Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2022-000575
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/05359/2019

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

2nd July 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HOFFMAN

Between

DX
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: In person
For the Respondent: Ms S Keerthy, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 23 June 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant and his family are granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant and/or his family. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals under s.82 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (“the 2002 Act”) against the respondent’s decision dated 21 May 2019 refusing his human rights claim and deciding to deport him to Jamaica.
2. The appellant also initially sought to appeal the respondent’s decision of the same date to refuse his asylum claim. However, for reasons explained below, that aspect of his appeal has now fallen away. The issue to be decided in this decision is whether the appellant’s deportation would amount to a disproportionate interference with his right to a family and private life in the United Kingdom, as protected by Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
3. For the reasons given below, I dismiss the appellant’s appeal.
Anonymity
4. The First-tier Tribunal made an anonymity order in respect of the appellant, and no application has been made to set it aside. While I give significant weight to the principle of open justice, particularly in cases involving foreign national offenders, I am satisfied that, in the present case, that principle is outweighed by the appellant’s personal circumstances. It is accepted that he was the victim of a serious sexual assault in childhood and there is a preserved finding from the First-tier Tribunal that he was a police informer, and, in those circumstances, the balance falls in favour of protecting his identity.
5. However, for reasons discussed with the parties during the hearing, I have changed the initials used to anonymise the applicant previously in these proceedings to “DX”. The terms of the anonymity order remain unchanged.
Background
6. The appellant was born in Jamaica in 1987. He arrived in the United Kingdom on 10 November 2001, aged 13, with leave to enter valid until 7 December 2001. He remained beyond that period and, on 5 February 2002, applied for leave to remain; that application was refused on 21 January 2003.
7. On 10 March 2004, the appellant received an absolute discharge having been convicted of failing to surrender to custody at an appointed time.
8. On 1 December 2004, the appellant was convicted of one count of robbery and two counts of attempted robbery, for which he received a 12-month detention and training order.
The first deportation decision and appeal
9. On 27 April 2007, the appellant was convicted of nine offences concerning the supply of Class A drugs and was sentenced to 30 months’ imprisonment. Consequently, on 19 October 2007, the respondent decided to deport him from the United Kingdom. The appellant exercised his right of appeal against that decision.
10. In a decision promulgated on 11 February 2008, a panel of the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal (AIT) allowed the appellant’s appeal on Article 8 grounds. The panel accepted that the appellant had been in a relationship with his partner, P1, for four years and that they had a one-year-old son, CX; that he was “sincere in his desire to reform and improve himself and [was] remorseful for his past crimes”; and that he posed a low risk of reoffending (see [14], [19] and [24]).
11. Following that decision, on 18 March 2008 the respondent granted the appellant discretionary leave to remain until 17 February 2011.
The second deportation decision and appeal
12. Despite the AIT’s confidence that the appellant had turned over a new leaf, on 30 September 2009, he was sentenced at to 30 months’ imprisonment for two counts of possession of a Class A drug (heroin) with intent to supply. The respondent therefore resumed steps to remove him to Jamaica, and a deportation order was made on 20 August 2010. The appellant was again granted a right of appeal, this time to the First-tier Tribunal.
13. In a determination promulgated on 14 February 2011, a panel of the First-tier Tribunal allowed the appellant’s appeal on Article 8 grounds. The panel accepted that the appellant had committed a very serious offence but considered that he had been “put under considerable pressure to co operate [sic] with a drug dealer to whom he owed money and who was threatening him and his family” (see [55]). The panel further observed that “the appellant is fully aware that, if he were to find himself in such a position again, he would need to contact the police”. Evidence before the panel indicated that the appellant had no longer been living with P1 (who did not give evidence) and that their relationship was strained; nevertheless, the panel accepted that family life subsisted between them for the purposes of Article 8. The respondent appealed to the Upper Tribunal, but that appeal was dismissed on 22 August 2011.
14. The deportation order was accordingly revoked and, on 19 September 2011, the appellant was granted discretionary leave to remain until 18 March 2012. He failed to apply to extend that leave and, on 14 February 2013, was served with notice that he was an overstayer. However, on 22 August 2013 he was granted a further period of leave, valid until 20 August 2016.
15. Meanwhile, on 29 May 2012 the appellant received a caution for common assault. According to the OASys report, the appellant’s victim was P1.
16. On 26 March 2013, the appellant was convicted of failing to surrender to custody at an appointed time; and on 9 April 2013 for driving while disqualified and using a vehicle while uninsured, all of which attracted a fine. Furthermore, on 31 July 2013, he was cautioned for destroying or damaging property. The OASys records that the appellant claimed that this resulted from the same event that took place on 29 May 2012.
17. On 31 March 2014, the appellant was again convicted of driving while disqualified and using a vehicle while uninsured.
