Tribunal decisions

The decision

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: UI-2022-000791
[PA/52960/2020]
IA/02783/2020

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision and Reasons Promulgated

On the 12 August 2024

Before

Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge MANUELL

Between

M I F R
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Heard at FIELD HOUSE on 26 July 2024

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr D Sellwood, Counsel
(instructed by Duncan Lewis Solicitors)
For the Respondent: Miss H Gilmour, Home Office Presenting Officer

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction
1. The Appellant appealed with permission granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Blundell and Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Chana dated 20 May 2024 against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Roblin who had dismissed the appeal of the Appellant against the refusal of his international protection and human rights claims. The decision and reasons was promulgated on or about 12 January 2022. Permission to appeal had initially been refused by both the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal but that refusal was successfully challenged by a judicial review in the High Court. The anonymity order(s) previously made remain in force.
2. The Appellant is a national of Sri Lanka, born there on 9 March 1983. On 17 September 2018 the Appellant was granted a Student Entry Visa valid until 31 January 2010. On 28 September 2008 the Appellant arrived in the United Kingdom and applied for Leave to Remain as a student, which was granted until 30 December 2010. On 22 December 2010 the Appellant submitted a further application for leave, but the application was refused on 21 April 2011. The Appellant appealed the decision on 13 June 2011 and the appeal was allowed. The Appellant was granted Leave to Remain on 23 August 2011 valid until 30 October 2012, subsequently extended until 31 November 2015.
3. On 14 November 2012 the Appellant was arrested by Hertfordshire Police for conspiracy to defraud. On 15 April 2013 the Appellant left the United Kingdom and travelled to Sri Lanka. He returned to the United Kingdom on 20 April 2013. On 26 February 2014 the Appellant submitted a further application for Leave to Remain in the United Kingdom, but the application remained outstanding due to the Appellant’s criminality and was later refused alongside the protection and human rights claim.
4. On 8 September 2014 the Appellant was sentenced at Ipswich Crown Court to four years imprisonment following his conviction on money laundering charges. On 20 December 2014 a Notice of Decision to Deport was issued, to which the Appellant responded on 29 December 2014, submitting a human rights and protection claim.
5. On 30 November 2015 the Appellant was notified that his protection claim was refused on Section 72 grounds. On 6 March 2017 a decision to refuse the Appellant’s human rights and protection claim and a deportation order was made, which the Appellant appealed. His appeal was dismissed by the First Tier Tribunal on 28 December 2017. Permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal was refused on 17 March 2018. The Appellant’s appeal rights became exhausted on 28 March 2018.
6. On 26 March 2018 the Appellant notified the Home Office he had been diagnosed with schizophrenia and severe depression with psychotic symptoms. On 24 October 2019 the Appellant’s submitted a Sri Lankan country report from Dr Chris Smith dated 5 September 2018. The further submissions were refused by the Respondent but, following a judicial review application, the Respondent agreed to reconsider the decisions dated 24 October 2019 and 27 November 2018. The new decision dated 10 December 2020 and review dated 3 November 2021 were the basis of the appeal before Judge Roblin.
The Appellant’s protection claim
7. Judge Roblin summarised the Appellant’s claim as follows:
“He is of Tamil ethnicity and Muslim faith. He is a supporter of the LTTE. It is the Appellant’s position that his father owned and ran with his two brothers a petrol station in Kantalae. The station supplied petrol to the LTTE between 2004 and 2008 arranged through a friend Mr Viththiyagaran and the Trincomalee l Regional Commander, Mr Paduman. This station was sold in 2012. The Appellant was arrested in the UK on 14 November 2012, having entered on a student visa on 28 September 2008, on suspicion of money laundering and fraud. The Appellant had allowed his friend Sajath Abdeen (“Sajath”) access to his bank account.. On 14 April 2013 the Appellant went back to Sri Lanka, when Sajath was also present, returning to the United Kingdom on 20 April 2013. The Appellant claims his family and his friend Ilmudeen began receiving threats including threats to kill. It is alleged the threats turned into physical violence including the Appellant’s father being detained by the authorities and demands from the authorities for the Appellant to return to Sri Lanka having supplied fuel to the LTTE.”
