nationals. I find that the appellant is an Ethiopian national and that he would be able to return to Ethiopia without any risk of being persecuted. There is no proper basis upon which to depart from the conclusions reached by Judge Woolley.

45. Having reached such a conclusion, the issue of draft evasion and illegal exit from Eritrea, and the applicability of MST, is immaterial. Mr Holmes made clear in his statement that the appellant did not advance an alternative case in respect of return to Ethiopia and that his nationality would be determinative of the appeal. The appellant has been granted leave to remain in the UK on the basis of his family and private life and there is therefore no human rights claim before me, the only issue being that of protection. The appellant has failed to show, even to the lower standard of proof, that he would be at risk on return to his home country. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.

DECISION

46. The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved an error on a point of law and has been set aside. I re-make the decision by dismissing the appeal on asylum, humanitarian protection and Article 3 human rights grounds.

Signed: S Kebede
Upper Tribunal Judge Kebede

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

5 February 2026