The third deportation decision and appeal
18. As with the AIT, the First-tier Tribunal panel proved to be overly optimistic in accepting the appellant’s assurances that he would desist from further criminal conduct. On 2 January 2015, the appellant was sentenced to concurrent terms of five years and 220 days’ imprisonment on four counts of supplying Class A drugs (one count relating to heroin, two to crack cocaine, and one to another unspecified substance). This offending prompted the respondent to initiate deportation action for a third time. A deportation order was signed on 28 November 2016; however, following the judgment of the Supreme Court in Kiarie & Byndloss v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] UKSC 42, the order was revoked and subsequently re-made on 21 May 2019. The appellant was again afforded a right of appeal to the First-tier Tribunal, which he exercised on both asylum and human rights grounds. The asylum claim was based on the appellant having been sexually abused as a child by a relative in Jamaica.
19. In a decision promulgated on 1 November 2021, the First-tier Tribunal dismissed the appellant’s asylum appeal but allowed his appeal on Article 8 grounds. By this point, the appellant was no longer claiming to be in a relationship with P1 and it had transpired from a DNA test that CX was not in fact his child. Instead, the appellant was now in a relationship with P2, with whom he had a son, C2, and was expecting a daughter, C3. The appellant also relied upon his relationship with another daughter, C1, born in 2006, with a different mother. The First-tier Tribunal accepted that the appellant was in a genuine and subsisting relationship with P2 and his children, C1 and C2 and that the appellant was attempting to repair his fractured relationship with his mother. The First-tier Tribunal found that the appellant’s deportation would not have unduly harsh consequences for P2 or C2, but it would have for C1. Taking into account several factors, including the appellant’s family in the United Kingdom, the sexual abuse he faced in Jamaica, the fact that he had not committed any offences for six months, and that he had come to the United Kingdom as a child, the judge allowed his appeal on the basis that there were “compelling circumstances” (rather than the correct test of very compelling circumstances) to his case.
20. That decision was set aside by Upper Tribunal Judge Perkins on 8 August 2023 on the basis that the judge had misapplied the very compelling circumstances test. The appeal was retained in the Upper Tribunal for remaking, and a hearing took place on 26 September 2023. However, no remaking decision was promulgated and, on 19 March 2025, the Principal Resident Judge directed that the appeal be reallocated to a different judge and relisted for rehearing on 24 April 2025. The appellant successfully applied for that hearing to be adjourned and, due to what appears to have been an administrative error, there was a delay in relisting the appeal. A case management hearing took place on 13 January 2026 (which the appellant failed to attend, having unsuccessfully sought an adjournment), and the remaking hearing was relisted before me on 12 May 2026. Shortly before that hearing, the appellant applied for an adjournment, which I refused. However, the appellant did not attend the hearing, apparently because his immigration adviser mistakenly believed that the hearing was listed for error of law rather than remaking. In those circumstances, I was left with little choice but to adjourn the hearing to 23 June 2026 and issued directions, sealed on 13 May 2026.
The hearing
21. On 17 June 2026, the appellant’s representatives applied for an adjournment of the remaking hearing on the basis that their counsel had withdrawn for “professional” reasons. I refused that application. My reasons are set out in my order dated 18 June 2026, and I do not therefore repeat them here. As a consequence, the appellant appeared in person.
22. As the appellant was unrepresented, I explained the purpose and structure of the hearing. I also informed him—bearing in mind that he is recovering from a road traffic accident—that he could take breaks whenever necessary, and that he should seek clarification if there were any aspects of the proceedings he did not understand. When confirming that he had all the relevant documents, it became apparent that, although he had the error of law bundle prepared by the respondent (which contained the parties’ evidence before the First-tier Tribunal), he did not have the supplementary bundle filed on his behalf by his legal representatives on 8 June 2026, a complete copy of the respondent’s decision dated 21 May 2019, the respondent’s skeleton argument, or the Police National Computer (PNC) report provided by Ms Keerthy. I therefore stood the hearing down for 75 minutes to enable him to read those documents.
23. I then permitted the appellant to make an opening statement giving the reasons why he should not be deported from the United Kingdom, following which he and his mother, Ms K, were cross-examined by Ms Keerthy. Their evidence is recorded in the record of proceedings and is not repeated here.
24. Following the oral evidence, Ms Keerthy made closing submissions. At my direction, these were structured in three parts (Exception 1, Exception 2, and very compelling circumstances), so that the appellant could respond to each in turn rather than addressing them all at the conclusion. At the end of the hearing, I reserved my decision.
Issues
25. In the error of law decision dated 8 August 2023, at [66], Upper Tribunal Judge Perkins preserved the following findings made by the First-tier Tribunal:
“The claimant has been convicted of a particularly serious crime and is a danger to the community.
He is not entitled to protection under the Refugee Convention.
The claimant enjoys “private and family life” with his partner, [P2], and his children [C1] and [C2].
It is in the best interests of [C1] and [C2] that the claimant remains in the United Kingdom.
The consequences of the claimant’s removal would not be “unduly harsh” for [C2] but would be unduly harsh for [C1].
The claimant could not expect family support or accommodation in Jamaica.
The claimant would not face [very] significant obstacles in the event of his return to Jamaica.
The claimant suffered “horrific childhood sexual abuse” when he was in Jamaica.
The claimant had not shown that returning him to Jamaica would create a real risk to his rights under Article 2 or Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
The claimant has worked as an informer for the metropolitan police.”