8. It was accepted that the Appellant should be treated as a vulnerable witness and Mr Sellwood confirmed that no complaint was made about the Judge’s conduct of the proceedings.
Judge Roblin’s findings
9. The Judge noted the findings of First-tier Tribunal Buckwell who dismissed the Appellant’s earlier appeal in a decision promulgated on 6 December 2017. The summary appears at [123] to [130] of Judge Roblin’s decision. Judge Buckwell had found that the Section 72 certificate should be disapplied to the protection claim because of the absence of future risk posed to the Appellant. He went on to find that it was not credible that the Appellant would be of any interest to the Sri Lankan authorities and was not at real risk for any Refugee Convention reason. His removal was proportionate. Hence the asylum and human rights appeals were dismissed.
10. Devaseelan* [2002] UKIAT 702 applied, so Judge Buckwell’s findings were the starting point. Section 72 should continue to be disapplied. There were now a number of experts’ reports, from Dr Chris Smith (country expert) and Dr Lisa Wootton (consultant psychiatrist), as well as a letter from Michael Earle (complex needs practitioner). There were also witness statements from the Appellant and others, as well as copy documents from Sri Lanka.
11. After conducting an extensive review of the evidence, Judge Roblin concluded at [160]: “I find that the subsequent information provided by the Appellant is not sufficient for me to depart from the findings of F-tTJ Buckwell. I find the Appellant’s account is unsubstantiated and speculative and on that basis I find his assertions that any third party interest in the Appellant as determined by Judge Buckwell in [75], [76] and [77] is speculative and the Appellant would not be of interest to the Sri Lankan authorities upon return.”
12. At [167] Judge Roblin concluded: “The Appellant's representative asserted that a combination of the Appellant's ethnicity and stigmatisation of mental health issues means the Appellant would be more likely to face persecution on account of his mental health condition. I do not agree. I have not been directed to any medical evidence which would indicate the Appellant's mental health conditions manifest in a manner that he would be viewed by society at large or by a specific group within society in such a way that he would be at risk of persecution. The Appellant has attended college, he is able to conduct research and [any such condition] does not appear to affect his day-to-day function. This is corroborated by the GP records and also by Mr Michael Earle's report and for those reasons I find the Appellant has failed to demonstrate to the lower standard he would be at risk of persecution on account of a combination of his ethnicity and mental health”.
13. As to the Appellant’s Article 3 ECHR suicide risk claim, Judge Roblin concluded at [187], after a review of the experts’ reports, the evidence and the relevant authorities, that: “The Appellant is surrounded by family in the United Kingdom and already has a support network. On arrival in Sri Lanka, he would be able to access medical support and again he is surrounded by friends and family and [they] filed evidence in support of the Appellant. Safeguards could if necessary be put in place as detailed by Dr Wootton. Accordingly, I am not satisfied the Appellant satisfies Article 3. Accordingly I find the Appellant has failed to demonstrate to the lower standard he would be at risk.”
14. As to the Appellant’s Article 8 ECHR claim, Judge Roblin found that the Appellant had no family life in the United Kingdom whereas he had a strong relationship with his parents in Sri Lanka. There were no very serious obstacles to the Appellant’s re-integration in Sri Lanka: see [192] of the decision. Nor were there any exceptional circumstances. After drawing up a balance sheet for proportionality purposes, Judge Roblin found that the public interest in the Appellant’s removal prevailed. Thus the human rights appeal was also dismissed.
Permission to appeal
15. The Appellant obtained permission to appeal on three grounds, as follows:
(1) Material mistakes of fact;
(2) Failure to take into account material evidence; and
(3) Material misdirections in law, of which there were said to be at least five.
These were explained in the grounds of appeal originally submitted to the Upper Tribunal on 2 March 2022 and were subsequently reiterated elsewhere.
Submissions
16. Mr Sellwood for the Appellant referred the Tribunal to the Appellant’s extensive bundle (1,051 pages) plus supplemental bundle, where the procedural history was fully set out with supporting documents. There was no need for a further skeleton argument as the previous written submissions had covered all necessary points.
Ground 1
17. As to ground 1, Mr Sellwood submitted that the Judge had misunderstood the evidence as to when the Appellant found out he was at risk in Sri Lanka. That evidence was not, as the Judge found, contradictory. The Appellant was first concerned for his safety after he returned to Sri Lanka in 2013, on account of what Sajath told him, and the fact there were unknown individuals hanging around his family home. As a result, the Appellant cut his journey short and returned to the United Kingdom. Further still, on the Appellant’s own account of events, his family in Sri Lanka did not start to receive threats or attention from the Sri Lankan authorities until several months later. At no point did the Appellant say his uncle informed him he was at risk prior to travelling to Sri Lanka. A finding appears to have been made to the contrary, which in turn was pivotal in the Judge’s conclusion that the Appellant’s account of events was incapable of belief.
18. The Appellant did not travel to Sri Lanka in 2013 with concerns he was on a stop or watch list there. His concern only arose afterwards. The authorities’ interest in his family, which in turn confirmed their interest in the Appellant, only arose months later. It was true that the Appellant asked his GP to provide evidence in support of his parents applying to visit him in the United Kingdom. The Appellant was advised it might assist his mental health to have family contact. He did not however request any contact be made with the Sri Lankan authorities, but rather with the United Kingdom High Commission in Sri Lanka. At that time (2018) the Sri Lankan authorities had already visited and interrogated the Appellant’s family (including detaining and torturing his father). It was unclear what an application for a visit visa to enter the United Kingdom would have done to aggravate the situation.
19. The Judge’s misunderstanding was a fatal error in the credibility assessment. The Appellant’s fears had arisen after 2013.
Ground 2
20. As to ground 2, counsel submitted that the Judge failed to take into account and or consider corroborating evidence that was highly probative to the assessment of risk on return. In particular, the Appellant’s maternal uncle, Mr Noordeen Lebbe (“Mr Lebbe”), gave live evidence at the appeal hearing. His evidence was not challenged. The fact Mr Lebbe gave evidence is recorded in the decision, but without analysis or specific findings one way or another. Mr Lebbe’s evidence was highly probative and corroborated the Appellant’s account of events.
21. The Judge gave insufficient attention to the two reports of Dr Chris Smith (“Dr Smith”), a country expert. The reports identified key aspects of the Appellant’s account of events in Sri Lanka that were consistent with the country situation. Dr Smith concluded that the Appellant’s fraud conviction in the United Kingdom was likely to trigger adverse interest from the Sri Lankan authorities, who would (erroneously) link it to LTTE activities. Such conclusions were not considered by the Judge, properly or at all. The same was true of Dr Smith’s analysis as to the likely barriers the Appellant would face in accessing medical treatment in Sri Lanka, and societal treatment generally of people with mental health problems.
22. The Judge had further erred by failing to give sufficient attention to the witness statements of the witnesses who were in Sri Lanka and could not attend the hearing. The Judge had overlooked the reason they were not present.
23. The Judge had failed to give proper consideration to the documents from Sri Lanka. The Judge had thereby overlooked the fact that corroboration in asylum claims is the exception, not the rule.
24. The Judge had given insufficient consideration to the medico-legal reports prepared by Dr Wootton when determining whether the Appellant’s account of events was plausible, particularly whether his mental ill health was relevant to the assessment of his evidence. This was a Mbanga [2005] EWCA Civ 367 error. Moreover, the existence of family support in Sri Lanka was contested by Dr Wootton.
25. It was also wrong of the Judge to undermine Dr Wootton’s conclusions based on Dr Wootton’s acceptance of the Appellant’s account. This was particularly important in light of the Respondent’s concession that the Appellant would possibly be arrested and released on bail to attend court if returned to Sri Lanka, because he would be returning as a failed asylum seeker, a point not considered or taken into account by Judge Roblin.
26. Following on from the last point Judge Roblin concluded at that the Appellant would have access to healthcare in Sri Lanka, by referring back to a previous finding (“I have already found that there is healthcare available to the Appellant which he previously had access to when he resided in Sri Lanka”.) No such previous finding appears in the decision. In any event, the conclusion failed to take into account various factors that pointed in the opposite direction, not least Dr Wootton’s conclusion that the Appellant would not seek medical treatment if returned to Sri Lanka.