26. Matters have, however, moved on since the First-tier Tribunal hearing in October 2021. In particular, C1 is now an adult, the appellant is no longer in a relationship with P2 and he has a third child (C3). At the adjourned hearing on 12 May 2026, I indicated to both parties that, in my view, given the significant passage of time since the First-tier Tribunal and error of law decisions, it would be necessary to reconsider the appellant’s Article 8 claim on a de novo basis with none of the Article 8 findings made by the First-tier Tribunal preserved. There was no objection from either advocate.
27. Therefore, the sole issue to be decided at the remaking hearing is whether the appellant’s deportation would breach his right to a private and family life. Due to the length of the sentence imposed by the Crown Court for the index offences (five years and 220 days), the appellant can only succeed on Article 8 grounds if he can demonstrate that there are very compelling circumstances to his case that outweigh the public interest in his deportation as a foreign national offender.
The legal framework
28. The deportation of foreign national offenders is governed by the UK Borders Act 2007 Act (“the 2007 Act”). Section 32 provides for the automatic deportation of foreign criminals sentenced to at least 12 months' imprisonment. Section 33 sets out the exceptions to automatic deportation. For the purposes of the present appeal, this includes where the person’s deportation would breach their rights under the ECHR: see s.33(2)(a).
29. Section 117C of the 2002 Act sets out considerations that a court or tribunal must take into account when considering the Article 8 ECHR rights of a foreign criminal appealing against a decision to deport them from the UK:
117C Article 8: additional considerations in cases involving foreign criminals

(1) The deportation of foreign criminals is in the public interest.

(2) The more serious the offence committed by a foreign criminal, the greater is the public interest in deportation of the criminal.

(3) In the case of a foreign criminal (“C”) who has not been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of four years or more, the public interest requires C's deportation unless Exception 1 or Exception 2 applies.

(4)  Exception 1 applies where—
(a)  C has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of C's life,
(b)  C is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom, and
(c)  there would be very significant obstacles to C's integration into the country to which C is proposed to be deported.

(5)  Exception 2 applies where C has a genuine and subsisting relationship with a qualifying partner, or a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a qualifying child, and the effect of C's deportation on the partner or child would be unduly harsh.

(6)  In the case of a foreign criminal who has been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least four years, the public interest requires deportation unless there are very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2.

(7)  The considerations in subsections (1) to (6) are to be taken into account where a court or tribunal is considering a decision to deport a foreign criminal only to the extent that the reason for the decision was the offence or offences for which the criminal has been convicted.
30. The burden of proof is on the appellant to prove the facts of his case applying the civil standard of balance of probabilities. The relevant date is the date of the hearing.
Findings
31. There is no dispute that the appellant meets the definition of a “foreign criminal” under s.32 of the 2007 Act: he is not a British citizen; he has been convicted in the UK of an offence; and he was sentenced to a period of imprisonment exceeding 12 months. Under s.32 of the 2007 Act and s.117C(1) of the 2002 Act, Parliament has made it clear that the deportation of a foreign criminal is conducive to the public good and in the public interest. Furthermore, under s.117C(2), the more serious the offence committed, the greater the public interest is in their deportation.
32. Under s.117C(6), in the case of a foreign criminal who has been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of four years or more, the public interest requires their deportation unless they can demonstrate very compelling circumstances over and above those set out in Exception 1 (private life) or Exception 2 (family life with a qualifying partner or child). Therefore, while the appellant cannot succeed in his appeal simply by meeting the criteria set out under Exceptions 1 and 2, it is necessary to consider them before looking at whether there are any very compelling circumstances to the case.
Exception 1
Length of residence
33. The appellant arrived in the United Kingdom when he was almost 14 years old and has therefore lived here for more than half of his life. However, the majority of that residence has been without lawful status. He has only had intermittent periods of leave to enter or remain, amounting in total to approximately six years and six months. He is consequently unable to satisfy the requirement of having been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of his life.
Social and cultural integration
34. Ms Keerthy submitted that the appellant is not socially and culturally integrated on account of his extensive criminal record. However, the appellant came to the United Kingdom at the age of 13 and has spent the greater part of his life here. He was educated in this country, attending both school and college, and speaks with an English accent. He has also undertaken a range of lawful employment, including work as a delivery driver, a door-to-door salesman, and a bricklayer, and has run his own vending machine business. While in custody, he obtained qualifications in welding and carpentry. In addition, he has been in relationships with British nationals and has three British children.
35. In those circumstances, I am satisfied that, notwithstanding his criminal conduct, the appellant is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom. He therefore meets the second limb of the Exception 1 test.
Very significant obstacles to reintegration
36. I am not satisfied that there would be very significant obstacles to the appellant’s reintegration into Jamaica.
37. The appellant spent the first 13 years of his life there and continues to have Jamaican family members in the United Kingdom, including his mother. It is therefore unlikely that he has no, or even little, familiarity with Jamaican culture.