27. The same was true of the finding that the Appellant had failed to show there were effective mechanisms in place to prevent him committing suicide on return, in circumstances where the risk was deemed to be high.
Ground 3
28. Judge Roblin made a number of misdirections in law, any one of which could have made a difference to the outcome of the appeal. They included but were not limited to the absence of proper consideration and or application of the Joint Presidential Guidance Note No.2 of 2010, which did not feature at any point within the decision insofar as the assessment of the Appellant’s evidence was concerned.
29. As already outlined in Ground 2, little or no weight appears to have been given to evidence from Sri Lanka in the absence of witnesses providing live evidence in light of the fact it did not cover all of the incidents the Appellant described. Such an approach runs contrary to the correct approach to fact finding in protection claims, where there is a ‘positive role for doubt’, given the inability of an asylum seeker to produce witnesses from the country of persecution, and the general lack of documentary or other evidence proving either past or future persecution: Karanakaran v SSHD [2000] 3 All ER 449.
30. The analysis of the Appellant’s suicide risk failed to apply the reformulation of the fifth principle espoused in J v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 629 (as required by Y (Sri Lanka) v SSHD [2009] EWCA Civ 362), i.e., that any genuine fear the Appellant may have about returning to Sri Lanka, even if without an objective foundation, is such as to create a real risk of suicide.
31. The approach outlined in AM (Zimbabwe) v SSHD [2020] UKSC 17 was not followed, including an assessment as to whether the Appellant had provided evidence that showed a prima facie case of a potential infringement of Article 3 ECHR, in which case the burden would have shifted to the Respondent to dispel any serious doubts raised.
32. The analysis of Articles 3 and 8 ECHR more widely were wrong in law, in that they failed to take into account material evidence (as per Ground 2).
33. Mr Sellwood asked that the decision be set aside and the appeal reheard.
Rule 24 notice
34. The Respondent had belatedly served a rule 24 notice dated 21 July 2024. (There was no objection to late service and time was extended accordingly.) Miss Gilmour had indicated at the start of the hearing that on reflection she was inclined to agree that Ground 1 of the Appellant’s grounds, a material mistake of fact, was made out. The Tribunal was under no obligation to accept that concession and was unwilling to accept it without hearing full argument.
35. The rule 24 notice was in the following terms:
“Ground 1
(a) The Appellant contends that the judge erred by making material mistakes of fact when assessing the appellant’s credibility. [154] – [155] and [158] of the decision are challenged. The Appellant addresses those findings and the evidence. The Respondent submits that the appellant is merely disagreeing with the decision and seeking to reargue his case. The Appellant has picked out three findings in isolation from the rest of the decision. The impugned paragraphs need to be read in their entirety and with the rest of the decision. The appellant claimed that he was at risk because had supplied fuel to the LTTE between 2004 – 2008 while working his father’s petrol station. He claims to have divulged this to Sajath while the latter was living in the United Kingdom with the appellant. He thinks Sajath told the authorities about him. Referring to the Respondent’s submissions made at the FtT hearing and as recorded from [74], as per Devaseelan* (above) the first judge’s decision was the starting point and the Appellant did not fit in the risk categories.
(b) [152] is relevant as the Judge found, ‘Nevertheless, despite the Appellant’s concerns the Appellant returned to Sri Lanka in April 2013 when he was able to travel to Sri Lanka and then return from Sri Lanka to the United Kingdom without incident.’ The Respondent contends that this finding is sound.
(c) The Respondent submits that there is no mistake at [154]. The Judge properly noted that the Appellant had not identified which person told him that Sajath had told the authorities that he had supplied fuel. Moreover, he claimed that he was informed by his uncle while in custody but nonetheless he had returned to Sri Lanka before had commenced his custodial sentence. This is contradictory as properly found by the Judge.
(d) In relation to [155], what is relevant and ignored by the Appellant in his grounds of appeal is that the Judge found that he was not stopped on entry or departure and left without incident. Had Sajath informed the authorities, the Appellant would have been stopped on entry and/or exit. The Respondent submits that this is a significant and good point. Rather than disclosing an error of law as posited by the Appellant, the decision shows the Judge’s careful consideration of the evidence.
(e) Regarding the Appellant’s contention at [4](c) of his grounds, in relation to him asking his GP to provide evidence to support his parents in their application to visit him in the United Kingdom, the Respondent submits there is no mistake of fact and no error of law. This point was put to the Appellant in cross-examination as recorded at [66]. As recorded in the decision, it was suggested to him that this was to alert the Sri Lankan authorities. Also, the Appellant confirmed that he had given permission to the High Commission to provide the support. The Respondent submits that the Judge’s finding at [158] is sound. It is not credible that the appellant would make this request if the authorities were seeking him.
(f) Moreover, the Respondent invites the Tribunal to note the Judge’s observation and finding at [159], particularly the following: ‘I remind myself the Appellant entered Sri Lanka and departed in 2013 and recently made enquiries for his parents to travel to the United Kingdom despite concerns he is on a stop or a watch list. When the Appellant entered Sri Lanka and departed, he did so without incident.’
(g) The Respondent also invites the tribunal to consider [160].
36. Ground 2
The Appellant contends that the Judge failed to consider material evidence.
(a) First, the judge made clear at [131] that they will refer to all the significant evidence in the determination but not all evidence will be referred to as there is a detailed written record of proceedings. It is trite [law] that a judge does not need to list every single piece of evidence in their decision.
(b) Second, the judge did consider the relevant evidence and there is no error of law. The judge did consider Mr Lebbe’s evidence as confirmed at [149](d) and [154]. Moreover, there is a materiality point. The Respondent refers to Mr Lebbe’s witness statement. He had not seen first-hand himself the authorities seeking the appellant. He refers to what he was informed by his sister: see [29] of his statement. In other words, Mr Lebbe had relied on hearsay. From [7] of his statement, he had referred to encounters with Sajath and at [18], he said he saw Sajath in Colombo. He did not say in his statement that Sajath said he had informed the authorities regarding the Appellant.
(c) The Respondent submits that the decision makes plain that the judge considered the report of Dr Smith. The Respondent refers to [138] – [143], [159], [176] and [179] of the decision.
(d) Regarding witness statements from family and friends, the Respondent contends that it was open to the Judge to draw an adverse inference where they had not attended to give live evidence. The onus is on the Appellant to prove his case. Not all the witnesses were based in Sri Lanka.
(e) The Appellant further contends that no consideration was given to the medico-legal reports by Dr Wootton. It appears that the appellant raises a Mibanga (above) point as he contends that the reports were considered after the asylum claim was rejected. Firstly, the judge did consider Dr Wootton’s reports as can be seen from [147] – [148] of the decision. At [149], the judge confirmed that in addition to the experts’ reports, he had also considered the letter from Dr Wootton to the Appellant’s GP. Paragraphs [162] onwards are relevant.
(f) In relation to the Mibanga point, the Respondent contends that [Dr Wootton’s] reports focused on the Appellant’s mental health – the Respondent refers to the instructions to her. There is no Mibanga error. As confirmed in QC (verification of documents; Mibanga duty) China [2021] UKUT 00033 (IAC), ‘What the case law reveals is that the judicial fact-finder has a duty to make his or her decision by reference to all the relevant evidence and needs to show in their decision that they have done so. The actual way in which the fact-finder goes about this task is a matter for them. As has been pointed out, one has to start somewhere.’ Headnote [3].
(g) The Respondent submits that the other points raised under Ground 2 are nothing but a disagreement. The judge’s finding at [166] that the attribution of PTSD, depression and anxiety is largely based on his account, is sound and in line with HA (expert evidence; mental health) Sri Lanka [2022] UKUT 00111 (IAC). The Respondent submits that it is incorrect to assert that the judge did not consider Dr Wootton’s reports. The Respondent also refers to [172] – [187]. Regarding the finding at [176] that healthcare is available in Sri Lanka, this was also found by the previous judge – see [160].