38. I accept that he has not lived in Jamaica since childhood and that he does not have friends or family there to provide support. However, although he is currently recovering from injuries sustained in a recent motorcycle accident, there is no evidence to suggest that, once recovered, he will be unable to work and support himself. As noted above, he has experience in a number of occupations, including running his own business, and has obtained vocational qualifications in welding and carpentry. He also indicated during the hearing that he was exploring work in highway maintenance. As Ms Keerthy submitted, there is no evidence to suggest that he would be unable to secure employment in Jamaica.
39. I accept that there may be an initial period during which the appellant will need to secure accommodation and employment, and during which he may face financial difficulty. The appellant stated that his family in the United Kingdom and the United States would be unable to support him due to their own financial commitments, and that he would not wish to burden them. However, I accept Ms Keerthy’s submission that it is more likely than not that his family would not abandon him, and that he would be able to draw upon some level of support during any transitional period. The appellant is intelligent, resourceful, and willing to work. I am satisfied that he is likely, within a reasonable period, to obtain employment and achieve self-sufficiency in Jamaica.
40. Finally, I address the preserved finding that the appellant was subjected to serious sexual abuse as a child in Jamaica. I accept that this has had a profound impact upon him and that he has previously received counselling. However, there is no evidence that he is currently undergoing treatment or that return to Jamaica would give rise to a significant deterioration in his mental health or his ability to reintegrate. There is evidence before the Tribunal that the offences were reported to the Jamaican authorities and are under investigation. The appellant has had no contact with the perpetrator since coming to the United Kingdom in 2001. On the evidence before me, I am not satisfied that there is a real risk of the perpetrator seeking to locate or harm the appellant upon his return or that, if he did have an intention to do so, the appellant would be unable to seek the assistance of the authorities.
41. Drawing these strands together, while I accept that the appellant will face obstacles in re-establishing his private life in Jamaica, those obstacles do not reach the threshold of being very significant. He therefore does not meet the third limb of Exception 1.
Conclusion on Exception 1
42. The appellant fails to meet the first and third limbs of section 117C(4) of the 2002 Act. He does not, therefore, satisfy the requirements of Exception 1.
Exception 2
43. The First-tier Tribunal had found in its 1 November 2021 decision that the appellant was in “a settled and loving relationship” with his partner, P2; that “there is no evidence or signs of any volatility or friction” between the couple; and that “this relationship is strong, loving and built on mutual respect”. In hindsight, none of those findings made by the judge proved to be correct. As of the date of the hearing before me, the appellant and P2 are no longer in a relationship. The appellant has had to apply to the Family Court to gain access to his two children with P2 and his evidence before me was that she was mentally unbalanced and that he has gone to the police to obtain a non-molestation order against her. For her part, P2 has emailed the Tribunal, most recently to allege that while the appellant has some access to his children, he is not a present father and has no involvement in the daily upbringing of the children and that he refuses to have 50/50 care of them.
44. I attach little weight to the allegations made by the appellant and P2 against each other given that they are unsupported by any objective evidence. Although I accept that the appellant did report P2 to the police in August 2025, there is no evidence before me as to the outcome of this. What I do take from this, though, is that there has been an acrimonious split between the two.
45. As a consequence, the appellant is no longer in a relationship with a qualifying partner. I do, however, accept that the appellant has a genuine and subsisting relationship with his three children, C1, C2 and C3. In respect of C2 and C3, I have before me a Family Court Child Arrangements Order (CAO) made on 24 April 2025 which, on alternating weeks, allows the appellant to spend time with them between 4pm-9pm on Tuesday and Thursday; and then Thursday from 4pm-9pm and Friday afterschool until Sunday at 4pm. There are also photos of the appellant with his children in the supplementary bundle as well as screenshots of videocalls. Ms Keerthy submitted that many of these photographs are recent, although I take into account that the CAO was only obtained in April of last year.
46. C1 is now an adult and therefore not a “qualifying child” for the purposes of Exception 2. C2 and C3 are both minors, and British citizens, and are therefore qualifying children. I must therefore consider whether the appellant’s deportation would have unduly harsh consequences for them.
47. Ms Keerthy confirmed that the respondent accepts that it would be unduly harsh for C2 and C3 to return to Jamaica with the appellant. Therefore, I need only to consider whether it would be unduly harsh for C2 and C3 to remain in the United Kingdom without their father.
48. I remind myself of the self-direction at [46] in the case of MK (section 55 – Tribunal options) Sierra Leone [2015] UKUT 00223 (IAC):
“By way of self-direction, we are mindful that “unduly harsh” does not equate with uncomfortable, inconvenient, undesirable or merely difficult. Rather, it poses a considerably more elevated threshold. “Harsh” in this context, denotes something severe, or bleak. It is the antithesis of pleasant or comfortable. Furthermore, the addition of the adverb “unduly” raises an already elevated standard still higher.”
49. I accept that the best interests of the children are for their father to remain in the United Kingdom. However, the best interests of a child are a primary, but not a paramount, consideration.
50. The appellant contended that it would be unduly harsh for C2 and C3 to be separated from him because they would lose his support, love and guidance.