37. Ground 3
(a) The Appellant contends that there was no consideration of or application of the Joint Presidential guidance on vulnerable witnesses. The Respondent contends that it is clear that the judge did consider and apply the same. The Respondent refers to [59] of the decision. At [149] of the decision, the Judge notes that since the determination of Judge Buckwell, the Judge considered his evidence including his medical records and expert reports. At [162], the Judge notes that since the decision of Judge Buckwell, the appellant has ‘now filed voluminous amounts of medical evidence…’ The Appellant has not pointed to any medical evidence which opines that he would have difficulty giving evidence. The Respondent relies on SB (vulnerable adult: credibility) Ghana [2019] UKUT 00398 (IAC).
(b) In relation to the Appellant’s contention regarding the evidence from witnesses at [6](b) of the grounds of appeal, the Respondent’s response is mainly covered in Ground 2. Additionally, the Respondent submits that this point is immaterial.
(c) Regarding the contention at [6](b) of the grounds of appeal, in relation to the Judge’s analysis of J v SSHD EWCA [2005] Civ 629, the Respondent considers that the fifth principle of J does not appear to be properly understood by the Appellant. The Judge was not satisfied that the Appellant was credible and therefore the Appellant’s fear of ill-treatment in Sri Lanka was not objectively well-founded.
(d) The Appellant’s complaints at [6](d) and (e) are in the Respondent’s submission, mere disagreement. The judge’s Article 3 ECHR assessment is sound and adequately reasoned. It is clear from the decision that the Judge had carefully analysed the decision before reaching well-reasoned findings. The Appellant had not discharged the burden on him to show that the initial threshold test was met (AM Zimbabwe). The Judge properly self-directed to AM Zimbabwe at [170]. The Respondent submits that there is no error. The SSHD invites the tribunal to dismiss the Appellant’s appeal and uphold the decision of the First-tier Tribunal.”
38. Miss Gilmour relied on the rule 24 notice. The Judge’s decision was thorough. Miss Gilmour submitted that there was nevertheless merit in the Appellant’s Ground 1, and that the Judge had misunderstood the sequence of events in 2013 when the Appellant went to Sri Lanka.
39. As to Grounds 2 and 3, these had no real substance and there was nothing she wished to add what was said about them in the rule 24 notice.
40. In reply, Mr Sellwood reiterated the points he had made earlier. The Appellant was not aware of risk before 2017. The medical evidence was relevant to the credibility assessment and was not taken into account. Materiality had a low threshold and the evidence given by the uncle deserved weight which it was not given.
Discussion and decision
41. The Tribunal reserved its decision, which now follows. The Tribunal is unable to accept Miss Gilmour’s concession, which essentially duplicates Mr Sellwood’s submissions in relation to Ground 1. It must be observed that this was never a meritorious appeal, as Judge Roblin demonstrated in a meticulous and comprehensive decision, which mastered voluminous materials masking a contrived repeat claim. The centrepiece of the Appellant’s protection claim had already been found not credible in 2017 by an experienced First-tier Tribunal Judge (Judge Buckwell), from which permission to appeal was rightly refused. Instead the Appellant’s solicitors launched an expensively packaged fresh claim, resting on the same alleged facts, and supported by lengthy experts’ reports and additional evidence.
42. It is important to place the Appellant’s claim into its historical context. The long and bloody civil war ended on 18 May 2009 with a crushing defeat of the LTTE and the death of its leader. Thereafter the Sri Lankan government engaged in a ruthless operation to round up all suspected LTTE supporters, many of whom were held in camps for lengthy periods. Old scores against the Tamils were reported as being settled. Against that background, the fact that the Appellant (a Tamil) left Sri Lanka his own passport without any difficulty in 2008, returned in 2013 on his own passport and encountered no difficulty on his arrival or his departure is of obvious significance, as Judge Roblin found. It is of course obvious that the Appellant was granted a student visa (and extensions of that visa) on the basis of his representations that he would be returning to his family in Sri Lanka and that there was no reason for him not to do so.