51. The appellant also contended that, due to P2’s depression and volatility, he provided C2 and C3 with a degree of stability and consistency that would otherwise be lacking. Whilst I accept that the appellant’s presence in the United Kingdom would, as a general proposition, offer his children an element of stability and continuity, I attach little weight to his assertion that P2 is an unstable or inconsistent presence in their lives. There is no independent evidence to substantiate that claim. Moreover, I take into account that, pursuant to the CAO, the Family Court has determined that P2 should be the children’s primary carer.
52. The appellant spoke eloquently about the absence of a father figure in his own upbringing, which he said left him without a moral compass and contributed to his involvement in criminal activity. He explained that he is anxious to ensure that his own children do not experience a similar absence. He expressed particular concern about the impact on C2, given his special needs. While he acknowledged that C3 is presently too young to understand his circumstances, he nevertheless fears that, in time, she may be affected in a similar way.
53. In relation to C2, the appellant stated that his school had referred him to a Special Educational Needs Coordinator (SENCo) and that he was awaiting an assessment to determine whether he has ADHD, autism, and/or whether he has been adversely affected by the breakdown of his parents’ relationship. In the supplementary bundle, the appellant has provided a letter from C2’s school, addressed “To Whom It May Concern” and dated 14 October 2025. The letter explains that C2 “presents with a high level of emotional dependency on adult support within the school environment”, which “is not typical for a child of his age and communicates concern about his emotional wellbeing”. The school has therefore implemented a Consistent Adult Response Plan to support the management of his behaviour, including physical interactions with other children. Reference is made to a number of incidents of concern, although no specific examples are provided. The letter states that the school’s SENCo and Family Support Worker “have had several discussions with [C2’s] mother regarding his behaviour and overall wellbeing”. It is further explained that, in April 2025, the SENCo made a referral to the Mental Health Support Team “to seek further assessment and support for [C2’s] emotional and behavioural needs”, and that “a further referral will be made to the Wellbeing Service”, with discussions having taken place with C2’s mother regarding a possible future referral to the Wilderness Project. Again, the letter refers only to discussions with the mother, and not with the appellant. The letter concludes by confirming that the school remains committed to supporting C2’s development and wellbeing and will work closely with his family and relevant external agencies to that end.
54. I make the following observations about this document. First, it is clear that C2 is experiencing emotional and developmental difficulties. However, the document does not confirm the appellant’s evidence that C2 is awaiting assessment to determine whether he has ADHD or autism, as opposed to his difficulties arising from the breakdown of his parents’ relationship. Whilst I accept, on the balance of probabilities, that the SENCo may wish these matters to be investigated, there is no evidence before me, as at the date of the hearing, that C2 has been diagnosed with ADHD or autism. Secondly, the letter records that the SENCo has had discussions about C2’s difficulties only with P2, and not with the appellant. This diminishes the weight I can attach to the appellant’s claim to be fully engaged in his children’s upbringing.
55. The appellant has also disclosed a further letter from the school, dated 1 June 2026, in the supplementary bundle. However, this does no more than confirm that C2 attends the school and that the school’s records identify P2 and the appellant as his parents. It therefore adds little to the appellant’s case.
56. The appellant relied before the First-tier Tribunal on a report prepared by an independent social worker. However, that report is dated 4 March 2020 and is now considerably out of date. Its primary focus was on C1, who was then only 13 years old, and on the impact of the appellant’s childhood sexual abuse. It therefore provides little assistance in assessing the impact of the appellant’s deportation on C2 and C3.
57. The appellant also claims to provide financial support for his children. Ms Keerthy submitted that the evidence before the Tribunal presented an incomplete picture, as only a limited number of bank statements had been disclosed, and those showed only sporadic payments to P2. She contended that this undermined the appellant’s assertion that he pays £120 per week.
58. I do not propose to set out the entirety of the bank statements. Instead, I focus on those from early 2024 onwards:
a. 16 January to 15 February 2024 (incomplete): One payment of £24 on 12 February (but four payments were made by P2 to the appellant on 22 January, 23 January, and 12 February, totalling £879).
b. 16 April 2024 to 15 May 2024 (incomplete): One payment of £120 on 16 April.
c. Undated statement (incomplete): One payment of £120 on 24 June (presumably 2024) and one of £150 on 9 July.
d. 16 July 2024 to 15 August 2024: Payments of £64 on 16 July, £70 on 24 July, and £25 on 5 August.
e. 13 December 2024 to 15 January 2025: Payments of £10 on 23 December 2024 and £50 on 7 January 2025.
f. 14 November 2025 to 15 December 2025: Payments of £230 on 18 November and £220 on 25 November 2025.
g. 13 March 2026 to 15 April 2026: Payments of £100 and £150, both made on 27 March.
59. The bank statements do not demonstrate that the appellant pays P2 £120 per week. As Ms Keerthy submitted, the payments are irregular in both frequency and amount. While I accept that the appellant may make additional contributions in cash, he has been unable to substantiate this beyond reliance on a document described as a “private agreement” between himself and P2, dated 29 May 2026 and apparently bearing P2’s signature. That document states:
“This written agreement shows that payments do not [go] through DWP as it is a private agreement. The payment is a weekly payment directly to [P2]. I make the payments via cash or bank transfer. [P2] and I both contribute to school clothes and shoes, school trips.”
60. I note that this document is of very recent origin and was not drafted by a legally qualified person. Crucially, it does not specify the amount said to be paid each week. Considered alongside the incomplete bank statements and the sporadic nature of the recorded transfers, I am unable to accept, on the balance of probabilities, that the appellant pays P2 £120 per week towards the children’s maintenance. I find it more likely that he provides financial contributions on an irregular basis and in varying amounts, including when required to contribute to items such as school clothing, holidays, and other expenses.
61. Taking the evidence as a whole, including the photographs of the appellant with his children, I am satisfied that he has a genuine and subsisting relationship with C2 and C3. This includes shared care arrangements with P2 in accordance with the CAO, as well as regular communication via WhatsApp and video calls. However, I find that the appellant has exaggerated the extent of his financial contributions to the children’s upbringing. I am also satisfied that he has overstated his involvement in engaging with C2’s school regarding his son’s wellbeing, which the school’s correspondence indicates is undertaken by P2.
Conclusion on Exception 2
62. I am satisfied that it would be harsh for C2 and C3 to be separated from their father. However, I am not satisfied that such separation would be unduly harsh.
63. As explained above, I am satisfied that it is in the best interests of the children for their father to remain in the United Kingdom, although that consideration is not determinative of the outcome of the unduly harsh test. In relation to C2 in particular, whatever the underlying cause of his behavioural and dependency issues at school, I am satisfied that the appellant’s deportation is unlikely to have a positive impact on those difficulties. However, as Ms Keerthy submitted, the school evidence indicates that C2 is receiving support from the SENCo and the Family Support Officer, and that a Consistent Adult Response Plan is in place. Mechanisms therefore exist to assist him.
64. As the appellant acknowledged, C3 is currently too young to understand his circumstances. While I accept that she is likely to feel his absence more acutely as she grows older, that is, regrettably, an inevitable consequence where a parent is deported from the United Kingdom. On the evidence before me, there is little to suggest that the distress C3 may experience would meet the elevated threshold required by the family life exception.
65. At present, the appellant’s ability to care for the children is governed by the CAO. If the appellant is removed, the children will lose even that level of contact, and I accept that it is likely to be difficult for them to visit Jamaica, at least while they remain minors. There is, however, evidence before the Tribunal that the appellant maintains contact with his children via WhatsApp and video calls (see paragraph 4 of his recent witness statement). While this is not a complete substitute for a father’s physical presence, I am satisfied that such methods could continue to be used to maintain contact from Jamaica. Furthermore, for the reasons already given, there is insufficient evidence to support the appellant’s claim that P2 is an unfit or unreliable mother to C2 and C3 such that it is vital that he remains physically present in their lives.
66. The appellant’s deportation is also likely to affect his ability to contribute financially to the children’s upbringing. However, for the reasons already explained, the evidence suggests that such contributions have been intermittent and of varying amounts. There was evidence before the Tribunal that P2 is in part-time employment and in receipt of benefits, and there is no evidence to suggest that the children would be left destitute in the absence of the appellant’s financial support. It may be that they would be unable to afford holidays without his contribution, but that falls well short of demonstrating circumstances that are severe or bleak.
67. For these reasons, the appellant has failed to demonstrate that the high threshold of undue harshness has been met.
Very compelling circumstances
68. As explained earlier in this decision, given the length of the appellant’s sentence, it is not sufficient for him to meet the requirements of Exceptions 1 or 2; he must demonstrate very compelling circumstances in his case over and above them. I remind myself that a failure to satisfy the requirements of Exceptions 1 and/or 2 does not preclude a finding that very compelling circumstances exist, although cases in which that threshold is met will be rare: see NA (Pakistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] EWCA Civ 662 at [30]–[33].
69. In considering the test under s.117C(6) of the 2002 Act, I have had regard to the guidance given by the Supreme Court in HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22, in particular at [51], and to OH (Algeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 1763 at [63], where Irwin LJ observed that, “[a]s a matter of language and logic”, the very compelling circumstances test sets a “very high bar indeed”.
The seriousness of the offence
70. There is a preserved finding in the First-tier Tribunal decision of 1 November 2021 that the appellant was convicted of a very serious offence. It is therefore unnecessary to repeat that analysis here. In any event, having considered the sentencing remarks and the length of the concurrent sentences imposed, I would independently have been satisfied that the offending was very serious.
The time elapsed since the offences were committed
71. The index offences were committed between August and October 2014, almost 12 years before the remaking hearing. I bear in mind that part of that period was spent in custody. I also take into account that these deportation proceedings have been ongoing since 2019, which may have operated as a disincentive to further offending. However, despite the appellant’s claim at paragraph 16 of his most recent witness statement that he is “a changed man” who has not been convicted of a criminal offence in the last 10 years, that assertion is incorrect. On 31 January 2022, he was convicted of producing a Class B controlled drug (cannabis). He pleaded guilty in the Magistrates’ Court and received a community order, together with an order to pay costs and a victim surcharge.