43. The Tribunal agrees with the submissions as to Ground 1 set out in the rule 24 notice, which need not be repeated here. Mr Sellwood’s principal submission rested on a fallacy and a misreading of the decision, i.e., that the Judge had misunderstood or conflated the facts, resulting in a faulty credibility assessment. The key passages in the Judge’s decision were as follows:
“154. I have carefully read the Appellant’s witness statements and the statements lodged by the Appellant in support and heard evidence from the Appellant’s uncle. He was the only witness on behalf of the Appellant to attend the hearing. Mr Lebbe explained in evidence that he introduced the Appellant to Sajath and he was aware the Appellant had laundered £500,000 through his accounts. The Appellant explained when he was in custody one of his uncles visited him and that Sajath had told the authorities he was supplying fuel. The Appellant did not identify which uncle. The Appellant however returned to Sri Lanka before he commenced his custodial sentence and claims people were outside his father’s home and explained he suspected they were from the authorities because of his involvement with fuel. I find the Appellant‘s evidence is contradictory. This impacts on the Appellant’s credibility.
“155. I remind myself that the Appellant’s evidence is that he last supplied fuel to the LTTE between 2004 to 2008 before he entered the United Kingdom on 28 September 2008. The Appellant did not apply for asylum on arrival. It is the Appellant’s position that it is probable that he is on a stop list or a watch list, but he returned to Sri Lanka in 2013 despite his concerns but he was not stopped on entry or departure and left without incident which left without incident which again impacts on his credibility . I accept when the Appellant returned to Sri Lanka in 2013 the Appellant’s passport was valid until 17 September 2014 and have had sight of the same.”
44. One of the central issues in the appeal was exactly when the Appellant claimed that he became aware of the Sri Lankan authorities’ alleged interest in him. As the allegedly illegal supply of fuel to the LTTE was said to have occurred between 2004 and 2008, the Appellant’s concerns about being exposed for illicit LTTE support must have existed from 2004 onwards. The contradictions in his evidence as to the date of his awareness is clearly explained and properly reasoned by the Judge in [154] of the decision. It was a story which did not stand up.
45. The Judge was entitled to find at [155] that the Appellant travelled to Sri Lanka with the awareness (on his version of events) that his alleged past connection to the LTTE would be of interest to the authorities if it existed and was discovered. It is clear from reading the decision as a whole (essential in this convoluted and contrived claim) that the Judge rejected the Appellant’s claim that he only found out that he was a wanted man in Sri Lanka after he was facing deportation from the United Kingdom.
46. Grounds 2 and 3 overlap. They have little substance and less force. Again the Tribunal agrees with the Respondent’s submissions set out in the rule 24 notice which there is no need to rehearse here. It has to be said that Mr Sellwood’s complaints were all carping criticisms requiring an extreme level of detail in the judgment which is neither necessary or practical to deliver. The Judge addressed all of the key issues satisfactorily. The Judge considered the evidence given by Mr Lebbe, the Appellant’s uncle, and explained why it took matters no further. Dr Smith’s reports were sufficiently considered, as the rule 24 notice points out, as well as the written evidence of the witnesses who were not called and the selected copy documents from Sri Lanka. Dr Wootton’s reports were also given proper and detailed consideration. Judge Buckwell had already found that adequate health care was available in Sri Lanka, and there was no evidence sufficient to justify a departure from that finding. See also [127] of the decision, which is the “prior finding” to which Judge Roblin referred.
47. There was no failure by the Judge to review and to take into account, so far as the Judge considered the evidence warranted it, the Appellant’s mental health in the process of assessing his evidence, and no Mbanga error. In short, the Judge found that feeble excuses for the Appellant’s lack of credibility were put forward, rather than persuasive explanations.
48. One submission which requires particular notice alongside the rule 24 notice is the complaint that the Judge failed, when conducting the suicide risk assessment, to distinguish between the Appellant’s subjective fear and his objective fear, i.e., had not followed the fifth principle in J (above). That submission is unfounded as the Judge properly found that the Appellant was not credible and thus had no genuine fear of return, whether subjective or objective.
49. The rule 24 notice shows correctly why the Judge did not misapply or misunderstand AM (Zimbabwe) (above).
50. Accordingly, the Tribunal finds that there was no material error of law. All of the arguments raised in the Appellant’s grounds are specious. Judge Roblin’s decision stands unchanged.
DECISION
The onwards appeal is dismissed. There was no material error of law and the original decision stands unchanged, including the anonymity order.

Signed R J Manuell Dated 2 August 2024
Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Manuell