Rehabilitation
72. The appellant contends that he has been rehabilitated and is now a changed man, relying principally on the sense of responsibility he feels towards his children. However, he was also a father (or at least believed himself to be one) at the time of his appeal hearings in 2008 and 2011. On those occasions, both the AIT and the First-tier Tribunal accepted his claims that he was part of a stable family unit and had renounced his criminal lifestyle, yet in each instance those findings were ultimately proved wrong. Similarly, in 2021, the First-tier Tribunal accepted that the appellant enjoyed a strong family life in the United Kingdom and that his insight into the impact of his own childhood sexual abuse reduced the likelihood of reoffending. Notwithstanding those findings, the appellant went on to reoffend once again.
73. During the hearing, the appellant was cross-examined about his assertion at paragraph 16 of his recent witness statement that he had not been convicted of a criminal offence in the past 10 years. He explained that he had intended to refer only to “serious” criminal offences, before appearing to accept that the production of drugs is indeed a serious offence, albeit not as serious as his previous drug-related convictions. He stated that he had been cultivating cannabis plants in his garage for personal use, ostensibly as a form of self-medication to cope with the stress arising from the breakdown of his relationship with P2.
74. In light of the fact that the appellant received only a community order, I accept that the cannabis was intended for his personal use. Nevertheless, his conduct was reckless, particularly given that he has children and is facing deportation for a third time. Further, I am not satisfied that the appellant has provided a credible explanation for the statement made at paragraph 16 of his witness statement; I find that it amounted to a deliberate attempt to mislead the Tribunal.
75. Ms Keerthy also directed the appellant to a section of the PNC report that records that he is under investigation by the police and that an arrest/summons had been issued on 25 November 2025. The appellant explained that he fit the description of a man who broke someone’s fence, but there was no further action taken. Given that the PNC report, which is dated 23 June 2026, says that the matter is still under investigation, and taking into account the appellant’s failure to mention the 31 January 2022 conviction in his witness statement, I treat his explanation with some caution.
76. I have considered the OASys report dated 6 July 2021. Whilst I take into account that it is now five years old, I am satisfied that it retains some evidential value when considered alongside the other material before me. In that report, the appellant was assessed as posing a low risk of reoffending but a medium risk of harm to children, the public, and a known adult. The risk assessment in respect of a known adult appears to be the result of the probation officer’s concern about the appellant’s history of domestic violence against P1 (see page 15 of the report). I take into account that despite the prediction, made on 19 October 2020, that he posed a low risk of reoffending, the applicant did in fact go on to reoffend in early 2021 (leading to the 31 January 2022 conviction). Although he was found to have fully achieved the objective of improving employment-related skills, the following objectives were assessed as unmet:
a. Improved management of personal relationships;
b. Maintenance of abstinence;
c. Improved use of leisure and recreational time;
d. Greater awareness of the consequences of his behaviour;
e. Increased understanding of the factors contributing to his offending behaviour.
There is no evidence before me to demonstrate that the appellant has since taken steps to address these outstanding objectives.
77. Given that the appellant has previously reoffended after persuading three separate tribunals that he had genuinely reformed, it would be imprudent not to treat his current claim of rehabilitation with considerable caution. I accept that, since the OASys report was prepared, he may have developed some additional insight into his behaviour and adopted a more mature outlook as a father. However, I have no basis for concluding that any such progress would materially reduce the risk of reoffending. Taking all matters into account, I am not satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the appellant would refrain from further offending if permitted to remain in the United Kingdom.
78. There is a preserved finding that the appellant acted as a police informer. This issue was first raised during his 2011 appeal. No evidence from the police was provided to the First-tier Tribunal to substantiate the claim (see [20]), and the panel merely recorded that he was “prepared to assist the police as an informer” (see [55]). At the 2021 appeal, the First-tier Tribunal noted the earlier finding that the appellant had “agreed to become an informer…whilst in prison” (see [34]), but went on to observe at [36]: “He has not sought to suggest before me that he is an informer and is assisting the police, so that aspect of his case has proved to be nothing more than, it has to be said, an assertion made by him.” It is therefore somewhat surprising that the judge subsequently attached weight to this factor (although it is unclear how much) in the proportionality assessment (see [91(xii)]).
79. At the hearing before me, no evidence was adduced from the police to clarify the nature or extent of the appellant’s assistance as an informer. In those circumstances, whilst I am bound by the preserved finding that the appellant agreed to act in that capacity, I attach little weight to this as evidence of positive rehabilitation. First, there is no supporting evidence as to the substance or significance of any assistance he may have provided. Secondly, and more importantly, this did not prevent the appellant from subsequently committing further offences.
80. In any event, even if I had accepted that the appellant has ceased offending for good, this would not, without more, be determinative of the outcome of the appeal. As the Supreme Court explained in HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22 at [58] (per Lord Hamblen, with whom the other Justices agreed), where “the only evidence of rehabilitation is that no further offences have been committed then, in general, that is likely to be of little or no material weight in the proportionality balance.”
The appellant’s family life in the UK
81. As explained in relation to Exception 2, the appellant has no partner in the United Kingdom. However, I accept that he enjoys family life, for the purposes of Article 8 ECHR, with C2 and C3, and that they are British citizens.
82. I do not accept that he has family life, for the purposes Article 8, with C1. She is now an adult and is expecting her own child. She does not live with the appellant and there is insufficient evidence before me to demonstrate that there are any additional elements of dependence involving more than the normal emotional ties between an adult child and a parent: see IA v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 1516 at [113]. The same conclusion applies to his relationship with his mother.
The length of the appellant’s stay in the UK
83. The appellant arrived in the United Kingdom in November 2001 at the age of 13. He has therefore lived here for most of his life, including the majority of his formative years and the entirety of his adulthood.
The appellant’s ties to Jamaica
84. The appellant has not lived in Jamaica since the age of 13 and has no experience of adult life there. I also accept that he no longer has friends or family in that country and that his ties to the country are limited. However, English is the official language, and I adopt my earlier findings that there are no very significant obstacles to his re-establishing a private life there.
Are there any very compelling circumstances?
85. Having undertaken a holistic assessment of the evidence, I am satisfied that there are no very compelling circumstances in the appellant’s case.
86. The starting point is the strong public interest in deportation, given the seriousness of the index offences as well as the appellant’s extensive criminal history over 18 years, comprising nine convictions for 25 offences, together with two cautions. These include drugs offences, robbery, and an offence against a person. Having considered the appellant’s evidence as well as the OASys report against the history of the case, I am not satisfied that the appellant would refrain from committing further offences if permitted to remain in this country.
87. On the appellant’s side of the balance, I attach weight to the following factors:
a. He has been present in the United Kingdom since 10 November 2001. His private life is largely centred on his work as a bricklayer (although he is currently unable to work due to injuries sustained in a road traffic accident) and his relationships with C1 and his mother, as well as extended family members and friends. As I have found, he is culturally and socially integrated. However, only approximately six and a half years of his residence have been lawful. For the majority of that time, his immigration status has been precarious or unlawful, including three periods during which he faced deportation. I take into account that the appellant would have had limited control over his immigration status while he was a child. Nevertheless, I find that any private life established during his adulthood, when his status was precarious or unlawful, attracts little weight: see s.117B(4)–(5) of the 2002 Act.
b. He has not lived in Jamaica since childhood and has no support network there. While I attach weight to this factor, nevertheless, for the reasons already given, there are no very significant obstacles to his reintegration.
c. He enjoys family life with C2 and C3, who are British citizens. Their best interests are a primary consideration and favour his remaining in the United Kingdom. Their relationship attracts significant weight. However, for the reasons already given, although the appellant’s deportation would have a detrimental impact, especially for C2, it would not be unduly harsh for them to remain in the United Kingdom with their mother, who is their primary carer, and to maintain contact with the appellant through WhatsApp and video calls.
d. There is a preserved finding of the First-tier Tribunal that the appellant suffered “horrific childhood abuse” in Jamaica. This will, therefore, mean that he faces an additional level of anxiety regarding his return there. Nevertheless, there is insufficient evidence before the Tribunal to show that the appellant is currently receiving any mental health treatment or support in the United Kingdom to help him deal with his childhood trauma. Furthermore, no evidence has been provided to show that any such treatment or support, if required, would be unavailable to him in Jamaica. There is also a preserved finding of the First-tier Tribunal that the appellant is not entitled to international protection on account of any risks arising from the childhood abuse. I therefore attach only moderate weight to this aspect of the appellant’s claim.
e. The appellant agreed to be an informer for the police. However, for the reasons explained above, I attach only little weight to this factor.
f. The appellant is recovering from injuries sustained in a road traffic accident requiring multiple surgeries. However, there is insufficient evidence that he will not make a substantial recovery or that appropriate treatment would be unavailable in Jamaica. I therefore attach limited weight to this factor.
88. Taken cumulatively, these factors fall short of establishing very compelling circumstances sufficient to outweigh the strong public interest in deportation. Even taking the appellant’s case at its highest under Exceptions 1 and 2, the additional features relied upon by the appellant do not elevate the case to the very compelling circumstances required.
Conclusion on Article 8 ECHR
89. Having weighed all the relevant considerations, I am satisfied that the interference with the appellant’s family and private life consequent upon his deportation to Jamaica would be proportionate. The strong public interest in his removal, given the seriousness and persistence of his offending, outweighs his ties to the United Kingdom, even when the circumstances of his children are taken into account.
Postscript
90. After completing my decision, I was provided with an email sent by the appellant to the Tribunal at 15:52 on 29 June 2026, attaching two images. The first is a copy of an email confirming that his application for a blue badge had been successful. The second is a screenshot of text messages between the appellant and P2, in which P2 states that C2 had punctured the tyres of another child’s bicycle and that she was awaiting a bill from the child’s parents.
91. These materials were not filed in accordance with the Tribunal’s directions, no application has been made to admit them out of time, and they post-date the remaking hearing. The respondent has therefore had no opportunity to consider them. I have nonetheless considered whether it is necessary to recall the parties for a further hearing to address this material. Having reviewed it, I am satisfied that the new evidence would make no material difference to my findings, and that it would be disproportionate and contrary to the overriding objective to re-open the proceedings.
Notice of Decision
The appeal is dismissed on human rights grounds.

M R Hoffman

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

1st July 2026